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IMINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
SEYENTH SITTING
Monday, 3rd December 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
l. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports
on the agenda; Adoption ofthe dralt order ofbusiness for
the second part ofthe session (Doc. 1235).
5. Action by the Presidential Committe (Presentation of
1. Resumption of tlo session
The President declared the thirty-sixth
ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.
2. Attendance registcr
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
i. Adoption of the miautes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were agtreed to.
1. Ernnination of uedentioh
In accordance with Rule 6 (l) of the Rules of
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter
from the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe informing
the Assembly that the credentials of the repre-
sentatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7
had been ratified by that Assembly.
5. Obsenen
The President welcomed observers from Bul-
gafia, Greece, Hungary, Nonray, Poland,
Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia.
The President congratulated those representa-
tives and substitutes from the Federal Republic
of Germany who had been re-elected to their
national parliament.
and debate on the report of the Presidentibl Committee,
Doc. 12521.
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, SecretaryCeneral of
WEU.
7. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty: (a/ Reply to the
second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the
thirty-fifth annual report of the Council; (b) wEU and the
European Community (Presentation of and debate on the
reporls ol the Polilical Committee and votes on the draft
recommendations, Docs. 1245 and 1250).
6. Addrcss by the Prusident of the Assembly
The President addressed the Assembly.
7. Eloction of a Yice-President of the Assembty
One candidate had been proposed for the
vacant post of Vice-President, namely Mr.
Sinesio.
The Assembly decided unanimously not to
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vic.e-
President by acclamation.
Mr. Sinesio was elected Vice-President by
acclamation.
The President informed the Assembly that the
order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was
as follows: Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. I-entz-Cornette, Mr.
Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr.
Martinez.
8. Reqaest by the Political Committee to place
two rcpofis on the agenda
Adoption of the draft oder of business
ofthe second part ofthe session
(rb.1235)
The President informed the Assembly that the
Political Committee had requested, in pur-
suance of Rule 4l of the Rules of Procedure,
that its report on the revision of the modified
Brussels Treaty 
- 
WEU and the European Com-
munity and, if adopted, its report on the conse-
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
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MINUTES SEVENTH SITTING
quences of developments in Central and Eastern
Europe for European security should be placed
on the agenda.
The Assembly agreed to place the items on the
agenda.
The President proposed the adoption of the
draft order ofbusiness for the second part ofthe
session, thus amended.
The amended draft order of business for the
second part of the session was adopted.
9. Action by the Presidential Committee
(hesentaion of aad defote oa thc rcport
oI the Praidantial Committee,
De, 1252)
The report of the Presidential Committee was
presented by Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of
the Assembly.
The debate was opened.
Speaker: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.
The debate was closed.
Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the
Assembly, replied to the speaker.
The Assembly ratified the action of the Presi-
dential Committeer.
10. Addrss by Mr. van Eelelen,
Secraary-Generul of WEU
Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
addressed the Assembly.
Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by
Sir Geoffrey Finsbery, MM. Scheer, Ahrens,
Stegagnini and Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.
11. Revision of tne modilied Brussels Treaty
(a) Reply to the second pan
of the thirty-foufih annual rcpofi
and the thiq-tifth annual report of the Council
(Pruscatotioa of and dabac on the rcport
oI ,lE Political C,ommiuee
ad yorc on the drqfi ruomncfutioru Doc. 1215)
The report of the Political Committee was
presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakers: MM. Scovacricchi, I-oPez
Valdivielso, Amaral and Tummers.
The debate was closed.
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr.
Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.'
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.
The draft recommendation was agreed to
unanimously. (This recommendation will be
published as No. 490)2.
O) WEA and the Eurcprcan Community
(hueawbn of and dcbac oil the ,rgort
oI ,he Politicol C,ommince
ad votc on the druft rcconnadation, Doc. 1250)
The report of the Political Committee was
presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakers: MM. de Puig, Malfatti, MoYa,
Perinat and lord.
Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Stoffelen, Amaral
and Soares Costa.
The debate was closed.
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr.
Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.
The draft recommendation was agreed to.(This recommendation will be published as
No.49l) 3.
12. Date, time and orderc of the day
of the next siuing
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was flrxed for Tuesday, 4th
December 1990, at l0 a.m.
The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.
2. See page 19.
3. See page 20.l. See pages 15 to 18.
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APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance r:
Belgium
MM. Adriaensens
Biefnot
Cauwenberghs(Kempinaire)
P6criaux
Noerens(Mrs. Staels-Dompas)
Uyttendaele
France
MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Caro
Collette
Durand
Hunault (Fillon)
Lagorce (Forni)
Jung
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Ahrens
Miiller
Italy
MM. Benassi
Caccia
Belgium
Mr. Chevalier
France
MM. Beix
Fou116
Galley
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Oehler
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
Niegel Portugal
Mrs. Holfmann (Reddemann)
MM. Scheer MM. Amaral (Candal)Soell Esteves
MM. Fassino (Filetti)
Fioret
Colombo (Kessler)
Malfatti
Manzolini
S t e gagni ni (Mezzapesa)
Rubner (Parisi)
Pieralli
Scovacricchi (Rodoti)
Sinesio
Luxembourg
Mr. Goerens
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Netherlands
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
(Aarts)
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MM. Stoffelen
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Fernandes Marques
Moreira
^Brifo (Silva Marques)
Soares Costa
Vieira Mesquita
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Antretter
Biihm
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Irmer
Kittelmann
Mrs. Luuk
MM. von Schmude
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Wulff
Italy
MM. Gabbuggiani
Martino
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Spain
MM. Lopez Valdivielso
(Alvarez)
Borderas
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Diaz
Fabra
LoWz Henares
Martinez
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Perinat
de Puig
Roman
Udted Kingdom
Mr. Lambie (Ewing)
Dame Peggy Fenner
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Mrs. Roe (Jessel)
Lord Mqckie ( Sir Russell
Johnston)
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Parry
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Shelton)
Sir Dudley Smith
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Thompson
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The following representatives apologised for their absence:
MM. Pecchioli
Rubbi
Sarti
Luxembourg
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
MM. Eversdijk
van Velzen
United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Garrett
Hardy
L The names ofsubstitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names ofthe latter being given in brackets.
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RECOMMENDATION 488'
on the corrsequences ofthe invosion of Kuwait:
olorations in the Gulf2
1. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of
the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of
the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Minis-
terial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the
first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation
and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore
RrcourrlrNos that the necessary steps be taken toformalise-the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy
and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations
to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.
2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very
near future, the Assembly Rscorrarr,rcNps that further consultations take place immediately at govern-
mental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and
further RrcouurNps that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within
each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft
and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.
3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful r6le in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in
conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations
and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat
forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RrcouMENDs that the Council study the options
for providing such assistance without delay.
4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United
Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly RrcouurNos
that the Council establish forthwith a liaison oflice in Washington to serve as a channel for North
American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Administration that direct
dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make
every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
l. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure.
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document
t2431.
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RECOMMENDATION 489'
on Eampcan s?iuriy and events
in the Near ad Middle Eost2
l. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in
Paris on 2lst August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty
with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
It welcomes the fact that the Council invited the countries taking part in European political
co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.
It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of
United Nations Secuity Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional mea-
sures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on lraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes
the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make
maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-
General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.
The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the
first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from
the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become
the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions taken
at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 2lst August 1990, affrrmed the prestige and
authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war andjust when a new international order is emerging.
Recognising the importance of coordination with the United States, it dso welcomes the fact
that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to find a political solution
to the conflict.
Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of coordination of member countries' naval
and air action in the Gulf.
It Rrcouunros that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait the prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.
2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries
and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.
It welcomes the fact that the Twelve reached ag;reement with the Soviet Union to adopt, at the
annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, a joint statement CIr the
situation in the Gulf region.
It Recour,,cNos that the Council pu$ue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and
develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo
against lraq.
3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed
by Iraq and in particular:
- 
the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the'Protocol forthe prohibition of
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of
warfare'that was signed in Geneva on lTth June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February
1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during
the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- 
many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time
of war;
- 
violations of the 196l Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.
It therefore RrcounrNps that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these vio
lations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make
l. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 2fth September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Pro,
cedure.
2. Explanatory memorandum: sce the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1242).
l6
TEXTS ADOPTED SEVENTH SITIING
reparations for the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in lraq against their will and those
inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.
4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford eco-
nomic assistance to Arab 
- 
and other 
- 
countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this
to be a positive decision and Rrcour',rcNps that the Council consider the possibility of convening a con-
ference on Euro-Arab ceoperation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab
kague.
It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 2lst August
provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve
European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the
question ofthe hostages held by Iraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a
good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.
5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring
that the lraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and
western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal
during and after the war with Iran.
It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced
military technolory by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the
United States.
In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the ailns race in lraq
and in all Middle Eastern countries.
It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the ligbt of current events,
wishes gtreater attention to be paid to those proposals.
6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the
application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may
lead to new and serious crises.
The Assembly considers that, after Iraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions
and international law, the international community and the United Nations must demonstrate the
same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of eco-
nomic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's
right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This
would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political
solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlement of the
I-ebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from kbanon.
It therefore Rrcouuexns that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly
Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an
international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.
7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands
of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.
It therefore RrcouunNps that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part
in this humanitarian effort.
8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty has been the basis for co-ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a
peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
It therefore Rscorr,rrvrn.rps that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join
WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.
9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of
taking effective action in the Gulf.
It Rpcorr,rurnrDs that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in
regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to
remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.
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10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security
through an alliance of WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may
help the emergence of a new system of security and international co'operation.
Finally, to achieve this end, it Rrcor*aunos that the Council make intensive use of all the pros-
pects revealed by the dramatic crisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective
European defence organisation.
l!i
tl
1
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RECOMMENDATION 490
on the revision of the ,rroditied Brussels Treaty
l. (a) TheAssembly, having noted the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and.the thirty-
fifth annual report of the Couniil, considers them to be administrative documents that provide no real
information about the activities of the WEU Council.
(b) ltnevertheless welcomes the fact that, in 1988, 1989 and 1990, it-received_more substantial
information from the United Kingdom, Belgian and French Chairmen-in-Offrce and from the Secretar-
ies-General, in particular throt'gh their letters to the President of the Assembly.
(c/ It therefore approves the second part of the thirty-fourth and the thirty-fifth annual report of
the Council.
(d) lt intends to follow up the Secretary-General's proposal to address its committees as and
when required.
(e/ It strongly REcoMMENps that the Council be more precise and helpful with its communica-
tions tbihe Assembiy, in particular its replies to recommendations and to written questions put by par-
liamentarians.
fi lt also REcoMMENDs that the Council inform it, whenever pssible, of the 
-conclusions drawn
from riborts by the Special Working Group, the Defence Representatives Group and sub-gtroups whose
work corresponds to the agendas of Assembly sessions.
2. (a) The Assembly has noted that the Council has started to examine the terms of a revision of
the treaty, made necessry by the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.
(D/ It considers that events in the Gulf, the CSCE as well as in Eastern and Ccntral Europe in
1989 ind 1990 have made an even more detailed examination of the terms of such a revision nec-
essary.
(c/ It proposes to examine in due course the questions raised by this revision.
(d) Atthis stage, however, in regard to Article IX of the treaty, it pnoposrs that the Council adopt
the following wording:
* The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an
assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed i! accordance with the
same criteria ai representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. "
In the same way, it would be valuable if national governments made a similar report to their own par-
liaments.
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RBCOMMEI\TDATION 491
oE WEU and rhc Eumpean hmmunig
l.^ The Assembly is the_only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementatioa
of the modified Brussels Treaty and regrets that, in sbite of this, the Council did not-inform it of
!_mportant proposalg made by a member country to associate ll/estern European Union with the
European Community.
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in theRg+t Treaty ofArticle V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the other provisions
of the treaty although they are its essential complemeni, particularly in regard to relations between
member countries and NATO.
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation
of WEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into ihe Community, althbugh some member states
of the EEC are still opposed to developing -a European concept of d6fence.
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemeated, these various mEasures would weaken the Atlantic
Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major r6le in international affairs.
5. It therefore REcoMMENDs that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe
to play a more effective part in N{Tg and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectivdly
each time the security of Europe is threatened.
6. It also REcoMMENDs that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels
Treaty without consulting it beforehand.
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EIGIITH SITTING
Tuesday, 4th December 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
1. Chairmanshipin-Office of the Council 
- 
presentation of
the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
Council, Doc. 12471' Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of
State, Minister for Foreigr AIIain of France, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council.
1. Attendstce rr4ister
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoption of the minutes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were agreed to.
3. Clmirmanship-in-Otfice of the Council -
prvsentation of thc fint pan of the thirty-sixth
unual rewrt of the Council, Doc. 1247
Addrcss by Mn Duma,s, Minister of Statg
Minister for Foruigt Alfain of Fruncc,
Chainwt-in-Officc of tlw Council
Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for
Foreign Alfairs of France, Chairman-in-Office
of the Council, addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Dumas answered questions put by MM.
Scheer, Caro, Beix, Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
MM. De Decker, Speed, Sir Russell Johnston,
MM. Martino, Stegagnini, Cetin (Observer from
Turkey), Lambie and Mrs. Hoffmann.
The sitting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and
resumed at 11.55 a.m.
Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
regjon (Presentation ol and joint debate on the reports of
the Political Commillee and the Defence Committee,
Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amend-
ments).
4. European security and the Gulf crisis
Consegtenus of the inwsion of Kuwait:
continaing operutions ia the Gulf rqion
(Pruenabn of dioitt dcMc on tlrc twrts
of thc Politial Connitta std the Dciere @mmittc,
Dus. 1211 ad orrr;ndnurtts orrd 1218 aad anudtncats)
The report of the Political Committee was
presented by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.
The report of the Defence Committee was
presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer,
Rapporteur.
The joint debate was opened.
At the suggestion of the President, the
Assembly agreed, in accordance with Rule 32 of
the Rules ofProcedure, that speeches should be
limited to five minutes.
Speakers: MM. Ward, Fassino, Scheer, Mrs.
Roe and Mr. Caro.
The joint debate was adjourned.
5. Chonges in the membcnhip of committees
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following
appointments of alternate members to fill
vacant seats in committees proposed by the
Italian Delegation:
- 
Political Committee: Mr. Colombo;
MINUTES OF PR(rcEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at /,0.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
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- 
Technological and Aerospace Committee:
Mr. Manzolini;
- 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration: Mr. Manzolini;
- Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges: Mr. Andreis;
- Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations: Mr. Colombo.
6, Date, timc and orders of the day
of the n*t sitting
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was flrxed for the same day at
3 p.m.
The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.
,i
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APPENDIX EIGHTH SITTING
APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance r:
Belgium
MM. Adriaensens
Chevalier
Noerens (Kempinaire)
P6criaux
Uyttendaele
France
MM. Beix
Caro
Collette
Durand
Lagorce (Forni)
Fourrd
Jung
Seitlinger
Vial-Massat
MM. Farsino (Filetti) SPain
Fioret
Colombo (Kessler)
Malfatti
Manzolini
Martino
Stegagnini (Mezzapesa)
Rubner (Parisi)
Pieralli
Sarti
Sinesio
Luxembourg
Mr. Goerens
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
MM. Lopez Valdivielso
(Alvarez)
Borderas
Cuatrecasas
Cuco
Diaz
Fabra
Sainz (l-opez Henares)
Martinez
Moya
Perinat
de Puig
Roman
- 
MM. De Hoop Schelfer (Aarts) Lord
Federal Republic of Germany fversOi3i Mr.
MM. Ahren, ,y,f;: [',1?i;1"'#er o"3t:Antretter Tummers MM.Mrs. H,offmann (B6hm) Urc. Biarveld-SchlamanMM. Holtz (van VJtienl Mrs.leld7naryn-0rger). Mr. Verbeek SirBindig (Mrs. Luuk) MM.
NiegelScheer PortugalSoell MM. Mota Torres (Candal)
Fernandes Marques SirItaly Moreira Sir
MM. Benassi gxi.i%'J3uMarQues) #rtCaccia Vieira Mesquita Mr.
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
Belgium
Mr. Biefnot
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
France
MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Fillon
Galley
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Oehler
Thyraud
Federal Republic of GermanY ltalY
United Kingdom
Kirkhill (Coleman)
Lambie (Ewing)
Peggy Fenner
Geoffrey Finsberg
Garrett
Hardy
Roe (Jessel)
Russell Johnston
Thompson (Earl of
Kinnoull)
Morris
Parry
William Shelton
Dudley Smith
Speed
Newall (Thompson)
Ward
MM. Biichner
Eich
Hitschler
Kittelmann
Mtiller
Reddemann
von Schmude
Unland
Wulff
MM. Gabbuggiani
Natali
Pecchioli
Rodoti
Rubbi
Portugpl
Mr. Esteves
United Kingdom
Cox
John Stokes
Mr.
Sir
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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NINTH SITTING
Tuesdag 4th December 1990
ORI'ERTI OF THE DAY
l. Chairmanshipinollice of the Council 
- 
presentation of
the first part of the thirty-sixth annual- report of the
Council, Doc. 1247; Address by Mr. Chevdniment, Min-
ister of Defencp of France.
1. Attendurce rqistcr
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoption of thc minutes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were ag€ed to.
3. Cluirmanship-in-Otfue of the Council 
-pre*ntation of the fint patt of the thirty-sixth
annual rcport of thc Council Doc. 1247
Addruss by Mr. Chctircmcnt,
Minister of Dcfence of Frwrce
Mr. Chevdnement, Minister of Defence of
France, addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Chevdnement answered questions put by
MM. Scheer, Caro, Antretter, Stegagnini, Sii
Dudley Smith, Mr. De Hoop Scheffeq Mrs.
Castellina (Member of the European Parliament,
Observer), Mr. Jessel (point of order), Sir Russell
Johnston, MM. Hardy, Romero, Martinez,
Feldmann, Goerens and Scheer (point of
order).
The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and
resumed at 5.25 p.m.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting was.opned at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
2. European security aad the Gulf crisis; Consequenes of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
te$ot (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Polilical
Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1214 and
amendments and 1218 and amendmen*).
1. Eumpan suurity and tlu Gulf crisis
Corcegrcnca of the invanion of Kuwait:
continuing operutions in thc Gulf rqion
(Raantd joitt &bc or rb rryrfi
of the Political Conmitte crd tb lhlcw C;onttttitta,
Irorr,. 1211 aed ameadmqtt ord 121E d usfmt)
The joint debate was rcsumed.
Speakcr: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.
Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Stegagnini, P6criaux, Cetin(Observer from Turley), Benassi, Sir John
Stokes, MM. Colombo, Soell and Fourr€.
Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair.
Spealcers: MM. Antretter and Martinez.
The joint debate was adjourned.
5. Datq time and ordon ol tlu day
of tlu nut sitting
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 5th
December 1990, at l0 a.m.
The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.
rlj
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APPENDIX NINTH SITTING
APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
Belgium Italy
MM. Adriaensens MM. Benassi
Noerens (Biefnot) CacciaChevalier Fassino (Filetti)
De Decker (Kempinaire) FioretP6criaux Colombo (Kessler)Cauwenberglu Stegagnini (Mezzapesa)(Mrs. Staels-Dompas) ParisiUyttendaele Pieralli
Sarti
Sinesio
France
MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Beix
Caro
Collette
Durand
Hunault (Fillon)
Fourr6
Lemoine (Oehler)
Luxembourg
Mr. Goerens
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
MM. Fernandes Marques
Moreira
Soares Costa
Spain
Il'lM. Lopez Valdivielso
(Alvarez)
Cuatrecasas
Cuco
Diaz
Fabra
l,opez Henares
Martinez
Moya
de Puig
Roman
United Kingdom
Lambie (Ewing)
Peggy Fenner
Rodney (Sir Geoffrey
Finsber$
Garrett
Hardy
Jessel
Russell Johnston
Parry
William Shelton
Dudley Smith
Speed
John Stokes
Newall (Thompson)
Bowden (Ward)
Mrs.
Federal Republic of Germany MM'
MM. Ahrens Mrs'Antretter Mr.
Feldmann (Hitschler)
MM.
Portugal
MJld.. Mota Torres (Candal)
Esteves
De Hoop Schelfer (Aarts)
Eversdijk
Haas-Berger
Stoffelen
Tummers
Baameld-Schlaman
(vanVelzen)
Verbeek
Mr.
Dame
Lord
MM.
Sir
MM.
Sir
Sir
Mr.
Sir
Lord
Mr.
Irmer
Mrs. Luuk
MM. Niegel
Scheer
Soell
France
MM. Forni
Galley
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Jung
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Bdhm
Biichner
Eich
Holtz
MM. Kittelmann
Mtiller
Reddemann
von Schmude
Unland
Wulff
Italy
MM. Gabbuggiani
Malfatti
Manzolini
Martino
Natali
Pecchioli
Rodoti
Rubbi
Portugal
MM. Silva Marques
Vieira Mesquita
Spain
MM. Borderas
Perinat
United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Earl of Kinnoull
Mr. Morris
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
I . The names of substitutes rcplacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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TENTH SITTING
Wednesday, 5th December 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
1. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for Inter-
national Security Affairs, United States Department of
State (Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States
Ambassador to France).
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
rcg;on (Resumed joint debate on the reports o.f the Political
Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and
amendments and 1248 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Pro
curement of the United Kingdom.
1. Aaendarce registet
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoption of the minutes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were agreed to.
3. Address by Mr. Banhobmew, Under-Suretory
for Interaational Security Affain,
United States Depafiment of State
The address by Mr. Bartholomew was
delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States
Ambassador to France.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis
Consequences of the invuioa of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region
(Resumed joint dcMc ot tlrc rcports
of thc Politicd Committec ad thc Dcfcace Commlnee
and yotes ot tle draft tecommcndttions, Dar;s. 1241
and anendmeats aad 121t, oddcadum and amcadmcnts)
The joint debate was resumed.
Speaker: Mr. Askin (Obsener from Turkey).
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. I,apez Valdivielso, Speed,
Romero, Fioret and Sole-Tura.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
region (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political
Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the
draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and
1248 and amendments).
5. Enhancing WEU's public relations (presentation of and
debate o.n.the report of the- Committbe for parliamentary
and Public Relations and vote on the draJi recommen-
dation, Doc. 12461.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting wcts opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair.
Speaker: Mr. Lambie.
The joint debate was adjourned.
5. Address by Mr. Cb* Minister of State for
Defence Prucuremcnt of the llnited Kingdom
Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Pro-
curement of the United Kingdom, addressed the
Assembly.
Mr. Clark answered questions put by Sir
Russell Johnston, MM. Ward, Hardy, Speed, Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg, the Earl of Kinnoull and Mr.
Garrett.
6. European security and the Gulf crisis
Consequences of the invasioa of Kuwait:
corrtinuing opemtions ia thc Gulf regioa
(Rcsumd joint debate on tlv ryports
of the Political Committec and thc Dcfauc C.ommidc
and votes oa tlu draft ncommcadatiots, Iret. 1211
and onuadmeats aad 1218, addeadum aad anqdnunts)
The joint debate was resumed.
Sir Geffiey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Veryvakis (Observer fromGreece), Andjelkovic (Observer fiom Yugo-
slavia), Lord Mackie and Mr. Hardy.
The joint debate was closed.
The President announced that speeches
which it had not been possible to delivei would
be printed as an appendix to the proceedings.
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Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens,
Chairman of the Political Committee, and Mr.
De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley
Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee,
replied to the speakers.
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft
recommendation in Document 1244.
An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr.
Pieralli and others:
5. At the end of the preamble to the draft rec-
ommendation, add a new ParagraPh:
" Considering the adoption by the United
Nations Security Council of Resolution 678
giving Iraq until l5th January l99l to
evacuate Kuwait before any force is used
against it and welcoming the fact that Pres-
ident Bush has decided to take advantage of
this respite to open talks with Iraq and that
the latter has accepted this proposal,'.
Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
6. In the draft recommendation proper, after
paragraph 2, add a new paragraPh:
" Ask member states to earmark or set up,
each according to its means, a force that can
be transported over long distances to help to
restore peace in response inter alia to requests
from the United Nations Security Council and
to provide it with weapons and equiPment
commensurate with the requirements of such
operations; ".
Speakers: MM. De Decker, Stoffelen and
Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 was not moved.
An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
7. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add:
", inter alia by systematic implementation of
paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty; ".
Speakers: MM. De Decker and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. t) was tabled by Mr.
Soell and others:
l. In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommen-
dation proper, leave out " which might take
levels above the agreed limits " and insert " in
the region'.
Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr.
Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
Three amendments (Nos. 2, 8 and 9) were
considered together.
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr.
Martinez and others:
2. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
the kbanese problem on the basis of the
application of the United Nations resolutions
which have still not been respected, while
strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI
of the treaty governing the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons signed by the nuclear
powers; ".
Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.
An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
8. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" a settlement of relations between Israel and
the Palestinians on the basis of implemen-
tation of relevant Security Council resolu-
tions; ".
Speaker: Mr. De Decker.
An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
9. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty
thanks to the disbandment of the militias and
the evacuation of L,ebanese territory by Israeli
and Syrian armed forces; ".
Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Martinez (point of
order).
The President proposed that the vote on the
three amendments be deferred.
An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
10. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft
recommendation proper, add a new sub-
paragraph:
' ensuring regular supplies of oil for the inter-
national market; ".
Speakers: MM. De Decker and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. I l) was tabled by Mr. De
Decker and others:
ll. At the end of paragraph 6 of the
recommendation proper, add a new
paragraph:
" establishing more effective solidarity
between Arab oil-producing countries and
draft
sub-
27
MINUTES TENTH SI]-TING
those that lack the resourtes essential for their
economic development;'.
Speakers: MM. De Decker, Martinez and
Ahrens.
The amendment was negatived.
The Assembly returned to Amendments 2, 8
and 9.
Amendment 8 was withdrawn.
Spealcers: MM. Stoffelen and Pieralli.
MM. Jessel and Ahrens spoke on Amendment 9.
Amendment 9 was agreed to.
Amendment 2 was amended by leaving out
the words * and the kbanese problem'and the
words 'signed by the nuclear powers'.
Speaker: Mr. Ahrens.
Amendment 2, as amended, was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM.
Martinez and Stoffelen:
3. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph:
" Seek the association ofall countries partici-
pating in the miltary and political effort to
ensure the success of the embargo 
- 
and in
particular the WEU member states 
- 
with the
talks between the United States and lraq fol-
lowing the United Nations Security Council
resolution.'.
Speal<erc: MM. Martinez, De Decker and
Ahrens.
The amenrlment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by MM.
Pieralli and De Decken
12. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph:
'Use all the means at its disposal to promote
a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait
and to determine the stages for the restoration
of lasting peace throughout the Near and
Middle East before expiry of the timalimit set
by the United Nations Security Council for
authorising recourse to force.'.
Spealeers: MM. Pieralli and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
Speal<er (point of order): Mr. Martinez.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the
amended draft recommendation.
The amended draft recommendation was
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 492)t.
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft
recommendation in Document 1248.
An amendment (No. l) was tabled by Mr.
Lambie:
l. Leave out paragraph 8 of the dralt recom-
mendation proper.
Speal<ers: MM. Iambie, Reddemann and Sir
Dudley Smith.
The amendment was negatived.
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr.
Stoffelen and others:
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation
proper, leave out all the words after * Brussels
Treaty'.
Spealcers: MM. Stoffelen, De Hoop Scheffer
and Sir Dudley Smith.
The amendment was negatived.
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr.
Lambie:
2. l*ave out paragraph l0 of the draft rccom-
mendation proper.
Speakerc: MM. Lambie, De Hoop Scheffer
and Sir Dudley Smith.
The amendment was negatived.
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr.
Martinez and others:
4. In paragraph l0 of the draft recommendation
proper, leave out all the words after " European
forces'.
Speal<crs: MM. Martinez, De Hoop Schelfer
and Sir Dudley Smith.
The amendment was negatived.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.
The draft recommendation was agreed to.This recommendation will be published as
No. 493) 2.
7. Change in thc or*r of huituss
The President proposed a change in the order
of business.
The proposal was agreed to.
8. Date, timc and ordcn d tke day
oftlu next sitting
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
- 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at
3 p.m.
The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.
l. See page 30.
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APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
Belgium
MM. Adriaensens
Biefnot
De Decl<er (Chevalier)
Noerens (Kempinaire)
P6criaux
Cauwenberglu(Mrs. Staels-Dompas)
Uyttendaele
France
MM. Bassinet
Beix
Caro
Collette
Durand
Lagorce (Forni)
Federal Republic of Germany
Italy
MM. Fassino (Filetti)
Fioret
Rubner (Kessler)
MM. Malfatti
Manzolini
Martino
Colombo (Mezzapesa)
Parisi
Pieralli
Scovacricch, (Rodotn)
Sarti
Sinesio
Luxembourg
Mr. Goerens
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Netherlands
Spain
MM. Lopez Valdivielso
(Alvarez)
Borderas
So I e-Tura (Cuatrecasas)
Cuco
Diaz
Fabra
Lopez Henares
Martinez
Moya
Perinat
de Puig
Roman
Uiited Kingdom
Mr. Lambie (Ewing)
Dame Peggy Fenner
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Garrett
Hardy
Jessel
Sir Russell Johnston
Earl of Kinnoull
MM. Atkinson (Morris)
Parry
Sir William Shelton
Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Speed
Sir John Stokes
I.ord Newal/ (Thompson)
Mr. Ward
MM. Benassi
Caccia
Gabbuggiani
Natali
Pecchioli
Rubbi
Luxembourg
Mr. Regenwetter
United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Ahrens MM'
Hoffmann (Bi,hm)
Irrrer
Miiller
Niegel
Reddemanrt
Scheer
De Hoop Schffir (Aarts)
Evendijk
Baarteld-Schlaman(Mrs. Haas-Berger)
Stoffelen
Tummers
van Velzen
Verbeek
MM.
Mrs.
Mr.
Mrs.
MM.
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
Portugal
MM. Brito (Candal)
Esteves
Fernandes Marques
Moreira
Amaral (Silva Marques)
Soares Costa
Vieira Mesquita
Federal Republic of Germany ItalyFrance
MM. Baumel
Fillon
Fou116
Galley
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Jung
Oehler
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
MM. Antretter
Biichner
Eich
Hitschler
Holtz
Kittelmann
Mrs. Luuk
MM. von Schmude
Soell
Unland
Wulff
I . The names of substitutes replacing rcpresentatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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RECOMMENDATION 492
on Eunolp.an secariy and the Gulf crisis
The Assembly,(i) Recalling its Recommendation 489;(it) Welcoming the firmness and continuity with which member countries have pursued their action
to promote the application of the embargo against Iraq decided upon by the Security Council in order
to obtain, without prior conditions, the release of all the hostages held by Iraq and the evacuation of all
Kuwaiti territory;(iit) Considering that WEU's contribution to the naval deployment to ensure that the embargo is
respected is of considerable importance and allows the implementation of United Nations measures to
be monitored satisfactorily;(iv) Noting with regret that it took longer than desirable to arrange this deployment;(v) Condemning with indignation the many violations of international law and human rights com-
mitted by Iraq and, in particular, the threat to use chemical weapons, non-respect of the 1949 Geneva
Convention regarding the treatment of civilians on the territory of a belligerent country and violations
of the 196l Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats;(vi) Considering that it is still possible that the firmness, solidarity, unity and political and diplo.
matic initiative of the international community will compel Iraq to obey the United Nations Security
Council;
(vii) Recalling that the Iraqi aggression was also a direct attack on the still fragile new world order
that efforts are still being made to establish to replace the one that prevailed throughout the East-West
confrontation and which must be based on respect for international law, co-operation and peace;
(viii) Welcoming the fact that the Twelve, at the summit meeting in Rome on l8th October, stressed
that the organisation of a peaceful order in the Near and Middle East implied agreement extending well
beyond the setting of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait;(ix) Recalling its condemnation of the measures of repression used by the Israeli police in Jerusalem
on 8th October and emphasising that a settlement of the Palestinian question,.in accordance with all
the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, is essential for the establishment of lasting peace
in the region;(x) Condemning the crimes committed in Beirut following the surrender of General Aoun, but
trusting that the end of the civil war in Lebanon should allow the militia to be disarmed and the armed
forces of Syria and Israel to be withdrawn from Lebanon;(xt) Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving Iraq
until 15th January l99l to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and welcoming the fact
that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks with Iraq and that the
latter has accepted this proposal,
RrcovnvtEnps rHAT rnr CouNclr-
l. Make a critical analysis of the establishment of WEU's co-ordination of forces sent by member
countries to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq's aggression against
Kuwait and its violations of the law of nations;
2. Follow up without delay Assembly recommendations urging it to set up a European observation
satellite agency;
3. Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be trans-
ported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United
Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the
requirements of such operations;
4. Instruct the chiefs of defence staffof the WEU member countries to continue their meetings and
those of subordinate bodies in order to prepare forces for possible co'ordinated operations, providing
inter alia for:
(a) co-operation in respect of transport;
(b) the definition of joint procedures;
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(c) the exchange of operational information;
(d) interoperability of the equipment and weapons of these national forces;
(e/ common exercises;
5. Pursue the reactivation of WEU, inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Ensure that the selective release of hostages does not weaken the determination of member coun-
tries to obtain the release of all hostages and the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
7. Use Europe's influence in the region to ensure that, after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait, negotiations are started to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the Middle East, with a
view in particular to:
(a) an agtreement between all countries in the region to renounce the possession of ABC
weapons, subject to effective international veri{ication;
(b) an agreement between countries in the region and arms-exporting countries to limit arma-
ments in all countries in the region and to ban the sale of arms in the region;
(c/ settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the application of the United Nations
resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of
Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(d) full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the
evacuation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces;
(e/ ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market;
8. Ask that the European Community afford assistance to countries in the region whose economy is
seriously affected by the crisis;
9. Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure the
success of the embargo 
- 
and in particular the WEU member states 
- 
with the talks between the United
States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution;
10. Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to
determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace throughout the Near and Middle East before
expiry of the timeJimit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising recourse to force.
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RECOMMENDATION 493
on the aonsequcrwes of tlrc invasion of Kuwait:
coatinuing opcrutioru in the Gulf rcgion
l. The Assembly insists that the best peaceful solution for the Gulf crisis lies in the respect of the
relevant United Nations resolutions, through the aprplication of the present sanctions against Iraq, and
Rrcoum.rps that the Council seek to ensure that this principle continues to govern the actions both of
member states and other allies.
2. Tho Assembly recalls its Recommendation 488, adopted on 20th September 1990, viz:
'The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3,
of the modifred Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's agg;ression against and occupation of Kuwait.
The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU coordination in the context of
the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.
The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Minis-
terial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to
call the first meeting under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.
The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further ooperation
and coordinition at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore
RrcouunNos that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc goup to consider
policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all
WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French
Ministry of Defence.
Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very
near future, the Assembly Rrcouurnros that further consultations take place immediately at gov-
ernmental level to establish corrmon command and control in the various Gulf zones alneady
agreed and further RscorvrMEhrDs that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engaggment
at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly coordinated
between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.
The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful r6le in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in
conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf opera-
tions and that WEU nations'assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where
combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and RTcoMMENDs that the Council
study the options for providing such assistance without delay.
Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United
Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly Rrcou-
MENDs that the Council establish forthwith a liaison offrce in Washington to serve as a channel
for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Adminis-
tration that direct dialogrre with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present.
The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance.'
3. The Assembly welcomes the fact that the Council, working through its special Ad Hoc Group,
has already seen fit to implement at least part of the above recommendation and that WEU
co-operation both at home and in the Gulf area has improved as a direct result. The Assembly believes
that the arrangements for the naval application of the United Nations embargo are now well estab-
lished and congtratulates the Council on the measures taken.
4. The Assembly now considers that much more should be done to coordinate land and air opera-
tions and that all WEU nations should make appropriate contributions, and therefore RscoIuIrrEhIDs
that the Council discuss further national contributions to defensive land and air forces in the Gulf
region and in particular should call for support in the areas of logistics and medical help (the idea of a
hospital ship with a multinational WEU medical team on board deserves special consideration).
5. In the knowledge that France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the only WEU nations with
combat aircraft in the Gulf region and concerned about the provision of adequate air cover for naval
forces in particular, the Assembly R:corr,rurNps that the members of the Council take the decisions nec-
essary to ceordinate air cover and extend effrcient air defence protection to all WEU nations' forces.
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6. Concerned that due consideration in the WEU Council has apparently not been given to the r6le
of forces, especially naval forces, should tension mount in the Gulf region and conflict break out, the
Assembly Rncor',rr'aiNos that the necessary political consultations should now take place to enable the
appropriite decisions on the r6le of naval forc,es in particular to be implemented without delay in the
event of hostilities.
7. Convinced that the present situation admirably illustrates the case for creating a Euroaean
centre iorttre prevention of'crises and recalling in this iontext_two earlier recommendqlions: 465 (Doc-
u.int iiSi, frapporteur: Mr. Fourr6), on ddfining the conditions for setting-u-p a Furopean obser-ilid ratiUiti aEincy in WEU, anO ,lbt (Docume-nt lT23,Rapporteur: Iord Newall), on creating a
B"ropla, ,iriniiiiori centre under WEU iuspices, the Assembly RpcotrlrasNDs that.the Council at itsf#h;.irg miniiteriA meeting take the deciiion to set up such -a centre to be used inter alia for crisis
managemeit and verification Ind equip it with 
_the necessary technical means (including access to
observation satellites) to enable it to function effectively.
8. The Assembly, believing that, even if the present crisis may. provg. unjOug as a model for
foroprar action, c6rtain optidns foi the future arb worth studying immediately*both in the WEU
4[g;bt, *il inhuiional pirliaments, RrcouMENDs that the Couircil emphasise WEU as the forum for
b.io-f-"i." io-ordination,'in keeping'with the modified Brussels Treaty., and examine for the longer
t"r- ifildea of creating'a WEU na-val on-call force for external operations,.together with a possible
pootirg of appropriate iational air mobile assets into a European rapid action force.
g. Considering that special efforts are required to_ eqsure. that the public. ilkept fully informed
iigurOirrg tfii rati6nati foi the WEU presence-in the Gulf-regi^o_n, th-e Assembly Rscorul\rrNDs that the
C6uncilinould co-ordinate, through the Secretary-General's oflicc, the presentation of WEU's r6le to
th;-;;aia ild to the publi6 and tf,at fnks betwe6n national public relations.grBanisations in member
itatei' ministries of defence should be formalised and encouraged in a similar aim.
10. Noting that defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are forcing.an unc(>
siOinui.d r;ppraisal of defencJpriorities, the Assbmbly Rercour,,reNps that the Council institute con-
J,iituii6r *itiin WBu on the optimum fuiure structure of European forces, preferably before further
cuts in national defence budgets are made.
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ELEVENTH SITTING
lVednesdan Sth Docember 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
1. Entrancing WEU's public relations (Presentation of ind
debate o-n the report of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations and vote on thi draft recommen-
dation, D@,. 12461.
2. Dnft budget of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year I 99 I (Presentation of and
debate on the report of the Committee on Bud[etary
Alfairs and Administration and vote on the draft trudgei,
Dor,,. l24l and addendum).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1989 
- 
the auditor's
report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presen-
tation of and debate on the reryrt of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administratibn and vote on the
motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1236 and
addendum).
4. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern
Eurqp€ for Europea.n security (presentation of and debiii
on the report of the political Committee, D&. t255 and
amendments).
Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, took
the Chair.
4. Drfi budga of the administrutirc ex?cnditare
of the Assembly for the finatcial year 1991
(Ptwatotioa of ail debote oa the t@il
of tlu Conmittu oa Budgaary
Alfoin oad Ad,miaistrutioa aad vote on tlu d$t budgct,
Ir@. 1211 oad oddcndum)
The report of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration was presented by
Mr. Rathbone on behalf of Mr. Klejdzinski,
Chairman and Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakerc: MM. Diaz, Miiller, Iord Mackie
and Mr. Niegel.
The debate was closed.
Mr. Rathbone replied to the speakers.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
budget of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1991.
The draft budget was agreed to unani-
mously.
5. Accounts of the administrative expeaditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 -
the auditor's relnrt and motion to approve the
final accounts
(Ptueatatioa ol aad wtc oa tlv ,Mrtoi of the Commiuee
on Budgaary fiIairs aad Admiaistrution to apprure
the fiaal @urrts, D@. 1236 and addeadin)
The motion of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration was presented by
MINUTES OF PR(rcEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the
Chair.
1. Atundance rcgister
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoption of the minates
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting had not yet been distributed and would
be submitted for adoption later.
3, Enhancing WEU's public relations
(Prescntaioa of oad debate on tlv rcprt
ol tlu C,ommitte lu Pailiancatary
ond Pablic Relaions ud wte
on thc druft ruomrcnfuion, Dfi. 1216)
The report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was presented by
Mr. Roman, Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakers: Mr. Nufrez, Mrs. Garcia
Manzanares, MM. Lapez Henares and
Esteves.
The debate was closed.
Mr. Roman, Rapporteur, and Sir William
Shelton, Chairman, replied to the speakers.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.
The draft recommendation was agreed to.(This recommendation will be published as No.
494) t
l. See page 37.
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Mr. Rathbone on behalf of Mr. Klejdzinski,
Chairman and Rapporteur.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the
motion to approve the final accounts for the
financial year 1989.
The motion was agreed to unanimously.
6. Consequences of developments in Centrul
and Eastern Europe for Eurolpan security
(Pruscntation of ail dcbotc on tlp rwrt
of thc Political Committee, De. 1255 aad uundmcnts)
The report of the Political Committee was
presented by Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, on behalf
of Mr. Lemoine, Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speaker: Mr. de Puig.
Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Miiller, Scovacricchi, Bowden,
Pachtas (Observer from Greece), Romero, Mota
Torres, Sole-Tura, Moya, Liapis (Observer from
Greece) and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
The debate was closed.
Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the
speakers.
7. Change in the order of businas
The President proposed a change in the order
of business.
The proposal was agreed to.
E. Date, time and orders of the daY
of the nert sitting
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 6th
December 1990, at l0 a.m.
The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.
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APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
Belgium
MM. Adriaensens
Cauwenberglu
(Kempinaire)
Uyttendaele
France
MM. Fourrd
Lemoine (Oehler)
Federal Republic of Germrny
Mr. Ahrens
Miiller
Niegel
Reddemann
Italy
MM. Fioret
Rubner (Kessler)
Colombo (Mezzapesa)
Parisi
Scovacricchi (Rodoti)
Sarti
Sinesio
Luxembourg
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Netherlands
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
(Aarts)
Mrs. Haas-Berger
MM. Stoffelen
Tummers
van Velzen
Verbeek
Portugd
MM. Mota Tones
(Candal)
Esteves
Fernandes Marques
Moreira
Soares Costa
Spain
MM. Lopez Valdivielso
(Alvarez)
Borderas
MM. So/e-Tura (Cuatrecasas)
Cuco
Diaz
Fabra
Lopez Henares
Martinez
Moya
Perinat
de Puig
Roman
United Kingdom
Mr. Lambie (Ewing)
Mrs. Roe (Dame Peggy
Fenner)
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
l-ofi Mackie (Sir Russell
Johnston)
MM. Howell @arl of Kinnoull)
Bowden (Morris)
Sir William Shelton
Stu John Hunt (Sir Dudley
Smith)
Mr. Rathbo,ne (Speed)
Sir John Stokes
Mr. Ward
MM. Pecchioli
Pieralli
Rubbi
Luxembourg
MM. Goerens
Regenwetter
Netherlands
Mr. Eversdijk
Portugal
MM. Silva Marques
Vieira Mesquita
United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Garrett
Hardy
Jessel
Parry
Thompson
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
Belgium
MM. Biefnot
Chevalier
P6criaux
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
France
MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Beix
Caro
Collette
Durand
Fillon
Forni
Galley
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Jung
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Antretter
Biihm
Biichner
Eich
Hitschler
Holtz
Irmer
Kittelmann
Mrs. Luuk
MM. Scheer
von Schmude
Soell
Unland
Wulff
Italy
MM. Benassi
Caccia
Filetti
Gabbuggiani
Malfatti
Manzolini
Martino
Natali
(
1
i
1
i
I ' The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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RECOMMENDATION 494
on enhancing WEU's public relations
(t) The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by tfe q.9iu, public o-pinion
liiro io p-"rri;6t"iy-a;u"tiJi. i[J r6ie of wEU as a result of its action ih the Gulf region following
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.(ii) This open debate nevertheless shows that-a large section of the public, if not. ignorant of WEU,
liiu nolor piecorcei"Lo ano .iriat n ideas about -it which, in member countries and across thelir"rtii t"o, riaO to 
"ra.t-oi.iroii,iiiii 
in ttie institution that does not colrespond to the increase in its
activities.
(iit) Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better.informed of the Council's activities, in
i"rti.urur tniougn tn" informdtioi letters from th-e S6cretary-General, in spite of the fact that their
iontents in no way commit the Council.
fiil The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiqu6s have beenirJu.o;ii;;i.r* 6r .iiiioes oitne councii of Miiisters -and several of its organs. It considers the
Council is thus starting to kegO the public better informed.
ld However. upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanatin-g from.re.giols
liitrioi-Eiidili Al il;-. iiitematii, coherent effoits to explain to the public the possibilitie.s
;fr;;;J by ;#;ilifi.e B;;;.fi f*"iifq iJtaursnine a new European gecqrity syslem; the council
muJt not, however, transfer the burdeir of these efforts to members of the Assembly.
hil The hesitation shown by the Council and memblr governments, failing to grasp the politicallJport*ir ;fffiti;iiiationi or to agtree on wEU's futdie 1619, mjg[t increase th9 no-u'preyale.ntilI;:"irii;ffiif.r;rdii;"Uout [ofeurope's future security should be guaranteed and organised.
THe Assptr,tsl-Y THEREFoRE REcoMMENDs rHAT THE Coutcll
l. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the sugges'
tioos .uoJuv Mi. ig,liliuo-n io written Question 285, with a yiew in particular to increasing the now
ilA"quaia nhanciA means available to WEU and its Assembly in this area;
Z. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security- Studies,-a communications
stratew allowini tn. puuri.-oltiut. on European security to be intensihed and WEU's image to be
lnfiuideOln pufitic ofinion, not only in Europe but also in North America;
extend the Secretary-General's public relations wo$ qd.urge member-govern-
tfiLii-rfforttlo e*ptiin to the pirUtic WEU's work in helping to establish a new
Europe;
3. Support and
ments to intensifr
security system in
4. tnform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals.
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Thursday, 6th December 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
MINUTES OF PR(rcEEDINGS
. 
The.sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Sir Geolfrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in
the Chair.
l. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern
Europe for European security (Vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments).
1. Attendance tryistet
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoptioa of tlu minates
The minutes of proceedings of the two pre-
vious sittings were agreed to.
3. Cowequenccs of doelopnunts in Central and
fusten Europe for European security
(Yotc oa thc drqfr twomrcrdatio4Ib, 1255 ud wttadmcats)
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft
recommendation.
An amendment (No. l) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
l. In the preamble to the draft recommendation,
after paragraph (il, add the following new para-
graphs:
" Welcoming the end of the division of
Europe and of the East-West confrontation
and the progress towards democratisation and
liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the
other Eastern European countries;
Conccrned nevertheless at the alarming
decline in the economic situation in Eastern
Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable
repercussions;
Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels
Treaty in which dl WEU member countries
undertook to promote the economic recovery
of Europe; "
2. Konversiya-- conversion in Soviet military industry (pre-
sentotion of and debate on the report of thb Technoiogical
and Aerospace Committee and iote 6n the draft recom-
mendation, Doc. 1249).
Speakcrc: MM. Ward, Martinez and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
_ 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
2. In the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, after paragraph (iil, add the following
new paragraphs:
* Emphasising that European security would
be threatened if areas of instability emerged in
Eastern Europe;
Considering that the strengthening and
institutionalisation of the CSCE proceis offer
the peoples of Europe new prospects and
improved security on the basis of a
strengthened system of all-European
co-operation;
Considering that the strengthened CSCE
should henceforth be used as the principal
forum for advancing disarmament -and lhe
limitation of armaments;'
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agreed to.
_ 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
3. In the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, after paragraph (iil, add the following
new paragraphs:
" Welcoming the fact that the final settlement
of the German problem has made it possible
to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic
Alliance and allowed the German people to be
united in freedom, thus enhancing itabitity
and security in Central Europe;
Considering that Germany's undertakings in
regard to recognition of its present frontiers
with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation
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of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the
levels of its armed forces are exemplary mea-
sures that are likely to strengfihen the confi-
dence of all European countries; "
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
4. In the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, after paragraph (iiil, add the following
new paragraphs:
" Supporting the steps being taken to establish
an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, which would give the parliamentary
dimension to the CSCE process as decided by
the Paris summit, while recalling its own
responsibilities in all areas covered by the
modified Brussels Treaty;
Recalling that WEU has special responsibility
in the establishment of a new European
security concept based on the doctrine ofsuf-
ficiency and taking account of the situation
that wil exist after the treaty on conventional
disarmament has been signed;
Considering the maintenance of United States
and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an
essential factor for guaranteeing the future
security of Europe in a new environment; "
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agtreed to.
Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Caro.
An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr-
Brito and others:
5. After paragraph I of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new ParagraPh:
" Play an active part in building the new all-
Euroirean system of co-operation and security
and give it useful impetus based on the
co-operation structures set up by member
countries in the framework of WEU, the
European Community and the Atlantic
Alliance; "
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
6. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragPPh:
" Give strong impetus to the European Com-
munity's efforts to organise and co-ordinate
assistance to the economies of the countries
concerned; "
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
7. Atfter paragraph 3 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new ParagraPh:
* In accordance with the modified Brussels
Treaty, examine from a military standpoint
the consequences of the reduction in tension
in Europe following the progressive with-
drawal of Soviet troops and define, in prepa-
ration for examination in the Atlantic
Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of
allied forces in EuroPe; "
Speaker: Mr. Martinez.
The amendment was agreed to.
An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr.
Brito and others:
8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommen-
dation pioper, add the following new para-
graphs:
'Follow up the intention it expressed in
Brussels to strengthen co-operation between
member countries in security matters so as to
open the way for a possible Euro-pean union
aisociating 
- the European Commun-ity,
European political co-operation and WEU;
Pursue its efforts to ensure that current
thinking about the creation of multinational
forces is set in the context of a European
security dimension;
Work out, with due account for the specific
nature of European security interests, a
European position for revising the strategy of
the Atlantlc Afliance in order to maintain
Europe's security in a new environment;
Develop means of countering more-qlickly
and more effectively any dangers which may
arise out of area;
Examine the expediency of regular meetings
of chiefs of deftnce staff of WEU member
countries;
Re-examine the r6le of deterrence in the new
European securitY context;
Take the decision to create an observation sat-
ellite agency. "
Speakers: MM. Martinez and Ahrens.
The amendment was agreed to.
The Asembly proceeded to vote on the
amended draft recommendation.
The amended draft reeommendation was
agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation
witt Ue published as No. 495) '.
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4. Konveniya 
- onvenion
in Sovia military industry
^(Presentation of ul debotc on tb try?tof thc Techrologicql and Actoqaa C-nnifl@
and yote on tb dnft rqpnnunilaAoa, Doc. I21g)
The report of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee was presented by Mr.
Tummers, Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakers: MM. Moya, Elisseev (Observer fromthe U,S^SR/, Moreira, Mrs. van den grint(Member of the European Parliament, Observer),
MM. Pedregosa and Atkinson.
The debate was closed.
Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur, and Mr. l!
Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers. 
'l
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft ;recommendation. i
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
.
unanimously._ 
_(Thi! recommendation will be .!published as No. 496)t. ;i
5. Close of the session
The President declared the thirty-sixth
ordinary session of the Assembly closed.-
The sitting was closed at 11.10 a.m.
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Mrs.
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l. The names ofsubstitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names ofthe latter being given in brackets.
4t
TEXTS ADOPTED TWELFTH SITTING
RECOMMENDATION 495
on the conseqaenaes of developments in Central and fustera Europe
for European security
The Assembly,
O Welcoming the adoption by thirty-four countries of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and
the signing of the agtreement on the limitation of conventional armaments;(iil Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and of the East-West confrontation and the
progress towards democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern
European countries;(iii) Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in
view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;(iv) Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty in which all WEU member countries
undertook to promote the economic recovery of Europe;
(v) Recalling that implementation of the principles set out in the security basket of the Helsinki
Final Act is an essential condition for advancing the entire CSCE process;(vil Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in
Eastern Europe;
(vii) Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer the peoples
of Europe new prospects and improved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-European
co-operation;
(viii) Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for
advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments;(ix) Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German problem has made it possible to
anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united in
freedom, thus enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;(x) Considering that Germany's undertakings in regard to recognition of its present frontiers with
Poland, confirmation of its renunciation of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the levels of its
armed forces are exemplary measures that are likely to strengthen the confidence of all European coun-
tries;
(xt) Welcoming the fact that the states participating in the CSCE have decided to set up a conflict
prevention centre which they consider to be a first step towards the creation of a true political
instrument allowing them to settle all disputes that may arise between them;
(xir) Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which would give the parliamentary dimension to the
CSCE process as decided by the Paris summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all areas
covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;
(xiii) Recalling that WEU has special responsibility in the establishment of a new European security
concept based on the doctrine of sufliciency and taking account of the situation that will exist after the
treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;
(xiv) Considering tbe maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an
essential factor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment;
(m) Considering that, because of the imminent meeting of heads of state or government of the
Twelve in Rome, the present report can present only provisional conclusions,
RscoruunNps rHAT THE cor.rNcrl
l. Ensure, at the Rome summit meeting, that the requirements of European security in the new sit-
uation are guaranteed;
2. Play an active part in building the new all-European system of co-operation and security and
give it useful impetus based on the co-operation structures set up by member countries in the
framework of WEU, the European Comrnunity and the Atlantic Alliance;
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3. Promote implementation of the decisions taken by the CSCE, in particular by:(/ ensuring that the conflict prevention centre carries out its tasks in optimum conditions;
(ii) grving strong impetus to the monitoring of disarmament agreements, inter alia by setting up
a centre for processing data obtained by observation satellites, and inform participating
countries of its conclusions;
4. Give strong impetus to the European Community's efforts to organise and co-ordinate assistance
to the economies of the countries concerned;
5. Propose to the CSCE the continuation of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and,
after the Helsinki conference, promote further stages of disarmament and guarantee stability in
Europe;
6. In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the conse-
quences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progressive withdrawal of Soviet troops
arld define, in preparation for examination in the Atlantic Alliance, a new concept for the deployment
of allied forces in Europe;
7. Keep the Assembly continuously informed of the progress of negotiations relating to the
organisation of Western Europe and security and co-operation in Europe;
8. Follow up the intention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member
countries in security matters so as to open the way for a possible European union associating the
European Community, European political co-operation and WEU;
9. Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is set
in the context of a European security dimension;
10. Work out, with due account for the specific nature of European security interests, a European
position for revising the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain Europe's security in a
new environment;
I l. Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise
out of area;
12. Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member coun-
tries;
13. Re-examine the rOle of deterrence in the new European security context;
14. Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency.
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RECOMMENDATION 496
on bnversiya - convetriot in Soviet military iadustry
The Assembly, ''(t) Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik
agreement;
(ii) Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable sufliciency in defence being introduced by the Soviet
Union will have immediate repercussions on military production;
(ii.i) Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE)
will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment;(iv/ Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for
civilian purposes the human and material resour@s thus being released;
(v) 
-. 
Aware thgt lhe Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving
the living standards of the population;(vil Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as
means for fortifring and preserving thb principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty;
(vit) Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms
now taking place in the Soviet Union;
(viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between
Western.European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and
security in the whole of Europe;(ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct
exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial;
@ Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany andFrance have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and
cooperation,
RrcoutrrrNps rHAT rHr Coulrcr
1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new
exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about
each other's social, economic and cultural systems;
2. Urye those rlember governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agree-
ments on good neighbourliness, partnership and co,operation, based on the new pattern of interna-
tional relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU
member states;
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying
conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet
Union.
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES
SEVENTH SITTING
Monday, 3rd December 1990
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1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observen.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
E. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports
on the agenda; Adoption of the draft order of business
for the second part of the session (Doc. 1235).
9. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of
and debate on the report of the hesidential Committee,
D@.12521.
Speal<crs: The President, Mr. Martinez (Vice-President of
the Assembly), Mrs. kntz-Cornette, Mr. Martinez.
10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary€eneral of
WEU.
1, Rcsumption of tlro session
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The sitting
is open.
I declare resumed the thirty-sixth ordinary
session of the Assembly of Western European
Union which was adjourned on 8th June 1990 at
the end of the sixth sitting.
2. Auendance register
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedingst.
Replies by Mn van Eekelen to questions put by: Sit
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Scheer, Ahrens, Stegagnini,
Mrs. I*ntz-Cornette.
11. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to
the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and
the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council (Presen-
nfion of and debate on the report of the Political Com-
miltee and vole on the draft recommendation, Dor,.
1245).
Spealcen: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
(Rapporteur), Mr. Scovacricchi, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr.
Amaral, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Tummers, Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg" Mr. Ahrens (Chairman).
(b) WEU and the European Community (Presentation of
and debate on the report of the Political Committee and
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1250).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
(Rapporteur), Mr. de Puig, Sir Geoffrey Finsbery, Mr.
Malfatti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg" Mr. Moya, Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg, Mr. Perinat, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. tord,
Sir Geoffrey Finsbery, Mr. Iagorce, Sir Geoffrey
Finsbery Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Geoffrey Finsbery, Mr.
Amaral, Sir Geoffrey Finsbery, Mr. Soares Costa, Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens (Chairman).
12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
3. Adoption of the minates
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In
accordance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
4. Exanination of credentials
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the examination of the cre-
dentials of the new representatives and substi-
tutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-
session, whose names have been published in
Notice No. 7.
In accordance with Rule 6(l) of the Rules of
Procedure, these credentials have been attested
by a statement of ratification from the President1. See page 14.
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The President (continued)
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.
Is there any objection to ratifying these cre-
dentials?...
The credentials
Assembly.
I welcome our
leagues.
are ratified by the
new parliamentary col-
5. Obsenen
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
May I, at
this point, welcome the large number of foreign
observers representing the parliaments of
Central and Eastern Europe, attending our
debates and interested in the work we do
together. Virtually every European parliament is
represented here today.
Nor, ladies and gentlemen, would you under-
stand if I failed to take this opportunity to
welcome and congratulate those of our col-
leagues from the Federal Republic of Germany
who were re+lected yesterday.
On your behalf, I therefore welcome Mr.
Antretter, Mr. Bindig, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. B6hm,
Mr. Biihler, Mr. Feldmann, Mrs. Fischer, Mr.
Hitschler, Mr. Holtz, Mr. Irmer, Mr.
Kittelmann, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Miiller, Mr. Pfuhl,
Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Schmitz, Mr.
von Schmude, Mr. Soell, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Zierer
and Mr. Zywietz.
I am sure you will all join me, ladies and gen-
tlemen, in expressing our pleasure at this satis-
fying result of the German elections; to those of
our former colleagues unlucky enough not to
have been elected I shall simply express our
sympathy and appreciation of their past collabo-
ration in our work.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- Secretary-
General, your Excellencies, ladies and gen-
tlemen, this session opens in a context that is
particularly rich but also changing and fraught
with uncertainty. One week ago, a few hundred
metres from here, representatives of a hundred
million men sanctioned, with the Charter of
Paris, the end of an era and the start of some-
thing else, something full of hope that must now
be fostered with realities. The Paris summit
meeting marked the move from a process of dis-
armament to a programme of collective
security.
For the first time in history, we are indeed
witnessing a deep-rooted change in the Euro-
pean landscape that is not the consequence ofa
war or of a bloody revolution.
We in WEU have a place in this process now
that it is less a matter of organising the balance
of forces than of seeking a new form of solidarity
based on shared values.
As an institution for collective security and
European co-operation, WEU already plays an
important part whenever it is question of
reacting to violations of international law and of
organising the united reaction of the community
of nations.
You will have understood that here I am
referring to the Gulf problem and the United
Nations' decisions to the enforcement of which
we are making a major contribution.
As you know, it was on 2nd August that Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait brought storm clouds into
the clear summer sky. It immediately became
clear that WEU could not remain indifferent to
this threat to international peace and, on 8th
August, on behalf of the Assembly, I asked the
Chairman-in-Office to convene a meeting of the
WEU Council at ministerial level under Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
Subsequent discussions in the Presidential
Committee and the other committees allow me
to convey to the Council the Assembly's great
satisfaction at three measures that it took,
perhaps not immediately, but at least within a
reasonably short time after the event.
First, it decided to meet effectively, at the
required level 
- 
and for the first time since
WEU was set up 
- 
to define the bases for con-
certed action. I would add that, in associating
certain non-member countries with this
meeting, the Chairman-in-Office showed better
than ever before that WEU was not a closed
institution and was capable, in case of need, of
bringing together all European countries sharing
one and the same concept of European security
and its implications. This is a valuable indi-
cation now that a new peaceful order is being
organised in Europe and thought is also being
given to the specific vocation of each of the
organisations around which a European entity is
being shaped. In this matter, the WEU Council
has shown that, whereas neither NATO nor
European political cooperation was able to take
firm initiatives, WEU could do so without sepa-
rating the nine member countries from their
partners in the Community or in the Atlantic
Alliance.
The Council must then be congratulated for
having, in these circumstances, found ways and
means of co-ordinating action taken by member
countries to participate in implementing the
embargo against lraq decided upon by the
United Nations Security Council. This is not the
first time, since similar co-ordination had been
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organised in 1987 to allow Europe to play an
active part in mine-sweeping operations in the
Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation in these
waters in spite of the war then being waged
between Iran and lraq. However, the events last
summer led the Council, for the first time, to
meet a request from the Assembly, i.e. to
convene a meeting of chiefs of defence staff of
member countries to study together the imple-
mentation of Council decisions. This initiative
must now be followed up: in other words, this
form of European military co-ordination must
be institutionalised, first to draw lessons from
the experience gained and then to allow Europe
to react more $viftly and effectively if peace is
again threatened or if collective assistance is
required for humanitarian tasks, for instance.
Finally, I wish to thank the Council for associ-
ating the Assembly, better than ever before, with
its activities. The two ministerial meetings were
indeed followed by meetings between the
Chairman-in-Oflice or his representative and
the Assembly, represented either by its Presi-
dential Committee or by its Political and
Defence Committees, at which valuable infor-
mation was given to the parliamentarians on the
Council's action, after which our questions were
answered in detail. It was also possible for the
Presidential Committee to send a delegation to
the Gulf to see how co-ordination was working
on the spot and to establish useful contacts with
the authorities of certain countries in the
region.
My special thanks go to the governments of
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the
Netherlands, which allowed the delegation to be
received on board their countries' warships,
where they were given detailed, instructive
information, after meeting, in Paris, the most
senior military staff responsible for co-
ordination. I would also thank the United States
Government for authorising us to extend our
mission beyond the limits of WEU and wel-
coming us aboard an American ship. The
reports that are to be presented at this session by
Mr. De Decker, for the Political Committee, and
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for the Defence Com-
mittee, both members of the delegation, will
allow the Assembly to assess the importance of
this visit and the information obtained. I would
sum up the situation by telling you that
European participation in the naval operations
- 
overall, 500/o of the total operational strength 
-
designed to apply the embargo has been of great
importance and has allowed the peoples in the
region to see Europe as an essential partner in
organising the return to a balanced, lasting peace.
The Presidential Committee's adoption of the
reports by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer
on 20th September enabled the Assembly to
make a very useful contribution in helping the
Arab countries understand the whys and where-
fores of the European presence in the Gulf.
I personally have endeavoured to ensure that
the whole Assembly was kept duly informed of
the activities of the Presidential Committee and
the Council in this area. All the documents ema-
nating from the Council have been sent to you
very quickly and the Prdsidential Committee did
not hesitate to resort to exceptional proced-
ure to allow the recommendations adopted by
the committees to be transmitted to the Council
on 2fth September, with the endorsement of the
Presidential Committee. It has also arranged for
new reports to be prepared providing material
for our debates at the present session.
There seem to be two kinds of lesson to be
drawn already from this affair which is not yet
over. First, WEU is now, more than ever, the
necessary channel for questions that cannot
validly be handled in NATO or solved solely in
the framework of political co-operation because
they involve the intervention of armed forces.
Second, setting WEU co-operation in motion is
still too slow for both military and political
reasons. Hence, the r6le effectively played by
Europe was not properly recognised by interna-
tional opinion and it did not enjoy all the
political advantages that it might have derived
from its military presence in the region. Today,
the necessary changes must be made in WEU's
methods so that it may act more quickly and
effectively should the need arise again.
Since none ofour cbuntries is now prepared to
allow its armed forces to be engaged in opera-
tions in which it has not decided to take part, it
would be desirable for them all to agree, outside
a time of crisis, to pre-assign some of their forces
and means for possible operations outside
Europe. This implies prior agreement on proce'
dures to be implemented and on the measures to
be taken in respect of transport and logistics,
exchanges of information and' interoperability of
armaments that might be earmarked for
co-ordinated operations outside Europe. Such
measures of course would not affect each state's
freedom to decide, in all circumstances, on the
nature of its commitment, be it to ensure appli-
cation of Security Council resolutions, the safe-
guarding of its nationals or any other peace-
keeping action. However, such steps would
considerably strengthen Europe's ability to voice
its views when a conflict is in the ofling and,
consequently, avert any threat to international
peace.
We must realise that, without WEU
co-ordination, most member countries would
not have been able or would not have wished to
take part in military deployment in the region of
the Gulf. However, such participation, even if
only modest, was of vital political importance. It
showed that Europe existed, not only as the sum
of resources made available by countries pre-
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pared to act against Iraq but also as an
expression of political will, separate from that of
the Americans, althouglr associated with them,
probably more alive to the legitimate concerns
of Arab peoples and states and also more
anxious to act only in the framework of guide-
lines laid down by the only authority capable of
expressing the point ofview ofthe international
community as a whole, i.e. the United Nations
Security Council. Insofar as we hope that the
application of the measures decided upen by the
Security Council will still allow peace to be
restored on a lawful basis, our co-ordinated par-
ticipation in the deployment of forces in the
Gulf is likely to have a strong influence on the
course of events and to ensure that Europe plays
its due part in settling the conflict.
The adoption of Resolution 678 by the
Security Council on 29th November makes it
urgent for the Council to meet again to decide
how Europe would take part in the trial of force
should Iraq's attitude make this necessary. A
firm statement by the Council of Ministers on
this subject at its meeting on 10th December
would obviously help to strengthen the action by
which the international community intends to
ensure that Iraq evacuates Kuwait without
recourse to force becoming necessary.
When I was in New York in November
attending the session of the United Nations
General Assembly, I was able to assess the
progress that Europe had made in world affairs
itrantcs to WEU because of the cohesion it
showed in the Gulf affair. On two occasions, I
met representatives of WEU member countries
during my week in New York and discussed
with them our views on the action taken by
Europe to ensure that a concept of peace pre-
vails, with due respect for international law,
thus giving our presence in the Gulf its full
dimension. I was also able to see that WEU was
henceforth an aspect of Europe that had become
a reality extending well beyond the periodical
meetings of ambassadors in london.
The second prominent matter in recent weeks
was the CSCE summit meeting in Paris from
19th to 21st November.
Its first task was to turn the page on a past
marked by the East-West confrontation that had
dominated international life for forty-three
years. With the signing of the treaty on the limi-
tation of conventional forces, the threat to
Western Europe is diminishing so much that
some are now wondering whether it is necessary
to retain the forces and bodies which have
ensured Europe's security for the last half-
century. This doubt is heightened because the
Warsaw Pact has practically disappeared, at
least as a military organisation, Germany has
been reunited around the Federal Republic and
within the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris
summit meeting has issued a charter for a new
Europe which sketches the guidelines for a new
order of peace and collective security on our
continent.
We all welcome these three events unre-
servedly. The end of an arrns race, which
weighed heavily on the development of our
economies and the balance of our societies, was
an aspiration which had always been endorsed
by WEU and its Assembly which, it should be
recalled, were set up in 1954 for the specific
purpose of establishing a freely-accepted disci-
pline between the member countries in this area.
The reunification of Germany in a democratic
state had, from the same date, been at the top of
the list of aims that the member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance set themselves in the london
Agreements. Finally, the replacement of the con-
frontation between blocs by a collective security
system had been the aim pursued !V all
European states since the Helsinki conference
whose Final Act dates back to 1975. I do not
think there are any differences between us on
these three points.
Conversely, in preparing for the present
session, I noted that different interpretations
have been placed on this year's events and I
have every reason to think that these will be at
the centre of this week's debates.
Some consider that suffrcient progress has
been made towards a new security order in
Europe to allow, here and now, a complete reap
praisal of the institutions which, in recent
decades, formed the basis of our security. They
consider that the participation of the five
members of the Security Council in the condem-
nation of Iraq and the institutionalisation of the
CSCE are in themselves sufficient guarantees for
the maintenance of international peace for any
further European mititary deployment to be
envisaged only to serve one or other of those
bodies.
Others, on the contrary, are still keenly aware
of the precarious nature of the majority in the
Security Council opposing the Iraqi aggression
and of the limits of the CSCE's authority. They
are still concerned about the existence of a sig-
nificant military and nuclear arsenal on both
sides of the Urals, the threatened withdrawal of
a large proportion of the American forces still
stationed in Europe and the risks of an
implosion in certain Central and Eastern
Euiopean countries due to the combined effects
of an unprecedented economic and social crisis
and the reawakening of nationalism. Finally, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world,
the development of chemical weapons and the
increase in the number of ballistic missiles mean
that while, for many people, Europe's security is
still a hope, it is not an established fact and still
less a certainty.
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In present circumstances in Europe, I believe
many people, aware of certain aspects of the new
realities, have a reasonable view of the future
but without grasping all the aspects. One of
WEU's vocations is now quite clearly to con-
tribute, within the framework of its responsibil-
ities, to the new organisation of peace in Europe.
Here, we cannot expect to replace the CSCE
whose r0le is to clarify and develop the prin-
ciples set out in the Helsinki Final Act and the
Charter of Paris for a new Europe and also to
implement them in the bodies it has just set up,
with a particular view to preventing conflicts.
Yet today it is hardly conceivable that the
thirty-four member countries of the CSCE can
agree to impose the implementation of any prin-
ciples it may define on countries which do not
wish to do so. Nor is it conceivable for it to rely
on national states to carry out this task, for
security and peace in Europe cannot be guar-
anteed by the domination of one power. Becauseit is the only truly European organisation
responsible for defence matters, WEU is also the
only one able to back up the CSCE when the
latter needs to deter one of its participants from
infringing the principles it defines. This is a
dimension of European security which our gov-
ernments will have to bear in mind when they
examine the necessary revision of the modified
Brussels Treaty in the coming year. Our
Assembly should also be asked to play a full part
in the exchanges of views which should lead to
the definition of the parliamentary dimension of
the CSCE.
In the context of this session, it is inevitable
that the two concepts of European security that
are upheld here will come to grips when WEU's
r6le in future years has to be determined. This
was evident when the Political Committee
finalised the reports it is to present at this
session and we should be grateful to it for having
reached the necessary compromises so that the
documents prepared by its rapporteurs will all 
-
or so we hope 
- 
be presented for public debate.
It is not by concealing differences or, one might
say, varying sensitivities, that exist in European
opinions but, on the contrary, by expressing
them in unrestricted debate that we shall play
the r6le assigned to the Assembly by the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and aflirm that vocation,
motives about the place security should occupy
in Europe of the Twelve. I must say, quite hon-
estly, that the many speeches, motions and pro-
posals emanating from various sides on this
subject show neither legal rigour nor political
clarity.
I do not believe there are any serious differ-
ences between us on fundamentals, i.e. that
Europe should assume greater responsibility for
its own security in future years and that the
Community has become the pole around which
future European union will be organised.
However, to attempt in the near future to
place defence in the framework of the Com-
munity either by separating Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty from the rest of the
treaty and including it in the Rome Treaty or by
wrongly interpreting the Single European Act or,
again, by remaining outside any form of treaty
would, I believe, run counter to the very cause of
European union. Moreover, the European Par-
liament felt this quite clearly when it adopted a
resolution urging the governments to stop reacti-
vating WEU to allow the Community to exercise
WEU's responsibilities and the European Par-
liament to take charge of ours, which meant it
preferred a paralysed Europe to European
activity beyond its control.
We have a more demanding and more respon-
sible concept of the building of Europe. We
think that what is being done, what is being pre-
pared in WEU, is a step forward for Europe
whose union cannot be achieved merely throughthe absorption into the Community of
organisations based on sound foundations such
as the modified Brussels Treaty but by bringing
together institutions such as the Community,
political co-operation and WEU in a dynamic
balance. The status and practice of each rep
resent factual European co-operation. Where
institutions are concerned, Europe is not a blank
page, as the President of the French Republic
recalled when opening the Paris conference on
l9th November. I hope the Rome summit
meeting will give priority to seeking converging
views rather than giving in to facile false solu-
tions which, while seeming to overcome the
more apparent than real contradictions in the
building of Europe, would in fact deprive
Europe of most of its ability to act in the area for
which we are responsible.
On the contrary, it is by making WEU better
able to exercise its responsibilities that we shall
further the advancement of the European cause.I will recall only for the record the proposals
made several times by our Assembly for WEU to
organise Europe's participation in the verifi-
cation provided for in the CFE agreements. At a
symposium organised by our Scientific Com-
mittee in Rome last April, we backed these pro-
posals up with a strong case for the creation of a
European agency to process data obtained by
l
{
i
which some now seem to wish to challenge, ol
being the parliament of European security.
Now the third dimension imposed on our
session by current events: we are meeting on the
eve of the Rome summit meeting which is to
allow the twelve member countries of the Com-
munity to fix the next stages in their march
towards economic and monetary union and
political union. For several weeks, this last point
has certainly been a focal point for quite natural
hopes and some more questionable ulterior
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satellites. The decision is in the Council's hands
and we would find it hard to understand any
further delay now that the CFE agreement was
signed last month. The Gulf affair has merely
underlined Europe's need to have the satellite
observation capability that it is lacking.
Even more important would be a decision by
our governments to appoint permanent repr€-
sentatives to the WEU Council, as in the
Council of Europe and NATO, so that WEU
questions, which will be of increasing impor-
tance in the future, may be followed full time
and at an appropriate level by governments.
All the matters I have just mentioned are on
the agenda of our session. It will be for you to
examine them in depth so that the message we
convey to the Council, to the press and to public
opinion is enhanced by our debates before being
weighed up by our votes. Without further delay,
ladies and gentlemen, I will therefore give you
the floor so that a session may be opened which
should be particularly important for the future
of Europe in view of the events in recent months
and others expected in the weeks ahead.
7. Elcction of a Yice-President of the Assembly
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Our friend
and colleague, Mr. Sarti, who is now Vice-
President of the Italian National Assembly, has
advised me of his resignation from the post of
Vice-President of the Assembly, and we must
therefore decide who is to take his place.
One nomination, that of Mr. Sinesio, has been
received, in the form prescribed by the rules.
If there is no objection, I propose that the
election of Mr. Sinesio as Vice-President should
be by acclamation.
Is there any objection?...
I therefore declare Mr. Sinesio duly elected
Vice-President of the Assembly.
The Vice-Presidents of the Assembly in order
of seniority are therefore: Mr. Sinesio, Mrs.
Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs.
Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa,
Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.
8. Request by the Political Committee
to place two relnrts on the agenda
Adoption of the draft order of business
of the second part of the session
(Doc, 1235)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before
examining the draft ordei of business for the
second part ofthe thirty-sixth ordinary session, I
have to advise the Assembly that, under Rule 4l
of the Rules of Procedure, the Political Com-
mittee has asked that the following be placed on
the agenda: first, the report on the revision of
the modified Brussels Treaty: WEU and the
European Community; second, subject to its
adopiion, the report on the consequences of
developments in Central and Eastern Europe for
European security.
Are there twenty members opposing the
request of the Political Committee?...
There are not. The reports are therefore
placed on the agenda.
The Assembly now has to vote on the
adoption of the draft order of business for the
second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session,
Document 1235.
Is there any opposition to the draft order of
business?...
The draft order of business is adopted.
9. Action by the Presidential Committez
(Presentation of aad debate on the report
of thc Presidential Conmittee, Doc. 1252)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the presentation of and
debate on the report of the Presidential Com-
mittee on action by the Presidential Committee,
Document 1252.
I call Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the
Assembly and Rapporteur.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation). - MayI first thank my colleagues in the Presidential
Committee for kindly entrusting me with the
responsibility of presenting the report on the
activity of the Presidential Committee, now that
our country and parliamentary delegation have
had six months of full participation in the life of
WEU, its Assembly and the committee.
I should like to begin by emphasising that the
last six months have not been exactly
uneventful. They have seen events of extreme
importance not only for the whole world,
Euiope and our individual countries but also for
WEU because they relate to WEU's field of
responsibility. So, there has been nothing
humdrum about the life of our Assembly during
the period on which we are reporting; on the
contiary, it has been a time of tensio!, reflected
of course in the activity and work of the Presi-
dential Committee.
Two major political events, to which Mr.
Pontillon referred in his opening speech, have
claimed the committee's attention, and they are
of course well represented in the orders of the
day of this plenary session. One relates to the
Gulf crisis and the other to what is going on in
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connection with the development of the new
European architecture, with its effects in the
area of security, culminating recently in the
CSCE summit held in Paris. We shall not
discuss either of these two events in depth just
now; this we shall do during the coming week.
Nevertheless, a number of important comments
are called for directly relating to the action taken
about them by the Presidential Committee.
As regards the war that Iraq has launched
against Kuwait, Iraq's aggression against the
international community and the conflict in the
Gulf, the Presidential Committee has held
several meetings connected with the activity of
the WEU Council of Ministers. In these
meetings we were given accurate, detailed, last-
minute and first-hand information by the
French Presidency. With this information, the
committee, on behalf of the Assembly, was able
to provide well-informed support, see the satis-
fying consequences of the reactivation of WEU
and play a more active and first-hand part in the
process of reactivation. The information from
the French Presidency also enabled the Presi-
dents in the committee to communicate the
information received to national parliaments,
thus contributing towards fruitful debate in
those parliaments and helping to increase the
awareness of and esteem for Western European
Union.
Activity with regard to the development of the
European architecture is intense and fast-
moving and though the question is certainly less
dramatic and tense than the Gulf conflict it is
perhaps no less important for the future. The
Presidential Committee has been able to gather
and disseminate information, have it discussed
by the committee's members and then inform
the national parliaments, their respective gov-
ernments and the WEU Council of Ministers of
the concerns the committee felt. Finally, it has
been able to think about the place that Western
European Union should occupy and the r6le it
should play in the construction of Europe that is
under way, as Mr. Pontillon also said a moment
ago. There can be no doubt that, in this con-
struction of Europe, security and a common
security policy are quite simply essential if the
plan is to advance.
The committee has fulfilled its budgetary
responsibilities as stated in the written report of
which you all have a copy, but I regret to have to
inform you of the Presidential Committee's dis-
appointment to learn that the expert committees
that were asked to communicate their findings
on this subject had not been able to satisfy, at
least not fully, the proper demands of the
Assembly and thus enable our activity to be
extended as required by the presence of Spain
and Portugal in WEU; neither have the experts
met our requirements enabling the Assembly to
step up its activity to the level required by the
reactivation of the organisation, as highlighted
by the events referred to above. It therefore
seems necessary to ask each delegation once
more to urge its government's representatives on
the Council of Ministers to understand the need
for and approve the budgetary increase for the
Assembly. Unless the additional resources are
forthcoming, much of what is said here now and
in the next few days will not produce any con-
crete result.
One minor point in connection with the work
of our committee concerns the logo of our
Assembly. Excellent work has been done on this
by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations under the chairmanship of Mr. Ewing.
This has been a triumph in that such a good
result has been produced so cheaply. This logo
should enable WEU to be more easily identified
among other European institutions and by the
public in our countries.
In conclusion, I should firstly like to express
the satisfaction we feel at the high level of
co-operation between the Presidential Com-
mittee and the Council of Ministers. I believe
that in this co-operation a very great degree of
agfeement and trust has been attained and we
hope to maintain and if possible improve it. Our
thanks are also due to the French Presidency forits recognition of our common interest in
achieving maximum flexibility and mutual
trust.
But secondly, I must share with you the
increasing concern felt by the Presidential Com-
mittee in connection with the events of the past
six months, especially the Gulf crisis. We are
concerned about the Assembly's lack of a repre-
sentative organ able to meet at short notice,
within days or even hours in certain circum-
stances, in order to analyse situations and
express the views of the Assembly on certain
events or actions that call for an immediate
opinion from the Assembly, not after five
months have gone by, which is what happened
after the events of 2nd August of this year. In
our view, there are two ways in which this gap
could be bridged: by giving much wider powers
to the Presidential Committee itself or by setting
up an intermediate body between the Assembly
and the Presidential Committee, similar to the
Standing Committee in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. We believe
that a body of this type is needed in order to
overcome the hiatus that developed during this
period. We are firmly of the opinion that this
course is preferable to giving wider powers to
the committee, even though we are aware that it
implies a long and complicated process like all
prooesses that involve changing regulations and
statutes in organisations as well developed as
WEU. In any event the Assembly, through the
52
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES SEVENTH SITTING
Mr. Martinez (continued)
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges, should take this matter in hand - we
understand that it is already doing so - and
submit its proposals as soon as possible.
In conclusion, I should like to thank the secre-
tariat once more for its help in drawing up the
document before you and my colleagues on the
Presidential Committee for appointing me to
represent them in this way at our meeting.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Mr. Martinez, for that excellent report.
The debate is open.
I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (Luxembourg)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. Martinez is virtually pro-
posing an intermediate group between the Presi-
dential Committee and our parliamentary
Assembly. Why should the Presidential Com-
mittee not be capable of fulfilling the tasks
arising in exceptional circumstances like those
which have occurred this year?
I really cannot see the point of su6h a standing
committee.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Does
anyone else wish to speak?...
The debate is closed.
I call the Rapporteur to reply to that
statement.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation). - I
have only one thing to say and that is that I am
in complete agreement. Mrs. Lentz-Cornette has
indeed recognised that we are following exactly
the course she indicates to remedy the short-
comings which we have identified in our
work.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). With
regard to the report presented by Mr. Martinez,
I take it that the Assembly agrees that we ratify
the action of the Presidential Committee?
Is anyone against?...
The action of the Presidential Committee is
ratified.
10. Address by Mr. van Eeleelen,
Secrctary-General of WEU
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the address by Mr. van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I
have pleasure in welcoming to this resumed
session and now invite to take the rostrum.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of
WEU) (Translation). - Mr. President, your
Excellencies, honourable members, it only
happens once in a blue moon, but this timeyour
session precedes the autumn meeting of the
WEU Ministerial Council by a few days. Thus
exempt from commenting on its outcome, I shall
focus- today on the future prospects for
European security.
A decisive decade in the history of the
European continent is drawing to a close. Over
this month of December 1990, first, the nine
WEU member states on Monday next, then the
twelve members of the European Council and
Intergovernmental Conferences and finally the
North Atlantic Council will be laying the
groundwork for faster progress with the building
of Europe in general and at the same time con-
tinuing to cbnstruct the European security
bulwark.
No such bulwark could exist without being
buttressed on two sides: on one, the European
Union that is to come; on the other, the Atlantic
Alliance. The European security identity derives
its strength and raison d'0tre from this dual but-
tressing - which has given us prosperity and
peace. Situated at the interface, the reactivated
WnU is all the better placed to serve as a model
for the security dimension of the European con-
struction process.
May I, Mr. President, take this opportunity to
press'home a twofold message prompted by a
ieading of the very pertinent reports by your
Assembly's committees and your own con-
densed and impressive opening address. Let me
get straight to the point and express two ideas,
wtrictr I believe are fundamental not only to the
discussions that will take place in this forum but
also to WEU's medium-term future.
First of all, let us harbour no illusions: the
European edifice will not have a credible
security dimension that will maintain peace in
our continent and worldwide if we skimp on the
tools that will make our defence strong. This is
the lesson that I personally have learned from an
analysis of the geostrategic conditions of our
security, the unfolding events in the Gulf crisis
and tlie prospects opened up by the CSCE
summit in paris. Let us not dissociate defence
from security, thinking that we can achieve the
latter without having the resources for the
former.
Secondly, the decisions on European union
now in geslation and the current strategic review
within the alliance will pave the way for a
harmonisation of institutions, in which our
organisation too - in both its intergovernmental
and its parliamentary dimension - will be impli-
cated. We cannot overlook the fact that certain
deadlines are approaching and we must
therefore be ready for them. The changes which
have taken place this year in the WEU minis-
terial organs have illustrated this vital need for
flexibility.
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The end of the cold war, closing the ideo.
logical divide that has separated the East from
the West of Europe, has created a continental
space where co-operation can flourish on a new
basis. To a growing extent, this space will be
dominated by a coherent European Community
weaving a varied fabric of relationships with
peoples who, now that the bloc has been rent
asunder, are at last liberated from servitude. The
faster Europe manages to organise itself, the
more it will be able to exploit its assets.
The first challenge facing the European insti-
tutions is to succeed in associating Central and
Eastern Europe with the future European union.
The first stage is that formidable revolution,
democratisation, which is inseparable from the
introduction of a market economy. If successful,it will pay substantial dividends in terms of
security.
The aflirrration of European unity can only
strengthen the process of democracy, which is
the prerequisite for restoring creativity where
excessive bureaucracy has led to penury.
Perestroika comes from an awareness that
democracy and the abolition of the party state
are the only path for the Soviet Union if it is to
remain a credible power. This process of ques-
tioning is revealing shortcomings and accentu-
ating poverty, thus provoking setbacks.
Our Europe must bring everything to bear to
ensure that they do not lead to confrontation in
the Soviet Union or in Yugoslavia. One of Pres-
ident Gorbachev's close advisers has warned of
the consequences of a possible " political
Chernobyl': uncontrollable migration and a
return to authoritarianism, with all the tragedies
it brings in its wake.
Our countries can stave off disaster by giving
generously oftheir aid and experience, as urgedby Chancellor Kohl, for this is also an
investment in our own future and in peace. The
status quo may in the event be a far cry from the
lasting stability we hope to see established.
Peoples are rediscovering their history and
identity. Former solidarity is being recreated
across frontiers often imposed in flagrant dis-
regard of human realities. A new unity may arisefrom today's fragmentation, provided that
Western Europe offers diversified and condi-
tional assistance, which, in reducing the imbal-
ances and promoting the requisite conversion,
will make genuine partners of the countries of
Eastern Europe.
If it is to be truly satisfactory, such a devel-
opment calls for the European union to be built
with tenacity but without undue haste. Two
traps to be avoided are a return to narrow
nationalism and starry-eyed optimism about a
world order.
Not all the risks of unequal rates of devel-
opment are in the East; they confront us on all
sides. The disastrous situation in Africa, and to
a lesser extent in Iatin America, is getting even
worse, and the Gulf crisis is certainly not
helping.
The danger of monetary disorder is no
illusion. While it places pressure on Europe toput its own house in order, it also imposes a
duty upon us to be able to contribute to the
emergence of a new international order in this
field.
Whatever soothing words we may choose to
mask the dangerous realities, Europe is con-
fronted with risks that are not just potential. It
must draw the right conclusions in terms of its
security. Saddam Hussein has at least the merit
of reminding us that we should be ready for all
contingencies.
Four months after the outbreak of the Gulf
crisis, I believe, Mr. President, that we can con-
gratulate ourselves that WEU 
- 
the Council and
Assembly 
- 
has so diligently and effectively
rallied to the breach. Our organisation's
communiqu6s and messages have helped to
mobilise public opinion while, behind the scenes,
naval, airlground and logistic co-ordination has
been set up to enforce the embargo.
The European Community and WEU member
states are united in condemning the annexation
of Kuwait and the grave, repeated violations of
international law perpetrated by Iraq in the
wake of this * coup de force ". They are also
united in their resolve to implement the resolu-
tions of the United Nations Security Council.
Their firmness reflects their determination to
exhaust every means of exerting peaceful
pressure. This does not mean that they are
waiving the option of force which Saddam
Hussein's criminal obduracy may oblige them to
invoke. Paradoxically, the future of peace is in
the hands of the aggressor.
By comparison with the 1988-89 operation,
WEU has established itself in the field as a true
partner to the Americans and to the Arab
powers who have expressed the wish for direct
aid from the international community. On this
subject, you will find helpful details in the
article I have just written for the November-
December issue of the journal * Survival ".
The time has not yet come to take stock of
these actions by WEU, but at least we have now
stated the problem of the mechanisms and
means that our organisation should have at its
disposal if it is to be able to play an effective
operational r6le in the early stages ofan out-of-
Europe crisis.
Like you, Mr. President, and Mr. De Decker, I
believe that Europe will have to have well-
trained and well-armed intervention forces that
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will enable it to defend its own interests in the
world, though without seeking to be a world
policeman. Is it realistic to believe that Europe
could be satisfied with United Nations forces to
act as buffers between warring factions or as
humanitarian missions? The world is far from
being governed by the principles that are
starting to prevail in Europe through the CSCE
process.
(The speaker continued in Enslish)
These principles have just been successfully
confirmed and expanded by the Charter of
Paris. A new chapter has been opened in the
momentous development of the CSCE process,
which paved the way for the opening of the gates
of freedom. Institutionalised ongoing co-
operation, as well as the first practical steps
towards effective conflict-prevention mecha-
nisms, signal a new and welcome departure.
However, the limitations of the CSCE process
are obvious. The difficult task ahead of giving
substance and life to the new bodies raises the
broader issue of structuring the three levels of
European co-operation in the field of security:
WEU and the European union, the alliance and
the CSCE process.
WEU and the alliance must ensure and rein-
force their cohesion in order to remain the irre-
placeable focus of stability for our continent.
Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance remains as jus-
tified in its existence as ever. The transatlantic
link binding Europe and North America is being
reassessed and will be developed on a new basis
in the wake of the CFE treaty. That is the
purpose of the review of the alliance's tasks and
the adaptation of NATO structures to a Europe
soon to be free of over-militarised confron-
tation.
This leap towards a future where neither
defence nor deterrence has become obsolete will
guarantee the relevance of the alliance in three
iespects. First, it will be as a stabilising factor as
long as 
- 
not least for the emerying democracies
- 
the Soviet Union or even Russia retains over-
whelming conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Secondly, it will be as a forum where North
America and Europe discuss common security
concerns, evaluate risks and co-ordinate their
responses; and thirdly, as an inspiration and
model for possible further development of
security structures in the CSCE framework.
The CSCE will operate most effectively at the
level of principles and prevention. It cannot for
the foreseeable future provide the firm defence
guarantees for the whole of Europe which exist
in the Washington and Brussels Treaties. WEU
and the alliance will continue to be the basis for
deterrence and defence.
Europe will effectively shoulder its increased
part of the common security burden only if it
develops its security co-operation - notably
through the creation of multinational units able
to integrate American reinforcements - and
avoids the trap of a renationalisation of defence.
Unilateral, unco-ordinated decisions would only
undermine national defence efforts as well as
Europe's credibility.
Within the alliance Europeans must now
ensure that their positions are presented and
explained so as to nurture an open-ended debate
prior to any final decision. This is an essential
element ol a balanced two-way working rela-
tionship with North America. European coun-
tries must get their act together and engage in a
process of bold and imaginative reflection, ini-
iiated in the WEU framework, to strengthen
their contribution to the alliance and give it
more coherence.
This will require more autonomy of action for
Europeans, and even the definition of opera-
tional r6les - in verification and space obser-
vation, for instance. Such developments will be
based on or stem from major steps forward in
the process of achieving a European union,
which is the commonly-accepted aim of the
Nine of WEU or the Twelve of the European
Community.
A gradual approach is being envisaged to that
end. Several institutional formulae have been
put forward. The vital prerequisites are,.first, to
ietain the achievements of the Community - the
acquis communautd; secondly, to build on the
achievements of WEU reactivation; thirdly, to
recognise that it will take some time fully.to
integrate a foreign policy and security
dimension into the mainstream of the European
construction process; and, fourthly, to address
security as a whole rather than piecemeal.
Transfers of sovereignty in defence obviously
can only be a step-by-step process. In the
meantime, bridges will have to be built. WEU
will be a useful instrument in that respect, since
its vocation is precisely to build bridges with the
community and with the alliance, paving the
way for the long overdue emergence of a strorlg
Euiopean defence identity as well as, what I call,
a transatlantic security contract. New mecha-
nisms for EC-WEU co-ordination may result
from the intergovernmental conference which is
to start in a few days.
Premature enlargement of WEU and the EC
for the sake of symmetry should be avoided
until the relationship between NATO, the EC
and WEU has been reassessed and improved
and until precise commonly-agreed criteria have
been defined. However, the intensification of
the information arrangements enjoyed by
Greece and Turkey as well as their extension to
other European NATO partners who are not in
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the Community and who wish to enjoy the same
opportunity may be considered.
As the Nine and the Twelve draw close
together, WEU countries could start to define
the content of future security contracts designed
to reinforce their relationships with those coun-
tries which, especially given their geostrategic
position, have a specific and major r6le in the
collective defence. The aim of such an initiative
would be to provide reassurance, expanding and
better co-ordinating existing security assistance
and co-operation under the auspices of the com-
petent European security institutions. It would
supplement, but not undermine or replace, com-
mitments undertaken within the alliance.
I am confident, Mr. President, that Europe
will move forward resolutely to give itself the
necessary structures and means to shoulder to
the full its ever-increasing responsibilities in the
world. The 1990s will be the decade of progress
in security, just as the 1960s were in economics
and the 1970s in foreign policy co-operation.
For the building of Europe, security is inextri-
cably linked to continuing prosperity, the latter
reinforcing the former. I hope that your discus-
sions will help to clarify the goals of European
union, for clarity is all the more vital since
success in the building of Europe depends so
much on public assent.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Secretary-General, for your highly informative
and realistic address. I trust you will be prepared
to reply to questions as usual.
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (Uniled Kingdom). 
-I have three quick questions to ask. Two arise
from the information letter covering May to
August. On page five the Secretary-General talks
about the institutionalisation of the CSCE, but
he makes no reference to the proposed assembly
of Europe. May we take it that he endorses the
idea of an assembly of Europe?
Secondly, the Secretary-General talked about
the four subjects which the institute is exam-
ining. May we take it that the conclusions willbe made available to this parliamentary
Assembly?
My third question is about a report which
appeared in yesterday's Figaro and suggests that
the Secretary-General is one of those who wishesto see his organisation disappear. Does he
endorse what Figaro says or is it inaccurate, as
so many newspaper reports are?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Secretary-General.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Seuetary-General of
WEU). 
- 
I gladly respond to Sir Geoffrey. All
three points merit an immediate reply.
First, I certainly endorse the assembly of
Europe, although it will probably have responsi-
bilities outside WEU and this Assembly in the
sense of security. However, at the same time 
- 
I
stress that this is my personal conviction 
- 
it
should be as identical as possible to the Council
of Europe. We do not need another assembly in
Europe standing entirely on its own. I know that
there is a problem with the North American rep
resentation, but I hope that it can be resolved. I
hope that there will be convergence. The
assembly of Europe will primarily deal with the
third basket of the CSCE process 
- 
the human
dimensions and everything that can be done to
strengthen human rights.
Secondly, we hope to inform the Assembly
about the major findings of the seminars in the
WEU Institute which, thanks to John Roper, got
off to an amazingly quick start. It has already
held three seminars on East-West relations with
representatives of Eastern European countries,
dealing with future European architecture and
the situation in the Mediterranean. I am sure
that Mr. Roper will be happy to make a
summary available to the Assembly.
Thirdly, as is often the case with newspaper
items, they are not entirely correct. Sometimes I
have said that I am probably the only Secretary-
General who, if everything goes as he wishes, in
the end would not mind seeing his oryanisation
merge into a wider context. In that context, I
hope that my speech this afternoon was useful to
the Assembly. I intended to demonstrate how I
look at the process of convergence. We started
with the economic dimension, then the foreign
policy dimension was added in the 1970s. Ulti-
mately, in the 1990s, I hope that other dimen-
sions will join the process 
- 
the environmental
and social dimensions as well as the security
dimension. I hope that ultimately we can all
merge in a European union. I have the feeling
that somebody else will be the Secretary-General
of WEU when that is realised.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Scheer.
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
In his statement the Secretary-
General referred to the intervention forces that
will be needed in future. My three questions are
directly related to this.
First, why set up intervention forces now, of
all times, at the beginning of the 1990s? Why are
these forces deemed necessary now, when-they
have not been necessary for the last few decadei
and there is surely more scope for peace and
ddtente now than in the past?
Second, how can this course, if adopted, be
r9e.ard9d as compatible with disarmament policy
objectives? Our goal is surely to solve political
problems by trying to eliminate their social and
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political causes peacefully, instead of adopting
this kind of approach and possibly making the
mistake that has been made 
- 
in different cir-
cumstances 
- 
several times in the last four
decades, by actually creating the problem which
must then allegedly be eliminated by a military
potential?
Third, how does the WEU Council of Min-
isters justify out-of-area operations by Western
European Union under the WEU treaty? I have
read the WEU treaty several times, without
finding anything in the text, purpose or reasons
underlying its existence to justify the formation
of out-of-area intervention forces. Can the Sec-
retary-General refute my suspicion that this
course of action would be in contravention of
the WEU treaty?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Secretary-General.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of
WEU)(Translation). 
- 
I will begin with the third
question, because I think it is the most
important. I believe WEU has dual competence
here. First, Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty
says that the WEU Council may be convened if
that is what a country wants, in connection with,
say, a crisis, or political developments anywhere
in the world, in other words, not restricted to
Europe.
Second, we have already set out in The Hague
platform that the most important question for
us Europeans is that of our security interests in
the world. So we are not restricted to one treaty
area, as NATO is. All we are concerned about is
whether there are European interests important
enough to be protected by specific means, such
as economic sanctions, or even, at the end of the
day, military means. The WEU Council came to
the conclusion in 1987 that we were able and
also willing to use such means. We are prepared.
We proved it in 1987, with the naval operation
in the Gulf, and we are doing so again today in
the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression. We are
prepared to accept responsibility for protecting
European interests. We do not want to leave
everything to the Americans. Nor will this be
possible in the future, because I do not think the
Americans will co-operate if we Europeans shirk
our respoRsibility. That would do serious harm
to relations with North America.
That is the justification, in general terms.
You began by asking, why intervention
forces? In my opinion, what is not possible
today 
- 
the President and Mr. De Decker have
said much the same thing 
- 
is a presence in the
Gulf region that is based on more than naval
units, that is to say, one that also includes land
and air forces. Why not? Because we do not have
suitable equipment and because these forces
have not had appropriate training. In the past
most WEU countries have been geared entirely
to an East-West crisis, to a major crisis, to a sur-
prise attack. We hope this will no longer happen
- 
and if it did, there would be a warning period.
My personal idea 
- 
we have not yet discussed
all the details in the WEU Council 
- 
is that we
in Europe should be capable of making some of
the troops we already have, and can use, more
mobile and training and equipping them better,
so that they can be deployed outside Europe if
that is the political decision we take. So the flex-
ibility that everyone is now emphasising should
also apply to these forces.
Your second question was whether this is
compatible with disarmament agreements. Yes,
of course it is. Why should it not be? As I told
the Assembly in June, European willingness to
integrate our forces into multinational units is
conducive to stability and confidence building.
We must work towards a situation in which mul-
tinational units are taken for granted in Europe,
in which military power is not national power. I
believe this to be entirely compatible with dis-
armament and arms control. So far, we have
restrictions on tanks and so on, but it is to be
hoped that there will also be ceilings on numbers
of troops in our countries, even before I 992. But
the deployment of multinational units in third-
country conflicts will be entirely compatible
with this agreement.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
I am sure we all welcomed the
initiative taken by President Bush immediately
after the Security Council issued its ultimatum,
in offering direct discussions with Iraq. I think
we all hope this will lead to a political solution
of this difficult problem. Having said this, I
have the following questions.
First, how was WEU, or how were the coun-
tries that have sent forces to the Gulf region,
involved in the American President's decision?
Were there any consultations, or, if not, how was
the decision communicated?
Second, are the discussions to take place after
consultation with WEU or with its participation,
or at least that of those countries which have
sent forces to the Gulf region?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Secretary-General.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Seuetary-General of
WEU) (Translation). Mr. President, Mr.
Ahrens has also raised two important ques-
tions.
In answer to the first, regarding contacts with
the Americans, I can say that they have been
very intensive. On the other hand, I was not
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myself informed of this new initiative, although
I very much welcome it, as does Mr. Ahrens, I
cannot say for the moment which of the WEU
countries had advance information, but that
may be a good question for the speakers who
will be here on Wednesday.
I would emphasise none the less that I think it
very important that President Bush said, in the
proposal to invite the Iraqi Foreigrr Minister to
Washington, that these contacts might be con-
tinued in the presence of the ambassadors of the
other countries participating in the Gulf oper-
ation. That is some indication that things are
moving in the direction indicated in your
question and which I, too, very much endorse.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). 
-
Secretary-General, in his statement, our Pres-
ident, Mr. Pontillon, kindly referred to what the
Assembly of WEU and the committee of which I
am Chairman have done with regard to
relaunching the satellite agency for the control of
disarmament. He also pointed out how useful
the availability of observation and remote-
sensing satellites is proving to be, among other
things, in relation to the military activities in the
Gulf.
WEU has gone some way towards meeting the
wishes of this Assembly by arranging for a com-
mittee to be set up to study the problems
surrounding the industrial and scientific
co-operation there needs to be between the space
agencies in order to achieve the desired objec-
tives.
I would like to know what action the Secre-
tary-General intends to take at the level of the
Council of Ministers to ensure that a positive
decision is arrived at.
I would also like to say that expectations in
the scientific world and in the space agencies are
high in this regard and that they are hoping for
solutions enabling this project to be put into
effect.
I would be grateful, Secretary-General, if you
would answer my question.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Secretary-General.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of
WEU). 
- 
It is with pleasure, Mr. President, that
I can assure Mr. Stegagnini that that item will be
on the agenda of the Council of Ministers on
lOth December. We have made some progress in
the ad hoc working group. We now propose a
step-by-step approach in which ultimately some
European satellites may be one possibility but
where as a first step we shall probably start more
modestly. The idea at present is to start with a
centre which will be fairly modest but will focus
in particular on the analysis of satellite photo-
graphs, which are becoming available through
other means. In the light of that experience we
shall define the next steps. I do not know to
what extent it will be possible at this stage to
make a final decision in December but certainly
in the spring the issue should be ripe for imple-
mentation. We shall certainly keep the Assembly
fully informed of our progress.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Let me add
that the Assembly's wish would be for a flrrm
decision to be taken on lOth December, not
postponed to next spring.
I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (Luxembourg)(Translation). 
- 
Secretary-General, you have
said that, paradoxically, future peace is in the
hands of the aggressor. Could you explain this
paradox to me ? So far, the aggressor has made
no great display of pacifism. He wanted war
otherwise he would not have invaded Kuwait.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Secretary-General.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of
WEU) (Translation). 
- 
To a certain extent, Mrs.
Lentz-Cornette, you are quite right to criticise
the expression. I hesitated to use it myself. But
there is., indeed, a paradox, and my use of the
expression was a way of pointing out that, with
President Bush's recent initiative, we are all
ready to take the road ofpeace and that it is up
to President Saddam Hussein to show whether
or not he is ready to go the same way, failing
which we shall have to use military force. Hence
the paradox that peace is in his hands. It is now
his responsibility.
The American initiative is very useful in the
sense that it will bring home to public opinion
quite clearly that we in the West have done our
utmost to avoid war.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Secretary-General.
11. Revision of the nodified Brusscls Truaty
(a) Reply to the second part
of the thirty-fouah annual report
and the thiq-fifth annual neport of the Council
(Prcscntaion of aad defute oa the report
of tlu Politbal Committee
and wtc on tb dmfi ruommendatioa Doc. 1245)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the presentation of and
debate on two reports from the Political Com-
mittee concerning the revision of the modified
Brussels Treaty and the votes on the draft
recommendations, Documents 1245 and 1250.
58
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES SEVENTH SITTING
The President (continued)
We shall first consider the report on the reply
to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual
report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the
Council, Document 1245.
I call the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Mr. President, may I begin by dealing with the
first report 
- 
Document 1245 on the revision of
the modiflred Brussels Treaty. Colleagues will see
that the report was adopted unanimously by the
Political Committee and that it contains several
items of considerable importance. I shall deal
with the last one first.
Colleagues will remember that for a consid-
erable time there have been complaints that the
burden of work falling on representatives is
exceptionally heavy because everyone who
comes to WEU is forced also to attend the
Council of Europe. The treaty makes it clear
that the representation here is identical to that
at the Council of Europe. For a long time - to
my knowledge for three years 
- 
there have been
requests for a change to enable each parliament
to decide for itself whether it wishes to send the
same delegation, an entirely different delegation
or a mixed delegation of some representatives
who go to the Council of Europe and some who
do not. Therefore, recommendation 2 (d) gives
the Council of Ministers a clear signal that in the
revision of the treaty 
- 
which they must make 
-
they should enable each country to choose the
method that it requires to select its delegation.
We were also critical of the fact that the
Council does not give us sufficient information
about its activities. I make it clear that we do
not refer to the excellent letters that we receive
from the Secretary-General. Those letters are a
pleasant new development. They are excessively
helpful and everyone owes a real debt of grat-
itude to Mr. van Eekelen for putting the letters
into such substantial form. They contain proper
views, not a mish-mash of diplomatic language
which in the end means absolutely nothing. Any
criticism that we made is not of the Secretary-
General's letters. We criticise the type of
" responses " that we receive from the Council
of Ministers, particularly in answer to our ques-
tions.
I doubt whether any ofus would accept such
answers in our national parliaments. Any min-
ister who tried to get away with such answers in
our own parliament would soon cease to be a
minister and would get short shrift. I am aware
of the problem, that there must be consensus
and that, therefore, we achieve the lowest
common denominator. But nonetheless, as we
say in the report, we are, after all, an assembly of
representatives of all the national parliaments.
We believe that we are rather more important
and, therefore, entitled to more substantial
answers than we customarily receive.
We applaud the Secretary-General's proposal
to address our committees and this has already
commenced. It is a very helpful meeting for the
Political Committee, and I hope that it will be
repeated, but we have to judge the occasion so
that we do not waste the time of .either ourselves
or of the Secretary-General. We are of one mind
as to how that should be done.
We made the point clearly that the Council
should make certain that the reports from its
variety of gpoups correspond properly to the
agendas of the sessions of the Assembly. We
stress the four items in recommendation 2,
which try to set out the need for revision of the
treaty, not only to take into account the
accession of Spain and Portugal, but to follow
what has happened in Eastern and Central
Europe.
That is as brief an explanation as I can give of
the document and the details of the draft recom-
mendation.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate
is open.
I call Mr. Scovacricchi.
Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, though I refer in particular to
paragraph 19 of the explanatory memorandum,
it seems to me that the debate could easily be
extended to cover all the subjects dealt with in
the two reports, i.e. WEU and the European
Community and the revision of the modified
Brussels Treaty. Allow me to put fonrard a few
thoughts.
Since the time when many of us held the view
that the first and only thing to do was simply to
strengthen WEU, a new political and military
situation has been taking shape in Europe that
has enabled a new conception of intra-European
relations to be envisaged guaranteeing security
for all in the framework of the existing struc-
tures though perhaps also, in the event of
enlargement or change, by bilateral agreement
provided the phasing necessary to prevent
imbalance being created is respected.
In its time, i.e. when it was being written, Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg's report - in fact the two
reports we are considering today - rightly
merited unanimous approval. But now, as a
result of the change I have referred to, the con-
viction is now to my mind full-grown that the
strengthening we want could be better achieved
by closer relations and, by the logic of things,
subsequent de facto association between WEU
and the EEC. WEU would provide the EEC with
a basis on which to construct a single foreign
policy among all the members of the EEC
whereas the EEC could provide WEU with a
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prestigious name, a kind of imprimatur, which
would of itself constitute a substantial strength-
ening of our institution.
It is clear, Mr. President, that all this in no
way affects the essential r6le of NATO as source
and guarantee of cohesion between the two
shores of the Atlantic. Although the ever-present
threat of the East that had dictated NATO's con-
stant state of vigilance has disappeared, the
residual military might of the Soviet Union on
both sides of the Urals argues for the mainte-
nance of staunch EuruAmerican relations.
These points, of course, have nothing to do
with the rOle of WEU in the Gulf which has a
short-term time frame compared with the wider
medium- and long-term perspective of the argu-
ments I have briefly, and superficially perhaps,
advanced. While commending the recommen-
dation for the work that has gone into it, I
therefore have reservations about it unless it is
brought up to date.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I think it
would be best, Sir Geoffrey, for you to reply first
to this question which raises many problems.
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-I should like to defer my reply. Mr. Scovacricchi
referred to paragraph 19 but, as he will know,
there is a separate report on this issue 
- 
the
second report, Document 1250. I shall reserve
my remarks on that paragraph until we come to
the second document, which I have not yet
introduced. It would be helpful to separate the
two items.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I think,
Mr. Scovacricchi, that Sir Geoffrey's proposal to
reply in the context of the second debate is
perhaps to the point because the recommen-
dation is specifically concerned.
I call Mr. l-opez Valdivielso.
Mr. LOPEZ VALDMELSO (Spain) (Trans-
lation). 
- 
I wish to comment briefly on Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg's report because its content
causes me concern about a matter of impor-
tance: the future not only of this Assembly but
of Western European Union itself. I should
therefore like to speak about the content of the
report rather than the draft recommendations,
as this really is relevant to the report that will be
discussed later.
The report deals, once again, with the need for
Western European Union to be revitalised. The
Gulf crisis has shown that even though much
remains to be done, WEU has performed an
important r6le 
- 
though one less important thanit should have been. Nevertheless, WEU has
done what it could, given its present consti-
tution as a political forum with no structure for
military coordination.
However, if we believe in WEU and in the
r6le that it can and ought to play in the future
we should do everything possible to make it
more operational and from that point of view I
believe that paragraphs l(e) and (fl of the recom-
mendation are extremely important.
It is essential for relations and communica-
tions between the Council and the Assembly to
be improved and for reports not to be treated as
mere administrative documents empty of any
real information on the activity of the Council.
There is also need for an improved response by
the Council to the recommendations from this
Assembly.
On some matters, political discussion alone is
not zuflicient; in WEU we have to move on
from words to action. I strongly agree with the
Rapporteur about the three lines of action that
should be taken by WEU during the coming
yeam, as mentioned in the report and referred to
by the Semetary-General in the speech he made
on 9th October. Taking this together with the
report we are shortly to debate I and I believe
the two are closely connected 
- 
I wish to state
that, although it is necessary to define a
European policy on defence and security, I
believe that the proposal that responsibility for
this should be assumed by the European Com-
munity can only create confusion and would not
help to achieve the aim in view. For one thing,
at a time when we are trying to confer stability,
content and importance on an institution we
should not undermine that institution by pro-
posing that it should be stripped of its powers,
and for another I believe the Community is not
the right body to have those. powers, if only
because not all of its members have the same
commitment to our common defence.
It will not make possible a common European
doctrine on security and foreign policy or
progress towards political union. That will be
considerably slowed down by what is happening
in the East, greatly though we may welcome
these events, and also by the depression. The
economic boom we have experienced and which
is now slowing down, was tending to accelerate
the process. The depression may bring it to a
halt. Unless progress is made towards economic
union which would be a factor in facilitating
political union, it is diffrcult to see how progress
towards unity on defence is possible.
Lastly, I believe it would be unwise to create a
separate institution rather than consolidate the
existing one; it could jeopardise the progxess
already achieved within Western European
Union. In a world of rapid political change
where the future is uncertain, WEU provides the
only instrument for uniting our efforts in the
field of security and for maintaining our links
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with our friends on the other side of the
Atlantic, without whom it is impossible to frame
a doctrine of security that goes beyond fine
speeches and high-sounding statements of prin-
ciple. For this reason it is also very important, as
the report insists, to define the concept of the
two pillars of the alliance.
I know that I have anticipated the debate that
is to follow, but there can be no doubt that what
he has just told us has a very important bearing
on this matter.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (Uniled Kingdom). 
-
I welcome what Mr. l-opez Valdivielso has said.
He is absolutely right that we must build a
structure and we must know where we are going.
We must also recognise that, in defence, that
structure is special because it involves not only
the survival of individual nations, but the
organisation to which they belong. That is whatI have sought to say in both documents. I
welcome the support that Mr. Lopez Valdivielso
has given.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- I call Mr.
Amaral.
Mr. AMARAL (Portugal) (Translation). 
- 
Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, it is with some
emotion that I speak my first words in this
Assembly and take this welcome opportunity to
pay my respects to you, Mr. President; I have
long had great regard and admiration for your
political style.
But my pleasure is also due to my being able
to put my first question to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
whose knowledge and political wisdom have
been evident throughout the many contacts I
have had with him.
May I therefore ask you, Sir Geoffrey, a
question which at bottom is only a reaffirmation
of what you yourself have said in all the
meetings of the committee of which I had the
honour to be a member.
Considering that the entry of Portugal and
Spain and the Gulf crisis, the two items con-
cerned in the recommendation proposed by
yourself and now under discussion in this
plenary meeting, although important and
doubtless of much interest to the life of the
Assembly, are not alone, considering the
upheavals we have seen in Central and Eastern
Europe, the end ofone ofthe blocs and the pos-
sible break up of the Soviet Union, considering
that in some sense Western Europe has lost the
points ofreference that had oriented its political
thinking for more than forty years, considering
the new r6le of NATO, considering that the
frame of reference for European defence and
security has also changed, and considering that
new prospects have opened up for CSCE, may I
ask you whether this broadening of the outlook
does not mean that we have to waste no time in
changing our statutes in order to enable this
Assembly to respond as effectively as possible to
the new challenges resulting from the rapid
changes taking place in Europe and thus to con-
tribute more effectively to peace and security
both in Europe and in the rest of the world.
Apart from this question, on which I should
be glad to hear your views, may I say that I fully
support the proposal that WEU should authorise
national parliaments to choose the members
representing them here. This would be an
improvement, for one thing because it would
facilitate the more frequent presence of parlia-
mentarians whose duties include attendance at
meetings of the Council of Europe. The dual rOle
inevitably implies some inconvenience, espe-
cially for members from peripheral countries
like Portugal since, even for just one day's work,
every trip involves three days' absence.
Furthermore, if national parliaments were
allowed to choose their own representatives this
would increase the number of members of par-
liament with international contacts, with bene-
ficial results for the parliaments concerned.
Moreover, the latter would be able to pick
members who would be better geared to the spe-
cific functions and particular objectives of
WEU, which are somewhat different from those
of the Council of Europe.
In view of the foregoing I support your pro-
posal that national parliaments should be
authorised to choose their representatives in
WEU. I think this can only be beneficial.
I should also like to support your view that the
statement made by the Italian Chairman-in-
Office of the Council of Ministers of the Com-
munities is a serious attack on the concept I am
advancing, with regard to the organs of sover-
eignty but above all the collective representation
of our parliaments. If that statement were to win
acceptance national parliaments would lose a
most important function, that of pronouncing
upon such important subjects as security and
defence.
I should like to hear Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's
opinion on these brief and rather bald com-
ments.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-
Thank you for your kind comments, Mr.
Amaral. I have two points to make because basi-
cally you were fully in support of the doc-
ument.
We have to examine the changes that are
taking place. Paragraph l0 of the explanatory
memorandum quotes what the Secretary-
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General said to the Political Committee. We
endorse what he said and point out that we have
spoken about this in a variety of recommenda-
tions. Nothing stops us from producing reports
on the dramatic changes that are taking place
throughout Europe.
You say, Mr. Amaral, that it would be nice to
have a quick change ofthe statutes, but that is a
long drawn-out process. You will not mind me
saying, dear friend, that although we persuaded
ministers to change statutes to include Spain
and Portugal, it took Portugal a long time to
ratify them so that it could become a full
member. We all must go through long processes
after ministers have reached their conclusions.
There is no likelihood of any swift changes of
statute. We must work within the existing
statutes - perhaps, by interpreting them as
widely as a parliamentary assembly would do.
That is why the Presidential Committee, for
example, could approve a couple of proposals in
the absence of the Assembly. That, in turn, is
why next time some sort of standing committee,
such as we have at the Council of Europe, will be
proposed. It would be able to act swiftly in
between meetings of the Assembly.
I shall deal with the third question when I
come to the second report. It concerned the
Italian proposition.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Tummers.
Mr. TUMMERS (N etherlands) (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, I would just like to take up the
first remark the Rapporteur made, about the
nature of delegations to the WEU Assembly.
Until now the requirement has been that these
delegations should be identical to the delega-
tions to the Council of Europe. The Rapporteur
wants the member states of the treaty to be free
to send different delegations to the two assem-
blies, and the reason he gives for this is the
pressure of work on the parliamentarians con-
cerned. I have advocated in the past that the
same delegations continue to be involved in the
work of the assemblies, and I will do so again.
whv?
There is a natural link between the Council of
Europe and WEU. WEU is founded on social,
economic and cultural stability as the basis of
peace and security. In the 1930s we learnt that
social, economic and cultural instability played
a major part in persuading the public to follow
warmongering politicians. In the 1950s, WEU
transferred social, economic and cultural
matters to the Council of Europe, but it did not
say that it was no longer interested in these
matters. This laid the foundations for the links
between the Council of Europe and WEU. It is
entirely in keeping with the Brussels Treaty that
WEU's interests should be looked after by those
who are also members of the Assembly of the
Council of Europe.
Indeed, given the ideas that Mr. van Eekelen
put forward earlier this afternoon about matters
relating to the CSCE and so on, we should not
only be approving of the present situation: it also
amounts to a genuine dual mandate. With more
specialised delegations there would be a danger of
more specialised military activities being dis-
cussed here. That might conflict with the
premises of the WEU treaty. Let me say once
again: there is a reasonable, functional and
natural link that must be maintained. Did Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg take these aspects into account
when considering whether or not to put fonuard
the idea of different delegations again?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
That is an interesting point. I have two com-
ments to make. Due to my normal brevity I did
not give massive reasons for this. It was not just
pressure of work. I have spoken to members of
delegations from different parliaments and they
all say that some of their colleagues are not
interested in the work of WEU because they are
not interested in defence. Some want to
specialise in environmental and cultural
matters. Although the modified treaty gave us
certain powers and functions in those areas,
many years ago we made it clear that we were
handing those matters, particularly economic
matters, over to the Council of Europe.
No one will force any country to change its
system if it does not want to. If the Netherlands
wishes to continue to have the identical dele-
gation, that will be its choice. In a democracy it
must be best to let each parliament decide the
composition of its delegation. That is all that we
are trying to do. We are providing flexibility.
I did not quite follow the point about dele-
gates who might be militaristic, which would be
in conflict with the treaty. Basically, we deal
with defence matters. Whether they deal with
convergence or not, they are still defence
matters. I cannot see that a militaristic view
would be alien. In many cases those who have
had a military career are most anxious to find
ways of peace. Perhaps it is wiser to provide this
flexibility, which is all that we are trying to do.
We are in no way saying that a country must
change. We are saying to the Council of Min-
isters that each member country should choose
its own composition.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
That con-
cludes the list of speakers.
The debate is closed.
I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr.
Ahrens.
62
{
J
{
I
d
I
I
I
i
,I
{
x
tl
I
I
i
I
I
d
I
I
i
l
I
i
ti
l
i
I
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES SEVENTH SITIING
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
The report was discussed at
length in committee. We adopted it unani-
mously. I call on the Assembly to approve it.
In particular, we took some considerable time
over the last question raised by Mr. Tummers.
In the process we were able to evaluate the expe-
rience of the new members from Spain and Por-
tugal, when they were forced to change the mem-
bership of their delegations.
We believe our proposal will create the flexi-
bility that will enable the parliaments of our
member countries to choose the way that seems
most appropriate.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I thank you
for that recommendation, Mr. Ahrens.
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1245.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or
more representatives or substitutes present in
the chamber request a vote by roll-call.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken
by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The draft recommendation ,s adopted
unanimously t.
@ WEA and the European Community
(Prusefrtation ofad dcbate on the report
of the Political Commiuee
and ,ote on the dmft recommendatbn, Doc. 1250)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
We shall
now consider the report by the Political Com-
mittee on WEU and the European Community,
Document 1250.
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur of the
Political Committee.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (Uniled Kingdom). 
-I should like to deal with the second report,
Document 1250, which picks up the item in par-
agraph 19 of the first report.
There are two ways of looking at the situation,
and there is no third way. The first is to be prag-
matic and to look at the situation as it is, which
is what the report tries to do. The report also
states that circumstances may change; nothing is
set in concrete. At this stage, especially in the
light of the comments by the Secretary-General,it would be wrong to make any premature
promises about change.
I should like to quote from the letter written
by the Secretary-General in September. The first
quote is important in the context of the failure
to get WEU understood as an organisation 
-
something about which we have complained for
years. He states: " The fact that WEU, in its own
right, co-chaired the naval conference in
Bahrain on 8th September along with the two
United States and Arab states representatives is
tangible proof that our organisation is indeed
the only one competent to give practical
expression to the European will to react con-
cretely to the direct threats to peace and security
in the widest sense. "
That is important, because we have never
before been recognised in that sense. Nice things
were said about us when we took part in the
mine-clearing operation, but we have never
co-chaired in that sense. It is important to make
that point.
The Secretary-General stated: * With WEU,
Europe has a nucleus around which to build a
new European defence structure, a structure
which must include operational responsibilities,
particularly for intervention outside Europe. "
The Secretary-General was talking about the
new geostrategic order and the increase in the
areas of instability in Europe. I need not list
those potential areas.
The Secretary-General stated: " On the
question of the current review of alliance
strategy, WEU member states must bring all
their weight to bear in this process. Western
Europe will in fact have to shoulder a greater
responsibility for conventional defence and the
new constraints arising from the implemen-
tation of the CFE treaty will call for much closer
defence co-operation, which will undoubtedly
affect the linkage between the component parts
ofthe reorganised European defence posture. It
is within WEU that speciflrc proposals must be
drawn up enabling Europeans to reply positively
to the invitation from the United States for
'partnership in leadership' within the alliance
and its politico-military bodies. "
That having been said, it would be folly for us
to leap into some other idea.
In two places in the report we make the point
that the only concrete suggestion for change
came from Mr. De Michelis, but we have not
seen the document. We.do not know what he
said. A couple of weeks ago, when we were in
Rome for the human rights ceremony, I had the
chance to talk to those involved and to ask
whether there was a text that could be made
available to us. I have not yet received that text.
It would be helpful if one of our Italian col-l. See page 19.
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leagues could get that text so that we could at
least see what was said.
I hope that at this stage the Assembly will
decide that it can endorse the document, which
makes a few separate points. I should like to deal
with them quickly. The document starts by
making it clear that this is the only assembly
entitled by treaty to deal with defence matters.
That treaty does not expire until 1998. It can be
denounced only by giving a year's notice there-
after. My reading of it is that, unless all states
decide to get rid of it, it continues and that it
cannot be denounced honourably by one state.
In our judgnent, one cannot separate one
item of the treaty when looking at the defence
issue as a whole. We noted that there was a
European Parliament resolution which proposed
that reactivation of WEU should be terminated.
Those who may have seen the BBC television
programme " Dr. Who' will remember that the
Daleks go about saying'Terminate' or * Exter-
minate " without defining what they say. We in
this Assembly are drawn directly from our
national parliaments. We are therefore able in
our national parliaments to raise these vital
matters of defence which Mr. iA,maral and our
friend from Spain, Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, said
are very much within our sovereign competence
under the treaty. The European Parlia4ent does
not have that same reputation because its
members do not have seats in a national par-
liament.
The committee and I are convinced that, if we
were to change the situation at this stage 
- 
I am
not talking about what may happen after 1998;it will take a long time to make any major
changes - it would, as Mr. van Eekelen said,
weaken the effect that Western Europe has on
the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. We are still the
European pillar of NATO. It is desperately
important that we remain recognised as such.
The committee said that we hoped that the
Council would pursue the reactivation of WEU
so that we can play a more effective part in
NATO. We ask the Council not to take a
decision that calls into question the treaty
without consulting us beforehand. That point is
made strongly. We do not want consultation
after the event; we want consultation if there is a
desire to make a radical change.
I hope that those remarks are sufficient to
introduce the document to the Assembly. I should
be delighted to deal with points as they come up.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Sir Geoffrey, for the concise manner in which
you present all your reports.
The debate is open.
I call Mr. de Puig to speak first.
Mr. de PUIG (Spain) (Translation). - The
report and the draft recommendation presented
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg constitute, as he
himself has told us, a rejection of certain pro'
posals that have reached us from some sectors of
the European Community. They say no to any
immediate linkage of WEU with the EEC but
yes to the reactivation of WEU. If I am to vote
for this draft recommendation I shall do so
because I see it as a short-term text, one for this
particular moment and dealing, in Sir Geoffrey's
own words, with the situation as it stands
without predetermining future possibilities.
Our thanks are due to Sir Geoffrey for his
report with its interesting supporting docurnen-
tation describing the legal situation and political
developments on this subject, which together
with further communications from him provide
a perfect outline of the legal and political situ-
ation. This is not a conclusive debate, it is the
first stage of in-depth discussions on the institu-
tional future of what we have called the new
European architecture in the area of peace and
security and which includes the future of WEU.
This is likely to be a wide-ranging debate that
will repeatedly occupy us during the months and
years to come. This is why I feel that the recom-
mendation relates fundamentally to the present
situation and that its recommendation to the
Council is meant for today and for the present
stage of existence of the European institutions
and Europe's institutional development. If, in a
few months'or years'time, we could vote upon
a different kind of recommendation and move a
few steps fonrard, I at least would welcome it.
I should like to explain the way I intend to
vote. I am against the pure and simple abolition
of WEU, for I thirk that it has an important part
to play, as the Gulf crisis has amply demon-
strated. It is the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. It has certain responsibilities which Sir
Geoffrey has just mentioned in relation to its
own status and representation; we are members
of national parliaments that are geographically
limited. There is no other institution covering
this area and this sphere in Europe. This seems
to me to justify WEU's existence and to rule out
any thought of its disappearance until the time
when it can be replaced by a different formation
in the European architecture referred to above.
On the contrary I believe it should be given new
strength, which would not prevent it from
becoming part of another organisation in the
future, in the new architecture. In any event, it
will be a good thing to strengthen WEU. I must
also agree with Sir Geoffrey that this is not the
time for WEU to be handed over to the Euro-
pean Community. There would be no agree-
ment on this at the present time either between
countries or members of parliament. There is no
current political proposal formulated in strictly
legal terms in the European Community and it
remains to be seen what decisions will be
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taken in the forthcoming intergovernmental
conferences. As yet, there is no clear, agreed
legal formula enjoying the general consensus.
This said, whilst I shall vote in favour of the
draft recommendation, I must also make the fol-
lowing observations. European union will
requirt the EEC to assume defence responsibil-
ities; it is not possible to conceive of future
political union without certain responsibilities
for defence. I believe the time is approaching
when a decision will have to be made on what
these responsibilities are to be and at that time it
would, I think, be in the nature of things for
WEU and the European Community to come
together. The same countries are involved, the
same governments. Whilst it is impossible to
imagine a European union that does not include
a defensive sphere of peace and security, it is
also impossible to imagine an EEC with respon-
sibility for defence existing side by side with a
WEU that is still alive and functioning.
This being so, we should be making a serious
mistake if our vote today meant that we were
shutting ourselves uP in an absurd
corporalivism trying to stem the tide of history
and faiting to recognise that Europe is changing
and that we must change with it. And although
at this time we are answering a clear no to
certain proposals that are neither well-reasoned,
nor serious, nor legally-based, nor formulated
with the necessary precision and which we think
exaggerated - as, for example, the idea of
WEU's simply being swallowed by the Com-
munity - our attitude must not be purely
defensive. Our object is not to keep this insti-
tution in being, on the sidelines of European
development, at all costs, but to serve the cause
of European defence and security as well as po.s-
sible, and when the situation changes, when in
1998 or some some other year, as Sir Geoffrey
said, there is a new political framework and
some valid legal formulae, we shall have to take
other decisions, probably very different from
those we are taking today, and urge forward
what I believe is the inevitable process of
linkage, association and perhaps integration of
wEU with the European Community. Now is
not the time but it will come, and WEU should
not simply follow in the wake of decisions made
by others. We have to be able to put fonward our
own proposals when the time is ripe.
Therefore, I regard today's vote as an open
one, not a closed or final one. Today we are
voting against the linkage of WEU to the EEC,
tomorrow we may very well be voting for it.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I can conflrrm to Mr. de Puig that there is no pre-
emption. Future events will require us to have a
fresh look at the position. I did not go into detail
because I am sure that everyone has read the
report. One immediate problem is referred to in
palagraph 13 of the explanatory memorandum.
Thai matter must be resolved. One point
occurred to me as Mr. de Puig was speaking. He
said that the problem may be a subject for dis-
cussion at some of the intergovernmental con-
ferences which will take place. The IGCs are
government organisations. NATO is a gov-
ernment organisation. The Council of Ministers
is a government organisation. One way to deal
with-the matter effectively may be to bring
together a small group drawn from the North
Atlantic Assembly, the European Parliament
and the WEU Assembly simply to consider as
parliamentarians how we see the futu_re, rather
ihan letting that future be decided for us by
bureaucrats and ministers. The Political Com-
mittee may decide to examine that as a con-
structive way forward. I hope that I have reas-
sured you Mr. de Puig that the matter will not be
set in concrete but that we shall merely make a
decision for the present.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I am
pleased to see this gratifying convergence of
view between Mr. de Puig and the
Rapporteur.
I call Mr. Malfatti.
Mr. MALFATTI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, I think it would be stating the obvious
to say that the international and indeed
European situation is changing too fast for us to
be content to draw a picture of the here and
now; instead it prompts us to assess the future
with realism and caution, but applying great
imagination - on a par with the changing 9i.tu-
ation itself - and a resolutely fonrardJooking
approach.
I would also, just looking at one feature of this
change, like to refer to the now imminent
European Council meeting which is to decide on
the terms of reference for the intergovernmental
conference on European union to be held in
Rome from l4th to l5th December this year.
The fact is that the central theme of European
union at this conference will be foreign policy.
Nor is it possible to conceive of a common
foreign policy that does not include the subject
of seiurity and also therefore, in some form or
other, the problems of defence.
Incidentally, it was the European Council
itself at its Dublin meeting that underlined the
two items of foreign policy and security to go on
the agenda of the intergovernmental conference
thus voicing its wish to establish terms of ref-
erence going beyond and above the provisions of
Article-30 of the Single Act on this subject.
kt me now begin by recalling a number of
fundamental principles from which, regardless
of the juridical apparel in which we clothe the
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process of our European construction, we must
not depart in the area of security and defence.
European security can be ensured only in the
NATO framework. The dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact does not imply any weakening of
the continuing value of the Atlantic Alliance
which must not and will not be called into
question by us because ofthe changing interna-
tional and pan-European situation. In the same
way there must be no calling into question of the
fundamental principle of the European coun-
tries' solidarity in defence as specifically stated
in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty of
WEU. More generally, I do not see why there
should be any plans for abandoning this basic
treaty.
It is also true, as I was saying, that we are
living in times of very rapid change and I do not
therefore see why, if everything is changing, we
should not begin to look at how our various
European institutions and their legal founda-
tions might be changed and improved. The first
positive step would be to apply the principle of
convergence to our institutions. We all know
that as things are there is, for example, an
exclusive responsibility for defence, borne by
WEU, and an exclusive responsibility for
common trade policy, borne by the European
Community and sanctioned by the Treaty of
Rome.
We all know that * defence " and 'common
trade policy' are not two separate worlds: to see
that this is true one has only to consider the
problem of sanctions and the embargo and all
that they imply for both WEU and the European
Community.
There is a fact so obvious in substance that we
cannot shut our eyes to it, namely that the
process of creating a politically united Europe 
-in fact the aboutissement of the construction of
European union 
- 
cannot be anything but
unitary and convergent.
What is more, no one can say that the united
Europe of tomorrow will not have more flexible
characteristics than the Europe of today. I am
thinking, for example, of the consequences of
the further enlargement of the Community to
include states that now have neutral status as
full members.
We should not oppose the principle of this
scenario nor should we resist more generally, in
spite of these problems, the movement of con-
vergence towards the final political goal of
European political unity. What I mean is that if
neutral states join the European Community,
that does not mean that the European Com-
munity will be thereby condemned never to be
able thereafter to develop, as a final phase, into
European political union. It will merely mean
that we shall have to foresee institutional or
inter-institutional adjustments to this new fact,
in other words introducing 
- 
as I say 
- 
a certain
flexibility.
That is why I think it would be a mistake to
shut ourselves up in what now exists and simply
take a photograph of it without trying to support
or, as far as we are concerned, promote the
movement of institutional convergence towards
the unity that is so essential.
The next European Council will, as I said,
decide the terms of reference of the intergovern-
mental conference with regard, among other
things, to foreign policy and security. So if we
want to move forward on this latter item from
the, in my opinion, disappointing startline rep-
resented by Article 30, however it is done and
certainly without encroaching on other institu-
tions'preserves, we shall have to take on the
task of finding a convergent and unitary answer
even to questions of defence, which cannot fail
to be involved as well if we want to construct the
unity of Europe and move forward in this field
and il precisely, we wish to do so under this
fundamental heading of common foreign
policy.
It would be strange if we were to completely
ignore the process ofchange that is at our door 
-
we are literally on the eve of important deci-
sions, international decisions, which may
concern us 
- 
and if we simply claim the respon-
sibilities and prerogatives we already have. If
you prefer, ladies and gentlemen, we should
claim these responsibilities but whilst opening
our doors to change in a unified frame of ref-
erence. None of us can aflirm, for example 
- 
and
the Rapporteur himself does not deny it 
- 
that
the modified Brussels Treaty would be seriously
flawed or undermined and nullified in any way
if it were placed under the aegis of the European
Council as has already been done in the case ofpolitical co-operation and security. What is
more, as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg the Rapporteur
said 
- 
and rightly argued in his report 
- 
this pos-
sibility is admissible. But it should also be
admissible, then, to take the opportunity to
make changes and therefore, as far as we are
concerned, to look into possible legal amend-
ments in the light of the present situation.
I appreciate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's usual
frankness, clarity and precision in this written
report and verbal statement. However, with the
same frankness, and perhaps 
- 
I do not know 
-
the same clarity but certainly with sincerity, I
must comment on what, in my opinion, is the
excessively static nature of the report. As the
debate stands at this particular time and in spite
of the limited opening that he himself has
pointed to in his report with regard to the
European Council as a point ofreference for our
institution as well, I have to say that I shall be
abstaining in the vote on the draft recommen-
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dation that has been tabled. This follows a line
of thought that is consistent with my argument
in the report I made on 22nd March last year at
the symposium that our Assembly held in
Florence on the future of European security.
In conclusion, I repeat what I said in Florence.
We urgently need a dialogue between our
various institutions, not a dialogue of the deaf
but a fruitful and positive discussion. At the
practical level, we need to organise an inter-
institutional dialogue as quickly as possible and
forms of inter-institutional co-operation, in par-
ticular between our parliamentary Assembly, the
European Parliament, their respective presi-
dents, the secretariat of the Council, the secre-
tariat responsible for political co-operation and
our own secretariat-general. This is a problem
which, if I am mistaken, our own Secretary-
General has just raised with the Assembly in his
excellent report, the object being to indicate
more clearly the path to be taken on the road of
convergence, with our common goal, namely the
building of a politically united Europe, clearly in
our sights.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I am disappointed with what Mr. Malfatti has
said. He spoke of changes, and said that NATO
is now examining the situation. What NATO
still cannot do, and what it is unlikely to do until
it changes its treaty, is to act out of area. We
have the opportunity, which we have demon-
strated on two occasions, to do that. We must
not throw that away until there is something
better in its place.
I said to Mr. de Puig, and I say to Mr.
Malfatti, that this document talks of the present.
It is unlikely that there will be any accession to
the Community before 1993. To make progress-
towards the Single Act will require a lot of
detailed work, and I believe that 1993 is the ear-
liest time at which new nations may be
admitted. That gives us an opportunity to
develop the idea that Mr. Malfatti had pro-
duced, although I believe that it has a weakness.
I do not want this discussion to go on between
officials. I think that we need to have a dis-
cussion an parliamentarians. What happened at
Dublin was a matter for governments, not for us
as parliamentarians.
If there are to be any changes - this report
speaks about a modified Brussels Treaty - they
must be unanimous, agreed and ratified in the
appropriate parliament. We are looking at some-
thing that will not happen swiftly, but the
window of opportunity is left wide open for
changes to be made as the situation develops. I
should be extremely surprised if, within two
years, there was not a further report to consider
what has happened in this matter. That report
would provide an opportunity for further pro-
posals to be made.
I hope that I have been able to persuade Mr.
Malfatti that his concept of flexibility and
movement would not be achieved were he to
abstain. If we wants to achieve his goal he
should support the report which speaks of the
present position and the changing world in
which we live. There will, therefore, be an
opportunity for changing the structure of, and
responsibility for, defence. One cannot do that
now as it would not be practicable.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Moya.
Mr. MOYA (Spain)(Translation). - I congrat-
ulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his report and I
appreciate the opportunity it gives us to embark
wi[n nim on a process that may take some time,
namely a debate or series of debates on
important questions affecting the future of our
Asiembly and the future of security institutions
in Europe. I believe it is a debate on both sub-
stance and attitudes that we must pursue
throughout this process.
There are four points I want to pick out from
the draft recommendation and the main ideas it
enshrines: First, the need for WEU to be reacti-
vated as a security institution. Second, effective
European participation in the alliance by
strengthening the traditional r6le of WEU as the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Third,
what-might be termed a certain reticence with
regard to dialogue and future relations between
WEU and the Community. Fourth, a proper
prudence in the taking of decisions.
I believe that these ideas and the report as a
whole underline the relevance and timeliness of
this debate and bring to light a number of under-
lying questions. In my view there are at bottom
tirre-e Lroad streams or three great issues all
relating to our concern about the future of this
institution. The first is the complementarity of
WEU with the Atlantic pole and the growing
awareness of the existence of the European
dimension of that alliance. The second is WEI/s
ability to take effective action in conflicts and
crises out of area where NATO is unable to act
in the absence of statutory provision for such
intervention. The third is the relationship
between the functions and powers of WEU and
the European Community.
The first issue relates to the traditional r6le of
WEU as forming a European pillar of the
alliance and the growing awareness in Europe of
the need to strengthen this pillar in order to
lessen the inequality between the two poles' This
emphasis on making the alliance more
Euiopean, about which so much has been said in
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recent years by leading European politicians, is
pursued in this report to good effect.
The second is about the lack ofstatutory pro-
vision for the alliance to act out of area, a
subject also mentioned in the report. The Gulf
crisis has clearly shown that Europe is able to
respond to a crisis situation affecting its
interests. There had been precedents during the
conflict between Iran and Iraq, but it is bnly
now that the successful co-ordination of the
folces deployed to implement the embargo has
raised expectations as to its future potential and
perhaps its eventual development into an inte-
grated operational structure. Here a phrase used
by the President of the Assembly in a statement
released a few months ago is relevant: he made
the point that when there is a formal legal
framework, an appropriate institution and also
the components of armed forces, logistic support
and so on, something new and important has
been created.
The third and perhaps most important issue,
given its future dimension, is that of the linkage,
relationship or integration of WEU with the
European Community. Whilst the solution is for
the future, the time for planning is now. And if
one had to define or map out the lines or posi-
tions that are taking shape around it there cbuld
be said to be the supporters of WEU as a dis-
tinct, differentiated body dealing with all the
questions connected with the cohesion of the
West 
- 
the redeployment of military forces, the
formation of multinational armies, European
participation in the verification of disarmament
agreements, co-operation in matters connected
with the arms industry, questions raised by out-
of-area conflicts, and so forth 
- 
and the 6thers
who believe with me that there is an inevitable
process of convergence between WEU and the
European Community.
It is becoming evident that a policy of all-injoint security will be the basis of the political
union of the Community and constitute the
m.ost important element in its foreigr policy. It
will be remembered that the document of The
lague platform of 1987 states that an integrated
Europe will not be complete until it extends to
secgrity and defence. A political union worthy
of the name will in the long run have to include
common defence. So the debate between the two
positions is not concerned so much with the aim
as the means and the phases and stages on the
way t9 it and the objective will be a Europe
speaking with a single voice in international
bodies and in the transatlantic relationship. This
vision carries with it a far fuller conception of the
Community, seeing it as a complete, homogeneous
entity rather than simply one European insti-
tution a+ong others. But this is something for dis-
cussion in the coming months or possibly years.
In closing may I make two points concerne{
less with substance than with attituAes. First, I
believe that the time is not yet ripe for firm.and :
final conclusions. It may be that what is'valid
today will have to be changed tomorrbw 
- 
and
th-is is a report for today. We may be in danger
of drawing final conclusions without suffrcient .
discussion. I believe that this is the time for a
frank, sincere dialogue in the search for a dehn-
itive security framework, and I believe that.in
this dialogue there should be no precipitate
attempts at dissblution and no defehsive self-
centeredness. Second, I also believe.that we
should continue to strengthen WEU.institu-
tionally, and this is not in conflict.with the
points I- have just made because thp stiBngth-
ening of WEU will b" good for the identity of
European defence in both cases, i.e.. if WEU is
maintained as a body with a differbnce and also
if a process of convergence with the Community
makes headway and is concluded. I thereforb
believe that we should all approve this report,
because it is a text that reflects the current situ-
ation without closing the door to th.e future.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-I am grateful to Mr. Moya for his support. In his
clear analysis he has covered the four main
items of reactivation, our place in NATO and
caution in our new ideas and relationships.
Caution, lrowever, does not mean..no progress,but ensuring that we progress step by step.
In an earlier response I mentioned that one of
the problems we must consider is paragraph 13,
which deals with the expansion of thb Com-
munity to neutral nations. Paragr4ph li is alio a
problem. Mr. Moya has spoken about a single
voice on defence, but in the near future I do not
believe that either France or 'the United
Kingdom will allow someone to speak on behalf
of their nuclear forces. That is another problem
which must be examined. It cannot, of course,
be examined quickly, but that does not mean
that it cannot be examined.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Perinat.
Mr. PERINAT (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
I noiv,for the first time, have the privilege of
addressing this Assembly on a really important
matter and on a report that is undoubtedly of
crucial importance.
For it is clear that in discussing the rela-
tionship Eetween the European Community and
Western European Union we are dealing with a
fundamental problem not only for these two
organisations but also in relation to the future
structure of Europe. I therefore wish to offer my
qingele congratulations to Sir Geoffrey Finsberig
for his report which gives a clear overview of th6
real situation of WEU in relation to the
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European Community with reference to pro-
posals aqd initiatives airned at integrating WEU
into the future Euroirean Community.
Doubtless we are aE agreed that it is impos-
sible to create, or at least to sustain, a new
political body. without its responsibilities
including sOcurity or defence. Therefore, the
initial idea of.strengthening the Treaty of Rome
by including in. it Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty might at first sigfot appear to be
a sensible step. But further examination of the
matter lehds to the cortclusion that in present
circurnstanCe's, far from strengthening the prin-
cipte cif Eirripean defence;.it would have the
opposite effect. In reality the powers of WEU
would be absorbed by an organisation, the
European Corfrmunity,. wiich, un d er Article 223
'of the'EEC tr.eaty, has no responsibility for
security or 6efence. What is more, it appears
likely tbat this inabillty to act in such matters,
far, from being changed by the European Com-
munity's arsumption of responsibility for
securiiy, would persist or even be accentuated.
The reason is very simple and has already been
p'ointed out by r{y colleague from Italy. Whereas
nine of the 
_presept Community member states
are members of WEU, two others, Denmark and
GreEce, are members of NATO, whilst a third,
lreland, has neutral status. It is possible, indeed
fgreseeable, that in the not very far distant
future d number of neutral countries may
become full rirembers of the Community whilst
sti[ retainirt$ neutral status. Clearly, if this were
to'happen the attitxde of the European Com-
munity. toivards defence would inevitably be
consideihblf diluted.'
' Therefore; and in . view of the present
eriphasis:oh the here and now, I believe that,
pendine developmeirts in the European Com-
munity, ii would be wise to continue strength-
ening WEU as far as possible as an organisation
for co-ordinLtirrg the defence of its member
countries, including that of any new members
which mieht in future wish to sign the Brussels
Treaty. We might also, if possible within the
WEU framework, set up a multinational
European intervention force and in any event
strengthen WEU so that it could increasingly
function as the European pillar in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir'Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom) -
I have two points to make. I wholly agree that
not to accept the report would weaken the
defence of Europe. We are all of one mind that
we cannot at this stage afford to do that.
Mr. Perinat talked about the accession of
neutral nations. One way round that, which
must be discussed, is for nations with a policy of
neutrality to have to undertake in a new treaty
to abstain from any discussion or vote on
defence matters so that they cannot block a
defence issue and stop it being discussed by
nations which want to take part in defence.
Those matters must be considered and that is
one way of considering the point raised.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Lord.
Mr. LORD (Uniled Kingdom). - I welcome
this excellent report and its recommendations,
which I entirely endorse. With all the military
happenings in the world it is tempting not only
to widen any debate on this subject, but to start
drawing premature conclusions and tampering
with existing structures. Those temptations
should be resisted.
Since reactivation, WEU has played an
increasing r0le in world affairs. Its part in
helping to enforce the sea blockade of Irag has
been crucial. Its r0le is not only growing, but is
increasingly being recognised internationally.
With the problems in the Gull it is important
not to undermine existing structures. In any
case, no action can be taken by treaty, as has
been said repeatedly and as is stressed in the
report's recommendations, until 1998.
With the changing face of Europe and the
United States' r6le in defence matters, it is
understandable that all European structures
should be the subject of some debate. The
change in Eastern and Central Europe, the unifi-
cation of Germany, the enlargement of the Com-
munity and the reduction of United States'
involvement mean that things cannot go on as
they are indefinitely. These changes bring as
many complications as opportunities- and they
musi be studied with great care before being
acted upon.
Last week in Rome, an interparliamentary
conference - a curtain-raiser, perhaps, to the
major conference of heads of government later
thii month - looked at the future of Europe in
relation to economic and political union. The
matter was discussed by members of national
parliaments and the European Parliament. I
attended that conference with members of par-
liament from the twelve members of the Com-
munity and I witnessed all the shades of
opinion, national and political, which were held
Uy ttre delegates, and I find it hard to conceive of
airy defence organisation that could be devised
in 
- 
such a way as to satisfy all nations and
opinion, yet could act decisively in time of
crisis. We shall have to wait and see.
There is a long way to go before any new
framework can be established. Times could not
be more perilous. When things are uncertain, it
pays to hold fast to what one has. There is a sim-
itarity between our position and that of a person
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using stepping stones to cross turbulent waters.
It is a foolish man who moves from the firm
stepping stone on which he is standing before he
has carefully tested the stone on to which he
plans to tread. For the immediately foreseeable
future, Western European Union in its present
form has a vital r6le and it should be supported
as strongly as possible, as should the report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-
I make two points in response to Mr.l,ord. I was
with him in Rome and I heard that discussion.
As I said earlier, it would have been difficult to
see a quick response in the Gulf in the light of
what we heard in Rome. What Mr. Lord said
was absolutely right. Do not give up what you
have until you know what is the replacement
and are certain that the replacement is as good,if not better. We went to Rome and, with ref-
erence to Mr. Malfatti, I would say, festina lente.
(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Lagorce.
Mr. LAGORCE (France) (Translation).
Today's debate on WEU and the EEC so effec-
tively launched by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's
report 
- 
or rather reports 
- 
is clearly funda-
mental at a time when the international system
is going through unprecedented changes and its
traditional balances are being challenged. But I
would like to go a little further than this
excellent report and make a number of com-
ments that it suggests to me though they will not
perhaps have your approval, Sir Geoffrey.
One fact has to be accepted at the outset: the
r6le and future of WEU, which is our special
concern, depend essentially on the form and
content to be assigned to the future Community.It is quite plain that to bring fully integrated
Western European unity in defence into being
the participating states have to share the same
ideas on the future of the Community, whetherit be a free-trade zone or the Delors project.
They must also have the same perception of
what constitute the main aspects of their
security.
Any further integration of western defence
with the object of forming a West Europeanpillar of the Atlantic Alliance would imply that
the states making up this security pole are ready
to give up part of their sovereignty in the
interests of a joint external policy and the
division of labour in their armed forces.
However, this would require some basic deci-
sions and a qualitative leap into integration
which must be primarily political. There-would
also have to be federal institutions capable of
overarching purely national patriotism and our
governments are perhaps not yet ready to make
these decisions and take such a leap.
And yet it is only when these decisions have
been made that it will perhaps be possible to
base WEU and the European Community in the
same structure with their respective r6les and
obligations set down in legal form. But is that
what we want now or what we will want later
on?
In order to maintain the defence alliance with
the United States it wi[ also be advisable 
- 
by a
simultaneous revision of the North Atlantic and
modified Brussels Treaties 
- 
to spell out legally
WEU's rdle as the European pillar of a NATO
refashioned to provide for the defence of the
western nations in which there would be two
great partners: one would be the organisation of
North American states and their allies and the
other the organisation of the states of the
enlarged Western European Union because, in
my opinion, it would be necessary to invite
those member states of the Community not yet
in WEU to join. At the same time the Council of
Europe should itselfbe broadened to absorb the
CSCE process, that is to say the thirty-four or
thirty-five members and the three baskets.
This of course raises the question of national
delegations, how they should be made up and
appointed and the r6le they are to play. Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg deals with this problem and I
shall not dwell on it.
In this way, an EEC-WEU coupling in a
federal framework would give WEU sufficient
weight to make it a credible partner for North
America and the rest of the world. It would also
give economic Europe a political voice and a
reality extending beyond its own frontiers.
However, at the moment, these ideas are
utopian given that the principal governments of
Western Europe, as I say, are not yet clear about
their idea of, or commitment to, political inte-gration. On the other hand it has to be
recognised that, in today's political envi-
ronment, they no longer really have a choice;
conversely they do have opportunities that are
not going to come again. The fact is that we haveto take full advantage of this situation of
extreme instability in the present period of
unprecedented change with dl its implications
for the security and hence the survival of the
countries of Western Europe faced with the chal-
lenges of the contemporary world and not, of
course, forgetting the countries of the third
world.
These challenges, these grave problemsdirectly or indirectly affecting every
industrialised market economy country natu-
rally call for worldwide solutions requiring at
least some co'operation and coordination
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between the leading powers on our planet. In
view of the success that the EEC now is we can
only hope that the member states will quickly
agr6e on a joint political plan and 
-make theq-ualitative leap that I referred to earlier in my
statement. It is this which will make Western
Europe together with WEU, its indispensable
partner in-the field of defence, a power in its
bwn rieht on the international scene capable of
confroilting without fear the immense challenges
of today and tomorrow.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-I do not know why Mr. Lagorce thought that I
would not like whit he said. What he suggested
is one way forward in the vast discussion. There
are many ways forward. Chairman Mao had a
phrase for it.-I do not disagree in anyway with
what Mr. Lagorce said, but it should be con-
sidered in the context of making progress.
Everything is up for discussion with re-gard to
the future- I should have thought that that was
how we should consider all proposals, even the
foolish one from Strasbourg that we should stop
the reactivation of WEU.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Stoffelen.
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). As I do not
speak as chairman of a group but as an indi-
vjdual member. I shall continue in my own lan-
guage, that is to saY, Dutch.
(The speaker continued in Dutch)
(Translation). 
- 
I should like very briefly to
mi,ke three comments and to draw a formal con-
clusion. My first comment follows on from the
concluding remarks made by SiI Geoffrey
Finsberg, whom I compliment on his report-. It
would 5e stupid and irresponsible to get rid of
WEU. It would be stupid and irresponsible to
stop using WEU as the one instrument we have
in Europe that is genuinely formally competent
and useful. It would also be irresponsible to stop
reactivating WEU, because it is more useful
than ever as an instrument for security in
Europe.
There are two reasons for this. The first is a
formal one. As I have said, WEU is the one
institution with formal authority, the Brussels
Treaty. The European Communities are clearly
not in the same position. The Rapporteur has
rightly referred to the relevant provision-s of the
Tieaty of Rome, which rule out the possibility of
the Community concerning itself with European
defence.
There is a second reason. I would not mind
betting that there is a terribly complex debate
going on at the moment in all the national par-
liaments, but more especially in the European
Parliament. It is generally noted that the Com-
munity takes a great deal of interest in economic
policy-and too little interest in the environment
ino ihe social situation of all those who are
sadlv no lonser able to work. This means there is
a de'bate on-the further development of Europe.
Is it to develop into a federation or into an inter-
governmental structure?
Like many others, I am in favour of a devel-
opment in wtrich more and more powers are and
must be transferred from the national govern-
ments and parliaments to the Commission
and the European Parliament. Others think
othenvise.
This debate alone is extremely intensive and
takes up a gteat deal of time. One of the gucs-
tions diicussed is the precise meaning of EMU.
We know that in 1993 international frontiers
will disappear and that we will then have free
movemenl of people, capital and goods. This
means that not only will there be a European
central bank but there must also be some form
of common EuroPean monetary PolicY,
co-ordination of the- main lines of economic
policy and means of preventing. exchange rate
iluctriations from either distorting the condi-
tions of competition or leading to imbalance.
The Commission is currently engaged in
drawing up many hundreds of directives. As
some oT you witl-know, I am the Chairman of
the Comhittee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights in the Council of Europe,.and as such I
haie discussions with the Chairman of the
European Parliament's legal Affairs. Com-
mitte;. It would be foolish to think that the
European Parliament can do more than consider
a few of these directives at the moment, which
means that many of them are being processed
without anybody taking a closer look at them.
This in itself takes so much time and effort
that I would go so far as to predict, although
others may disagree, that, quite apart from the
formal obstacles, the Community cannot pos-
sibly get down to discussing aspects of either
Eurbp-ean security or European defence in the,
next five years.
My second comment may seem to contradict
the first, but it does not. I am firmly convinced
that the'EPU will go on developing. There will
always be the spectacle of European leaders,
with- or without their foreign ministers, con-
cerning themselves with almost every aspect of
European security and with more and more
aspecis of Europ6an defence. It is, to Py tltg
leist, quite conceivable that a new situation will
exist'in four or five years' time. We can already
see a change in the views of Ireland' Never-
theless, I agree with the Rapporteur that no one
can make a safe forecast. I think this is what
should happen. I believe it is quite conceivable
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that five years or more from now we will be
talking about a possible merging of WEU and
the European Community, but I cannot guar-
antee this, of course. I think it is something we
must bear in mind.
My third comment conoerns the CSCE.
Anyone who considers the essenoe of the reso-
lution adopted in November will see that there
is-g:rtainty about the emergence of an assembly
of Europe, at least where the first two baskets oithe Helsinki agreement are concerned. As
regards the treatment of the security aspect, the
third basket, it would be very unwise torule out
any of the options. It is quite conceivable that
WEU will be able to do some extremely useful
work in this context. I am not saying this is the
only option, but it is certainly one of many
options and must not be ruled out. It is purL
folly to write off WEU at this stage, as some
members of the European Parliament are doing
- 
and I say this with all due respect.
Mr. President, this brings me to my formal
conclusion. This report and recommendation
are rightly limited to an assessment of the
present situation and a description of WEU'sposition, now and in the foreseeable future.
With this in mind, I will say that this text has
my wholehearted support.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
- 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (tlnited Kingdom). 
-I agree with Mr. Stoffelen's commeni that it
would be foolish to throw away what we have.
He said that perhaps, in five years'time, Ireland
and other groups may have changed their views.
One possibility 
- 
I keep floating these ideas 
- 
is
that if it were decided in due course to subsume
the work of defence inside the Community, the
Community will delegate specifically defence
matters to WEU. That is one way of doing it.
There are so many possible wayi that, if bne
were to write a report to take account of all the
possibilities, it would be fifty pages long and full
. of ideas, 90Yo of which would never come to fru-
ition. All that one can do is to say: 'Here are
many ideas. As time goes by, one may be able to
develop some into actualities." -
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Amaral.
__Mr, AMARAL (Portugal) (Translation).Thank you, Mr. President. I shoutd just lilie to
Take-two small points, first to congratulate SirGeoffrey Finsberg for the excellent work he has
done and secondly to make a brief comment on
the. questions asked today and Sir Geoffrey's
enlightening replies.
It is always very diffrcult to talk about the
future. The Europe we envisage is in our minds
and thoughts and thought can never be static ; itis changing night and day.
It has been well said that Europe is *the
homeland of creative discord" and it ii my belief
that, given the speed at which things aie hap
pening, we must find a precise formula or
concept for Europe as quickly as we can. Cer-
tqinly concepts differ. The Communities, the
Council of Europe, and we in WEU all have dif-
ferent ideas about Europe of the future.
But despite these differences and the new
ideas that are constantly surfacing, we. are
lopeful and confident that before long we shall
be able to reconcile these differences which, in
any event, all stem from the principles under-
lying each of the international organisations I
have just mentioned.
As I said in my previous statement, all these
organisations have differing objectives. Bebause
they are different, they are bound to have dif-
ferent attitudes and positions regarding the
problems of the day and the forecasts theyhake
of the future in so far as such forecasts can be
made.
I think that your draft recommendation, Sir
Geoffrey, squares with future possibilities
within the context of present realities and
current thinking.
This being so, and particularly because the
attempt to amalgamate WEU, even in formal
te-rms, with another international organisation
of different aims and scope is not feasible, I
have to say that in my opinion the draft recom-
mendation you are putting fonrard fully meets
the criterion of looking at future possibilities
from the viewpoint of present realities. I shall
therefore support and vote for the draft recom-
mendation.
_ 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (lJnited Kingdom). 
-My answer to Mr. Amaral is, I agree! -
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
last speaker on the list, Mr. Soares Costa.
Mr. SOARES COSTA (Portugal) (Trans-
lation). 
- 
Mr. President, Iadies and gentlemen, I
am gratified by the content, scale and scope of
the debate we have held today on the second
part of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report, the more
so as it was I who raised the subject at the
October meeting of the Presidential Committee
of WEU. I am gratified because the proceedings
in some of the other Community institutioni,
notably the Commission and the European par-
liament, caused me some concern and con-
vinced me that it was necessary for our WEU
Assembly to state its position on this question. I
qm also gratified because in this report the
Political Committee of the Assembly has been
able to express itself on this matter with much
greater clarity and wealth of detail than I was
able to do at our meeting in October.
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Mr. Soares Costa (continued)
But my present contribution is motivated
mainly by what our Secretary-General and also
our President said a short while ago in the
opening speeches.
The Secretary-General stated here today that
WEU is one of the bases of the security
dimension in the building of Europe. And in
fact, as the report before us recognises, it is on
this basis that we are members of the only insti-
tution with specific authority to consider
defence in Europe, that is to say, it is the only
parliamentary assembly of its kind.
But our President has today presented us with
a big challenge concerning the effectiveness with
which this Assembly, during the present plenary
session, will be able to formulate our views and
position on the important issue of our rela-
tionship with the European Economic Com-
munity and the way in which we must make our
contribution to the construction of Europe.
As our President stated, it must be built with
pragmatism, a sense of responsibility and
realism. But what in fact do these three words
mean in relation to the problem before us today?
In the first place, said Mr. Pontillon, Europe
must be built with pragmatism. Well, I think
that "pragmatism" in defence has to do with
three fundamental questions. As was said in the
report that we approved here at our plenary
session last June and is repeated in the doc-
ument before us today, the first question has to
do with how far WEU may be considered as the
"European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance. But
on that basis, some other things become obvious
- 
at least to me. These have to do with what
WEU can or should be in the future.
Thus, in the first place, we have to think about
the military alliances. After the events that have
occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, these
alliances have totally changed their meaning and
will have to change in attitude; and we are not
talking about the Warsaw Pact, since NATO
itself has stated that it is prepared to undergo
change and to adapt itself to the new circum-
stances.
But, beyond that, it is clear that many voices
in many European countries are beginning to
stress the need to build a new security order in
Europe. As I understand it, what is sought is a
new order based on co-operation now that the
area of confrontation between the blocs has
ended. And obviously, co-operation must
embrace the enlarged area which includes the
twelve countries of the European Economic
Community, the other Western European coun-
tries and the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe; and we know that at least some of these
countries have already indicated their interest in
co-operating with Western European Union, for
instance as "special observers" with the same
status as observers in the Council of Europe.
This then provides a vision of Western
European Union which could in future become
a solid nucleus for an enlarged organisation to
serve as a practical channel for co-operation
with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in security as well as other things.
Lastly, a third idea also connected with this
pragmatic way of facing the problem is to con-
sider the challenges and risks facing Europe but
originating outside the European theatre. WEU
already has the flexibility and capability for
action out of area 
- 
something which, as we
know, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO do not
have. We would be in a position to develop a
strategy of European defence against out-of-area
threats.
The second matter on which our President
spoke was "responsibility", and this is much
more worrying to me because when we are
thinking about building the new Europe we must
realise that it is unacceptable for the various
European institutions to use the present
moment to claim powers and responsibilities
which it is doubtful they could ever live up to.
At this time of transition we must not make mis-
takes 
- 
or at least not the old mistakes.
It appears to me that the proposals of which
we are aware, in particular those in Mr.
Romero's report which was approved in the
European Parliament on 9th October, are an
attempt to remove powers and responsibilities
from an existing organisation 
- 
WEU. The
process of absorbing or deactivating an insti-
tution seems to me anything but responsible as a
way to go about building Europe as we wish to
do. It is very surprising in as much as the Com-
munities have, in fact, chosen to go along the
path of deepening rather than broadening their
relationship, and we know that this is a conse-
quence of the Single Act, which has to do with
economic and monetary union and with future
political union. The truth is that, as I see it, this
organisation is facing a very different situ-
ation.
WEU has no need to deepen its organisation,
but it may well need to widen co-operation to
include other parts of Europe.
Lastly, I should like to refer to the problem of
realism, and, on that score, of all the areas in
which countries are possessive about their sover-
eignty the most sensitive is defence.
This being so, how is it conceivable that the
countries which today constitute the European
Economic Community could agree to make sub-
stantial transfers of power in defence matters to
a supranational organisation of an integrated
nature such as the EEC is at present?
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Without question this is a crucial issue. I
believe that, as a number of members have said
today, it will take some time before this becomes
possible, if only because, as our Rapporteur also
points out, there are problems connected with
the fact that some members of the Twelve are
not members of WEU. Examples are Ireland,
which is neutral, Denmark, which is not a
member of WEU, and Greece, a particularly
sensitive case in the area of defence because
under its present constitution it has certain links
with NATO.
These therefore are questions that have to be
approached cautiously, step by step, and very
wisely lest they hinder progress towards our
basic objectives.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -I have two comments to make. First, I agree
with Mr. Soares Costa's ideas about there being
yet another way to examine the situation. Cer-
tainly it was his item which came up at the Pres-
idential Committee and gave rise to this swift
report. Secondly, he is right that as the years go
on, the concept of peace and stability will
become much wider because it will embrace the
whole of Europe, as I said at the beginning. I do
not rule out the possibility of the Soviet Union
perhaps requiring help to deal with particular
problems within her territory. It must be in
everybody's interests to ensure that we have sta-
bility throughout Europe if our peoples are to
progress.
I wish to express my warrn appreciation to
Mr. Burgelin for the swift and efficient way in
which he put together many of these facts to
produce the report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The debate
is closed.
I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr.
Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I have only a few comments to make.
Relations between the Community and WEU
have been a matter of concern to this Assembly
for some considerable time. I can remember the
subject being discussed in this chamber sev-
enteen or eighteen years ago. It became a partic-
ularly urgent issue after the first direct electionsto the European Parliament, when the
momentum created by those elections led the
members of the European Parliament to believe
that they could not only discuss but also take
decisions on everything. We have been consid-
ering this subject since that time. Nothing has
really changed since then.
If we decided to dissolve WEU today, it would
mean two things.
First, we would destroy the European pillar of
NATO. I do not think there is another
organisation that could take on the task of
bringing together European ideas and opinions
and putting them to our North American
partners and others. That would be particularly
inconvenient 
- 
as Mr. Soares Costa has pointed
out, and he is right 
- 
because NATO is also
undergoing change and because it would be
completely out of the question and unaccept-
able, in my opinion, for Europe's voice not to be
heard in this debate.
Second, if we dissolve WEU, the matters we
discuss here would not be transferred to another
organisation but would revert to our national
parliaments. That would mean the
renationalisation of defence policy in Europe. I
believe that too would do great damage. At the
moment any discussion on this should result in a
clear 'No" to the demand that WEU be dis-
solved or its restructuring and revitalisation pre-
vented.
Like any report, this one is merely a snapshot.
It can do no more than summarise the discus-
sions that can be held here and now. It does not,
therefore, contain any thoughts on what might
happen in five or ten years' time. I want to
emphasise that. That is also the way we saw it in
committee. We said we could neither know nor
speak today about anything that might happen
in the future. I am personally convinced - I
share the optimism of my colleague, Pieter
Stoffelen 
- 
that, despite all the difficulties,
European union will come, and if it is strong
enough, it will take on the important task of a
European defence policy, but not for the
moment. In the meantime, we need Western
European Union. Just as we needed it yesterday
and the day before, we need it today and
tomorrow as well, or at least for a foreseeable
period. That is what is in this report, that is
what it is based on.
On the committee's behalf I should like to
thank our Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
and especially Mr. Burgelin. They worked
together extremely well. I should like to thank all
the members of the committee, for playing a
very active part in this debate, and all those here
who have participated in the debate or at least
shown their interest in it through their presence
and perseverance.
I ask you to adopt this report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1250.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or
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more representatives or substitutes present in
the chamber request a vote by roll-call.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll+all?...
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken
by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The draft recommendation is adopted t.
12. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 4th December, at
l0 a.m. with the following orders of the day:
1. Chairmanshiein-Oflice of the Council -
presentation of the first part of the thirty-
sixth annual report of the Council, Doc-
ument 1247 ; Address by Mr. Dumas, Min-
ister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of France, Chairman-in-Office of the
Council.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis;Con-
sequences of the invasion of Kuwait: con-
tinuing operations in the Gulf region (Pre-
sentation ofandjoint debate on the reports
of the Political Committee and the Defence
Committee, Documents 1244 and amend-
ments and 1248 and amendments).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)
l. See page 20.
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EIGHTH SITTING
Tuesday, 4th December 19f)
SUMMARY
l. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Chairmanshipin0ffrce of the Council 
- 
presentation of
the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
Council, Doc. 1247; Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of
State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Dumas to questiow put by: MM. Scheer,
Caro, Beix, Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. De Decker,
Speed, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Martino, Stegagnini,
Cetin (Observer from Turlcey), lambie, Mrs. Hoffmann.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The sitting
is open.
1. Auendance register
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedingst.
2. Adoption of the minates
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In
accordance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
i. Chairmanship-in-Olftce of the Council 
-prcsentation of the first part of the thiq-sixth
annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247
Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State,
Minister for Foreigt Atfairs of France,
Chairman-in-Ollice of the Council
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the presentation of the first
part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
region (Presentation ofand joint debate on the reports of
the Political Committee and the Defence Committee,
Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amend-
ments).
Spealcers: The President, MM. De Decker (Rapporteur of
the Political Committee), De Hoop Scheffer (Rapporteur
of the Defence Committee), Ward, Fassino, Scheer, Mrs.
Roe, Mr. Caro.
5. Changes in the membership of committees.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
Council, Document 1247; address by Mr.
Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the
Council.
May I welcome you as Chairman-in-Office of
the Council. You have given us much evidence
of your dynamic activity and also your concern
to ensure a special quality in the relations
betwedn the Assembly and the Council. This is
much appreciated by the Assembly, which
awaits your address with interest.
May I ask you to take the rostrum.
Mr. DUMAS (Minister of State, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of
the Council) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, as
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council I am
greatly appreciative of your words of welcome,
for which I personally thank you most cordially.
I am particularly grateful for your tribute to the
Chairman's work during his period of office.
Mr. President, Secretary-General and ladies
and gentlemen, France considers it a great
honour to be holding the chairmanship of the
Council of Western European Union at such an
exceptional time in the history of our continent.
I have already had the pleasure of speaking to
the Assembly in the past about my country's
position and ideas. Hence it is a renewed
pleasure to have this opportunity of recalling the
achievements of the first few months of this
chairmanship and looking together at certain
future possibilities. Afterwards I shall be very
glad to answer your questions and thus deepen
the discussion in the usual way.
The sitting was opened at /,0.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair
l See page 23.
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Mr. Dumas (continued)
The beginning of the French chairmanship
coincided with the crisis in the Gulf. Since I am
talking to parliamentarians who follow these
questions very closely I shall skip the details of
the positions adopted by the member countries
but I would, because it is important, recall
members' unanimous condemnation of the
attack on Kuwait and their very flrrm determi-
nation that the United Nations resolutions must
be complied with.
Nor shall I go over the various steps taken by
the member states to co-ordinate their action in
implementing sanctions and exploring the
opportunities for co-operation in logistics. The
French Defence Minister, who will be speaking
here this afternoon, will certainly refer to this.
However, there are two essential lessons I
should like to draw. First, Europe, as such, is
present in the Gulf. Secondly, WEU, facing for
the first time a major international crisis - the
first major crisis of the new world order - has
shown itself capable of responding to the needs
of the moment.
I should like to mention first the speed and
quality of our co-operation. After the outbreak
of Iraqi aggression on 2nd August, and at only
very short notice, as you will remember, the
Ministerial Council met twice. The military
chiefs were able to agree a first outline for
ceoperation in the days immediately following
the attack and effective co-ordination structures
were very quickly set up combining diplomats
and representatives of the armed forces.
Next I should like to say that the results
achieved are remarkable in many ways.
Co-ordination between the naval forces
deployed by the member countries to implement
sanctions is working excellently. This
co-ordination has ensured rationalisation of
effort in the various areas of action, and
effective and constant mutual support. I make
this point because I was able to see it for myself
on the spot when I accompanied the President of
the Republic on his visit to the area.
For the future, I draw two conclusions
regarding WEU's ability to respond quickly and
launch the effective co-operation that I have just
described.
First, proof has been given - if such proof
were necessary 
- 
of the importance of the WEU
institutional framework. At the precise moment
when the institution is under debate, we must
remember this point in present and future dis-
cussions on European security.
Also, the member states have demonstrated
their ability to act jointly to uphold interna-
tional law and defend their interests. In these
matters WEU has its own responsibility that
other organisations do not. Europeans should
therefore make the most of it. Would it not be a
mistake to try to build a strong European union
if this economic and political entity, developing
before our very eyes, was not able to defend
worldwide its interests and its peoples? United
Europe, in the form we see it, cannot be based
on reliance on others.
WEU must therefore take an active part in the
debate about what is being called the future
architecture of European security. At the present
stage this debate concerns the future of three
institutions, the European Community, the
Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE, and their
respective r0les.
I shall begin with the last of these and refer
flrrst to the importance of the recent Paris
summit that was held in a climate of remarkable
consensus and helped to turn a page in
European history. France is honoured to have
hosted this exceptional event, symbolising as it
did the end of the arbitrary division of Europe.
Major decisions were taken to wipe the past
from the slate: regular political meetings, the
continuation of talks on disarmament and confi-
dence and the beginnings of institutionalisation
in the form of a secretariat and a conflict-
prevention centre, all decisions that, in short,
will help to give wider scope to co-operation
between the member states of the CSCE, the
essential framework for the stability of our con-
tinent.
As for NATO, recent developments in Europe
and in East-West relations call for its adaptation
without challenging its essential purpose. Surely
it is now necessary to highlight Europe's contri-
bution and achieve a stable, lasting and more
balanced transatlantic relationship.
Alongside this heightening of the European
profile, work on building the Community will
intensify. Obviously, in defence and security
matters, the process will be in stages, each stage
corresponding to an increase of stability. But
within this European framework, let us already
draw all the benefit we can from WEU: the
existing member states should be able to
increase their own efforts whilst developing
co-operation with their twelve partners
wherever possible on all questions affecting theirjoint security interests.
I am thinking in particular of disarmament.
The agreement signed on l9th November at the
Paris summit was, as everyone agrees, an unprec-
edented and historic event. Its implementation
will bring about a situation of parity and stabilityin military relations in Europe previously
characterised by a confrontation of armed forces
and an ovenvhelming imbalance in favour of the
Soviet Union. Any surprise attack should now be
impossible, and instead of rhetorical discussion
blinded by ideology we shall now have dialogue,
openness and understanding.
77
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES EIGHTH SITTING
Mr. Dumas (continued)
This does not mean that our work is over. In
fact it is only just beginning. Like it or not, the
agreement of 19th November is still tinged with
the sequels of the post-war period. But it is an
essential bridge towards further stages that will
strengthen stability and security in Europe. This
is the work we still have to do.
For the moment, talks are about to begin on
the strengths of the armed forces and prepara-
tions are to be made for the future negotiations
between all the CSCE participants to follow the
Helsinki meeting in 1992. During its period of
office the French presidency will do its best to
ensure that WEU makes an effective and
decisive contribution to the definition of future
negotiating positions.
I should also like to remind you of the impor-
tance that we attach to European co-operation in
implementing verification procedures. For real
disarmament there has to be confidence and
therefore verification. At the next ministerial
meeting of WEU it is intended that the ministers
approve concrete proposals in this respect. This
is one of the presidency's main concerns and I
am sure that you are aware of its efforts to
launch a special co-operative programme for
exploiting satellite data. We were the flrrst to
raise this subject even before taking over the
chairmanship. The French Defence Minister,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevdnement, will be referring
to this matter this afternoon.
In conclusion, before moving on to questions
and answers and then travelling to Brussels where
the Foreigrr Alfairs Council is meeting today, let
me raise the subject of the Institute for Security
Studies which has just been set up and which we
shall shortly be offrcially inaugurating. This could
not come at a better time. Since we have to go on
thinking about the subjects that I just referred to,
what better place could there be than this
institute? As you know, and I take no personal
credit here, it is the result of a French initiative.
Self-flattery is not the reason why I have reverted
to this subject, quite the contrary, I simply
wanted to say that in the minds of those who pre
moted the idea, as with those who accepted it,
there were two essential tasks that we wished to
entrust to this institute, and for once current
events have proved their relevance.
The first of these tasks is to deepen our study
of European security. This is essential to the
debate on political union which is about to open
in the next few days in Rome where, as you are
aware, we shall be launching the two intergov-
ernmental conferences scheduled for 1991.
The second task for the institute is to develop
the dialogue between Western Europe and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. I am
pleased to note that this dialogue is already in
progress. At a time when the post-war security
structures are being completely rethot'ght, it
would be pointless for us " Western " Europeans
to be considering the future of our institutions
and our co-operative arrangements without heed
for the conoerns of the new European demo-
cracies. Europe would be walking on one leg and
we know that this is not very satisfactory.
We are unlikely to find a quick and easy
solution to these new problems facing us, which
is all the more reason why we should start to
think about them as soon as we can. In any
event, work on dialogue and comprehension has
now begun, in particular within the framework
of our institution, so we should pursue it with
determination and resolution 
- 
that is certainly
what the presidency plans to do.
I-adies and gentlemen, before going on to
questions and answers, I should like to
emphasise the value, in the presidency's eyes, of
the work that you are doing. This is not just an
oratorical flourish or polite compliment for I
believe that WEU will be called upon to play an
essential r6le in the years to come.
One reason is that you represent millions of
men and women who, as we know, are uneasy
about the vast upheavals taking place today and
who, in their heart of hearts, whilst feeling this
anxiety, nurture the hope ofa Europe at peace.
That is what we are working towards. This gives
the measure of your contribution to the essential
point of discussion in the concluding years of
the century, namely, the future security of the
citizens of Europe.
Great progress has been made in this field
since the major upheavals at the end of 1989,
the high point being the CSCE summit in Paris.
But let us be clear: more progress still has to be
made and I urge you to go forward, inventively
where necessary but always forward, because
your r6le will be essential in the new age. I thank
you.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
for these words of encouragement, especially on
behalf of those who believe in the future of this
institution. I should also like to thank you for
your expression of confidence in this Assembly
and your concluding words designed to stim-
ulate its vigour and imagination.
You said you were prepared in the time-
honoured way to answer questions from
members of the Assembly. There are several
who are particularly interested in your remarks
and will no doubt wish to ask questions.
I call the first speaker, Mr. Scheer.
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Minister, I have a question on
the French position at the future disarmament
negotiations. We all know that the French Gov-
ernment has not wished to participate and has
not participated in the nuclear disarmament
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negotiations in Europe. Let me say straight away
that to consider French nuclear potential
without French involvement would not in prin-
ciple be acceptable or right. But it seems to me
that its active involvement will in fact be
essential in the future, given the fundamental
changes that have occurred.
In the 1970s and into the 1980s the French
specified from when and under what conditions
they might participate. Now there has been a
fundamental change in East-West relations in
Europe, and most of the conditions laid down at
that time have, in fact, been more than fulfilled.
The question is, therefore, when and on what
terms the French Government will begin to play
an active part in nuclear disarmament negotia-
tions, not only with regard to Europe, but gen-
erally. This seems very important for the
future.
My second question concerns the current Gulf
conflict. Why, in the Minister's opinion, has
precedence not been given in recent weeks to the
idea of waiting a grcat deal longer for sanctions
to take effect before issuing an ultimatum? From
your view of the discussions at international
level 
- 
I am referring not only to the French
stance but to your own assessment, which I
would like to hear 
- 
why is there not a great deal
more talk about the European implications of a
possibly precipitate war 
- 
its effect on European
interests, in other words, and about the conse-
quences ofsuch a war in general? I believe a spe-
cifically European view is needed here.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Do you
wish to answer each question or take them in
batches?
Mr. DUMAS (Minister of State, Minister for
Foreign Alfairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of
the Councif (Translation). - In batches, Mr.
President.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Caro.
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I should
like to thank you for your efforts as Chairman of
the Council since the start of lraq's invasion of
Kuwait. There is broad consensus, of course, for
finding peace but there is unambiguous firmness
that this has to be under the absolute terms
imposed by the United Nations regarding with-
drawal from Kuwait and the release of the hos-
tages. Looking forward to the future and to whatI hope will be years of peace and stability I
should like to ask the Minister for his views on
having an organisation in the Near and Middle
East, possibly taking its cue from what we are
trying to construct for Europe and stability in
Eqrgpe,. in order to- contain the risk of any new
crisis similar to the one we are now going
through. Such an organisation, under demo-
cratic control and taking due account of human
rights and, of course, the use of oil resources,
would prevent these resources becoming a
critical issue again and avoid the probability of
their being used to blackmail the industrialised
countries, with all the consequences that would
have for the countries ofthe south and the dra-
matic developments still facing us there. Could
we not have a kind of CSCE in the Middle East?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Beix.
Mr. BEIX (France) (Translation). - My
question concerns what you referred to as the
future architecture of European security. The
need to develop links of solidarity in order to
improve European security is apparent and
involves the somewhat magic structure of CSCE.
But CSCE may have prolonged difficulties with
the enormous economic problems of the coun-
tries of Central Europe. These countries will no
doubt find it very diflicult to cope with two
requirements, the economic adjustment nec-
essary for their development and self-defence,
i.e. the means of ensuring their own security.
So CSCE could well be a debating chamber for
decades with a kind of two-tier Europe: one con-
sisting of some fifteen highly-developed coun-
tries, and the other made up of ten or so others
lagging very far behind.
In this situation, how important, in your view,
is the r6le of WEU? Are we on the way to an
enlargement of the institution or towards Eleater
military co-operation? The questions facing this
institution include the numerical increase in
multinational forces and closer co-operation
between countries with nuclear weapons.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Mr. DUMAS (Minister of State, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Ofrice of
the Council (Translation). - Mr. President, I
shall answer now so as not to let the questions go
stale and while they are still fresh both in my
mind and in those of my listeners.
Mr. Scheer asked me about future nuclear dis-
armament and the position of France. I can be
very clear on this. France's conditions for partic-
ipation in nuclear disarmament were set out in
1983 in a speech made at the United Nations by
the Head of State. It is not true that my country
refuses to take part in nuclear disarmament. It
has simply laid down a number of commonsense
conditions.
Why? First, because they take into account
the specific nature of France's nuclear capa-
bility. Second, because they are based on a quan-
titative argument. Put briefly, France's nuclear
potential, by comparison with that of the two
world superpowers, is in the order of 4010. So
France has not refused to take part in the dis-
cussion.
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The conditions laid down in 1983 still apply
in both their restrictive and encouraging aspects
and we shall await the results of the discussions
on strategic disarmament to see whether things
are moving in the direction that we hope 
- 
and
we really do hope. Depending on the results, for
which I understand, from both the Soviet and
the United States sides, we may not have too
long to wait, France will adjust its position.
The second of Mr. Scheer's questions con-
cerned the Gulf. He asked me about the
embargo and its effect on the passing of the last
resolution.
Should we go on waiting? When Kuwait was
invaded and this sovereign country, which is a
member of the United Nations, was annexed by
Iraq, the Security Council passed a number of
resolutions. These resolutions call for the with-
drawal of Iraqi troops, the freeing of hostages,
the rehabilitation of Kuwait as a sovereign state
and the restoration of the legitimate power.
Together with these principles, the Security
Council also agreed on a number of restrictive
measures including the embargo and economic
sanctions. The experts considered that a period
of five to six months would be necessary to see
the real effects of these sanctions. We are near
the end of this six-month period.
This, let it be said in passing, is one of the
reasons why France, at the last debate, felt that
the deadline for the Iraqis to evacuate Kuwait
should be l5th January rather than lst January
so as to give the international community a last
chance for sanctions to be effective. So, as you
can see, we are roughly on time with the
deadline that the experts thought necessary.
Thus the policy of the international com-
munity, which France fully supports, is twofold:
to continue the embargo, which is beginning to
bite and will have even more effect during the
forty-five days between now and l5th January,
and 
- 
whilst hoping for the best but preparing
for the worst so that things are absolutely clear 
-
to pass without further delay a resolution pro-
viding for coercive measures and the use of force
in the event of the failure of sanctions or the
continued refusal to comply with the resolutions
of the Security Council.
There is therefore no contradiction in the
sequence of measures taken by the Security
Council and the international community; they
compliment each other.
This is the spirit in which they should be seen,
the idea and hope, of course, being that they will
make the Baghdad Government see reason and
that the preparedness to use force and coercion
will lead to a peaceful and diplomatic solution of
the Gulf crisis.
I also think that I can say that the same
attitude prevailed in the minds of the countries
submitting the resolution and those who voted
for it, namely, to make provision for further
measures of constraint for a given date, but in
the hope that they would lead the Iraqi leaders
to agree to comply with the resolutions passed
by the Security Council since 2nd August.
In any event, the French Government does
not believe it is biased in favour of using force.
On the contrary, we prefer a peaceful solution
but we realise, in accordance with the time-
honoured formula, that we have to prepare for
war in order to keep the peace. This has been
said in very many ways, once in Latin, in the
past.
Also referring to Kuwait, Mr. Caro spoke
about unambiguous flinnness. That is indeed the
case, and I thank him for saying so. Looking into
the future he asked whether we supported the
idea of a CSCE formula for the Near East. I
agree that in view of the increasing number of
conflicts in this region of the world it is essential
that the international community, the com-
munity of nations, should one day do something
to bring about a global settlement of all these
crises. We certainly do not want, for the
moment, to link any of these conflicts with the
Kuwait problem 
- 
it would be handing argu-
ments to Saddam Hussein 
- 
but it is clear that
this zone of turbulence needs some special
approach. So when Mr. Caro asks why not have
a forum on the CSCE model dealing with human
rights and the use of resources, my answer is:
why not indeed? But I would add that the han-
dling of security issues in the region needs to be
included.
This is why, in the proposals set out by- the
French Government on various occasions, we
have said we wanted an international conference
to be held that would take responsibility for
these various conflicts and look into the points
you have raised, namely human rights, the use
of resources, control of disarmament in all these
countries (we must not forget that, at the present
time, it is in this region of the world that there is
the biggest build-up of weapons of all kinds) and
finally rules for security. This is something
which, as we have often said, France would fully
support.
Mr. Beix, repeating the expression I have used
at this rostrum: " the future architecture of
European security', asked me about the r6le of
WEU. Part of the reply I gave in my address.
When we say Europe we have to be clear which
Europe we mean. I have the impression that
ideas are getting mixed up. It is too easy to say
Europe all the time.
What does this mean? It means, first of all,
that we have to settle the problem of building
the Europe of the Twelve within the framework
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of the European Economic Community: this is a
first definition of Europe.
Then we need to look at what is happening in
the other Europe, which is also Europe, namely
Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of
this region, or most of them, want to move, and
are in fact moving, towards genuine democracy.
But they are also beset by political, economic
and social difficulties. They have not yet been
able to find their balance or harmony. Things
will no doubt develop differently in each of
these countries with their new-found freedom,
but we have to recognise that the European Fro-
nomic Community cannot continue to enjoy its
comfort and success without a glance at what is
happening on its doorstep, for one thing because
the way things develop may have its impact on
life in the European Economic Community.
Just suppose that these democratic move-
ments fail and destabilise the government in
these countries. You can easily see that this
would affect security in Europe. Just suppose
that their many serious economic difliculties get
worse; you can easily see that this would have
social consequences, e.g. a flood of immigrarrts
looking for a better life or just for work. The
European Economic Community would then
have to react in a disaster scenario, which it
would be better to prevent than cure. Hence the
idea that, with these eastern countries, we
should have a structure enabling meetings and
exchanges to take place in the year-s to come
between the Community and each of the coun-
tries concerned. This is the confederation idea
launched last year by the President ofthe French
Republic. So this is the second idea to have in
mind when Europe is on the table.
There is a third notion. When we talk about
Europe we also have to consider the security
that we wish to establish there. We speak about
a Europe at peace because Europe has been the
theatre of all the wars, and we hope to be
entering a new period which is one of
co-operation and peace; hence - security.
Security in Europe is at the moment assured
through the work of CSCE. CSCE includes
Europe, the United States and Canada. This is
how it should be, and, in the present situation,
alliances should continue because they help to
keep a balance. As you said, CSCE is-a forum
whi-ch brings together the countries of Eutope,
with the eiception of Albania - although this
country attended at a small side table during the
discusjions - Canada and the United States, the
latter re-balancing things in Europe.
Then there is WEU. WEU represents Euro-
p€ils, or some of them. It is here in WEU that
we have to think about our specific European
security problems, there being no incompati-
bility with the Atlantic Alliance, which is essen-
tially a military alliance, or CSCE which keeps
the bahnce of security with our American and
Canadian allies. This compels us, as Europeans
in WEU, to think in depth about what we want
in the area of security.
This rOle is an essential one and it is not to
flatter the parliamentary Assembly that I say-
this again today. At the present time I know of
no other organisation where we can discuss
these security problems. So let us go to work.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Minister. kt us now deal with the second series
of questions.
I call Mr. Soell.
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- Quoting experts is always a
problem. The Minister has said that exp-erts
befieve sanctions would take practical effect
after five to six months. Other experts, including
forrner American Secretary of Defence
McNamara, have said sanctions will be most
effective after twelve to eighteen months. They
believe that without supplies of spare parts the
value of the sensitive components of Iraq's
weapons systems would be reduced by- hall
especially in the climate of the desert. Conse-
quently, even should a military conflict be nec-
essary, the firepower of lraq's weapons systems
would become far less effective. This means that
here, too, we must take very careful stock and
not allow the pressure of time to affect us.
I want to follow this comment with a question
focusing on the debate on the future r6le of
Western European Union. From the ranks of the
Commission in Brussels we have a proposal for
the inclusion of an article on a common security
policy when the treaties of Rome are eventually
imerided to make way for a political union. Ref-
erence is made in this context to Article V of the
modified Brtrssels Treaty, which requires the
member countries to assist each other as a
matter of course. What does the Minister think
of this proposal? Will there not also have to be a
change-in fhe institutions, to enable the national
parliiments, which are not the only bodies with
itre right to control the security policies of their
countiies, to exert an influence at Europe-an
level, perhaps through the establishment of a
second chamber or senate?.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (Uniled Kingdom). --
May I go back to the Minister's architecture of
Euiope? He made no reference to the one
organisation that already cov9ry what I call
WEstern, Eastern and Central Europe - the
Council of Europe. How does he see its rOle in
that architecture?
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Second, when the Minister talks about the
convergence ofdefence policies, is he saying that
France would be prepared to put her nuclear
power under the control or direction of the
Community? Does he think that the United
Kingdom would even contemplate that?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
De Decker.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). 
-In your address you stressed the need for NATO
to adjust to the radical East-West changes that
have taken place in Europe and you referred to a
more specific European r6le within the Atlantic
Alliance. As you are aware, NATO is currently
discussing whether it should one day modify iti
geographical limits and be able to act out-side
what is known as * the NATO arean. I should
like to know the view of the WEU Council of
Ministers on this point and whether you share
the feeling that such a process could hinder the
delnition of a specifically European concept of
defence.
My next question concerns our presence in the
Gulf. You emphasised the importance of WEU's
r6le, with particular regard to co-ordination of
the naval forces in the Gulf. You also mentioned
the fact that, naturally, our countries are present
both on land and in the air. However, it is clear
that there is a very $eat imbalance between the
strength of the American and European presence
on land and in the air. Do you not think that this
imbalance, in the event of conflict, could
weaken Europe's independent power of
decision?
l_egal opinion and that it is always very easy to
find another to give you exactly the opposit6! It
is the first thing you learn in a profession which
I have exercised for a long time!
Generally speaking, the experts consider that
sanctions start to have an effect after six
months, but twelve months are better than six.
However, beyond twelve months a complication
arises relating to the climatic conditions in the
Gulf. If there were to be armed intervention, it
should take place within a given period of time
which, of course, would reduce the time allowed
to see whether sanctions would work. It is never-
theless true that most experts consider that after
six months we should have a clear and definite
picture of the results of sanctions.
It has to be pointed out that at present Iraq is
no longer selling its oil, that the resources it
draws from oil sales are falling and that it is
having difliculty in buying spart parts for its
military equipment. Admittedly, the current
sanctions are not altogether watertight and are
being circumvented with the complicity of
certain countries; however, on the whole, -they
are achieving results. It is difficult to say what
the public attiitude is, but we can considerihat in
the first six months sanctions have already had a
real impact. This must inevitably be taken into
account.
Mr. Soell also asked me about political union
and Article V. The article is still perfectly valid,
but this is not where the difliculty lies! It is a
question of implementing this Article V in the
present context. This is one of the subjects for
you to ponder in your wisdom.
Sir Geoffrey spoke about the architecture of
Egope, rebuking me mildly for not having men-
tioned the Council of Europe. I did not mention
it because it goes without saying. The Council of
Europe is the oldest of the European institutions
and no one would dream, least of all the
Chairman of the Council, of denying the results
of its work, quite the contrary. fhat said, the
Council of Europe has no authority to concern
itself with security problems. Its specific r6le is
clearly defined both in the texts and in practice.
It has played, still does play, and will continue to
play, an important r0le in its own field, particu-
larly in human rights where, as a resuft of its
work,_ remarkable progress has been achieved,
contributing to the changes that have taken
place in the countries of the East.
The Council of Europe plays, and will con-
tinue to play, an essential r6le in welcoming in
some of these countries. This has happened only
recently and the countries concerned have found
th-eir proper place in this eminent Assembly,
which is the oldest on the continent of Europe.
The Council of Europe is doing what it stroulddo and I think it will continue to play an
essential r6le in our construction of Europe as a
whole.
The
Speed.
PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Mr. SPEED (United Kingdom). 
- 
You have
already referred, Mr. Dumas, to the transat-
lantic alliance. In terms of its credibility and the
burden-sharing argument, it is important that
the Americans are aware of the considerable
forces 
- 
maritime and otherwise 
- that WEU
has placed in the Gulf. Are you satisfied that the
various embassies in Washington and the infor-
mation services of France, the United Kingdom
and the other WEU countries are presentihg in
as full a fashion as possible all the information
about what WEU is doing in the Gulf? I fear that
there is widespread ignorance about that in the
United States, which is not good for the alliance
or WEU.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
_ 
M1. DU^IIAS (Minister of State, Minister for
F.oreiqn Affairlof France, Chairman-in-Of/ici of
the Council)(Translation). 
- 
May I answ6r Mi.
Soell by saying that experts are experts. It is like
professors of law. We all know that we can
always find one professor of law to give you one
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Sir Geoffrey also asked me a question about
the French nuclear force at the same time as he
had the audacity to ask me a question about
Great Britain... How embarrassing it would be
for me if I took this question as an opportunity
to reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment ! I shall not take that risk.
What I can say concerns my own country. The
deterrent, as its name implies, was designed to
prevent war, not to wage or win a war. It is
iherefore not conceivable that it should come
under community or collegiate control as the
final decision to use it rests with the head of
state. He alone would have to determine
whether, first, there was a major risk for his
country and, secondly, whether it was right to
press the nuclear button.
You will understand that these two condi-
tions, by their very nature, make it impossible
for such a deterrent to be placed under the
command of a collegiate group, which would
need to debate before making a decision, conse-
quently robbing the deterrent of its ability to
prevent war.
Therefore, whilst discussion on security or
even defence problems and common interests in
Europe can take place, it seems to me that
because of its very nature the control of a
deterrent cannot be transferred from one
person, the head of state, to q grqlp- which
would need to hold a debate - with all that this
entails - before contemplating its use.
Mr. De Decker asked two questions. Yes, I
believe in the part to be played by Europeans
and we are here, moreover, to debate this
matter, there being no incompatibility between
having a more specific r6le for Europeans and
the eiistence of the alliance. Some people see
Europe's advancement within the alliance as
being in opposition to Europe's. own
advancement, believing that what is given to
Europe will be taken away from the a[iance. I
hold-the opposite view. The clearer Europe's
vision of its responsibilities in security and
defence matters, the stronger the alliance will be.
Its geographical competence remained open to
discuision. I think it was at a NATO meeting in
Brussels that I said that France at present was
not in favour of any major change in the
Atlantic Alliance's area of responsibility. The
alliance was born out of circumstances of history
that we all are aware of and it has a specific
vocation.
So I think it would be a mistake for the
alliance to become the policeman of the whole
world and involve itself in settling all conflicts
throughout the planet. This is not the view of
the Flench Government, although it remains
open to discussion about changes to the Atlantic
Alliance in view of the recent events that we
referred to this morning.
Mr. De Decker's second question obviously
concerns the Gulf problems. He asked me
whether the autonomy of decision-making was
not affected by the co-ordination there : well this
is very finely put ! We obviously have to choose
between the difficulties and we must know what
we want.
If Europe wants a say in security and defence
matters when its interests are involved it cannot
react in random fashion. There has to be a
minimum of co-ordination, which, as I said,
functioned very well in the Gulf crisis. I went
there personally and the information that we
received from the military strengthened this
conviction. But at the same time if you have
co-ordination there has to be some sacrifice of
individual control. A happy medium has to be
found. And we look for it somewhere in the
decision-making process which, in the present
state of affairs and of our relations with others,
is solely a matter for the sovereign states. Am I
going tb the Gulf or not? It is a matter of prin-
ciple. Once this decision has been taken there is
th-e question bf putting it into practice and
co-ordinating efforts, simply to avoid contradic-
tions, dupliCations, wrong tactics, but also to
increase effectiveness. This is exactly what is
happening.
France, for example, retained its power of
decision up to the last moment because the Pres-
ident of the Republic had recently stated that
there would be no automatic implementation in
the field ofthe resolution passed by the Security
Council. This was a decision taken at the highest
level. Once the decision has been taken there
must then be the best possible co-ordination of
the armed forces in the field. May I just point
out that this is going very well. On the one hand,
co-ordination within WEU is effective, and
co-ordination between the units from the WEU
countries and the forces of the United States is
also working very well.
In saying this I have partly answered Mr.
Speed's question on the sharing of responsibility
between WEU and the United States. There is
good co-ordination at two levels: that of the
naval, air and ground forces in the area and also
at overall command level. There is frequent,
serious and effective contact between France
and the other countries concerned. In this
matter nothing further needs to be said.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall
now move on to the last set of questions.
I call Sir Russell Johnston.
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
I should like to ask the Minister two brief ques-
tions. First, I wish to press him further on the
question already raised by Mr. Beix and Mr.
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Soell about the future of our institution. Mr.
Dumas said that the European Community
intergovernmental conference in Rome will
undoubtedly discuss that, in particular the
absorption of WEU into the European Com-
munity. Some people have advocated that,
notably liberal leaders at their meeting in Berlin
on 23rd November, and others have discussed
it. What exactly are the objections to such a
course?
My second question is different. Mr. Dumas
referred to the concentration of weapons in the
Middle East when he discussed the Gulf. That
concentration is one to which his country and,
indeed, mine have made notable, although not
exclusive, contributions. What thoughts does he
have about the future control of the arms trade,
particularly to areas of political instability?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- I call Mr.
Martino.
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). 
- 
I have
the feeling, Minister, that Europe is plagued by a
syndrome of its time: new relations between
East and West and North and South seem to b6
monopolising attention in our countries.
Even here in this Assembly where we are
debating reports concerning the Gulf crisis, the
serious problem of our future in terms of
security if not defence seems to be pushed into
second place.
After recent events it is my belief that the
United States will no longer want to be involved
following its decisive action in two world wars
and the present Gulf crisis to uphold freedom
and international law
In your view, Minister, are our countries fully
aware of the diffrculty of solving this problem,
perhaps by means of operational and practical
changes to the United Nations to render it
capable of resolving the conflicts, difficulties
and tense situations which now exist?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). 
-You are certainly aware, Minister, of ltaly's
recent proposals for a conference on Mediter-
ranean security. May I ask you whether, should
this conference take place, you would support
the idea of WEU taking part as the sole and
supreme international body responsible for the
problems of European security?
Also, what would be the position of France
which traditionally has a highly important r6le
in North Africa?
To my mind such a conference would rep-
resent a second step after the launching of CSCE
and ought to attract close attention as it is pre-
cisely the North-South confrontation which
raises the problems to which you referred
earlier.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Cetin, Observer from Turkey.
Mr. CETIN (Obsemer from Turkey). * Mr.
Minister, as you rightly said, the Paris summit is
a big and historlc atep towards stability and
security in Europe, but recent events and the
crisis in the Gulf have shown that the world is
not just Europe and that peace and security in
Europe do not bring peace and security to other
parls o-f the world. What do you think-is neeflgd
in the long run to achieve security and to secure
peace and stability in the Middle East?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call. Mr.
Lambie.
Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, I am a substitute for Mr. Ewing.
I should like to follow up the questions asked
by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Speed about the
European contributio4 to the alliance. The Min-
ister of State spoke with pride about the fact that
Europe was present in the Gulf. I put it to him
that, if and when war breaks out in the Gulf,
Europe will be present not militarily but in the
sense that every country fighting will be usini
weapons supplied by European nations
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and
especially the Benelux countries. Whether it is
poison, chemical weapons, missiles, missile
sites, tanks or guns, every country, including
Iraq, will be fighting rirlth European weapons..
The Minister is kidding himselfl but he is cer-
tainly not kidding me. He is being slighfly hypo-
critical when he suggests that there is a
European alliance in the Gulf. How can hejustify being proud of the fact that there is a
European presence in the Gulf when there are
half a million American troops and thousands of
American planes in the area and Europe has
only a naval presence at sea, where there will be
no fighting? I put it to the Minister that, if there
is a war in the Gulf, it will be decided by the
United States, by United States weapons and
guns, and that Europe will have no say in when
The PRESIDENT firanslation). - I call Mrs.
Hoffmann.
Mrs. HOFFMANN (Germany) (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, Minister, I have a question,
and I would like to make one comment on
another issue.
The Minister said that the aggressor, Saddam
Hussein, must, if possible, now be induced 
- 
thisis our c,ommon goal 
- 
to accept a peaceful
solution by the various measures that are being
taken. That goes without saying. But I feel there
has not yet been nearly enough discussion of.a
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ve,ry subtle question, which is undoubtedly
beiirg considered at international level and in
the Minister's own country: this aggressor,
Saddam Hussein, may have biological weapons
and probably nuclear weapons in the foreseeable
future. Should this not be taken into account at
the peace conference, to preclude the possibility
of his posing a far greater threat to us ir two,
three or four years' time?
The Minister has already given an answer
which I would just like to confirm with a brief
comment. I consider it absolutely essential for
there to be an international conference to
discuss the other craterc of a volcano that has
existed in this turbulent zone, as you have called
it, for many years. These negotiations must be
followed by discussions on Lebanon's problems,
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other
issues.
Unless we tackle these two points together -
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, with its
possible future developments, on the one haod,
ind developments throughout the region on the
other hand - we shall not be able to arrive at a
long-term peace settlement.
The PRESIDENT (translation). - Minister, it
is your privilege to draw conclusions from this
las-t set of questions. You have the floor.
Mr. DUMAS (Minister of State, Minister for
Foreign AJfairs of France, Chairman-in'Olfice
of tie Council) (Translation). - Thank you
Mr. President. We shall try to come to a con-
clusion. This means, perhaps, that I shall take
the questions out ofchronological order because
some of them call for replies that lead more
readily to conclusions, others being more
factual.
Sir Russell Johnston again asked about the
future of the institution; I have already given
my reply. He spoke about the openi,ng of the
R6me-Conferenbe which is scheduled to begin
shortly. He asked me about some ideas which
are bding mooted, namely whether WEU could
be incorporated into the European Economic
Community. Finally, he referrpd to the concen'
tration of weapons in the Near East.
On the flrrst subject, I am tempted to say that
the difliculty is enough to make us give up. The
European Community represents twelve coun-
tries, one of which at least has a special status,
namely, Ireland. WEU, on the other hand, repre-
sents dn$ nine, and two ofthe countries seeking
to join are members of the Europ944 pconomic
Cohmunity: they are not yet in WEU and this
may be a short-ctrt for bringing them_in directly.
I do'not think, for thc immcdiate futurc, that
there will' be any'.ircorporation or a total
merge& but the intergovernmenlal 
-conferenco
tnat wiU draw up its own terms of reference will
determine the best way for WEU to become in a
sense what it already is today, namely, the
forum for debate, reflection and action on the
security problem.
On this question, and in conclusion, may I
briefly say that the Rome intergovernmental
confeience will decide via the union what the
Communities' common foreign policy will be.
Now there can be no common foreign policy of
the Community of the Twelve without in-depth
study and the formulation of conclusions on
security.
This is the problem that will face the negoti-
ators and an answer has to be found. France's
position, which you know well since I have often
itated it, is that WEU should be used to achieve
progress in the sphere of security, that a-speciSl
link- needs to be established - although this still
requires to be defined - between the Community
and WnU and that the instruments of raP
prochement between the two institutions should
be so adjusted that WEU and the Economic
Community can advance in step with one
another.
The concentration of weapons in this region of
the world 
- 
I shall come back to this in a moment
in my reply to Mrs. Hoffmann - is clearly a
matter of tfeat concern, and I think that if there
has to be an international conference it should
look at this problem, which will be one of the
most serious remaining alter the Gulf crisis.
I shalt keep my answer to the questio'ns from
Mr. Martino and also from Mr. Stegagnini until
the end because they will enable me to con-
clude.
Mr. Cetin, representing Turkey, asked me the
following question on security: 'Progress is
being made in East-West relations. But,. in
Europe, is any progress being made in the region
that airectly concerns Turkey? " It is a question
that we ask ourselves too. I think it can only be
resolved through a major international con-
ference. I shall come back to this shortly.
In his vehement intervention, Mr. Lambie,
United Kingdom, pointed out that Europe was
present in the Near East in two ways: it was
present because it had sent troops to restore
order; it was also unfortunately present because
it had supplied weapons to most of these coun-
tries. Whai can I do about it? All I can tell you is
that 8096 of Iraq's weaponry was supplied by the
Soviet Union.
But I think there is some contradiction in the
qucstion that he expounded at length' It is not
dossible to criticise the countries of Europe for
having supplied weapons to these countries and
at tne-same time reproach them now for making
only a minimum contribution to the restoration
of 6rder and want them to take a more active
rOlc in the war when in so doing, in the end, they
would be increasing thcir profits in every way.
85
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES EIGHTH SIT-TING
Mr. Dumas (continued)
I think that this situation must be looked at
very calmly, ild with regret for the past. I
myself was one of those in France who were
critical of the arms contracts with Iraq. And this
is not something entirely new. But I should
really like to see every country make its con-
fession in this matter. We should all be able to
draw some lessons from this situation.
Coming to a more serious matter, we have to
determine what would be the part played by the
countries of Europe if war were to break out. It
is quite incorrect to say that these countries have
only sent naval forces and that, consequently,
they would not take part in any conflict. The
countries of Europe are present in the air, this is
in any event true of France; they are present at
sea 
- 
this is also true of Great Britain 
- 
and they
are present on land on the frontier between
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Reality cannot be dis-
torted for the sake of argument.
This gives me no pleasure. I am no trouble-
maker. I am not one of those people looking for
war. I hate war. I know that it represents human
losses, sorrow, death, misery and unhappiness.
But I also know that it is costly not to act in
time. I do not want to give any history lessons,
but all of us here have certain events in our
minds.
Mrs. Hoffmann brought up the question of a
peaceful solution. Of course we all agree with
this, and I am sure that this feeling is deeply
sh4rgd both by the Assembly and by public
opinion in all our countries. It is obvious, and
there is no need to repeat it.
But she also raised the problem of the con-
tinuing threat by the aggressor. This is a genuine
problem that leads me on to a conclusion and, at
the same time, a reply to Mr. Martino and Mr.
Stegagnini.
If the Gulf crisis is resolved as we hope,
namely by Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, then
there can be genuine discussion on the problems
of the region, not only on the specific problems
of the Gulf crisis, but also on its causes, which
are clear but which we have somewhat forgotten
following the attack itself. So, starting fro-m the
principle that no one individual or state has the
right to take the law into his own hands, it will
then be necessary to start to think about the
problems of this region.
But you are right Mrs. Hoffmann to say that
this solution can only be found through anlnter-
national conference, which is an idea that is
gradually gaining ground. Such a conference will
need to propose solutions for the pacification of
Lebanon, where the efforts of the government
are out of all proportion with the results it
obtains, namely, disarmament of the militia and
the withdrawal of foreign troops 
- 
the Syrians in
the north and the Israelis in the south. It should
aim to resolve the Israeli-Palestine conflict for
which no solution seems at present possible and
which is constantly getting worse, because the
conditions imposed upon the Palestinians are
daily becoming more unbearable and more
threatening; I am thinking particularly of what
has recently happened in Jerusalem or in the last
few days in the occupied territories. The con-
ference will also have to look at the GuIf crisis.
All these issues can be covered by an interna-
tional conference, with a number of special sub-
conferences on each ofthe conflicts that I havejust mentioned. Their objective 
- 
as I have just
said to Mr. Caro 
- 
would be to meet certain
essentials, namely, respect of human rights,
exploitation of resources, restoration of
democracy, respect for the sovereignty of states
- 
I have just mentioned [rcbanon 
- 
and disarm-
ament.
Coming back to the question put by the repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom, whilst it is
true that foreign powers have been guilty of sup.
plying too many weapons in this particularly
sensitive region, it would be a fair compensation
for them to come to the conference table and
reduce these weapons to the minimum needed
for security. May I say that a number of major
countries are thinking of this, including the
United States, and that France intends to take
part in such discussions.
Thus the proper way ahead is to hold an inter-
national conference.
To conclude, let me say that Mr. Martino has
raised the fundamental problem facing us today,
a problem illustrated throt,gh the Gulf crisis.
He spoke about the question of compliance
with the law. He said at the beginning of his
remarks that the United States no longer wanted
to intervene. As I listened I was inclined to add
that that was the view of the Soviet Union too
which had also burnt its fingers in its various
excursions beyond its frontiers.
We are in a completely new situation which
contrasts with what is, or is about to be, behind
us. Up to now, the balance of the world
depended on the balance ofthe superpowers and
the sharing of responsibilities. But if both sides
no longer wish to police their area, we must
draw one of two conclusions: if the world is not
careful we shall move towards a system where
regional anarchies flourish, where there are con-
quests, invasions and the annexation of the
weak by the strong. Conversely, we can move
to-wards compliance with the rules and prin-
ciples of international law.
_ 
You rightly stated that, through the Security
Council, the United Nations can play a r6le tha:tit has probably not performed since 1945
because of the international situation that
developed after the war.
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Shall we then be moving towards anarchy, cre-
ating conflict, disasters and perhaps, in the end,
towards the risk of wider conflicts such as a world
war or, on the contrary, are we, through the
United Nations, moving towards a period of
respect for law and the rules of law, in which case
humanity may enjoy a period of relative pros-
perity, co-operation and peace?
But we must be careful. The Gulf crisis is
important because it involves these two prin-
ciples and not just because it is one of the
regional conflicts such as we know in other
regions of the world. There are, for sxqmple,
fourteen conflicts going on in Africa. This is a
reality, but it is not the only problem. What is
goingto happen to oil resourceg i1 the region is
not itre only problem. Whilst it is important I
believe that beyond these considerations - I
thank Mr. Manino for having asked the question
- 
there is a much bigger issue which is going to
dominate the coming years, namely, do we or do
we not want the principle of respect of national
sovereignty to prevail, or, on the corrtrary, do we
want th-e rirle of force to prevail, a force which in
certain cases is relative: each one will choose his
victim, will annex, and do what he wants in his
area. We have to be careful. It is an issue which
goes far beyond the considerations arising out of
the present conflict, however serious that may be.
These are considerations for the future. France
would like to play its part along with other coun-
tries and ensure that law prevails over force and
that international law should henceforth be the
law governing the life of states.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank you
for your address and perhaps even more for the
answers that you have given to the questions
from members which have made such a contri-
bution to the debate we are about to have on
European security and the Gulf crisis and on the
futurb of this institution and the specific contri-
bution that it can make to European security.
The sitting is suspended.
(The sitting was suspended at 1/,.35 a.m. and
resumed at 11.55 a.m. with Mr. Soares Costa,
Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting
is resumed.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis
Consequences of the invasion of )uwait:
cofitinuing operations in the Gulf region
(Pruscatotion of and ioint debate on the r,cpofis
of tlp Political Committee aad the Defcnce Committec,
Dms. 1244 atd ameadncnfi aild 1218 and anerdments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the presentation of and joint
debate on the reports of the Political Committee
and the Defence Committee on European
security and the Gulf crisis and the conse-
quences of the invasion of Kuwait: continu-ing
operations in the Gulf region, Documents 1244
and amendments and 1248 and amendments.
The joint debate will be continued this
afternoon and tomorrow morning and will be
followed by a vote on the draft recommenda-
tions submitted by the Political Committee and
the Defence Committee.
I call Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur of the
Political Committee.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
In opening my address I should first like to
thank Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur on this same
subject, namely European security and the Gulf
crisis, for the help and assistance he has kindly
given me. In his report, Mr. Pieralli has thor-
oughly analysed the unacceptable act of
aggreision by Iraq against Kuwait.
Iraq has violated all the rules of international
law by its attack on a sovereign state, taking hos-
tages, violating embassies and threatening the
use of chemical weapons.
After the end of the conflict of the blocs we
were not expecting to be faced so soon with a
crisis of such importance with such crucial
potential consequences for our security and our
economy.
As regards our security, it is very hard to
accept tf,at a country of eighteen million inhabi-
tants, not yet equipped with nuclear weapons,
but already having chemical weapons, can
threaten oui vital interests and defy the leading
world powers.
This situation should open the eyes of those
who believed or hoped that the demise of com-
munism and the ending of the East-West con-
frontation would open the door to a peaceful
universe from which armed conflict was perma-
nently banished. On the contrary, everything
seemi to indicate that the new world we are dis-
covering will be shaken by a mounting number
of inteniive regional conflicts and that collective
security will be all the more difficult to ensure
because a large number of irrational states will
soon possess nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles.
But our security will be even further comprG
mised if we lack the determination - now that
the period of the veto in the United Nations as
used by the major powers for the benefit of their
protdgEs is ovei 
- 
to insist on compliance with
interi'ational law and with all the resolutions of
the United Nations Security Council.
Failing that determination, whatever it costs,
the Unitld Nations will meet the same sad fate
as the League of Nations and the world will be
like a giani western where the heroes will obvi-
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ously be those with the fastest trigger. What is at
issue in the Gulf crisis is, above all, the
supremacy of law and the triumph of the legit-
imacy of international law over the use of force.
Hence it is our Assembly's duty to ensure that
law prevails over force, but at the same time to
be resolved to allow the use of force if that is
necessary for the rule of law to be victorious.
This does not of coruse mean that we should
allow ourselves to fall into the trap being se
with increasing skill by Saddam Hussein. When
he attacked Kuwait the lot of the Palestinians
was not in his mind at all. He invaded Kuwait to
g!!b its oil and plunder its banls. It is only as an
after-thought and, faced with the unexp6ctedly
determined and intense international reaction
that he made a play of linking Kuwait with the
problem of the territories occupied by Israel,
admitting in so doing the de facto illegality and
illegitimacy of his own aggression and occu-
pation.
So there can be no guestion ofour countries'
falling in with Saddam Hussein's wishes and
agreeing that the settlement of the lraqi-Kuwait
crisis be linked with that of the diflicult problem
of security in the Middle East, the Palestinians'
legitimate right to self-determination and
Israel's right to ensure its own security.
This question will need to be settled by the
international community, but only after Iraq has
left Kuwait and freed the hostages. The Pales-
tinian question is nevertheless the one where
Europe has a specific r6le in this oisis. In the
eyes of all the Arab states, Europe clearly has
greater understanding for the unjust fate of the
Palestinians than the United States which only
seems to have thought of Israel's interests
without suffrcient consideration for the far-
reaching consequences ofthe blatant injustice of
which the Palestinian people are the victims
even if it is true that the Arab states bordering
on Israel are often guilty of a grcat deal of
hypocrisy in the matter.
However this may be, recent developments in
the Kuwait crisis and its managemcnt clearly
show that firmness and the solidarity and unity
of the international community are the only pos
sible keys to a peaceful settlement of the conflict
with the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait
and the freeing of the hostages.
The interview which Saddam Hussein gave to
the Franco-Belgian journalist Christine Ockrent
the day before yesterday shows that force is the
only language the Iraqi leader knows and under-
stands. His intentions are wholly evil and his
plan to turn the conflict into a cultural war isparticularly disturbing. Saddam Hussein sees
himself as the champion of the poor victimised
by the rich, whereas if he had not devoted most
of his country's resources to fighting wars his
people would be enjoying the same kind of pros-
perity as Saudi Arabia.
Saddam Hussein, who fought Iran under the
anti-religious banner, now projects himself as
the champion of Islam supposedly oppresed by
the international community 
- 
although the vast
majority of Arab countries and peoples dispute
his legitimacy.
From my travels in the Gulf region and Cairo,
I have been able to assess the determination of
the Arab countries of the region in the face of
the Iraqi President who is mainly felt to be a
threat and alone responsible for the tragedies
and misery that the invasion of Kuwait has
brought upon hundreds and thousands ofEgyp.
tians, Palestinians and people from the Far East.
If time appears to be on the side of Saddam
Hussein in the United States and in Europe,
where public opinion seems less and less
inclined to see the necd for a possible armed
conflict, it is not on his side in the Arab world
and the Gulf where there is mounting awareness
of the tide of tragedy that his crazy acts have set
in motion.
The international community has reacted
rightly by imposing sanctions through Security
Council resolutions, a tactic which, although not
totally effective, must surely sap Iraq's vitality,
particularly in depriving the country of all
financial resources. But we should not under-
estimate Saddam Hussein's ability to win back
Arab support through his pro-Palestinian propa-
ganda and we must also realise that this
manoeuvre will be all the rnore effective and
profitable if Saddam Hussein is able to hold on
to the prestige he gets because ofthe size ofhis
armed forces.
Nor must we ever forgct that it will not be too
long before lraq has nuclear weapons which
Saddam Hussein, as his past record proves,
would not hesitate to use whether against his
Arab or Israeli neighbours or against American
or European forces.
After the present conflict, therefore, there has
to be a general agtreement to limit conventional
weapons and a treaty on the denuclearisation of
the region. Failing such agreement, and no one
underestimates its difficulty in a part of the
world so marked by bitter mistrust, any with-
drawal of western forces, even after the with-
drawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait would leave
the countries of the re$on in an unacceptably
insecure position.
But to return to Europe. Thc Gulf crisis has
dcmonstrated the usefulness and increasing
effectiveness of WEU, but it has also shown how
nationally thc countries of Europe react when it
is a matter of deploying their armed forces, even
i
I
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though they agree on objectives and know the
importance of solidarity. Relatively easy as it
was to give WEU the task of co-ordinating the
European naval forces responsible for enforcing
the embargo, it has proved almost impossible to
co-ordinate anything involving the presence of
European land and air forces in Saudi Arabia.
As regards land and air forces, France and
Great Britain have gone it alone. Your
Rapporteur has the strong feeling that France
would have liked the British Government to
agree to position its land forces alongside the
French, and this, as we know, has not happened.
This individualism of the European countries is
apparent to all. And Saddam Hussein has
already made use of it in his propaganda. In any
event, this individualism and hence this division
between European countries shows how tightly
responsibility for defence and security matters is
bound up with national sovereignty, how sen-
sitive an issue it is and how illusory it is, in the
short term to expect the countries ofEurope to
surrender this responsibility to a supranational
European structure like the EEC.
The Gulf crisis, which has demonstrated that
no one European state, however powerful, could
have the slightest influence on this type of con-
flict, has also shown that at this stage only an
intergovernmental European organisation like
WEU could make any progress with a European
defence concept. There also needs to be the
political will to do so. Europe has specific
interests to protect and its sensitivities in
regional crises are sometimes different from
those of the United States, even though we share
the same values.
This is why your Rapporteur thinks it
essential, if we do not want Europe for ever to
have no other r6le than to follow and support
American forces and policies, for Europe not to
delay in equipping itself not only with a satellite
observation agency but also with credible land
and air forces that can be transported long dis-
tances to contribute to the restoration of peace
in response to the appeals of the Security
Council of the United Nations.
Setting up this mobile European force would
not involve any new investment because it
would be a matter of deploying mobile forces we
already have as circumstances require. Nor
would we have to form a European anny as
such. It would simply mean having existing
national forces of the countries which so agree
operating togethcr by mans of common logistic
procedures and systems.
This modular mobile force which could, when
our countries felt this to be needed, be placed
under the authority of the WEU Council, would
considerably increase Europe's credibility and
influence. It would also contribute to the dura-
bility of peace and stability in the world.
Only WEU has the intergovernmental capa-
bility at present to achieve this objective, which
would bring us closer to political union. Let us
seize this opportunity and ensure that this
tragedy in Kuwait ultimately advances the cause
of peace and the construction of Europe.
This is why, with the support of members of
all the political groups in our Assembly, I have
tabled amendments to the draft recommen-
dation before us not only so as to allow for the
most recent events, and in particular the
Security Council's adoption of Resolution 678,
but also in order to define mone nalTowly our
European objectives. I should be grateful if, in
this spirit, you would adopt this report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Mr. De Decker, for the excellent presentation of
your report and for the clarity of your statement.
You have made it very clear that what is at stake
in the Gulf crisis is the question of compliance
with international law. You have also made it
clear that it is the international community's
responsibility to help solve the various problems
causing such instability in the Near East. But
this contribution from the international com-
munity depends on one condition i.e. that Iraq
leave Kuwait and free the hostages.
(The President continued in English)
I now call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer to present
the report of the Defence Committee,
Document 1248.
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, you have the floor.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, the report I have the honour to present
to you this morning, as Rapporteur of the
Defence Committee, is the twin of the report
that has just been very ably presented by my col-
league, Mr. De Decker.
The report is an updated version of a report
that was adopted on 20th September by the
Presidential Committee, acting under the emer-
gency procedure, on behalf of your Assembly
and 
-mine. Basically, it' covers two different
themes. Firstly, it analyses how in the current
Gulf crisis WEU has been able to do what we
felt had to be done as regards co-ordination and
co-operation, partly on the basis of the visit we
were able to make to the region under the lead-
ership of our President, Robert Pontillon.
Attention is focused on the WEU countries'
naval contribution in the Gulf, which, as Mr. DQ
Decker has said, is a far better example than
what is happening in tho air and on land - and
one that may be further improved - of what can
be achieved in the way of co-ordination.
Another of the main thrusts of the report is
that it takes a first look at the future. It considers
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a number of the problems we are bound to face
once the Gulf crisis has been resolved 
- 
peace-
fully, as we all hope. What lessons are there to be
learnt from this crisis for our organisation?
What is WEU's position in the European
political and military arena, with particular ref-
erence, of course, to the r6le which WEU can
and must play? This applies to what are com-
monly known as out-of-area problems. The end
of my report in particular 
- 
I will discuss this at
greater lengfh in a moment 
- 
considers this type
of problem and attempts to trigger a debate
which the Defence Committee feels must be
conducted within WEU.
When I look at the present situation as I seek
to explain this first part of my report, I find that
since it was written and unanimously approved
by the Defence Committee, the Security Coun-
cil's adoption of Resolution 678 has shown how
important it is for the international community
and, therefore, WEU to remain involved and to
continue acting on the basis of the United
Nations resolutions. WEU is not neutral in the
military sense either, and is on the side of the
community of nations in this respect. That is
how it should stay.
Mr. President, when we look at what has been
achieved so far and what remains to be
achieved, we can see that some of the recom-
mendations made in the previous report I pre-
sented on behalf of the Defence Committee have
been followed up in the political sense, but that
there are still a number of things to be done. My
report urges that these things actually be done,
that discussions continue and that thought be
given to the possibility of better, integrated
command structures in addition to what has
already been achieved, because what has been
achieved has been based on a situation oftense
peace. As politicians we cannot afford not to
proceed, in our opinions and our thinking, from
a situation which is no longer one of tense peace,
but one in which other consequences may occur
in the Gulf and hostilities may break out unex-
pectedly 
- 
and I underline the word " unex-
pectedly ".
More can and must also be done with regard
to WEU's naval presence in the Gulf region. A
great deal of importance must be attached to
WEU's relationship with its major ally on the
other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The report
therefore emphasises the importance of getting
the message across, both to the public in the
United States and to our fellow representatives
on Capitol Hill, as to what WEU does in general,
and not only at this moment, during the Gulf
crisis. We must convince our allies that our con-
tribution serves the same purpose as their
own.
We can see that what has been achieved in the
Gulf so far has been reasonably successful, as
regards the enforcement, by the presence of
ships from a number of WEU countries, of the
sanctions announced by the United Nations
Security Council. That must be emphasised. As I
have just said, more must be done, but the
enforcement of sanctions has been reasonably
successful. More needs to be done, in particular,
about the co-ordination of air and land forces.
Here I agree with Mr. De Decker. The French
Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas, made a few com-
ments on this. This Rapporteur also firmly
believes that more can be done, just as more can
be done as regards multinational contributions
in the WEU context. One of the recommenda-
tions in the report therefore puts fonrard the
idea of a hospital ship with a multinational
crew. During our visit to the Gulf we were able
to see that co-operation at sea 
- 
my report
explains how this proceeds 
- 
leaves something
to be desired in some respects and is satisfactory
in others. One unsatisfactory aspect is the pro-
vision of air cover for the ships of the WEU
countries that are in the Gulf. You will therefore
see an appeal to France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, the countries with air forces in the
region, for a major improvement in co-
ordination with WEU in this respect too. There
must, for example, be more than agreements
among the Italian Tornado units on air cover for
Italian ships: it must also be possible for air
cover to be organised on a wider front and in a
WEU context.
Mr. President, when I speak of a situation of
tense peace, which may unexpectedly turn into
other situations, it is quite clear that more is
needed in political terms than a decision as to
the r6le the WEU countries' ships will have to
play if the situation I have just described
actually arises. The Defence Committee realises
full well that a debate of this kind cannot and
must not be held in public. We also find that the
ministers have not yet taken sufficient interest
in such matters and that they will have to be a
permanent item on the agenda. They will cer-
tainly have to be on the agenda when the min-
isters meet on 2fth December.
Passing from the present situation to the
political and military future, members will not
be surprised to find that once again 
- 
I regret to
say 
- 
my report emphasises the importance of
crisis prevention and satellite observation. As
this has often been discussed at length in this
Assembly, it is disappointing that it should have
to be raised again in a report. Your Rapporteur
and the Defence Committee feel that the Gulf
crisis reveals the relevance and political impor-
tance of the recommendations that have been
made.
Mr. President, I also have this to say about the
future. During the discussion with French
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Foreign Minister Dumas we heard what he
thought of the future of this organisation, partic-
ularly on the assumption that after the thaw in
East-West relations the threats to Europe now
and in the future will be more numerous and
more varied than the threat we have been accus-
tomed to in the last forty-five years. It is abun-
dantly clear that the sound of this threat will be
quite largely out of area, from regions that we
have traditionally referred to as out of area. In
the context of the report I have presented this
morning, we will therefore have to consider the
r6le to be played by our organisation, WEU,
when it comes to out-of-area threats.
My report includes a recommendation to
study the idea of doing more for naval
co-operation. Marshalling national resources
and considering some form of European rapid
deployment force is not something about which
the Defence Committee will say: " We will have
that tomorrow ". That is not the case. Hence the
wording of this recommendation.
I will dwell on this a little longer, because
amendments have been tabled to this recom-
mendation, which I consider to be extremely
important. We cannot evade this issue if we
want to talk about the lessons WEU can already
learn from this Gulf crisis. Even arguing from a
negative angle, it must be obvious that, for
reasons with which we are all familiar, the North
Atlantic Alliance cannot take action out of area.
Some people may say that it must take action,
but your Rapporteur agrees with what the
French Foreign Minister said about this this
morning. A distinction must be made between
what is desirable and what is possible for the
North Atlantic Alliance in this context. If it can
also be said that, as the integration of foreign
policy continues, the Europe of the Twelve will
certainly be unable to avoid problems connected
with the integration of security policy - two
aspects that are inseparable - your conclusion
must be, whatever you think about it, that this
will be a long drawn-out business. This is not
something that can be settled overnight. Even if
you adopt a negative approach, which I do not
subscribe to, this brings you to WEU, where
matters of this kind will have to be considered,
if only because there is no other forum.
In conclusion, my report includes a passage
concerning the defence budget cuts being madein many countries. It is, of course, for the
national parliaments and governments to decide
what they spend on defence. I feel it is our
responsibility as parliamentarians gathered in
this Assembly to urge our political leaders to
prevent this from happening in an unco-
ordinated way. When shaping future European
defence structures, which is something else we
face when we talk about lessons to be
learned from the Gulf crisis and its implications,
" think before you act " should be our motto. We
must first consider what structure the military
forces in Europe should have, and then, your
Rapporteur believes, it may be possible for
further cuts to be made in defence budgets in a
co-ordinated way. Let me make myself clear: I
totally reject the suggestion that there can be no
cuts in defence, but I believe we must consider
this problem if we are justified in claiming to be
an organisation that has a part to play in the
shaping of a future European defence structure.
That is why my recommendation, to which
amendments have been tabled, says that the
WEU Ministers must continue to play a part.
That is the view of your Rapporteur and the
Defence Committee.
Members of the Assembly will find an infor-
mation document attached to my report. It gives
a chronological account of the military develop-
ments, in particular, between the outbreak of the
crisis in the Gulf and the presentation of my
report. The Defence Committee thought it
would be useful for this chronological account to
be attached to the report.
When we talk about the Gulf crisis, we are
talking about the political aspects, the associated
military aspects and the Security Council resolu-
tions, of which there are now a considerable
number. President Saddam Hussein is being
asked to do what he should have done long
before. I will finish with a comment on a
human, rather than a military aspect. Amidst all
the other distress, political and military, we
must not forget that the hostages in lraq are in
an extremely distressful situation. There are rel-
atives of these hostages living in a number of our
countries, and they are in an equally distressful
situation. I just wanted to make a personal ref-
erence to this.
I will not trouble you further with my intro-
duction, because it is the debate, not the
rapporteurs, that will be important in the next
few days. I hope the report I have presented on
behalf of the Defence Committee contains sufft-
cient material for discussion in the Assembly
and will provide guidance as to how, along with
future political lines, other lines can - and mustbe plotted, more in terms of military
co-ordination, which could give WEU the place
in Europe it deserves.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for that presentation of
the report on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee.
There are already thirty speakers on the list
for the joint debate on the Gulf crisis. I therefore
propose to the Assembly, in accordance with
Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, that speeches
in this debate should be limited to five minutes
for each speaker, with the exception of the com-
mittee chairmen and rapporteurs.
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May I remind you that, under Rule 32, the
Assembly votes on this proposal without
debate.
Is there any objection?...
It is agreed.
I call. Mr. Ward of the United Kingdom.
Mr. WARD (United Kingdom). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. President. As the first speaker from the
floor, may I compliment our two Rapporteurs
not only on the detail they have included in their
report, but on the speed oftheir reaction to the
events. Thcir report is extremely helpful to those
who want to take part in the debate.
I understand and sympathise with those col-
leagues who want to use the example of the
action taken to ded with Iraqi aggression in the
Middle East as a model for action by WEU to
protect European security in the future. It is
unlikely, however, that future crises will neces-
sarily have the same characteristics of blatant
aggression, a major threat to regional stability
and a threat to the international community
politically and economicdly. In other crises it
may not necessarily bo possible to resolve themby international intervention. Therefore it
would be unwise to plan future structures
designed to protect Europe based on the present
action in the Gulf.
It would be unwise to assume that the United
Nations will always act as promptly and in such
a co-ordinated fashion as it has on Kuwait. In
common with many others, I hope that we can
look forward to a period of international
co-operation at the United Nations, but we must
also consider other scenarios.
All the allied nations are committed to
ensuring the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. We must also ensure that a lasting
solution is found to the.problems posed by the
invasion of Kuwait and the Iraqi possession of
chemical and biological weapons and their pos-
sible future possession of a nuclear weapon.
We all hope, even at this late hour, that a
peaceful solution can be found. There must be
no weakening of the United Nations' stated
position that- Iraq must withdraw completely
from Kuwait and unconditionally release all
hostages. However, that is not enough. Iraq
must be made to make full reparation for the
damage done in Kuwait and pay compensation
to the relatives of those killed, tortured or
impn$oned by the lraqis.
The latest initiative by Prcsident Bush may be
the last chance fora peaoofirl solution. I hope
that he will convince us, his allies, and Saddam
Hussein, that there will be no retreat fncm the
United Nations position.and that any.discussion
will end by l5th January 1991, when the latest
United Nations resolution becomes operative
and force may be used.
Many people, including prominent Amer-
icans, are concerned that Saddam Hussein sees
further talks as a sign of weakness. That can be
prevented if any meetings are used solely to
explain to the Iraqis in the simplest terms and
with the widest publicity that this is their last
chance to comply with the United Nations reso-
lution, on which there can be no negotiation.
I approve of the tactic of building up over-
whelming military power in the'Gulf while
seeking a peaceful solution at the same time.
The penalty for not resisting aggression is
written in large letters in recent European
history.
The best chance for peace in the Middle East
is to convince the aggressor that, whether the
conflict is in words or weapons, he will ulti-
mately lose.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
Mr. Ward for your contribution to the debate.
I now call Mr. Fassino.
Mr. FASSINO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, let me say at
once that I agree with the two reports and that I
too congratulate the Rapporteurs for the clear
and concise picture they have given us of both
the military and the political situation. In par-
ticular, however, I am pleased to see reaffrrmed
the crucial and highly positive r6le of WEU with
regard to a crisis which, although in an area
outside Europe, has a considerable impact on
our continent, now on the brink of an exceed-
ingly diflicult period in the economic and other
fields.
It is for these reasons 
- 
in addition to those
referred to a short time ago by the French Min-
ister for Foreign Alfairs - that I feel that the
Middle Eastern problem has to be solved
quickly because it is extraordinarily difficult to
grapple wiih a military and an economic chal-
lengp at the same time. Europe in particular,
confronted as it is by a grave economic crisis
and the need to help the Eastern European coun-
tries in the serious diffrculties they are experi-
encing, will have to take firm and swift decisions
in the military and other fields, if and when this
becomes necessary 
- 
though we hope that this is
not required. Tho eighteenth resolution of the
United Nations, which contains an ultimatum
and a deadline, creates a state,of alert. Even
though we want peace and not war, we still have
to do overything neccssary to prcpare for the
latter. This morniDg the French Minicter for
Foreign Alfairs, adapting an old Latin distum,
used the words 'prepare for war if you want
peace ".
I
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The recent apparent overtures by the Iraqi
rdgime and the 
- 
more than apparent, we hope 
-
possibility of a direct dialogue between the two
chief adversaries must not divert us from our
serious pursuit of the path of firmness, without
which Europe would be weakened just when we
want it to remain strong.
While we all certainly pray that the forth-
coming meetings will result in a diplomatic
solution as hoped by the United Nations,
nothing should be left undone in our endeavour
to defend ourselves at the diplomatic level and,
more especially, on the other level where struc-
tures are still inefficient and above all dis-jointed. I have pondered on what the
Rapporteur said this morning about the lack of
co-ordination but in my view this has to be
attributed not to the attitudes of individuals but
to the physical lack of co-ordination between the
forces working together in an effort to safeguard
peace and to prepare, should it be necessary, for
war.
We therefore await with hope the outcome of
this unexpected, and we trust fruitful, break in
the clouds between President Bush and Saddam
Hussein. I fear that the latter will be reluctant to
give up his pan-Arab leadership, and we should
therefore be prepared for fresh outbursts of
intolerance, fanaticism and irrationality to
darken the sky again.
As the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, pointed
out this morning, it is good to note that demon-
strations in favour of Hussein in Arab countries
have diminished. The Arabs are becoming aware
that the threat of poverty to their countries is
caused not by the West but by the person who
wishes to become the leader of what is called
pan-Arab civilisation. This is important because
it may persuade many people to change their
minds. Also it illustrates the power of
democracy and the weakness of autho-
ritarianism 
- 
an historical, philosophical and
political lesson.
In the light of these principles I therefore
endorse the position embodied in the recom-
mendation which, in any case, draws on the
United Nations resolutions. I believe that per-
manent consultation between the chiefs of
defence staffs is desirable and that the idea that
WEU should be consulted as one of the actors in
this crisis is sound. It is also desirable that there
should be a recognition procedure between the
western naval and air forces deployed in the
Gulf for safety reasons and to avoid incidents
between friendly units 
- 
as has already hap-
pened and must not occur again.
I attach special importance to the estab-
lishment of a liaison office to ensure stable rela-
tions with the United States 
- 
in the words of
the report: * to convince the United States
Administration that direct dialogue with WEU
is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at
present ". This must constitute an important
point of referenc€, and this latter view was reite-
rated several times this morning by Mr.
Dumas.
The draft recommendation therefore urges the
Council to make every effort to ensure recog-
nition of WEU as the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance. This principle must also be
reflected in the implementation of effective
solutions in terms of military technology
including the crisis management centre, the
observation satellite agency and the creation ofa
European military force.
I will conclude, Mr. President, by stating that
the vital principle and central objective are
those of a vision of WEU fulfilling an essential
rOle as the European pillar whose task, in the
present case, is to promote security throughout
the Middle East. We consider that WEU must
carry out an effective inspection of armaments
in the Middle East, just as it did before in
Europe.
I shall conclude with the hope that, to develop
our strength, to encourage the spirit and idea of
a speciflrcally European defence and to reinforce
the unity of Europe which could become one of
the aims of the coming decade beyond present
boundaries, these ideas of ours will succeed in
creating the kind of Europe which we have so far
failed to do for so many years.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Fassino.
I now call Mr. Scheer of Germany to take the
floor.
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, I have to say
that, unlike the previous two speakers, I do not
agree with the general tenor of the draft recom-
mendation. I would like to plead for a strictly
peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis, not a mil-
itary one. And I do not need anyone 
- 
I will say
this straight away 
- 
to tell me what to think of
Saddam Hussein. Two years ago, aftef Saddam
Hussein had used chemical weapons, and vio-
lated international law and human rights: after
he had perpetrated an act ofaggression, and not
for the first time, I called on my party's behalf
for international measures, including sanctions
and condemnation of Saddam Hussein as a war
criminal. Sadly, there was absolutely no political
reaction at that time, and so our governments
went on supplying him with equipment and now
share the responsibility for the situation in the
Gulf. There is no denying this. But it also means
that we have a political duty to our own people
to seek a strictly peaceful solution, so that our
men will not be shot down with weapons sup-
plied to Iraq by our governments in the past.
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But that is not the only reason for avoiding
military action. It is absurd - to be absolutely
frank 
- 
not to rely on the effect of sanctions.
Given the implications of military action, it
does not matter in the least whether these sanc-
tions continue for another six or nine or twelve
months. When you begin making comparisons,
it is obvious that sanctions are bound to work:
Iraq, with a population of seventeen million, is
economically half as strong as Belgium, and it
faces a community of nations that is enforcing
these sanctions with the United Nations. To
have no faith in them is a sign of political
weakness and nothing else.
The consequences ofwar are obvious: burning
oilfields would cause an ecological disaster on an
unprecedented scale, a drastic reduction in
worldwide oil supplies would result in a dra-
matic rise in prices, making the price rises of the
1970s look insignificant by comparison. This in
turn would increase the danger of a world eco-
nomic crisis and the total collapse of the third
world, which would then most definitely be
unable to pay the rising oil bills, seeing that
those countries were not even able to pay the
bills resulting from the oil crises of the 1970s.
The consequences throughout the Arab region
would also be incalculable. Every attempt to
find a political solution to the Palestinian
problem and other problems, Europe's entire
relationship with the new Arab identity, now
described as Islamic fundamentalism, all this
could be shattered for a long time to come. War
simply leads to more tensions.
Any attempt to give preference to military
solutions to problems which can only be solved
politically, and which have not been adequately
and appropriately solved in recent years, can
only lead to chaos. That is why we must and I -
along with others 
- 
shall oppose any attempt to
seek a military solution rather than sanctions.
Second, the WEU treaties, which are sup-
posed to give WEU its legitimacy, contain
nothing to justify out-of-area operations in the
future. WEU is concerned with defence in
Europe. It must, of course, take an interest in
political developments as regards security issues
elsewhere. But to respond by forming a military
unit would mean changing the purpose of the
provisions governing Western European Union
and would be just as wrong, as I have already
said, as military intervention in the Gulf. This is
the wrong approach.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Scheer.
I now call Mrs. Roe of the United
Kingdom.
Mrs. ROE (United Kingdom). - First, I con-
gratulate Mr. De Decker and Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer on their excellent reports relating to the
Gulf crisis.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has rightly attracted
the revulsion and condemnation of the rest of
the world. Saddam Hussein's annexation of that
small and virtually defenceless country was
wholly contrary to international law and every
tenet of civilised conduct. When he failed to
achieve his territorial and political ambitions by
bullying and threats, Saddam Hussein resorted
to the use of force finally to achieve his aims.
This is simply a case of unprovoked aggression
and it throws into jeopardy the fragile peace of
the Middle East. There is no doubt that Saddam
has brought the region to the brink of war by his
ambitions. The only way to avoid that war, with
the terrible loss of life and destruction which it
might bring, is for Iraq to end its illegal occu-
pation of Kuwait.
Saddam's bizarrre hope that the Arab world
and the western world would acquiesce in his
aggression has come to nought. How could the
other threatened countries of the Gulf, from
Saudi Arabia to Syria, possibly turn a blind eye
to an act of aggression which puts their security
into grave doubt? How could the western world
possibly stand by and watch international law
being flouted, a friend and ally annexed and a
militant superpower threaten the whole of the
Gulf region?
In an almost unprecedented show of unity, the
United Nations condemned lraq's occupation
and called on Saddam Hussein to withdraw his
troops. I am surprised that Iraq has failed to
meet the legitimate demands of almost all the
nations of the world. History has, however,
shown that dictators are indifferent to interna-
tional law and wholly oblivious of condem-
nation.
In invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein made a
massive error of judgment. He believed that the
rest of the world would indulgently ignore his
conquest. He thought that the other Arab coun-
tries had neither the will nor the means to resist
him. He thought that the Community and WEU
countries would ignore the threat he posed to
some of the West's staunchest allies in the Gulf.
He was very wrong. With almost 500 000 troops
from round the world in place in Saudi Arabia,
he must be aware that he can no longer continue
his occupation of Kuwait. At sea, an interna-
tional armada is enforcing the blockade. The
world reaction to the invasion has proved tan-
gibly that Saddam's illegal annexation cannot be
allowed to stand.
Although Saddam has had time to withdraw
his troops, all he has done is reinforce his occu-
pying armies and taunt the West with the
obscene spectacle of hostages. Sanctions have
clearly begun to bite, yet they have not as yet
persuaded Saddam Hussein of the seriousness of
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the opposition that he now faces. The new
United Nations resolution sets a firm deadline
for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. I am con-
vinced that it is right to give Saddam Hussein
until the new year to pull out of Kuwait, because
it is clear that a war in the Gulf is in no one's
interest and it is right that the allies should do
all that they can to head offthe risk of war. Ulti-
mately, if Iraq tries to call the allies' bluff, it will
be forced out of Kuwait, because it is clear that
the army now gathering in Saudi Arabia is not
some elaborate hoax designed to frighten but
incapable of acting. I have no doubt that the will
exists in the nations that have committed forces
to the area to use those forces should the need
arise.
I am no expert on military power, but I know
that the quality and sheer size of the forces com-
mitted to the Gulf by the Americans, the British,
the Syrians and the Egyptians and by many
other countries 
- 
thirty in all 
- 
have the capacity
to root Iraq out of occupied Kuwait. There is no
question of an American president or a British
prime minister and other political leaders
sending their forces to war in pursuit of an
unwinnable goal. If they have to go into action,
Saddam Hussein should understand that they
will win decisively.
Iraq's leaders made a monumental error in
seizing Kuwait, yet even now that error can be
reversed. My earnest hope is that Saddam
Hussein will do so and save the region from war.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
very much for your contribution, Mrs. Roe.
(The President continued in French)
(Translation). 
- 
I call Mr. Caro who is the last
speaker this morning.
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). 
- 
I should
like to thank the Political Committee and the
Defence Committee and the eminent Rappor-
teurs, Mr. De Decker and Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer, for two excellent reports which it was
right to put together in this debate. They are
indeed inseparable just like the two Rapporteurs
who make a very good pair.
Obviously, I should like to see a very thorough
follow-up to these reports. I am thinking in par-
ticular of all the data they give about the Gulf
crisis and the military efforts of WEU countriesin the context of the action envisaged and
authorised by the resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council.
When we refer to defence, we also mean car-
rying out national decisions in the WEU
framework. Here, though within the framework
of the United Nations resolutions, we are con-
cerned essentially with national decisions by the
member states of WEU which have agreed,
under the modified Brussels Treaty, to
co-ordinate their efforts in the application of
those decisions through the Council, to which I
pay tribute, and all the bodies which work with
the Assembly, not to forget the inestimable con-
tribution of the Secretary-General.
In this connection I should like our
Rapporteur to tell us, at the purely military level
of co-ordination, whether greater emphasis
should not be placed upon the value of meetings
of chiefs of staff of Western European Union
member countries' armed forces. I take this very
particular case 
- 
there are many others -
because our debate today on the two reports
raises two problems.
First, as a result of the crisis caused by the
'Anschluss " of Kuwait and all that is now
going on 
- 
rejection of the disaster of war with
the proviso that war will be waged if necessary -
the need for a stronger political organisation of
Europe's defence and security becomes clear in
our minds. We have our plan ready. The WEU
Assembly has an unchanging doctrine in this
respect and the address that you heard this
morning by the Chairman-in-Offrce of the
Council shows that the path that we have
marked out is steadily being pursued; perhaps
we shall be able to translate this very shortly into
reality. I must say, especially after listening to
Mr. Scheer, that as regards the catastrophic
results of an armed conflict, we are all able to
picture its terrible results both for man and his
environment. War, alas, brings destruction and
misery. There was a time, the second world war,
when men were prepared to lay down their lives
in equally apocalyptic conditions. The purpose
of that war, too, was to enforce the law. This
morning on the radio I heard statements by well-
known European political figures who are
beginning to say: the fight over there is not really
for us Europeans. From Mr. Scheer's words I
think I understood 
- 
Mr. Scheer will forgive me
for taking him to task since others are using the
same arguments - that we have to make a
careful distinction between what we call the
WEU area, the NATO area and out of area.
As democrats attached to the principles of
law, it is right for us to say that when interna-
tional and human rights are under threat from
totalitarian governments, there are no in or out-
of-area distinctions.
In what they are doing, the member states of
WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and the United
Nations are acting within their area of responsi-
bility to defend human rights and the right of
countries to live under the democratic rdgimes
which we have encouraged them to acquire. The
rule of law knows no barriers and I ask the com-
mittee to call upon the Assembly as a whole to
affirm it, so as to cut short this attempt to trap
us in this dualism, through the hope of a nego-
tiated settlement.
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We have a right to hope for negotiation
because, as Mr. Dumas said, we all hate war, but
we have no right to allow ourselves to be
trapped: it is not because war is unthinkable that
we should not be prepared to fight. What is
required above all is that we and our institutions
should defend what is right.
WEU would gain even more in stature by
claiming its right to have its part in the discus-
sions on the organisation of peace and security
in Europe, and doing all in its power to ensure
that the future institutions, in which we wish to
play an important r6le, are consistent with this
political option which we have always advocated
and which, because of, or perhaps thanl$ to, the
Gulf crisis, we can portray to the whole world
with much more credibility than before.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
Mr. Caro for your words and prticularly for
pointing out again that the rule of law is never
out of area.
(The President continued in English)
It is now time to adjourn this joint debate. It
will be resumed this afternoon and again
tomorrow morning when we shall vote on the
draft recommendations presented by the
Political Committee and the Defence Com-
mittee.
5, Clungcs ln the mnficnhip of committe.cs
The PRESIDENT. - The Italian Delegation
has proposed the following appointments as
alternate members of committees to fill vacant
seats: Mr. Colombo to the Political Committee,
Mr. Manzolini to the Technological and Aero-
space Committee, Mr. Manzolini to the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration, Mr. Andreis to the Committee on Rules
of Procedure and Privileges, Mr. Colombo to the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions.
Is there any objection?...
The changes are agreed to.
6. Date, timc and ordcn of tlu day
of the n*t sitting
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I propose
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following
orders of the day:
l. ChairmanshipinOflice of the Council -
presentation of the first part of the thirty-
sixth annual report of the Council,
Document 1247; Address by Mr. Chev0-
nement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Con-
sequences of the invasion of Kuwait: con-
tinuing operations in the Gulf region
(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the
Political Committee and the Defence Com-
mittee, Documents 1244 and amendments
and 1248 and amendments).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)
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1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes
3. Chairmanshipin-Offrce of the Council - presentation of
the first pari of the thirty-sixth annual re-port. of the
Council; iddress by Mr.- Chev0nement, Minister of
Defence of France.
Replies by Mr. Chevtnement to questions put b!:. \41'
Scfreer, Mr. Caro, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Stegagnini, Sir
Dudlev Smith. Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Castellina(Member of ihe European Parliament, Observer), Mt.
iessel (poini of order), Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Hardy,
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting
is open.
1. Attendtnce tegistet
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names
of the substitutes atiending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of Proceedings'.
2. Adoption of the minata
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In
accordance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
3. Chairmanship-in-Olfice of the Couttcil -
orcsentation of thc lirst patt of the thit0'sixth' 
annual iport of the Council, Doc. 1247
Address by Mr. ChevDnement,
Minister of Defence of France
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first
order of the day is the presentation of the flrst
part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
Mr. Romero, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Feldmann, Mr. Goerens,
Mr. Scheer (point of ordeil.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kuwaiu continuing operations in the Gulfiiio" ine**ed ioint debate on tie ieports of the Political
C6mm'ittee and ihe Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and
amendments and 1248 and amendments,).
Soeakers: The President, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, ]vlr'
Siesasnini. Mr. P6criarix, Mr. Cetin (Observer from
fuikdfl, Mr. Benassi, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Colombo, Mr.
Soell, 
-lrir. 
Fourr6, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Martinez.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting'
The sitting was opened at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
Council by the Minister of Defence of France,
Mr. Chevdnement.
Once again, Minister, let me sqy how pleased
we are Io welcome you to this Assembly,
although in the circumstances this may be
somewlat pointless since you already know the
building w6[. we have already had much infor-
mation]chrification and detail from you before.
Today you are here as French co-Chairman-in-
Offrc6 ilf ttre Council. This morning we were
addressed by Mr. Roland Dumas, who replied
very fully and to everyone's obvious satisfaction
to the m'any questiorhe was asked, and I know
that you yourself have agreed 
-to-reply to ques-
tions-afte; your address. May I therefore thank
you once hgain for being here and without
iurther ado ihvite you to take your place at the
rostrum.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). - Mr. President, Secre-
tarv-Gi:niral. ladies ind gentlemen, it is only a
fed days since the Paris summit of the
thirty-four member countries of the CSCE came
to an end. As many heads of state, as well as the
President of the Fiench Republic, have pointed
out, this summit will prob-ably go 
-down in
history as the symbolic end of an era: that of the
cold i,ar and Yalta, which had divided Europe
into two opposing blocs dominated by the two
supefpowers.
The Gulf crisis also belongs to a new world
which does not fit into the bipolar pattern
either, but shows the need for region?1.-crises to
be managed in a multi-polar context. Like manyl. See page 25.
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current events in Europe, including the collapse
of the Soviet fortress, the crumbling away of tne
Warsaw Pact and the re-union of Germany, the
Gulf crisis is a consequence of the crisis in the
Soviet Union, a point we can come back to
shortly if you wish during question time.
The events of recent months are alive in all
our minds: the democratisation of the countries
of the East, German uniflrcation, recently
accented by general elections for the whole of
the united country, the upheavals that have not
yet settled down and the big question marks
hanging over the future of the Soviet Union.
All these upsets directly impact institutions
designed to flrt a strategic context that is now in a
proc-ess of radical change: we have to face up to
the fact that one chapter in European historyhas
closed and another has opened. Examplei are
the new impetus in the process of European uni-
fication with political union its declared aim,
the new dimensions now planned for the CSCE,particularly in the sphere of pan-European
security co-operation, the imminent demi5e of
the W-arsaw Pact, and the increasingly apparent
need_for adjustment and fundamental chahge in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, at
developments arising out of evenis occurring in
the past year.
Finally, there is the issue of the possible
co-ordination of European action outside the
NATO area in a context where the East-West
approach and its implicit solidarities no longer
necessarily apply.
It is within this radically new context and
against this background that I should now like to
set what I have to say about WEU's possible
contribution to the future security of Europe.
As you just said, Mr. President, Mr. Roland
Dumas conveyed to you this morning how
strongly the French Government felt thaaWEU
h.ad a positive part to play in writing this new
chapter of European history.
- 
As regards Europe, the challenge facing us can
be summarised quite simply: a gradual tran-
sition has to be made from a balance of confron-
tation dominated by the United States-USSR
strategic equation to a situation where stability
will be more a matter of continental balance in i
context of co-operation.
For forty years the opposition between the
blocs has made equilibrium in Europe part of,
and a consequence of, the global East-West stra-
tegic balance and for forty years the Europeans
have greatly enjoyed the benefit of the United
States commitment. At all events it has been a
great comfort to them. Today the American mil-
itary presence in Europe is going to change, first
for budgetary reasons and, iecond, becarlse it is
increasingly difficult to justify it to American
public opinion for which the defence of Europe
was primarily part and parcel of the global con-
frontation with the Soviet Union. Tbday, that
has all gone. How thinking has changed in one
year!
However, the United States-USSR ddtente is
not going to correct the strategic imbalance in
Europe implicit in the presence of a military
superpower in continental Europe. This is the
truth and there is a risk in the fact that the
reduction of the United States' r6le in the
defence of Europe and the relaxing of our own
defence eflort, if we are not careful, may lead to
q 9lJategtc void in a fragmented Western Europefailing to assume responsibility for its own
defence.
First, I should like to look at the problem of
strengthening European co-operation in defence
matters,_because that would be an essential guar-
antee of the continent's long-term stabilitt. At
the same time, this strengthening of European
qo-operation would be part of the logic of
Europe's progress towards unity.
The strengthening of European defence
cg-operation should help to strengthen the
alliance and maintain links with the United
States, a key element in European equilibrium.
Some people have talked about a SanFrancisco/
Madivostok equilibrium. This is the whole
question of setting up of a new transatlantic
partnership in wtrich Europeans would play a
new rOle implicit both in progress tith
European unification and in the shouldering of
essential responsibility for their own defence.
Speaking to you on what I think is at least the
third occasion, I shall not repeat what I have
said at other times, but clearly 340 million Euro-
pe.?ns cannot go on for ever depending on 250
million Americans for their security.- That is
obvious. But we need to be aware ofihis for us
to make the necessary arrangements in time.
Let me also add that in my view facilitating
and encouraging this development is in the alli-
ance's interest too. We must not cling to the
past.
. 
Greater responsibility for defining and pro-
yi4ing their own defence is a necessary con-
dition for Europeans to assume more of the
burdens and risks and, ifI have understood cor-
rectly, this is what we are being asked to do.
In my opinion, Western European Union has
always had an essential part to play in this nec-
essary reorgaqisation of defence solidarities
between Europeans and Americans. I have never
ceased Sying this here and elsewhere and todaythe truth is more obvious than ever.
The Brussels Treaty provides the necessarylegal framework for the achievement o?
European agreement on defence questions for
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the organisation of specifically Europgan
co-operition at the military level compatible
*itt tt 
" 
maintenance of a changed form of
transatlantic co-oPeration.
It is in this spirit that we proposed.to our
Dartners to set up an agency for evaluating !at-
itlite data which should, in my view, be the first
step towards the creation of a European satellite
obiervation capability. The point here is that,
whether for verifying disarmament agreements
or studying crisii situations, satellites play a
unique iOte Uv providing an autonomolrs obser-
vation capabiiity not subject to overflight or vis-
iting agreementi that would not necessarifv Qe
.esplctiO in a crisis, i.e. just when observation is
absolutely vital.
It seems to me that this opens up a vast oppor-
tunitv for rational European co-operation for
the benefit of security and disarmament which
would itself serve the cause of peace in Europe.
Bv combining our European resources we could
have observalion facilities providing us with the
minimum of autonomy we need by comparison
with the other sPace Powers.
We should never forget that the Soviet or
American effort is often ten, fifteen or twenty
times what we are capable of as Europeans. And
for the future of this space observation capa-
bility - I am thinking in particular of radar or
infri-red observation iatellites - we need to pool
our resources and efforts.
This is not an aggressive position; it is one
serving European interests which are peace and
surveillance of disarmament agreements, and we
must have the courage to go forward towards it.
On that score let me warn against making
Europe part of an electoral platform^if we are
not prepared to make a number of practical
arrangements to make it come true. How
Euroiean we are can be measured by. the yard-
stickbf political will. This political will is either
ihere of not there. We hope it is, and that this
will give Europe a chance to become a fact.
I also welcome the news that the principle of
the meeting of the chiefs of staffof our countries
is now agrJed. The first meeting is to be held in
spring nlxt year where, aryqqg other things,
tiere-witt be-an exchange of ideas on military
developments in Europe, something that is-very
necessiry now the Paris agleements have been
signed.
The essential point remains that defence soli-
darity has to bebased on a common perception
of ttie way in which that defence is to be
ensured. I im sorry to dwell on the obvious, lut
questions of doctiine and strategy are funda-
irental to any reorganisation of our 
.defence
system. Otherwise we could well fabricate an
empty solidarity within which narrow national
approaches would remain or even grow stronger
oi'mate the development of the defence of
Europe dependent on imported and inappro-priati thebries ultimately inconsistent with
the responsibility connected with the defence of
a country's oi of a community's security
interests.
And as there is no more serious requirement
than to ensure the long-term security of our
countries and of Europe, we need to know how
we are going to prepaie to cope with situations
that, bytefinitioh, are evolving, changing and, I
would add, unpredictable.
Western European Union can and must be
oart of the framework when this joint concept of
buropean defence in conformity with European
interests is develoPed.
Our long-term visions are not far off, as-is
clear from-our adoption in 1987 of a joint decla-
ration on European security interests and in the
discussions held in the groups organised by this
institution.
Of course, you will say, much has happened
since 1987. this is true,-but the relevance of a
defence doctrine which can only be a long-te-rm
doctrine may be judged by the fact that the far-
reaching chinges that we have witnessed have
not ou[dated-its raison d'Otre. In the final
analysis this seems to me to be true.
In my view, Western European Union also has
a futur6 because the Brussels Treaty provides for
solidarity of outlook in the face of all those
forms of aggression that are the reasons why- the
sienatorieJ to the treaty jointly consider how
thiv should organise their defence in the per-
spettive of the potitical union of the member
cbuntries of the CommunitY.
This relates more particularly to the nuclear
deterrent necessary to guarantee a stable balance
of security in Euiope. We also confirmed this
principle in The Hague security platform.
Nuclear weapons, not least because of the rOle
that they wert said to plly in 1!9 alliance
strategy, are often considered by- public.opiniort
as thef,tie weapons, with the result that their r6le
in the preventlon of conflicts and maintenance
of staliility is not always clearly- perceived.
Wronelv. 6f course! But have we always made
the njc66sary effort to explain this? The truth is
ihat *e havl been running a practical exercise
foi forty years and we now need to show that it
has been a complete success.
The deterrent achieved what it was meant to
achieve; we won this cold war which is now a
itiine of the past because the deterrent showed
itietito be effective, because in the final analysis
it prevented war, because it gu-aranteed peace
anil because it made possible these great
ihanget, which are now reality, through the
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signing ofthe treaty on the reduction ofconven-
tional weapons and on confidence and security
measures in Europe 
- 
the Paris charter for a new
Europe.
To meet the problems implicit in its vulnera-
bility in the face of this conflict, Europe needs to
be able to rely on an adequate nucleai deterrent
for its defence. You have only to think of the
immense conurbations, the countless industrial
installations and the dozens of nuclear power
stations there are to picture the devastating
effects of a conflict in Western Europe, even
limited to conventional weapons. The Soviet
Union and the United States with their vast
op€n areas are vulnerable in a different way. It is
this speciflrc fragility, due to its small territorial
size, density ofpopulation and degree ofdevel-
opr.ngnt and to the very nature of its society
which means that Europe's objective can never
be to fight a devastating and deadly war but only
to prevent war. The nuclear deterrent with the
threat of destruction that it holds for any
aggressor is the only way to discourage any
attempt at aggression by proving that thepolitical and military mathematiCs of such
aggression would be an absurdity.
The deterrent outdates war as a political
instrument for settling conflicts, and with tne
ending of the cold war nothing would be worse
than for us to go back to the Clausewitz logic
that war could be politics as usual but in another
form.
Thc presence of four nuclear powers on the
continent of Europe has the strategic effect of
loc$ng out any possibility of large-s-cale conflict
in. Europe, and a dampening effect on possible
crises.
We feel that the deterrent must be on the
minimum scale: the purpose is not to win a war
but.to prevent one breaking out. Over-capacity
designed for purposes of waging a nuclear war
would be both unjustified and dangerous
because it could be used or perceived as a ihreat.
A minimum deterrent, however, has a stabilising
effect because its use can only be envisaged td
defend the vital interests of thicountries s[aring
th9 gqme defence space and linked by the indis-
soluble ties of geography, as is our Case.
Our objective must therefore be to make the
doctrine of a country like France and that which
appean to be emerging from the discussions of
our allies complementary to one another. I am
th.inting in particular of the Inndon conference;
whilst it is clear that the doctrines there are not
wholly in line, the question is: can they be made
complementary? It is in this direction that our
thinking should be aimed.
. 
That brings me to the second solidarity forumin security matters, namely the CSCE. -
- 
Solidarity in security matters among the
thirty-four countries of Europe forms part of the
history and geography of the continent, and,
now that the artificial barrier between the East
and West has come down, the CSCE should be
the. veh.icle for strengthening and developing this
solidarity.
The continent of Europe must maintain peace
and stability and the collective interests of all
the peoples of Europe should take precedence
over individual interests. But even if the mil-
itary balance essentially related to the presence
on European soil of the Soviet Union 
- 
which in
lny event will remain a major military power -
is still an essential condition for maintiining sta-
bility and peace, pan-European consultation and
agreement should bring about the concerted and
co-operative management of the military ele-
ments that ensure this balance. This is the prin-
ciple underlying the disarmament agreements
and, on these grounds, they represent a success
and a hope for Europe as a whole.
Indeed, the fact that the twenty-two member
countries of the two alliances reached agreement
on levels of armaments involving big reductions
and that they will set up jointly a verification
system and transparency measures gives positive
lope fgr the establishment of new mititary rela-tions between Europeans, based on trans-
parency, trust and cooperation. WEU has its
r6le to play in these relations, in so far as the
Eurgneans have specific interests to uphold, par-
ticularly in the areas of verificatiorr and cbm-
pliance.
Perhaps I shoqld, at this point, draw your
attention to the fact that there has already been
a case of non-compliance east of the Urals where
the Soviets have placed an impressive quantity
of weapons. We also know that many countries
in the West and in Central Europe are far from
complying with the theoretical ceilings assigned
to them. The,measures that we see tf,em taking
in successive budgets do not point to such com-
pliance with the result that there is some risk of
imbalance, on which we have to keep a careful
watch. But I do not want to play the pessimist.
There have been suflicieni major- political
events 
- 
the collapse of the Soviet fortress, the
break-up of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of
Germagy, the withdrawal of Soviet troops back
to the USSR 
- 
for it to be considered that the
one, to some extent, offsets the other. But we
still need to be watchful about compliance with
these- agreements. We must not allow strategic
imbalances and vacuums to develop, whilh
could prove disastrous temptations. We should
remember that the best guarantee of peace is our
own vigilance.
At the same time, the decisions to organise
regular- political consultation among- the
thirty-four and to set up a conflict prevlntion
centre shows a joint determination to promote
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the means of ensuring stability and preventing
and limiting such crises as may arise in Europe,
which is a dangerous continent, as the past has
shown. while this dialogue is primarily political,
consideration of the military conditions of
long-term stability is also implicit. Ilep aqain,
tWf=U can contribute to this process with a view,
more particularly, to the next seminar on mil-
itary doctrines in 1991.
As you are aware, the two extraordinary WEU
miniiterial meetings in August and September
were an opportunity for us to state our common
views on the measures to be taken in response to
the lraqi attack on Kuwait.
Here is a situation report on co-ordinated
action since the first ministerial meeting on 2lst
Aueust. First there was a common ministerial
dir6ctive on co-ordination of measures by WEU
counhies to enforce the embargo at sea. It was
the first of its kind and was adopted at the end
of August after the meeting of the chiefs of staff
of oui armed forces.
Next there were the naval " points of contact'
meetings which defined the specific areas of
co-ordination and enabled all the necessary
information to be exchanged to ensure that the
deployment envisaged by each of- our-various
countiles was coheient with the other. There is
thus a unit monitoring the situation of " WEI'J "
warships operating at naval headquarters in
Paris ind ?ehying information to the head-
quarters of member countries.
Finally, there is local co-ordination through
the " conferences of commandants in the zone of
the naval forces of the WEU member countries'
which are held about once every month. It is in
this framework that patrol sectors have been
defined for our ships operating in the zone
extending either side of the Strait of Hormuz.
This has-made it possible to organise a rota of
member countriest ships so as to ensure a vir-
tually permanent presence and particularly that
of aiogistic support ship in the area.
We are therefore very pleased with the various
decisions that have been taken, which show that
the co-ordination structures set up are playing
an effective r6le. Six WEU countries are now
Dermanently present in the crisis area. In total,
ibr this emtiaigo enforcement mission alone, our
countries have deployed nineteen fighting ships
and some twenty suiport, supply and-auxiliary
ships with the- same embargo enforcement
mission.
As for the deployment of land and air forces,
after the ministerial meeting on l8th September,
the ad hoc group set up to ihplement the minis-
terial diredtivei conCluded that co'operation
between WEU member countries could chiefly
be done in the logistics field. While some would
have liked to have gone a little further this was
nevertheless what was agtreed: there would be
assistance with air and sea transport from the
home countries to the potential theatre of opera-
tions, participation in the security ofsuch trans-
portation; esiorts in the Mediterranean and Red
Sea; technical, air transport and medical support
in the crisis zone, etc.
At the practical level, a network of military
ooints of iontact has been set up similar to that
bf naval points of contact. Four meetings of the
military points of contact have already.taken
place ind the organisation of co-operation in
iogistics is makin[ progf,ess: the structures have
been set up and there is a monrtonng unlt oper'
ating in the country of the chairmanship.
Finally, on the basis of the lists of needs sub-
mitted Uefore the meeting by the British and the
French, a number of - areas of logistic
co-opeiation have been identified and there
have been many co-operative actions in these
areas.
This list of wEU joint actions highlights the
Drosress achieved in terms of specific co-
bpe-.atioo between Europeans. At the same time
it reveals how much remains to be done in pro-
viOine the countries of Europe with the means of
contri-buting collectively and effectively in the
diplomatic-and military fields to the stability of
regions like the Gulf which are of crucial stra-
teEic importance to Europe. It requires us to
pool oui thoughts about the aims and 
-instru-
ments of European co-operation in defending
our essential security interests both in Europe
and elsewhere.
This is a major task and it is there for us to do'
Manv oractical measures have already been
tat eri. f have listed them, but much remains to
be done. What we have done so far is a measure
of both your will and ours to go forw-ard so that
this European security identity, to-which I have
often ref6rred, can advance still further in the
months and years to come.
I thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you^
for the wealth of ihformation and news of
projects in your address and its clear illustration
bf [ne agreement there is between the Minis-
terial Co:uncil and the parliamentary Assembly
in their hopes for the future.
Thank you also for agreeing to answer the
questions bf some of our members. Perhaps you
would like to answer the questions in batches or
possibly you would prefer to answer one
question at a time.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). I would prefer to answer
one question at a time.
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Scheer.
Mr. SCHEER Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
I would like to ask the Minister
if, when discussing the problems in the Gulf, his
government considered the possibility that the
pressure of time now under discussion may
simply be due to the excessive deployment oi
troops now taking place in the Gulf. The daily
costs are enormous in financial terms and too
grcat a physical strain may be imposed on troops
and weapons when the desert storms begin in
the spring. So might the pressure of time be due
solely to this, and not to any doubts about the
sanctions working? It would be quite possible to
wait longer than the deadline of l5th January
for sanctions to take effect. As we have heard
and read that the French Government has been
highly sophisticated in its approach to this
question 
- 
more sophisticated than many other
countries 
- 
I would like the Minister to iell me,if he can, what discussions of a sophisticated
nature have taken place in France.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). What
about these shades of opinion, Minister!
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
F1an9e) (Translation). 
- My reply will be very
simple. Although there are alwayi many shadei
of opinion when governments are debating,
there cannot be any when action is required. -
The embargo strategy was defined last August.
As we know its effect can only be gradual but
troops with an essentially defensive and
deterrent r6le have been deployed at the same
time.
Now that the United Nations resolution has
been passed authorising recourse to further mea-
sures after l5th January, one may rightly
wonder what will happen. Having sent 400@0
troops into the zone, the United Slates has indi-
cated clearly that there is not really any question
of them spending another summei in ine regionin such large numbers. So it seems that the
countdown has in fact begun. But this is part of
situation logic. Consequently, it is within thisperiod that Iraq has to move and agree to go
back on its annexation of Kuwait.
In a speech to the United Nations on 24th
September, which is still perfectly valid today,
the President of the French Republic calldd
upon Iraq first to indicate its intention to
withdraw from Kuwait and, secondly, to free the
hostages.
Thereafter, in a second stage, the United
Nations would be prepared to guarantee the
withdrawal of the Iraqi troops, the setting up of
an interim Arab force in Kuwait and the liolding
of free elections in that country, once the demdgraphic balances had been naturally re-estab-
lished.
Thirdly, the President of the Republic said the
problems of the region 
- 
a veritable tinder box 
-
would be considered. A few moments ago, I
referred to the implications of the crisis in the
U-SSR not only for Europe but also for this part
of the world. It is clear that Israel hoped in some
way to take advantage of the circumstances to
consolidate its presence in Transjordania. Simi-
larly, Iraq wanted to be in a position of strength
to play a leading and decisive r6le within OPEC.
Unfortunately, to do so, it violated the funda-
mental r6le of the sovereignty of states and in
particular that of a state that is a member of the
United Nations organisation, which is not
acceptable.
A violation of the law is not acceptable on the
g4ounds that the law is not universally applied.If it were, what would we do? In any civilised
society one crime cannot be an excuse for
another. So it is not acceptable to make the fact
that certain United Nations resolutions have not
been applied, whether they concern the occupied
territories or Lebanon, an excuse not to comply
with other resolutions. Without making these
into global issues, as Saddam Hussein would like
to do, we feel, as Mr. Dumas said this morning,
that we now need to call an international con-
ference to consider all the problems of the
region, both the political problems and the mil-
itary problems connected with a certain balance
of armaments.
One possibility would be for Israel to under-
take not to make first use of nuclear weapons; in
exchange, naturally, the Arab countries 
- 
which
are all still at war with Israel, with the exception
of Egypt 
- 
would recognise Israel, while Israel
itself would undertake to recognise the right of
the Palestinian people to have a homeland and a
state. This could not be done in a few weeks or
months, perhaps not even in a year. But it seems
reasonable to see it as part ofa long-term peace-
ful settlement, which we hope is still possible.
- 
However, France is not master of the world, a
fact that no one regrets, ourselves included. We
think that a dialogue is necessary, as far as pos-
sible, in this case to achieve a peaceful solution
because we realise what a war and its conse-
quences would mean. At the same time, we
cannot just do nothing. We are caught between
these two equally uncomfortable constraints.
Faced with this apparent contradiction it is not
possible to globalise the matter because one
cannot make one act ofaggression the excuse for
another. Moreover, the law must obviously be
the same for all. Twotier justice is no justiie, it
is injustice.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Caro.
M., CARO (France) (Translation). 
- 
Myquestion to the Minister relates to tha
organisation of the defence of European security
It
t'
1l
I
t
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Mr. Caro (continued)
in which we are nearing the end. The Assembly
has always had a very firm doctrine in this
matter. To personalise its identity it has.always
sought to have the foreign and defence ministers
of t[e member countries working together. This
is legitimate in the sphere of public international
law Tor international organisations. Since reacti-
vation in 1984, this has become a reality which
sives us ereat satisfaction. It took the Pershing
Erisis und the installation of these missiles in
Europe in 1981 to bring the go-vernments to the
realisation that WEU was useful and should be
reactivated.
Then there had to be the Gulf crisis for
another of the Assembly's requests to bear fruit,
namely that the chiefs of staff of our armed
forces- should meet as frequently as possible.
You have already referred to the unit at naval
headquarters and, although they have been
irreguiar, we have had meetings between chiefs
of itaff. In the future there will be a CSCE
organisation within which WEU, 
-thanks to the
uniaralleled advantages of 
. 
the-- modified
Brussels Treaty, intendi to play its full part. This
mornins. the 
-Minister 
of State, Chairman-in-
Office ii ttre Council, confirmed how advisable
it would be to have such an organisation.
Can this identification of our organisation,
with all the advantages it would present in terms
of co-ordinating defence, arlnaments and the
strategy to be apblied in a crisis, be upheld in the
negoti-itions on- the institutionalisation of the
CSCE?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister of Defence.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). - I am tempted to-answer
bv savine that WEU will be what we make of it.
If is 6ur-responsibility at all times. It is the suc-
cession of 
-our 
actions that decide what is
done.
As vou mentioned, we have had the Pershing
crisisind the Gulf crisis. Now there is the CSCE
and the great question of balance in Europe'
It is fairly clear that in order to balance Soviet
or. if vou [ike, Russian power - nobody knows
wliat the future will bring - there has to be a suf-
ficiently permanent defence bulwark in Western
Europe f6r confidence to reign on our continent.
Imbalance in fact generates mistrust. It is
balance that creates- confidence and permits
co-operation. The concern for this qeaceful
balance has to be our guide and prompt WEU to
take initiatives to ensure that it is not disturbed.
From this point of view, the meetingof chiefs of
staff and ihe exchange of information on our
respective defence policies will allow us to judge
whbther we carry enough weight, foryive me for
the pun.
I note that Germany will not reach its theo-
retical ceiling; nor will Italy; nor will France for
many areas. Several countries have been allowed
considerable entitlements: Poland, Bulgaria,
Greece, Turkey. These entitlements will
probabiy not be reached and will remain theo-
ietical. Conversely, under the rule of suffrciency.
the Soviet Union will keep a little over a third of
its military potential in ihe zone running from
the Atlantii to the Urals. Large quantities of
weapons will be transferred east of the Urals.
Will the balance be maintained? It is difftcult
to be certain.In 1918, Marshal Foch said: * Now
that I am head of a coalition I admire Napoleon
much less ". We should not forget that there are
thirtv-four countries on the continent of Europe
and ihat the Soviet Union represents a good
third. We have to make sure that there is a rea'
sonable balance between the interests of the
Soviet Union and of Europe and those of all-
Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr'
Antretter.
Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). - I would like to ask
the Minfttdr a question that is not connected
with the Gulf. The day after tomorrow the par-
liamentary Assembly will be debating Yt'
Tummers;s report on conversion in Soviet mil-
itarv industrv. For many years Mr. Tummers
his' been iuccessfully promoting relations
between the parliameritary Assembly and the
USSR.
Against this background I want to ask the
Minister if he can imagine supporting initiatives
in our part of Europe - in WEU and in his own
country - to promote efforts similar to the con-
version of the Soviet armaments industry, which
we now endorse.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France)(Translation). - First we have to reduce
it J asv*metries I have just mentioned. If wel;k at numbers of tanki, the Soviet Union is
credited with 51 000. At the present time it has
declared 24C[0 between the Atlantic and the
Urals and admits having transferred 8 000 to
10000 east of the Urals, which it has agreed to
destroy or convert. Germany has just over 4 000
tants'if we include thos6 from the former
German Democratic Republic in the Federal
German total. France has I 300- Italy has a thee
retical entitlement of about I 000 if I remember
correctly. You can see the orders of magnitude
that we are dealing with. When we have reduced
the asymmetries we shall sce what the situation is'
As far as my country is concerned there will be
no difficulty in gettin! below the agreed number:
it already has.
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Mr. Chevbnement (continued)
We are also ready, for any WEU study or
initiative, to supply all the data it needi to
further its knowledge of the problems so that we
genuinely feel we are contributing to greater
security by co-ordinated, methodical, simulta-
neous reduction of weapons, as between East
and West, and between the various powers of
Europe in a way that avoids the creation of
imbalances and the temptations they ref
resent.
More specifically, you asked if we were con-
templating converting our tanks. Obsolescence
is the best way to disarm and we already have afair stock of equipment in depots wlich we
could no longer use.
There has never been disarmament agreement
on cross-bows and arquebuses, and yet these
weapons are now out of use. I would also point
out that we had 7 800 aircraft in l9l8 but only
i50 loday. It was not a disarmament agreementthat brought about that spectacular reduction.
. 
Life is.a mo-re powerful force than anything
else and, in reality, it is life that is going to cause
us, uslng our reason, to opt for lower levels of
armament, provided of course that security is
guaranteed.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (haly) (Translation). 
-
$in!ye.r, J-u!t 
"ty 
next year wil see the expiry of
the United Nations ultimatum to Iraq anAine
possible transition to the military option. If this
undesirable situation comes aboui, what will
become of our WEU?
So far the ad hoc group has, as you reminded
us a^ short time ago Minister, been very suc-
cessful in co-ordinating the various navil and
air forces in the Gulf,-both at the operational
level including the patrolling of the area, and
also at the logistics, data-transmission and tele-
communications levels. But this activity is con-fined to monitoring the embargo a'nd per-
fo.rming a deterrent r6le or, riore simply,
adjusting to a hostile, desert environment.-To
conduct an offensive operation, however, ajoint
and unified concentration of forces and, a-bove
all, integrated action by the military command
wogld be required. Such conditions do not apply
at the moment, nor can they apply with WEUi;
its present form. Since thc Unitrad Nations has
no real command structure those European
countries wishing to implement the UniteO
Nations resolution would have no alternative
but to place their own forces under American
command and control.
. 
\Ylrut is your view of this eventuality, Min-
ister?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
A frank
question for no doubt a no less straight-fonvard
answer.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
This questibn was
raised at the last Ministerial Council of WEU. I
recall having proposed that the world . land, be
added after 'forces' and it was your Foreign
Minister who was against this am6ndment.
So it was the WEU Council of Ministers
which decided to limit WEU's participation to
the fo-rces required for enforcing the -embargo,
namely essentially naval forces. Certain coun-
tries have sent air force units. To the best of my
knowledge only two WEU countries have lani
forces in the area and they, of counie by com-
parison with what the American forces are now
and, above all, will be in a month's time, can
only be cullqd supplementary potential. ihus,
with no political will to do so, as was clear at the
lpt WEV Council, I cannot really see any like-lihood of our setting up a WEU hi:adquariers. It
would probably be desirable had we had thepolitical will, but we have to admit that it has
not been forthcoming.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). 
-]I!{,the_n, is the conclusion? From lst JanuaryWEU will cease to perform the function whicf,
has to date been confined to monitoring the
embargo. For military operations we -have
neither the equipment nor the capacity to
proceed in the manner which might beiequ6sted
by the United Nations Security-Council.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMEIIT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
Now that-we-have aUnited Nations Security Council resolution
authorising additional measures as from l5th
{*u"_ry, I - ask this WEU parliamentaryAssembly what it thinks. Should- WEU act ii
this connection to enforce the applicatiqr of the
Security Council's resolution, w[ictr potentially
implies a change of strates/ as compared witfi
the strategy of sanctions? But, ladiei and gen-
tlgr.ngn: it is not for me to replace the Asseribly
which is surely grown up enough to state its own
vrews.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I thinkyour plea will be heard, Minister. An
amendment has been submitted by several
members asking the Council of Minisiers to be
precise in its behaviour and attitude on this spe-
cific point.
I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the
Defence Committee.
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Sir Dudley SMITH (Uniled Kingdom).
Many of us who are not Frenchmen have a
warm regard for the Minister. He has rightly
stressed the importance of the United States
continuing to have a presence and influence in
Europe, if not necessarily a military one. Does
he believe that it is extremely important that the
United States should continue to support the
concepts of Western European Union being the
European pillar of the alliance?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHETGNEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
Yes, I think that that is
perfectly desirable. The United States has in fact
made it known that WEU could be a useful
framework. Now we have to look at the practical
arrangements. What will actually happen both as
regards the organisation of command and the
organisation of the forces? This is something we
could try to think about.
However, as my colleague, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, said this morning, we should
like WEU to be the security dimension of the
European Community and the instrument used
to give substance to the European pillar, the
European defence bulwark. Of course, this
implies big changes and to bring these changes
about we have to evaluate the events which have
occurred in Europe over the last year and a half.
The alliance clearly needs fundamental review
and change. And, as I said earlier, Europeans
must have grcater responsibilities in this alliance
if they are to take on a greater share of the
burden. One possibility is that the WEU Council
could have a similar r0le, with regard to the
defence of Europe, to the Atlantic Council.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you.
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, special Rapporteur
on the problems of European security in relation
to the Gulf matter.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, if the French
Defence Minister is right in saying that Europe
cannot go on depending on America for ever,
what, in his opinion, should be the r6le of
nuclear weapons in Europe, as European inte-
Eration continues? I refer in this context to the
intergovernmental conferences beginning in
December and particularly to the conference on
European political union. The French Minister
has discussed this at length. Are we now talking
about a continuing r6le for American nuclear
weapons, about European nuclear weapons,
about European decision-making powgrs, or
about a Europe with French, British or Franco.
British nuclear weapons?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). - Thank you for this
opportunity to revert to this question - a funda-
mental issue for geographical reasons which a
look at the map of the world makes obvious.
Europe is a relatively small, urbanised, highlv-
populated and highly sensitive area where
modern warfare, even conventional, cannot be
contemplated. The only appropriate strategy for
Europeans is that ofthe deterrent, the strategy of
prevention. Hence the need for a nuclear
force.
What forrn should it have? There are the
American nuclear weapons, but they are the
product of an American concept - which could
itself change 
- 
ranging from a theory of flexible
response to that of use as a last resort. Whilst
this may have been politically relevant at a given
point in European history, it now seems hardly
logical as the right military response to what is
possible in the way of new threats on the
horizon. One can hardly contemplate using
nuclear weapons after all others have failed. In
any event this is not France's doctrine.
France's doctrine is strictly one of deterrence,
the object being not to raise the nuclear
threshold too high and thus prevent a possible
aggressor from thinking that he could deploy
conventional forces and gain considerable
success on the battlefield before being con-
fronted with the nuclear possibility.
The United Kingdom has an intermediate
position in line with its geographical situation.
This is why, being realistic, I just said that our
doctrines were complementary rather than over'
lapping. I do not, for example, think that the
United States would be prepared to move
towards the French doctrine to the extent of
guaranteeing absolutely the security of Europe.
The question you have asked goes further: can
we, in the long term, talk about a European
deterrent? It would presuppose the achievement
of, or at least considerable progxess towards,
political union and, in any event, the emergence
of a shared feeling about security whereby all the
nations of Europe would feel under attack if any
one were attacked. I can tell you that this is the
attitude that we see ourselves taking for the
future.
The fact is that we think it possible to define a
non-aggressive European concept of deterrence.
But, as I say, we are not trying to establish some
sort of posture with the aim of changing the bal-
ances in Europe. These are now established
because the agreements signed in Paris have,
once for all we hope, drawn a map of Europe at
least in terms of its political balances and fron-
tiers. Naturally, life will go on; many more
things will happen. But if changes do come
about, it will not be by force, only by mutual
consent.
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Mr. Chevbnement (continued)
Consequently, we have to position ourselves
in the context of cooperative management of
pan-European security to define what would
constitute a minimum deterrent in Western
Europe capable ofbalancing the Soviet deterrent
which, I would remind you, is formidable:
12 000 strategic nuclear warheads now or 8 300
once the START I agreement has been signed
and applied, tens of thousands of tactical
nuclear warheads and I 800 launchers.
In other words, there is an arsenal. Without
levelling any accusations at the Soviets, because
I am sure their intentions are peaceful, I feel we
have to take these facts for what they are,
namely objective factors in our decisions: no
one can control the future. We cannot be sure
what will happen 
- 
whether it be for the best or
the worst.
We think that we should maintain this suffi-
cient, or if you prefer, minimum deterrent which
even Mr. Gorbachev has recognised as a per-
fectly acceptable hypothesis from the Soviet
point of view. But there is still some way to go
on both sides to achieve this minimum and emi-
nently political deterrent with the guarantee it
offers of long-term stability on our continent
and lasting peace in Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Both this
morning and this afternoon it has been our priv-
ilege and pleasure to have with us a delegation of
three members of the European Parliament.
May I welcome them on your behalf. At a time
when we are all trying to define the contribution
that our various institutions can make within a
dynamic balance towards the promotion of a
European defence identity, the presence of an
important delegation from the European Par-
liament is most welcome.
Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you on
behalf of the Assembly.
Mrs. Castellina, who is a member of this dele-
gation, would like to ask you a question. We see
no reason why not. I hope you will agree to reply
to a parliamentarian who, although a stranger to
this Assembly, is a member of the large
European family.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
With pleasure.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mrs.
Castellina.
Mrs. CASTELLINA (Member of the European
Parliament, Observe) (Translation). 
- 
On behalf
of our delegation I thank you, Mr. President, for
giving one of us the chance to speak. We are
very pleased to be with you at this meeting.
Listening to you speak about the European
and French nuclear capability, it seemed that
the conclusion could be drawn that if Kuwait
had also had a viable atomic bomb it would
have been able to deter lraq. Should we con-
clude that a proliferation of nuclear weapons on
the grand scale would be the answer to our
nightmares?
This was not, however, the question that I
wanted to ask you; it was simply a remark in
reaction to your words.
(The speaker continued in ltalian).
The American Defence Secretary has told the
Senate that President Bush requires no further
authorisation from the United States Congress
to engage in war.
I would like to ask you, Minister, whether the
ships, aircraft and in some cases European
troops sent to the Gulf to enforce the embargo
could also be used for another purpose, namely
armed intervention, without this being voted on
in their respective parliaments, just as the Amer-
icans can?
From what you have said it seems to me that
you are suggesting that this Assembly should
take a decision on this matter and, frankly, that
would strike me as being constitutionally
doubtful.
I should further like to ask you what practical
relevance any decision of this sort would have,
whether it were taken by WEU or the national
parliaments, in the event that it proved different
from that taken by President Bush, seeing that
European ships and aircraft would both be
involved in the case of an American decision on
the Gulf.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEYENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
You referred to the
unfortunate fate of Kuwait: we have no desire to
experience the same, which is the very reason
why for several decades we have tried to have a
credible defence force.
We have reason to believe that this defence
strategy has been effective, because there has
been no major war in Europe. We have to ask
why things have developed the way they have. Is
it not because the prospect of a major war was so
terrifying, so destructive, that it forestalled any
kind of political gamble by those who might still
believe that a war could still be advantagieous
and be an instrument of politics in another
form? I think we ought to pursue the ideal, and
maybe that ideal is a world without nuclear
weapons.
But staying with reality, as I mentioned a few
moments ago, means remembering that even
after the implementation of the START I agree-
ments, the United States and the Soviet Union
will still have 8 300 strategic nuclear warheads,
to say nothing of their tactical warheads. This is
the reality.
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Mr. Chevinement (continued)
Here, we are in Europe and you belong to the
European Parliament. So we have to concern
ourselves with the future of Europe, its security
and its margin of freedom. It seems to me that
the existence of small quantities - a few hundred
warheads 
- 
of European nuclear weapons is
perhaps an advantage for Europe which can thus
make its voice heard in the world. It is in any
event a means of keeping us from under the
wheels of the Roman chariot which was the fate
suffered by the vanquished after the victorious
campaigns of your consuls and generals.
Without wishing to play the part of
Vercing6torix, I should say that it is useful, from
the point of view of European interests as a
whole, that Europeans should maintain a
deterrent-based defence posture.
Your question was of wider scope and relates
to our attitude towards the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. At present the only countries
that officially have nuclear weapons are the five
member countries of the United Nations
Security Council, but we know that there are
about ten so-called " threshold " countries which
have, or are on the point of having, nuclear
weapons.
This opens up the vast question of whether
nuclear weapons can have a stabilising effect in
other parts of the world as they have had in the
global confrontation between the East and West
or, on the contrary, will they lead to horrific
wars? It is diflicult to have a firm opinion on
this matter. However, in view of the large
number of unsolved political problems and the
degree of irrationality in certain parts of the
world 
- 
like the one you referred to in the
second part of what you said - we must accept
that the risk exists.
You also asked what would happen to the
naval forces that countries had sent to the Gulf.
I think that those countries deciding to apply
additional measures would automatically find
themselves involved.
The others would have to shoulder their
responsibilities but it is doubtful whether ships
stationed mostly between one thousand and
fifteen hundred kilometres from lraq's frontiers
would run any great risk. Nobody, of course, is
safe from acts of terrorism which can happen
everywhere, even in countries where war has not
been declared.
Finally, you asked what kind of decisions the
parliaments could take. It is up to each country
to determine its course of action in accordance
with its constitution.
With respect to WEU, it is clear that what I
referred to earlier could only be in the form of a
wish 
- 
should you have a wish to make - and it
is naturally up to the parliamentary Assembly of
WEU to express any such wish. But it cannot be
a decision.
I hope this is a full answer. Have I satisfied
your curiosity?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mrs.
Castellina.
Mrs. CASTELLINA (Member of thg European
Parliament, Observer) (Translation). The
question was possibly somewhat complicated:
who is going to start the war or make the
decision? But I confess that it is not...
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). - It is like a game of
poker in which two principal players hold the
cards. Most of us are bystanders without a clear
enough view to tell how many trumps each has
in his hand.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Jessel.
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). - On a point
of order, Mr. President. In the interests of the
safety and security of each of our countries, is
not the question which we have just heard from
a member of the European Parliament a good
reason why we should never allow the European
Parliament to have anything to do with our
defences?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). This
interlude being provisionally over, let us con-
tinue the debate.
I call Sir Russell Johnston.
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
Mr. Chevdnement opened his remarks by saying
that the CSCE agreement had ended the old
world order and opened the way to the new.
Later he spoke of borders being fixed for ever.
We must not forget the Baltic states - Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania 
- 
which are still trapped in
the old order and still denied the independence
that was wrenched from them by an agreement
between Hitler and Stalin. I should like to know
what the Minister thinks can be done to help
them.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
It is a tough job to
answer such a diflicult question. France never
recognised the annexation of the three Baltic
states in 1940. As for WEU, I am not aware that
it has adopted any stance on this matter, but
there is nothing to prevent it from expressing a
wish.
The redefinition of relationships between the
fifteen republics forming the Soviet Union is
one of the big tasks facing Mr. Gorbachev.
Without wishing to complicate his task, we hope
that he will find the right solutions, but they
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may not necessarily be the same for all the
republics. There are different cases: the three
Baltic republics, the republics of the Caucasus,
the republics of Central Asia and then the Slav
republics, namely Russia, the Ukraine and Bye-
lorussia.
If I may give a purely personal opinion, we are
probably moving towards a variable geometry
structure. We have to be prepared for change.
Our British friends managed to create a Com-
monwealth in which I believe a number of coun-
tries regard themselves as independent and free,
but full members. France 
- 
and this is still in our
constitution - built what we call the Com-
munity. That was in 1958, and in 1960 the coun-
tries that were part of it became independent.
At the President of the Republic has some-
times said, you have to let time take its course.
Some developments have to be given time. We
must remember that the Soviet Union has to
resolve problems that are not all that simple and
we need perhaps to facilitate Mr. Gorbachev's
task. But this is no reason for us to forget the
fate of the Baltic states.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Hardy.
Mr. HARDY (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
May I ask
two questions which are not entirely unrelated?
First, does the Minister foresee Europe
accepting in the next few years an obligation to
world security and peace, leading to a structural
organisation and an expenditure of resources
that reflect the fact that, although the United
States may well serve as the dominant
policeman, we understand that its participation
will reflect the degree of self-interest which it
sees facing it in a particular situation?
Secondly, the Minister referred to the main-
tenance of adequate weaponry over the years
ahead. He will accept, however, that historic
change and political agreement mean that there
is now, or shortly will be, a large surplus of
weaponry in Europe. Does he believe that that
presents the world with a problem? It is bound
to encourage the arms trade and to create a
desire to capitalise on the surplus, or obsoles-
cence, of weapons. That will present a serious
risk of instability in other regions and lead to a
distortion of the economy of the third world
which could contribute to future instability on
our planet.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister of Defence.
Mr. CHETGNEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
You referred to the r6le
that Europe might play in the future to guar-
antee some form of world security and you
asked whether the United States could continue
to be the world's policeman.
In our opinion what has happened is positive
because the United Nations has adopted a set of
resolutions and thus laid down a legal
framework for resolving problems that may arise
in the future. In other words, if crises occur, they
should be resolved in the framework of the
United Nations. Naturally, it is desirable that
Europe should be involved.
May I add that the USSR, which has pro-
foundly changed its political orientation, and
China are also members of the United Nations
Security Council. We are thus certainly moving
towards a multi-polar world and it is important
that the United Nations should try to appear as
the guardian of the law 
- 
a law which should be
the same for all 
- 
if the United Nations is not to
be seen in the future as an organisation of the
countries of the North, the East and the West 
-
countries that have achieved cohesion 
- 
whilst
the countries of the South would be left out in
the cold. The United Nations must win credi-
bility and retain it.
I think that if Europe has a r6le to play,
including the setting up of the security forces
that you referred to a few days ago, Mr. Pres-
ident, it is that of helping a genuine rule of law
to prevail at world level without any idea of a
policeman in sole control of war and peace.
The second problem concerns surplus arms in
Europe. I think I have already made it clear that
given the volume of weapons and the difficulty
that the Soviets are experiencing 
- 
for all kinds
of physical and human reasons - in reducing
that volume, we are not yet in a position to send
all our material to the scraFyard. This would be
wrong.
May I also say that within the limit of the
ceilings fixed, which are even so very high 
-
20 000 tanks on either side, with slightly over
13 000 for the Soviet Union 
- 
Hitler had 2 000
in 1940 
- 
the race for quality is certain to
quicken in the years to come. The fewer
weapons there are, the more sophisticated they
will be. Of course we could dream of an ideal
world where humanity would not be governed
by the law of the balance of forces, where it
would in a sense escape from the force of
gravity... I am speaking about the gravity of
physics and not that of an assembly as serious as
this one...
But obviously, we have not yet come to that
point. What I should like to say is that we must
carry out this reduction of weapons in a
methodical and balanced way if we want to pre-
serve security and, consequently, confidence.
Clearly there is considerable risk of large quan-
tities of weapons finding their way to the third
world, which is, to some degree, what we are
seeing, with the considerable concentration of
weapons in the Gulf today. But there again, we
hope that common sense will prevail and that
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we shall be able to transplant arms control agree-
ments in another form. We know that it will be
much more difficult in the Middle East, because
there is neither democracy nor confidence there.
A state of war still exists. So there is a great deal
to do, but it is an objective that would be rea-
sonable to set ourselves if we want to avoid war.
I am sure we all agree that it is better to avoid
war if we can. All of this, however, inevitably
takes time and requires both imagination and
courage.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
There are
four members with questions to ask. Would they
please be brief so as to keep to our schedule.
I call Mr. Romero.
Mr. ROMERO (Spain)(Translation). 
- 
May I
briefly ask two questions. The first relates to the
future of the European Conference on Security
and Co-operation. In order to provide it with a
permanent establishment and means of verifi-
cation we have to work towards shared security
in Europe, and in my opinion we cannot make
progress in that direction if we limit this security
to one group of countries. In other words, it
would not be fair to keep the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe in the waiting room
for years without assuring them, now that the
Warsaw Pact has effectively disappeared, that
we have a responsibility before history to create
a shared rdgime of security in Europe.
In my country, in Malaga, a Mediterranean
city, there is a saying that * There is no
favourable wind for a boat that does not know
which port it is going to ", and it is very
important for us to know in which direction we
are going if we are to succeed in healing past
divisions in Europe and achieve a shared
security system. Moreover, since you have
referred to the recent treaties on annaments and
we are going to discuss here the conversion of
the arms industry, from which something like
twenty-five million Europeans directly or indi-
rectly earn their living, we have to organise this
conversion in a way that will guarantee security
and give direction to industrial production.
Having touched upon the future of the
European Conference on Security and
Co-operation I now want to ask about the Gulf
crisis. There is a United Nations resolution
setting a fixed date without waiting for sanctions
to take effect, in the hope that the ultimatum
will not expire and war become necessary. But
there are two arguments that are not acceptable
to public opinion in Europe. One is that the
United States troops deployed in the zone are
becoming weary and that therefore Saddam
Hussein has to be given a fixed time in which to
evacuate Kuwait or face war. The other
argument which your colleague the Foreign Min-
ister used this morning concerns the problems of
climate and weather that will arise if there is a
delay of twelve months which, according to
some experts, is the time that will be needed for
the sanctions to take effect. Those two argu-
ments are not sufliciently weighty and con-
sistent to cause us to favour the military option.
My group is in favour of a peaceful solution,
giving sanctions more time to work and to make
Saddam Hussein leave Kuwait, discussing the
problems of the area as a whole and avoiding
war.
My specific question is that WEU countries
do not have a general staffand that therefore the
plans for action in the Gulf zone are NATO
plans. France has said on more than one
occasion that she reserves her autonomy
regarding participation in a combat until the
President of the Republic and the French Gov-
ernment so decide, but the plans that exist are
NATO plans.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr.
Romero, I remind you that you are asking a
question and not developing an argument.
I call the Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
As regards the future of
the CSCE, there must be guarantees for the
countries of Europe as a whole. Obviously, they
will vary, depending on whether they are pro-
vided by an alliance such as the Atlantic
Alliance or by the CSCE, but perhaps it could be
WEU's r6le to specify the conditions in which it
considers the frontiers of these countries could
be guaranteed.
First of all, who is threatening them? For the
moment these countries cannot feel threatened
since the occupying Soviet troops are going to
withdraw. So the question is what about the
future? There is only one reply and it is within
ourselves. It resides in our ability to create a
bulwark of balance so that Europe may, for a
long time to come, be a stable continent where it
would be in no one's interests to break the
peace.
In this connection, there should be a combi
nation of measures to achieve afins reduction,
verification, transparency and at the same time
the maintenance of a certain defence posture
based on a stable balance of security.
This is what human nature is like, neither all
light nor total darkness. It is made up of both
and the management of balances requires from
you 
- 
with your political responsibilities 
- 
a
great sense of responsibility and vigilance. No
one can be relieved of this responsibility by
some invisible hand, some automatic mech-
anism, or some solemn declaration that time
will not outdate. History has never witnessed
this. Let us not relieve future generations in
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advance from the responsibilities that will come
down to them.
The proverb quoted in Malaga 
- 
if you do not
know the port you are bound for you cannot plot
your course - had already been quoted by
Seneca. I see that it has got as far as Malaga, a
very good destination.
You mentioned the problem of industrial con-
version. It is a vast but very real subject for
Europe. The future of Europe's defence
industry, incidentally, is something for the IEPG
to study. Here there are links to be set up with
WEU.
Turning to the Gull it is true that l5th
January is the deadline set by the United
Nations for authorising the use of further mea-
sures, which have not been spelt out. This does
not mean that the embargo will end on l5th
January. It will continue. kt us say that this is
another turn of the screw on lraq. If Iraq does
intend to move it will be between now and then.
In any event that would be highly desirable.
I have tried to reason out how it could be pos-
sible for a political solution to materialise
between now and 15th January. Iraq would have
to state its intention to leave Kuwait. There
would have to be a flexible link established with
other problems that might arise. This could, for
example, be in the context of a conference next
year, that no one imagines could come to any
immediate conclusions, given the complexity of
the problems. But it is not possible to globalise
everything. Iraq first has to withdraw from
Kuwait and must be made to understand this.
Plans have been drawn up but I must contradict
you on this point: they are not NATO plans but
those of the joint United States-Saudi head-
quarters, in co-ordination with the British,
French and other commanders.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Martinez.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
The
task of building Europe by means of political
union on which dl WEU member states have
embarked under the auspices of the Community
requires us to progress as rapidly as possible in
defining and establishing a European security
policy.
In Spain, with the exception of some marginal
groups, the vast majority of political movements
believe that WEU is a useful instrument for for-
mulating this European security policy and it
was precisely for this reason that our country
recently applied for membership. As the Min-
ister well knows, we are not founder members
but applied for membership very recently, pre-
cisely because of our wish to build a united
Europe. The decision was fully in line with other
decisions we have taken; it forms part of an
overall strategy for building Europe as seen from
Spain.
My question is, first, does the Minister agree
that WEU really constitutes a useful instrument
and platform where we can together work out as
speedily as possible this common European
policy on security?
Second, does the Minister understand that the
action which has been taken precisely because of
the Gulf crisis, namely the co-ordination at the
level of naval operations through WEU, implies
a certain practical and strategic contribution
towards formulating a common security policy
at continental level?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
Naturally, it would sur-
prise you if I answered your question in the neg-
ative. I have already said here that I believe
WEU to be useful, but also essential, if we want
to put our heads together on our security
problems. This means that we must show
political will.
The real problem of WEU is not a question of
meetings and how useful it is. It is a matter of
the political will of each of its member countries
to use the organisation to promote WEU as the
place for concrete achievements such as those
that I have just referred to. In connection with
the Gulf crisis, we have been able to call the
committee of chiefs of staff together for the first
time. A satellite data verification agency could
be a further WEU initiative. Beyond that, WEU,
in conjunction with the European Economic
Community, could naturally play an important
part at European level in the security of
Europe.
The fact that Spain and Portugal have joined
WEU is another essential contribution. Other
countries could also join or obtain observer
status. Clearly there are joint security interests
outside Europe that we could look after better
than we do at present. In the Gulf we are rather
in the situation of being a support or buttress for
the United States. We know that the buttress is
essential to the cathedral, but it would be pref-
erable for us to be able to play a greater r6le and
act in accordance with our own criteria, more
than is at present the case.
Here again the problem of political will arises
and that of the military resources we are able to
deploy at sea, in the air and on land.
I think that the best yardstick, the true
barometer of our political will is to be found in
what has happened. We have a number of large
ships, a few aircraft, and land forces which,
though not negligible, do not represent a
decisive capability.
,I
{
I
I
it
;
i
{
rl(
q
I
t
,ii
1
't
flI
I
110
OFFICIAL REFORT OF DEBATES NINTH SITTING
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Feldmann.
Mr. FELDMANN (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). - Can the Minister
envisage the French Government seeing the
Gulf crisis as a reason to review its policy on
arms exports, and does he think there is any
prospect of a common restrictive European
policy on arrns exports?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEWNEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France)(Translation). 
- 
As you know, in France
you need a licence to export defence equipment.
In principle it is prohibited. Government per-
mission is necessary for all exports of this kind
and exceptions have to be approved by a com-
mittee chaired by the Prime Minister.
Ours is not the only country to have exported
weapons to this part of the world. True, we have
supplied arms to lraq, but at the request of all
the countries of the region and with the
agreement of all the western countries. We were
a long way behind the Soviet Union as a supplier
of weapons to lraq. This was at a time when
everyone believed that Iraq was a stabilising
force holding back the tide of Islamic fundamen-
talism. It took Iran five years to accept United
Nations Resolution 598, which opened the door
to peace in 1990. At that time, we had no idea
that Iraq would change from a stabilising to a
destabilising factor. From lst August, we placed
a total embargo on any transfer of weapons and
there are certain categories of weapons that we
never shipped 
- 
particularly in the ballistic field,
to Iraq. Other countries have transferred other
technologies but I shall say no more about that.
The issue that you raise concerns the control
of transfers of technology from developed coun-
tries like France, the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, the
United States, of course, and the Soviet Union
to countries in extremely unstable regions.
In the future it is probable or even certain that
common rules will need to be established to
achieve a balance in the level of armaments in
this part of the world and to introduce arns
control, and perhaps it may be necessary to
assist it from outside by imposing stricter con-
straints on ourselves. These exist, as far as
nuclear weapons are concerned, in the form of
the obligations under the non-proliferation
fieaty1' as regards chemical weapons there is a
convention that is under negotiation in Geneva.
We hope this will be signed next spring.
In the ballistic sphere the MTCR (Missile Tech-
nology Control R6grme) discussions could be rein-
forced. This is one way we could go, but in my
opinion the problem of arms control cannot be
divorced from the solution of political
problems.
Indeed, this crisis may in the end serve some
purpose if we are able to achieve more
acceptance of the idea of mutual recognition in
Israel, Palestine and all the countries in this
area. What the region lacks most of all is a
modicum of tolerance and mutual acceptance
because, in its absence, I fear that all the con-
trols that we might establish may be evaded.
Naturally, these controls are necessary and we
must try to resolve the political problems at the
root. We know very well what they are called.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
We are
now coming to the end of the debate. I call the
last speaker, Mr. Goerens.
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Trunslation).
- 
The question I should like to ask has already
been raised by several members. I should like to
revert to the possible transfer of Western
European Union's responsibilities to the
European Communities, which is a very serious
matter.
Most of the major political groupings are prG
moting the idea of a transfer. Most of the foreign
ministers, who are members of the Council of
Western European Union, speak in the condi-
tional about this matter here at the Assembly,
but with rather more commitment outside this
forum. You yourself have said that before any
decision of this nature could be taken, there
needed to be a clearer definition of what
European union would consist of. Allow me to
say that I fully share your opinions on this
subject. So, is it not premature to have the
question of whether Western European Union
should be absorbed into the European Commu-
nities on the agenda of the next intergovern-
mental conference in Rome? In other words, do
you share my view that merely changing the
label will not resolve the fundamental problems
of European defence?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CHEVENEMENT (Minister of Defence of
France) (Translation). 
- 
I think our views are
very close. I think we need to keep in tune with
the rhythms not of nature but of political life.
WEU has the great advantage of existing and if
we were to give the European Economic Com-
munity responsibility for defence and security
matters we would certainly raise problems once
again that would probably be insoluble. This
road is marked with the wrecks of past
failures.
In my opinion we should be much more prag-
matic and rely on what exists and try to advance
the security dimension of Europe in WEU. I
think that WEU is a framework in which we can
notch up decisive progress. If that progress is
made then perhaps the question of merying
WEU and the EEC will come up. This at least is
lll
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my way of looking at things, which is essentially
pragmatic as you can see.
I think this approach is firmly realistic. There
are of course some very attractive pictures we
could paint for the future, but why cling to illu-
sions? It must surely be a waste of time to build
fabrications that we know will never come to
life. It is better to see things in concrete terms
and try to go forward, as I tried to say a little
while ago at the rostrum, by notching up points
like the meeting of committees of chiefs of staff
and the observation satellite agency. We must
exchange information and make sure that each
ofour countries takes an overall view ofthe con-
ditions for Europe's future security, be careful
not to relax our defence effort too soon, retain
some form of co-ordination, keep our guard up
and act in a co-ordinated and constructive
manner though at the same time in a spirit of
friendship towards the Soviet Union because
Russia forms part of the broader spectrum of
European civilisation whilst not neglecting the
essential factors of our security. This is how we
shall best serve the cause ofour peoples and the
cause of peace.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister, for these concluding words.
Before closing the debate, I call Mr. Scheer to
speak on a point of order.
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, I refer to the
statement by a British member, who made some
very controversial remarks about a question
from a member of the European Parliament and
denied that the European Parliament had any
competence in security matters. The question
put by the member of the European Parliament
concerned an issue that traditionally pertains to
democratic constitutions: parliaments have the
right to decide on war and peace.
I must say to the member from the United
Kingdom that long ago a king was beheaded
there, because he had disregarded parliament's
right to adopt a budget. The question here is
whether the far more important right of parlia-
ments to decide on war and peace is respected.
This is a major question, and your remark did
not unfortunately befit a parliament.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). The
incident is closed. I took it upon myself to allow
one ofthe representatives ofthe European Par-
liament to speak and she is responsible for what
she said. Even so, let me say that the national
parliaments whose direct representatives we are
have exclusive and sovereign rights of decision
in matters of peace and war.
It only remains for me to thank you once
again, Minister, for your willingness to answer
all our questions, which were indeed numerous.
Thank you also for your expression of confi-
dence in the skill and qualifications of our
members, and in the future of the
organisation.
We shall now adjourn for a few minutes.
(The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and
resumed at 5.25 p.m.)
4. Europeaa suuriy and the Gulf crisis
Consequeaca of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operatbw in the Gulf region
(Raand joiat debtc on thc rcports
of the Politictl Committe ond tlu Defence Committee,
Dus. 1211 d urcadnuats and 1218 ud upndments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the resumed joint debate on
the report of the Political Committee on
Europein security and the Gulf crisis, Doc-
ument 1244 and amendments, and the report of
the Defence Committee on the consequences of
the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in
the Gulf, Document 1248 and amendments.
The joint debate is resumed.
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - Mr. President, before I
comment on the reports now under discussion,
may I say that I find today's proceedings rather
unsatisfactory. Why? We were able to talk to
Mr. Dumas for two hours this morning and to
Mr. Chev0nement for two hours this afternoon.
Of course, these are two fascinating personalities
for the Assembly to talk to, but in my view the
debate on the Gulf is now over and all we can do
is discuss the reports by our two colleagues. I
think it is a pity that we cannot discuss the Gulf
problem in rather wider terms. I propose that
this should be considered by the Presidential
Committee. I would like to see a timeJimit
imposed on the ministers as well as our fellow
parliamentarians. M€mbers should be able to
put only one question. I do not think these
things should last any longer than twenty
minutes.
I therefore believe we have all had just about
enough of the Gull WEU and all the rest of it.
But I do have a few things to say about the
report. To my mind, there are two main issues.
As a result of the Gulf crisis WEU is being seen
from a completely different angle, not only by
those who are concerned with defence, but also
by those who had scarcely heard of WEU. All of
a sudden WEU has become the centre of
interest.
Yesterday we discussed ,Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg's report on WEU now and in the
future, WEU and its place in Europe and WEU
tL2
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in co-operation with NATO, the European Com-
munitf and the CSCE. These are important
questions, which I believe will continue to be
discussed in the Assembly for a long time to
come. I think it is equally necessary to discuss
these matters and clarify our standpoint on
them in our national parliaments.
Paragraph 8 of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report
refers to some of the initiatives that might be
expected of WEU. The question in this con-
neition is this: can we * use' WEU in the future
to operate outside the treaty area, in whatever
way? I think it is of the utmost importance for
WEU's future that we take a decision on this.
When we decided to send forces, ships or
whatever to the Gulf, was that action justified
bv the terms of the WEU treaty? Opinions on
tliis still differ. I think our Assembly and the
national parliaments must adopt a position on
this before we consider whether it should
happen again. I would like to see that estab-
lished.
In my opinion, Mr. De Decker's report does
not plaie quite enough emphasis on a peaceful
soluiion. WEU's Political Committee certainly
could have referred to a solution of this kind in a
preamble.
I also feel that Mr. De Decker's report says
rather too little about the background. As a rule
we refer in the preamble to things which we
welcome or condemn. I do not think the pre-
amble to Mr. De Decker's report says enough
about such things as arms supplies. We have
heard Mr. Chevdnement say today that France
supplied weapons because the Soviet Union was
dolng the same. In other words, what one does,
the other will do, too. So treaties on arms
control, arms supplies and arms exports will cer-
tainly be needed in the future and not, if at all
possible, in the distant future, particularly where
[his area is concerned. If this had been done,
there would have been less need for hypocrisy.
We now regard what is happening as very bad
indeed - and it is, of course - but we cannot
conceal the fact that our various countries,
almost without exception, have helped Iraq to
obtain weapons, just like the rest of the Middle
East. I do not agree with Mr. Chevdnement that
we thought we should help lraq to obtain
weapons because that country was a stabilising
factor in the Middle East. I have never regarded
it as such.
I would not like to finish my statement
without saying that every means must be used to
prevent war from breaking out in the Middle
East. I do not say this because I want to leave
Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the position they
are now occupying, or because I have any sym-
pathy for the way in which Saddam Hussein has
icted. As a person he failed in my eyes when he
misused children in a way that I saw as almost
on a par with child pornography to convince the
world of his good and philanthropic inten-
tions.
We must prevent war, because the people who
are being sent there are being maneuvred into a
situation where there is no clear view of the
future. I also think it would be impossible for us
not to become involved in the conflict. I
therefore very much welcome the fact that, even
though Resolution 678 has been adopted by the
Secuiity Council, President Bush is prepared to
negotiaie. I am glad that everything is to take
shape within the United Nations, whatever we
may ito. This certainly also applies to any action
taki:n by WEU and must at all events continue
to hold good for the future.
(Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I also wish
to express my great appreciation to our two
Rapporteurs foi reports which are highly
important not only in their thorougfiness and in
the presentation of the information they contain
but also because of the political judgments made
in them.
I must say that while the events in the Gulf
have given rise to serious worries at interna-
tional- level some advantage has nevertheless
accrued as far as Western European Union is
concerned, and this point has been made by the
previous speaker. Because of events in the Gulf,
ihe work it is doing and the r6le it has taken on,
Western European Union is drawing interna-
tional attention to itself as a political body and
an essentially European political forum for
co-ordination, security and defence.
This is an important fact exerting consid-
erable attraction. Today, for example, we see
here several members of parliament who do not
belong to WEU. Though not members, Greek,
NorwEgian and Danish deputies are associated
with the WEU effort in the Gulf, thus
symbolising in this forum and in this
organisation a truly European capacity for
aciion, co-ordination and political representa-
tiveness.
This is highly important as it could prompt
other accessioni. It is clear that Norway, which
some time ago dissociated itself from the
European Community, EoY, through its sym-
pathr, ideologically, with what wEU is doing,
itrouh not itself a member, be the cal'se of other
countries becoming members - of the Com-
munity as well - the result of which will be a
wider and completer EuroPe.
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However, the firm solidarity there was at the
start of the events in the Gulf and at the
beginning of the occupation of Kuwait seems to
have weakened with the passage of time. The
fact has to be noted that, notwithstanding the
efforts by ministers and by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council of Ministers and despite
the wholehearted commitment of France at a
diflicult and sensitive moment and the back-up
received from all the Community countries, il
seems 
- 
I repeat 
- 
that our solidarity has
weakened. The hostage question has given rise
to different attitudes and created ill-feeling 
- 
I
do not say distrust, but certainly resentment 
-
between some European countries, more con-
cerned about freeing the hostages, and others
adhering more strictly to the formal under-
takings not to fall for the tricks of Saddam
Hussein in any way.
This is highly important as it brings home to
us that the longer a solution to the crisis is
delayed, the more easily will Iraq be able to
overcome the solidarity and adhesion of the
European and American allies.
And this is where we have to be careful. The
United Nations was right to set a deadline 
-January l99l 
- 
for taking final decisions on the
occupation of Kuwait and on what the allies and
countries bound by the decisions of the United
Nations must do. In fact, however, in the long
run the initial solidarity could well gradually
evaporate, and divisions and friction arise, that
are not wanted at such a diflicult and sensitive
moment.
I would now like to say something about the
Federal Republic of Germany's specific contri-
bution to the WEU effort. As you know, this
country has not taken any direct part in the
deployment of armed forces in the Gulf 
- 
nor
could it do so, perhaps, because of the familiar
constitutional problems which had already sur-
faced during the previous WEU mission in the
Gulf four yearc ago. However, that country's
contribution on the political and, more espe-
cially, economic levels is beyond doubt. As you
know, the Federal Republic of Germany has
decided to make available 1.7 billion DM to
assist those countries in which the embargo is
cqg-sing hardship and internal 
- 
even political 
-difliculties. I refer here to Turkey, Jordan and
Egvpt.
However, Mr. President, it would have been
very good ifthis allocation ofresources had been
made through WEU. But no, it went via the
European Community. This makes me think
that the comments we heard again yesterday inthis chamber calling for a rapprochement
between WEU and the European Community by
a kind of functional osmosis are not so greatly
mistaken. It has in fact already hap ned
through the Federal Republic of Germany's
action in the Gulf affair.
I will end, Mr. President, by thanking the
Rapporteurs for drawing attention to the impor-
tance of our Assembly in relation to the creaiion
of the satellite agency, which has been men-
tioned and confirmed here by both the President
of the Assembly and the French Minister of
Defence.
We are fully committed to this struggle to
ensure that WEU has a fundamental r6le in dis-
armament verification 
- 
and extending to other
sectors. We are sure that if we had had an obser-
vation facility during the Gulf events many
problems would already be partly solved. My
final hope is that the two repois on today's
order of the day will win broad support as they
are indeed extremely valuable.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
P6criaux.
Mr. PECRI AUX (Belyium) (Transtation). 
-The easing, maybe the end even, of East-West
tension inevitably had to lead one day or
another to a reassessment of North-South rela-
tions and to an upward reassessment of what is
at stake. It was also to be expected that the
occasion would be the outbreak of the first
major conflict in the Arab world and that it
would.pose a threat to oil supplies or challenge
the existing balance of power in the region.
The economic and geostrategic importance of
the Arabian peninsula and the overarming of
most of its states, the demographic and financial
$isparities dividing its peoples and the longhistory of persistent, deeply-rooted conflict in
the area, have long given cause for expecting the
womt not only for the region itself but for the
world as a whole.
Issues of concern to our own political world
are the management of raw materials, the distri-
bution of wealth, the crucial question of debt,
the proliferation of weapons and the changing
balance of power in the region.
In such a context, the Gulf crisis disconcerts
us and confounds our would-be rational western
logic. But so far with Security Council Reso-
lution 678, following in the logical line of what
has happened up to now, the international com-
munity has stood firm. The six-week deadline is
intended to let Iraq think again and understand
that the international community is ready to use
force. Six weeks is not long, but six weeks is
eqough for the unpredictable Saddam Hussein,
who got it wrong when he attacked Iran, who gotit wrong when he invaded Kuwait and who
guessed wrongly what the Soviet Union's
attitude would be, to come to his senses.
If_Iryg now withdrew from Kuwait its prestige
would be enhanced in the Arab world.
I
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In applying the decisions of the United
Nations 
- 
the first country to do so - Iraq would
be a trend-setter.
It would induce other countries and other
nations to resolve their conflicts in the same
way. I am thinking of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict of course and the situation in Lebanon.
A negotiating process of the CSCE type is
becoming urgently necessary in the Middle East
in order to create a new political climate, new
confidence and new forms of international
co-operation there and to bring about disarm-
ament or at least major reductions in the level of
armaments.
Together with the Socialist Group, I therefore
urge the WEU Assembly to reiterate its wish
that a peaceful solution be urgently sought to
bring the Gulf crisis to an end and to guarantee
security in Europe.
May I add that during my visit to the Belgian
naval force stationed in Fujayrah, a few minutes
away from Dubai, I heard from highJevel offi-
cial6 in the Emirates how favourably they had
been impressed by the visit of our President,
Mr. Pontillon, who happened to have been there
a few hours before. I wished the members in this
chamber to know this and extend my sincere
thanks to Mr. Pontillon.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Cetin.
Mr. CETIN (Observer from Turkey). - I con-
gratulate our two Rapporteurs on their valuable
reports.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was a serious
violation of international law and was unaccep-
table. From the outset of the crisis, Turkey took
a principled and determined stand against the
Iraqi aggression by asking for the unconditional
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. To this
end, Turkey has followed the embargo decisions
taken by the United Nations Security Council
against Iraq. Because of her geographical
location, Turkey has been a key country in
implementing the resolutions concerning the
embargo. The recent events in the Gulf region
have proved once again the importance of
Turkey to the security and defence of Europe.
As a result of the embargo, the pipeline
through which Iraq had shipped 540/o of its
petroleum exports has been closed. Turkey was
the main road transit country from the West to
Iraq; that has been stopped. Turkey was one of
the biggest exporters of food products and con-
struction materials to lraq; that has been
stopped.
Turkey's geographical location, which is
important for the effective implementation of
the embargo, has brought with it a heavy eco-
nomic and political burden. Turkey has first
place among the countries most severely
affected economically by the Gulf crisis. All our
exports to and imports from Iraq which had an
important part in our foreign trade have
stopped. Our contracting companies, which used
to carry out successful works in Iraq, left the
country with big losses. Thousands of workers
left their jobs and are now jobless. Because of
the embargo, Iraq does not pay her debts to
Turkey, and the increasing price of petroleum
has affected our balance of payments.
Before the crisis, Turkey used to export more
than 50% of Iraqi crude oil through two pipe-
lines with a capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day.
We used to receive all our crude oil imports
through those pipelines from Iraq. We employed
40 000 trucks to carry Turkish exports and
trans-shipped goods to lraq. A total of 6 000
tanker trucks were used to import crude oil and
oil products from Iraq. The whole set-up
involved more than 100 000 families. Tourism
has also been affected.
Of course, we must not forget the oil stations,
motels, restaurants and repair shops which
depended on the business brought by those
acfivities. All those losses have occurred in the
less-developed south+astern Anatolian prov-
inces. The annual cost of the Gulf crisis to
Turkey, excluding indirect costs to the economy,
is about US $5 billion.
It is not because of those important economic
and material losses, but because we believe in
the life ofthe people and because ofour peaceful
policy that we do not want war. Our people do
not want war. We want to have peace and
peaceful solutions in the Middle East. Turkey is
ihe only country represented in this room which
has a border with lraq. If war broke out, my
country and my people would be in the heart of
the war, which would be beyond our control. We
must realise that we will not get peace in the
Middle East through war. It is clear that the
forces from other countries will leave the region
after a certain period, but our people will have
to stay there as neighbours with 370 kilometres
of border and with many common interests with
the Iraqi people.
The unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from
Kuwait is a precondition of a peaceful solution,
but withdrawal alone will not bring real peace
and stability to the region. There are many other
problems in the region which will cause new
crises in the future, including the question of
Palestine, Lebanon, Israel and disarmament.
Therefore, after the withdrawal of lraqi forces
from Kuwait, negotiations should begin among
the countries in the region to achieve stability,
peace and security.
We must find a way to reach peace in the
region, perhaps through the mechanism of a
cohference on security and co-operation in the
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Middle East. Without such an agreement among
all the nations of the region it will be impossible
to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the
Middle East. But that should not be linked
directly with the immediate problem of the
withdrawal of lraq from Kuwait.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Benassi.
Mr. BENASSI (Italy) (Translation). 
- 
Mr.
President, there are certain basic points which,
for the sake of clarity, I would like to make at
the outset: a forthright and unequivocal con-
demnation of lraqi aggression against Kuwait,
the defence of international law, in principle and
in form, enjoying uniform support within the
United Nations and the call on the aggressor,
Saddam Hussein, to free all the hostages and to
withdraw unconditionally from the country
which he has invaded and occupied.
In the last few days two new developments
have hit the headlines: Resolution 678 passed by
the United Nations Security Council which
authorises the possible use of force to overcome
the aggressor's stubborn resistance and Pres-
ident Bush's initiative which could give new life
and energy to the attempt at a negotiated reso.
lution of the conflict.
Somebody yesterday afternoon in this
chamber asked whether the meeting proposed by
the American President 
- 
in a move for which
there is general support and praise 
- 
is a uni-
lateral initiative or the outcome of an agreement
with the other countries involved and with
armed forces in the Gulf. This is a fair question
as I too believe that apart from individual
national peace initiatives, desirable though they
may be, it must be the United Nations 
- 
and
only the United Nations 
- 
which can be the
proper forum for the management of the crisis
in all its phases, particularly,at a tense moment
such as the present.
However, there is something else I wish to say,
today more than ever after the United Nations'
last resolution, namely that we have to continue
the search with tenacity, perseverance and even
greater conviction for a peaceful way out ofthe
Middle East crisis. It would be tragic if in the
minds of governments and peoples the military
option came before a political solution, and it
would also be tragic if the time still available for
negotiation and for democracy were seen pri-
marily as a period of waiting and preparing for
an armed encounter and for war.
Today the question for all of us, our countries
and Europe, is not what we should do in the
event of war but what we must do with patience
and conviction to bring about the defeat ofthe
aggressor without the use of force and bloodshed
of unimaginable proportions.
Mr. President, I am deeply convinced that war
is no solution for the problems confronting the
democratic world, not just because of the human
and moral tragedy which war always brings but
because I believe that the crisis and troubles of
the Middle East do not begin and end with the
Iraqi aggression. If an armed conflict broke out,
other issues with a high risk potential such as the
Palestinian question, the sovereignty of
kbanon, the integrity of the state of Israel and
the pacification of the Middle East as a whole 
-
though these are separate problems to be tackled
at another time 
- 
might well assume dimensions
which would be diflicult to control.
These are the thoughts and concerns which I
wished to voice dictated by a realistic and
responsible view of a scenario which none of us
can lightly dismiss should we really have to cross
over from the justified embargo of today and a
possible peaceful solutiorr to the terrible and
bloody sounds of armed conflict.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
John Stokes.
Sir John STOKES (United Kingdom). 
- 
I was
sorry not to be here this morning to take part in
the earlier proceedings. I should like to congrat-
ulate both Rapporteurs on the excellent work
they have done in their reports. Of course, in the
past few days the situation has been tremen-
dously changed by Mr. Bush's offer to hold talks
with the Iraqis.
We have had a certain amount of excitement
and political difliculty in my country caused by
our former Prime Minister, Mr. Heath and
others. Mr. Brandt has also travelled from
Germany to see Saddam to try to bargain over
the hostages. In my country the families of those
hostages appear evening after evening on tele-
vision in a highly emotional state. I fear that
they are trying to alter the foreign policy not
only of my government, but of that of the
United Nations. AII the efforts to try to see
Saddam and to deal with the hostages have been
a grievous mistake and only add kudos to him.
It is difficult for an honest person to see what
there is to talk about with Saddam as Iraq
?ppears to have no intention of withdrawingfrom Kuwait and making appropriate compen-
sation for the appalling wrong and damage done
to that country.
The reason why Mr. Bush has felt compelled
to offer talks is the growing peace movemEnt in
Congress and among the American public. Yet if
Saddam Hussein still refuses to withdraw from
Kuwait what can Mr. Bush do? He will be in a
diflicult position if the United States Congress
and people are unwilling to allow him to go to
war. He must miss the support of my former
Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, who, sadly,
recently resigned.
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Saddam Hussein will try to prolong the talks
for as long as he possibly can and he will bring in
the Palestinians and other issues. We must not
allow him to get off the hook for that reason,
although I accept that the Palestinian problem
must be solved as soon as Saddam has been put
in his place.
If the United States fails to insist on the lraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait, Mr. Bush will have
allowed aggtession to go unpunished and also
fatally damaged the position of the United
Statei as a great power. The fact that Iraq will
soon have nuclear weapons adds to the
awfulness of the situation.
Iraq is diffrcult terrain in which to flrght. I
know the country as I was there as a soldier for
nearly a year during the war. IfSaddam does not
withdraw I believe, reluctantly, that war must
become inevitable, awful though that thought is.
I think appeasement will not only be a fearful
blow to the standing of the United States and
our allies, but almost a mortal blow to the
United Nations and the Security Council,
which, for the flrrst time in forty years, has
shown itself to be strong and united. Those are
the diflicult facts which the peace party must
face 
- 
I am afraid that some mistaken clergymen
and others seem to forget them. Therefore,
reluctantly, let us hope that the allies will strike
and that their campaign will be short, sharp and
successful and, after l5th January, the sooner
the better.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Colombo.
Mr. COLOMBO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, the collapse of the Marxist r6gime has
marked the end of one of the threats to
European security. Luckily, this danger had
already been blunted by the separation of China
from the Soviet bloc in the sixties and seventies.
By acting in this way China not only weakened
tf,e Soviet bloc but also forced it to transfer huge
military forces from the European theatre to the
Far East.
There was reason to hope for a lengthy period
of peace for the whole of humanity which could
be used for the exercise of intelligence, determi-
nation and economic resour@s and to
strengthen peace in its modern definition, i.e.
development. But that did not happen: the
boundary line of the danger to security merely
moved from East/IVest to North/South. An ugly
and dangerous war broke out in the Arab
world.
Saddam Hussein's aim was not simply to
occupy Kuwait but to pursue the logical conse-
quences of this at military level, in other words
to occupy Saudi Arabia and the other small Arab
states. Politically, his objective was to take over
the leadership of the Arab world and, economi-
cally, to use oil as a means of holding the entire
industrialised world to ransom. Together, these
three interlinked objectives could make an
explosive mixture of unlimited potency.
At the United Nations, with the resolutions
that it has passed, democracy is fortunately
gaining ground in international relations; Pres-
ident Bush's latest move and his readiness for
direct meetings at diplomatic level is part of the
picture. All the same, the great question of what
is to be done in genuine concrete terms when we
reach l5th January remains unanswered. It is an
awesome question which requires an equally
awesome 
- 
but certain - answer.
Other speakers have already addressed this
aspect. For our part we want to draw attention
to three fundamental problems that have to be
considered for a policy embracing the whole of
the Islamic world.
The first problem is that of Islam, a subject
which demands deeper political and cultural
insight. We used to think that the problem of the
yeai 2000 would be the confrontation between
western culture and Marxism, but instead it will
be the culture, history and political strategy of
the West in confrontation with those of the
Islamic world. How should Europe and the West
prepare for this confrontation? What is certain
is that the military defence aspect is only one
facet ofthe problem as a whole, and perhaps not
the most important. It needs to be treated by
means of a global approach as it represents not
danger but a source of substantial enrichment
for the whole community.
The second problem is the relationship
between Europe and the Islamic countries on the
Mediterranean coast of Africa which, with the
exception of Libya, are the least fundamentalist
in outlook and therefore more open to dialogue.
Moves to strengthen the CSCE-type working
group 
- 
in this case the CSCM since it is con-
ierned with the Mediterranean region - need to
be warmly encouraged.
Thirdly and lastly, there is the oil problem
and its possible internationalisation. Our
Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, has referred to the
question with considerable caution, but it is a
rbal one and it arises from the more general
issue of whether it is reasonable and possible to
leave a commodity - in this case a source of
energy 
- 
on which the life and development of a
large portion of humanity may dep-end to the
whim-of a small group. This calls for a quali-
tative leap in the way we think about devel-
opment, economics, the function of ownership
and the concept of solidarity, and the question
is, of course, not confined to oil.
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It is not only up to us 
- 
and even less us here
today 
- 
to produce a solution to these problems,
which are universal, and specially not at a time
when temperatures are raised as they are just
now. But it is a task which nobody can shirk.
This is certainly true of ourselves who have had
the temerity to accept direct responsibilities in
the diflicult but exhilarating world of politics
which Aristotle defined as the art of managing
every aspect of the state. It is within the
framework of a broader and more inclusive
concept of this kind that it will be possible to
find a true and lasting solution to the problems
posed by the Gulf oonflict.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Soell.
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, we should be
particularly grateful to the two Rapporteurs for
attempting to present the fullest possible picture
of the problems in the Gulf and also for their
efforts to gather information on the spot.
What first strikes me when I consider the
analysis is that there is rather too much scep
ticism about the effects of sanctions. During this
morning's debate with French Foreign Minister
Dumas, I stressed that not only Mr. McNamara
but almost all former American Secretaries of
Defence, down to Mr. Weinberger and Mr.
Carlucci, have said that sanctions must be given
time to take proper effect, and this also applies
to the spare parts for weapons systems, which
are now suffering badly in the desert climate.
The criticism levelled at Jordan in Mr. De
Decker's report is, I feel, somewhat unjustified.
The sanctions are hitting Jordan hard. The Jor-
danian King, having had major internal diffi-
culties in the last few months before the out-
break of the Gulf crisis, has tried to make the
sanctions work. I did not therefore think it was a
very wise piece of American diplomacy when
President Bush and Secretary of State Baker
ignored the Jordanian King on their visit to the
reglon.
Mr. De Decker said that the Gulf region was
of more vital importance to Europe than to the
United States. In terms of direct economic
dependence, I believe the Japanese are the most
dependent on oil from the Gulf region. But the
Americans are also highly deirendent. They
consume 30% of the oil produced in the world.
Of this they produce only half in their own
country and now import over half of what they
consume, although they account for only about
50,6 of the world population.
Europe is more vitally affected by a different
issue: the fact that we are greatly dependent, and
shall be still more so, on whether certain funda-
mentalist tendencies gain the upper hand, or
whether the reasonable elements of the Arab
world, of their political parties, their political
class, their creative people, are still prepared for
a European-Arab dialogue, which in many
respects has not even begun. We have a genuine
interest in seeing this dialogue proceed as peace-
fully as possible. We need only think of such
problems as the population pressure on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean. We have
no interest in seeing hostilities break out there,
although it may be impossible to avoid them
because of Saddam Hussein's attitude.
I should like briefly to mention two other
points. The first is the problem of nuclear
weapons and chemical weapons. This problem
cannot be addressed solely in relation to lraq. It
is obvious that the principle of non-proliferation
has failed, particularly in the Gulf, but also in
the Near and Middle East as a whole, because
there are, of course, nuclear poweni there which
have not complied with the provisions of the
non-proliferation treaty in any way. This is true
not only of Iraq but also of Israel. Hence the
desire of both Iraq and Libya to produce other
weapons, which are less expensive and are also
intended as a means of deterring Israel.
One last point: Foreign Minister Dumas said
that the Europeans should not act as a world
police force.
The report and recommendation call for a
permanent group of WEU chiefs of defence staff
to prepare for possible co-ordinated operations
unconnected with the Gulf crisis. I do not think
this is right, until it has been possible to install
within the framework of the United Nations 
-
and the United Nations is referred to in almost
every article of the WEU treaty as the most
important reference institution what is
demanded in Article 43, a military staff under
the auspices of the United Nations, and a system
for regulating the operational side of this mil-
itary staffs activities. Until this has been done,
all efforts focusing on the United Nations in this
respect should certainly be supported. It would
be wrong for Europe to form a permanent
general staff of its own.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Fou116.
Mr. FOURRE @rance) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, no one will be
surprised at my asking to speak in this debate on
a subject of special concern to me and which I
have been bringing up for nearly eight years
now: the setting up of a European observation
satellite agency. I thank the two Rapporteurs
who also refer to the importance of establishing
this European agency in their respective recom-
mendations 
- 
paragraph 2 in one case and para-
graph 7 in the other.
The fact is that co-operation in the area con-
cerned, namely aflns control, is impossible to
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imagine without the use of certain units
essential for in situ inspection which, inciden-
tally, is within the capacity of facilities that
already exist in our respective countries, i.e. sat-
ellites.
The r6le of the European observation satellite
agency as defined in the reports before you and
unanimously approved two years ago would
make for a considerable advance along the road
of technical, technological and political co-
operation and in the mobilisation of effort and
resources.
We all realise the great potential importance
of this European agency, and in the light of what
the President has said several times, we all
regret, given the events in the Gull that we do
not have it. In the context of our calls for
co-operation in the Gulf crisis, it would indeed
have been specially useful for us to have a
facility at our disposal enabling us to take
co-ordinated action at European level before
accepting dependence on the United States of
America.
We need such co-operation; a moment ago we
were all demanding it. Here we have the means
of achieving it ready to hand. Why not set up
this European observation satellite agency
immediately? In his letter to the President of the
Assembly, the Secretary-General reminds us
that an ad hoc group was formed and met on
24th and 27th November to finalise a report
requested by the ministers at their April
meeting. A ministerial decision was drafted, for
submission to the enlarged Council late
November. Unfortunately, there are various
pointers suggesting that firm political will to go
ahead with setting up the agency is not there.
Yet, as I say, pragmatically and on a stage-by-
stage basis, we have the necessary technical
resources available and no extraordinary
funding requirements would be necessary.
So what is going on, given the vigour and rese
lution with which this Assembly called for the
agency to be set up? This is olrr question and we
have to ask the Council of Ministers for an
answer at its meeting on 10th December next, as
the draft recommendation which I presented
asking that we be notified of the conclusions of
the study was adopted unanimously two years
ago.
Mr. President, I asked to speak in order to
recall that expression of our wishes and also the
need for this agency which has your resolute
support, and I am glad that the Rapporteurs did
not- omit mention of this very practical
instrument of co-operation in their reports.
On a more general note and addressing the
diffrculties that lie ahead, I would like to quote
from President Mitterrand's address to the
United Nations on the Gulf crisis. He said thatin a world where interdependence was the
common lot of all, even the most powerful
amongst us, it was tempting to see self-
dependence as an escape, as though the only
means of asserting one's identity and distinction
was to deny those of others and as though this
need for identity could be satisfied by xeno-
phobia or nationalism. The conclusion that is
ultimately found to the crisis caused by the Iraqi
aggression would be exemplary in this regard.
I hope, Mr. President, that it is not this need
for identity, distinction or individualism which
is preventing us from putting the co-operative
project for a European observation satellite
agency into effect.
(Mn Pontillon, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I think that
you, like me, will have derived some encour-
lgement or at least heard some echo of your
wbrries in the words of the Defence Minister.
I call Mr. Antretter.
Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, the
Security Council's recent resolution leaves very
little time to find a peaceful solution to the con-
flict in the Gulf. For the first time in the United
Nations'history, the Security Council has been
almost unanimous in condemning the annex-
ation of a member country and demanding
Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
The fact that this is the first time the United
Nations has applied the measures for which its
charter provides in the event of a breach of the
peace and acts of aggression is of tremendous
historicat importance. The modified Brussels
Treaty states explicitly that the treaty--mqy not
be inferpreted as - and I quote - " affectin-g in
any way the authority and responsibility of the
Seiurity Council under the Charter " where
international security is concerned.
The treaty on which our organisation is based
thus indicates the limits to European
co-ordination of the forces operating in the Gulf
region. Now that the cold war is over, e-very
effort must be made to prevent new fronts from
forming, which might poison international rela-
tions. It is therefore tremendously important
that the peace-keeping measures in the Gulf
region aie based on a United Nations
mandate.
We must not allow ourselves to be driven into
a situation in which our only alternatives are to
rush forward into war, or to make a humiliating
retreat. This has nothing to do with pussy-
footing or appeasement. Let us not forget that
two of oui member countries, France and
Britain, fell victim during the operation on the
Suez Canal in October 1956 to the idea that a
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new Munich must be avoided at all costs. We all
know where this outlook led.
So everything possible must now be done,
with European participation, to sound out the
last remaining prospects of an internal Arab
solution. I therefore welcome the French
Foreign Minister's announcement that he would
be taking the relevant initiative to Baghdad.
Even though the chances of an Arab solution are
slim now that Morocco's initiative has failed,
the countries united in WEU or the European
Community still have time to test the possibility
of a peaceful solution of this kind.
The agreement reached within the CSCE
framework on arms limitation, conflict pre-
vention and international supervision surely
indicates how a regional peace settlement can be
achieved. Is it not now up to the Europeans to
co-ordinate the supervision of arms exports and
weapons supplies to the Near East and so ensure
that other countries do not one day follow Iraq's
example and give expression to their lust forpower with an arms build-up positively
encouraged by European arms supplies?
Instead of playing war games with a European
fleet of cruisers, as some parts of Mr. De
Decker's otherwise balanced report do, the
Assembly should call on the Secretary-General
to initiate action whereby WEU and a reacti-
vated arms control agency would co-operate
with the national authorities in establishing
European principles to govern the export of
arms supplies and equipment that can be used to
manufacture weapons in third countries.
Mr. De Decker criticises the inefficiency of
WEU co-ordination in the Gulf operation. We
too criticise the lack of political unity among the
member countries of WEU. Why did the Euro-
peans in the Security Council not speak with one
voice? Why did they not adopt a co-ordinated
position on the Soviet proposal for the reacti-
vation of the United Nations Military Staff
Committee under the United Nations Charter?
The Iraqi aggressor must now be confronted
with the international law of the United
Nations. To ensure that this is done is up to
WEU, which is, moreover, explicitly required to
do so by Article VI of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
The age of gunboat diplomacy is over. Only if
we now support the United Nations in its peace-
keeping task of ensuring collective securiiy will
we be able one day to achieve in other regions
what we have recently brought to a conclusion in
Europe with the CSCE.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Martinez.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation).
Since 2nd August when lraq invaded Kuwait we
have had many occasions to speak about this
conflict in numerous parliamentary forums. In
the Assembly of the Council of Europe, in the
Conference of the Interparliamentary Union
and in our own national parliament we have
analysed the situation, discussed the responsibil-
ities borne by each of us and committed our-
selves to the search for a solution to this conflict,
the seriousness of which is clear to all. We are
not here today to go over the details ofprevious
analyses or to restate positions already adopted
in the Presidential Committee and in the pro-
ceedings of the Political Committee where we
have discussed the excellent report submitted by
Mr. De Decker. In expressing my support for the
text of the two recommendations before us and
my intention to vote for them I simply wish to
state a position of principle and to say some-
thing about the latest happenings in the con-
flict.
We have repeatedly said that invasion, occu-
pation and annexation of Kuwait by lraq con-
stitute naked aggression. It is a flagrant and
extremely grave violation of international law
and above all it constitutes a frontal attack by
Iraq upon the new international order based on
peace and co-operation, which we are just
beginning to build now that the era of confron-
tation between the two blocs has ended. And to
give the true measure of international concern,
which we share, there is the disruption which
Iraq's action is causing in world energy markets,
exacerbated by speculation on the part ofthe big
oil companies, with devastating consequences
for national economies, particularly those of the
poorer countries. If to all this we add the vio-
lation of human rights and of international rules
constituted by hostage-taking, the siege of the
embassies and the outrages of the invading army
against the population of Kuwait, we have a
picture of lraq's conduct that is despicable from
any civilised point of view.
Fortunately, the international community has
reacted and is reacting appropriately to this aggr€s-
sion by Iraq. The response has been remarkably
unanimous and firm, and above all it has been
channelled through the organisation established
for that purpose, namely the United Nations;
moreover the response has taken the form of an
intelligent policy, that of sanctions. In this
response and in its implementation, it is very
important that all that has gone before shoulil
not remain mere worthless scraps of paper.
Our countries have taken action to live up to
their responsibilities. Our organisation, WEU,
has been a useful and effective instrument; in
this respect it has to be said that the response
has come up to the expectations we had when we
recently joined Western European Union. We
thought it would be effective, and this has shown
us that it is indeed so.
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Having said that, I believe it is important to
unmask the diplomatic and political strategy
that has been followed by Iraq, the sole
aggxessor, the sole warrnonger in this whole con-
flict. Saddam Hussein has been acting systemati-
cally, perhaps surprised by the unanimity,
firmness and scope of our response, with the
object of sowing confusion and of disguising and
distorting the truth, presenting it not as an
attack by one Arab country against another Arab
country but rather as an attack by the United
States against [raq, an attack by the West against
the Arab countries, a part of the North-South
conflict. Saddam Hussein's strategy has also
endeavoured to divert blame in order to conceal
his own, and to muddy the waters by mixing
together different conflicts precisely in order to
distract attention from his own aggf,ession. The
fact is that Iraq has been largely concerned to
find flaws and destroy unanimity in the condem-
nation of its actions or at least in the unanimous
call for the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein and
his troops from Kuwait.
There is no doubt that some people through
nailvetd or interest, useful fools, or co-
conspirators, have played the aggressor's game.
Only very few have refrained from condem-
nation, though others have followed apparently
strong condemnation by an immediate barrage
of arguments and sophisms, seeking to place
responsibility elsewhere and recommending
actions that would in fact help to nullify the res-
olutions of the United Nations that they claim
to support. Fortunately there are very few who
have gone along with this strategy, when
speaking here and in our national parliaments.
I think we can now say that the strategy of
confusion followed by Saddam Hussein has
failed. He has failed to break the unanimity of
condemnation and response. I believe it is
essential for us here to maintain and support the
effectiveness of this action, as has been said by
the two Ministers who represent the presidency
of WEU. Mr. President, much is at stake for the
world in the Gulf today, not just as regards the
crisis itself, but above all for the future of the
world. Yesterday one member said that this situ-
ation could not have come about during the cold
war period, and perhaps he is right, but take
care, for it is neither possible nor reasonable to
draw nostalgic conclusions about the previous
period, which was undoubtedly worse than the
present. The conclusion to be drawn is com-
mitment, it is to ensure that the fragile peace
secured by a state oftension, the unstable equi-
librium maintained by the confrontation of the
superpowers, shall be replaced, now that that
period of history has been closed, not by the law
ofthejungle and the law ofthe strongest, but by
peace and a superior and more stable balance,
based on confidence and co-operation.
I should like to make two comments in
closing, Mr. President. First, we must pursue to
the end our strategy of seeking a political and
peaceful solution, of support for the United
Nations and of a solution within and with the
United Nations. In the words of an amendment
that we have submitted to the draft'recommen-
dation, it seems essential to ask that our coun-
tries that have become politically and militarily
involved in order that sanctions may work, and
especially the WEU countries, should be asso-
ciated with the tdks that have been announced
between the United States and Saddam Hussein,
not pushed to the sidelines. Let us remember
that we have said that the violation of interna-
tional law and the crisis affect not two parties
but everyone, and that the response and the
solution must likewise come not from two but
from all 
- 
or at least, all of us.
Secondly and lastly, may I express the hope
that the United Nations will come out of the
crisis strengthened in its authority and in its
effectiveness as an instrument fof solving this
conflict, and above all for bringing aborit solu-
tions to future conflicts in a new world order of
peace and progress. May I also add that if we
iucceed in resolving the Gulf conflict in
accordance with the rules of international law
and on the basis of United Nations resolutions,
we shall have gained great moral strength and
also placed ourselves under the obligation to
continue advancing with fresh energy to resolve
conflicts like those between Israel and Palestine
or that within Lebanon, as well as one much
closer to us, indeed within our area, the Cyprus
conflict, in accordance with the rules of interna-
tional law and on the basis of outstanding
United Nations resolutions.
Mr. President, we are committed to taking
action towards these objectives, as is the over-
whelming majority in the Spanish parliament.
You may count on us, as we in Spain are sure
that we can count on you.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That
statement by the chairman of the Spanish Dele-
gation closes the first part of this afternoon's
debate.
The joint debate is now adjourned. It will be
resumed tomorrow morning followed by the
votes on the draft recommendations presented
by the Political Committee and the Defence
Committee.
5. Date, time and orden of the daY
of the next sitting
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and
sentlemen. I now have some news, or more
6xactly a message, for you. I have just received a
telephone call from the Under-Secretary of
t2r
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State, Mr. Bartholomew, explaining that he has
had to stay in Washington on the instructions of
the Secretary of State Mr. Baker because of the
intense diplomatic activity in the American
capital connected, of course, with the matter
with which we too are unendingly occupied. Mr.
Bartholomew presents his apologies to the
Assembly and has asked Mr. Curley, United
States Ambassador to France, to read his
address in his place tomorrow. This will not of
course be followed by a debate. That, ladies and
gentlemen, is the message I had to give you.
I therefore propose that the Assembly hold its
lgxt public sitting tomorrow morning,
Wednesday, 5th December, at l0 a.m. with the
following orders of the day:
l. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-
Secretary for International Security Affairs,
United States Department of State(Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United
States Ambassador to France).
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Con-
sequences of the invasion of Kuwait: con-
tinuing operations in the Gulf region
(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the
Political Committee and the Defence Com-
mittee, Documents 1244 and amendments
and 1248 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for
Defence Procurement of the United
Kingdom.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Con-
sequences of the invasion of Kuwait: con-
tinuing operations in the Gulf region
(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the
Political Committee and the Defence Com-
mittee and votes on the draft recommenda-
tions, Documents 1244 and amendments
and 1248 and amendments).
5. Enhancing WEU's public relations (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations and vote on the draft recommen-
dation, Document 1246\.
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)
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Wednesday, 5th December 1990
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1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for Inter-
national Security Affairs, United States Department of
State (Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States
Ambassador to France).
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the iivasion of Kirwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
region (Resumedjoint debale on the repors ofthe Political
C6mmittee and ihe Defence Committee and votes on the
draft recommendations, Docs. l2zl4 and amendments and
1248, addendum and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Askin (OQs9rv9r from
Turlcey), Mr. lopez Valdivielso, Mr. Speed, Mr. Romero,
Mr. Fioret, Mr. Sole-Tura, Mr. Lambie.
5. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Pre'
curement of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Clark to questions Plt by: $ir- Russell
Johnston, Mr. Ward, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Speed, Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg, the Earl of Kinnoull, Mr. Garrett.
6. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of
the invasion of Kirwait: continuing operations in the Gulf
region (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political
Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the
draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and
1248, addendum and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Veryvakis (Ob.sgmer.from
Greece), Mr. Andjelkovtic (Observer from Yugoslavia),-
Lord Mackie, Mr. Hardy, Mr. De Decker (Rapporteur of
the Political Committed), Mr. Ahrens (Chairman of the
Political Committee), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (Rapporteur
of the Defence Committee), Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman
6f the Ddfence Committed, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Ahrens, Mr.
De Dec(er, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. De Decker,
Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr' Ahrens, IvIr.
Stoffelen, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Martinez(point of order), Mr. De Decker, M1. Ahlens,.Mr' De
Decker,- Mr. Martinez, Mr. Ahrens, Mr' Stoffelen, Mr.
Pieralli, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Martinez, Mr' De
Decker, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. De Decker,
Mr. Pi6ra[i, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Martinez (point of order),
Mr. Lambie, Mr. Reddemann, Sir Dudley Smith'
Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley Smith,
Mr. Lambie, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley Smith'
Mr. Martinez, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley
Smith.
7. Change in the order of business'
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
3. Address by Mr. Bartholomew,(Indct sumary for Inunwtiorul WrW Affain,
Ilnited States Department of State
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and
gentlemen, as I informed you yesterday evening
before closing the sitting, Mr. Bartholomew,
Under-Secretary for International Security
Affairs, United States Department of State, who-
had agreed to address the Assembly in place of
Mr. Biker, who was prevented from doing so by-
other commitments, has unfortunately himself
been obliged to stay in Washington for talks of
the highest importance connected with the
problems which are the subject of our present
debates.
Mr. Bartholomew's speech will therefore be
read by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States
Ambasiador to France, to whom I now extend
both my personal greetings as a Frenchman in
this forum and a welcome from the WEU
Assembly.
Please come to the rostrum.
The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting
is open.
1. Attendance rugister
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedings'.
2. Adoption of the ninutes
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Procedure,
the minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
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Mr. CURLEY (United States Ambassador toFrance). Good morning, Mr. President,
members of the Assembly, honoured guests,
mesdames et messieurs, ladies and gentlemen. I
am very grateful to you and I thank you very
much for receiving me here today. While I am
honoured to be in this chamber with you, I am
here by a quirk of circumstance. As your Pres-
ident said, our Under-Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs, my very good
friend, Reginald Bartholomew, was unable at
the very last moment to come to France. He has
asked me to stand in his place in the Assembly,
and I am happy to do so.
I bring you wann greetings from President
Bush, with whoqr I was in touch yesterday, and
from Secretary of State Baker. My government
appreciates the positive input, attitude and force
that Western European Union brings to our
common security. I was with President Bush
when he stressed that point in his Boston Uni-
versity speech eighteen months ago.
I have taken the liberty, ladies and gentlemen
and Mr. President, of summarising in my own
fashion and as accurately as possible Under-
Secretary of State Bartholomew's planned
address to this Assembly. The full text of Secre-
tary Bartholomew's remarks is being made avail-
able to you separately. As I said, ladies and gentle-
men, it is a great honour for me to be in this
chamber. It is my first visit to the Assembly.
This meeting occurs as we near the end of a
troubled century. The divisions of the cold war
are behind us, but other challenges, as the Paris
CSCE summit and the Gulf crisis show, lie
ahead of us. Much remains to be done to build a
new secure world order. As we help to build that
new world order, the central questions of Amer-
icans and Europeans today are: how does the
forty-five-year-old Atlantic relationship evolve?
We believe that the relationship must take three
aspects into account: a transformed NATO, still
central to our security; a greater European
security identity, which will strengthen NATO;
and the new realities outside Europe, under-
scored of course by the Gulf crisis, which call for
new patterns of transatlantic co-operation.
So much in Europe and in NATO has
changed. First, we have the prospect of a
reduced Soviet threat. The Soviet withdrawal
from Eastern Europe and their signature on a
conventional forces agreement are great and
pogitive steps. Secondly, we have a promising
political agenda in front of us. We must move
beyond containment to a new security archi-
tecture in Europe and we must draw the Soviet
Union into co-operative r6les and help Eastern
Europe achieve security and well-being.
Some have said that those two vast changes 
-
the decline of the Soviet threat and the rise of a
new political agenda 
- 
mean an end to NATO's
functions, but those functions remain vital.
NATO will continue to assure the security and
defence of its members. It will promote
democracy and stability in all Europe and it will
maintain transatlantic co-operation. In short,
NATO must be a central pillar of Europe's new
architecture. As Europe changes, obviously NATO
will change with it. In fact, NATO is already
adapting its strategy and its forces. A smallei
military structure will rely more and more on a
multinational core. It will also rely less on
nuclear weapons, making them truly weapons of
the last resort. But, above all, NATO will con-
linue to protect Europe by counterbalancing theSoviet Union or any other potential aggressor.
We cannot ignore the possibility in the unfore-
seen future of a hostile Soviet Union or a spillover
ofinternal strife there or in other places in Eastern
Europe. Responsible nations cannot base their
security and independence on the restraint of
others. In sum, we must be able to defend our-
selves from any challenge and from any direction.
Only then can we fulfil our political agenda.
NATO's leaders at the London summit spelt
out this agenda. They knew that our political
tasks are so big that we can deal with them only
on the broad transatlantic basis which NATO
provides. The initiatives agreed in London,
which reflect this wisdom, were designed to find
new ways to co'operate with the Soviets and
Eastern Europeans. We started the process in
Paris in November, when NATO and the former
members of the Warsaw Pact signed a pledge
not to use force in their relations. My country's
rOle in NATO's transformation and in all the
great events in Europe in 1990 shows that we
intend to stay engaged in the alliance and in
Europe as a European power.
Our r6le in two world wars and in the cold war
teaches us that American and European values
and security are inseparable. NATO's system of
collective defence and of political co-ordination
is a first-time success among free nations. The
Atlantic community in the fullest sense binds usin ways unique to NATO. That is why we
remain committed to Europe and why we will
keep substantial conventional and nuclear forces
here.
For much of the post-war era, the United
States has willingly borne a leadership r6le in
Atlantic defence and Atlantic security. At times,
we chafed at this responsibility 
- 
it was irritating
- 
but we recognised that our rOle was a conse-
quence of the massive Soviet tlneat. Now, new
circumstances and Europe's rising strength open
the way to greater European weight in the
Atlantic relationship. We regard that devel-
opment, not as an excuse for us to do less, but as
a source of strength to the alliance in the new
world order. My government believes that a dis-tinct and substantial European r6le in the
alliance will bolster a sense of transatlantic com-
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Mr. Curley (continued)
munity and strengthen the centrality of NATO.It will contribute to maintaining America's
engagement in Europe.
The transatlantic relationship is rooted in
shared values and hard-headed interests. An
enhanced European identity should strengthen
those values and interests. It will achieve that if
the European dimension develops in the context
of the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance is shaped
by the basic objectives that we all share. Those
objectives include maintaining the ability of all
siiteen members to participate in matters which
affect their security and strengthening the ability
of alliance institutions to manage security chal-
lenges. Those security challenges include threats
from outside Europe. The dangers in the Gulf,
for example, are serious, as we all know. The
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
arms and the risk to vital resources concern us
all. Iraq's aggression is so blatant that the world
has been able to mobilise as never before. We
are also blessed with a state of readiness created
by the cold war.
However, future challenges may be more
ambiguous. In this partnership of nations, we
cannot afford to let ambiguity paralyse us. In
confronting Iraq we have used all available
mechanisms, including NATO and WEU.
Although Europe is closer to the Gulf and her
interests are as affected as those of the United
States, United States forces are preponderant - a
fact which underscores the need to enhance
Europe's weight in out-of-area security matters.
Looking beyond the Gulf, however, we must
consider the implications for NATO without a
divisive out-of-area debate. As we aim high in
our ambition, we must carefully guard against the
unforeseen, as always. America looks forward to
the future with confidence - confidence in the
grand partnership that we have built together.
Mr. President, distinguished members of the
Assembly, ladies and gentlemen, please accept
my gratitude for your courtesy in receiving me,
here today. On behalf of the United States of
America and my President, I salute our part-
nership for the future and once again I thank
you very much.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Ambassador, for this message and the com-
mitment it implies and for its recognition of the
part played by our institution in the common
security effort. Please convey our thanks to Mr.
Baker, Mr. Bartholomew, the American Gov-
ernment and President Bush for your contri-
bution to our deliberations. Would you also add
that we still hope to welcome them in person at a
future session.
Thank you again, Ambassador, for your con-
tribution to our debate.
4. European securtty and the Gulf crisis
Consequences of the invosion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region
(Resumcd joint dcbste on the rcporrs
of the Politbal C-ommiuu aad tb Defeacc Committee
and wtes on thc draft ruomnendntbas,
Dus. 1214 aad a,merdinlpnts and 1218,
addeadam and uondments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the resumed joint debate on
the reports of the Political Committee and the
Defence Committee on European security and
the Gulf crisis and the consequences of the
invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the
Gulf region and votes on the draft recommenda-
tions, Documents 1244 and amendments and
1248, addendum and amendments.
The joint debate is resumed.
I call Mr. Askin, Observer from Turkey.
Mr. ASKIN (Observer from Turkey). - Mr.
President, developing close relations with the
western world in all domains and participating
actively in the European political, social and
economic integration process is one of the main
priorities of Turkish foreign policy.
In fact, with her active membership of NATO,
OECD and the Council of Europe, Turkey has
demonstrated her strong interest in all aspects,
as well as the democratic values and institutions
of the European movement.
Turkey is an important bastion of Western
Europeah defence. She is a reliable pa4ner in
NATO. As a strong and stable ally in the
southern region of the alliance, Turkey has a lot
to offer to the creation of the future European
security order. As a matter of fact, a European
defence without Turkish participation is bound
to be vulnerable. Against that background, we
believe that the accession of Turkey as a full
member of Western European Union will
greatly contribute to the strengthening process
of ttre European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
The Gulf crisis, which brought a region which
neighbours Turkey to the threshold of war, is the
major issue to be discussed during the present
session of the Assembly.
The recent Gulf crisis has demonstrated once
again the importance of Turkey to security and
defence. We are confident that Turkey will take
the place that it deserves in the new European
security structure that is being created. For that
reason, Turkey should be given the place that it
deserves in the new European security structure
by joining Western European Union as a full
member. Turkey attaches great importance to its
full membership of Western European Union.
(Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair)
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Lopez Valdivielso.
Mr. LOPEZ VALDMELSO (Spain) (Trans-
lation). 
- 
Thank you, Madam President. May I
begin by associating myself with the congratula-
tions expressed to the Rapporteurs by all my col-
leagues and thank them for all they have done to
keep this Assembly informed on such an
important matter, and I should also like to thank
all those who have helped in this task.
After the cold war was over many people in
Europe jumped to the conclusion that armed
forces should be drastically reduced, defence
budgets cut and virtually all our security mea-
sures dismantled because the threat represented
by Warsaw Pact socialism to our freedoms and
to democracy had vanished. They failed to
recognise that other potential threats exist 
- 
as
the Gulf crisis has shown 
- 
and that therefore it
would be wrong to assume that the West has no
need of the military strength necessary to deter
anybody who wanted to turn hypothetical
threats into reality.
It is very easy to indulge in wishful thinking,
but we should resist the temptation because,
unfortunately, there are still rulers who, with the
support of powerful armies, are capable of any-
thing, as Saddam Hussein has clearly shown. As
we have seen, pressure, condemnations and res
olutions of the highest international organ-
isations may mean little to a nun prepared to
invade a neighbouring country and destroy it by
annexation, to use civilians as hostages and to
threaten to use weapons of total destruction;
nobody can sway such a man except with the
backing of military force. So armies are still nec-
essary as an instrument and an argument in
international politics and the answer to those
who with the best intentions but little realism
were asking: * Armies? what for?' has come
from Saddam Hussein.
If despite unanimous international rejection
the United States had not brought their desert
shield into play we should now be sorry and
begging Saddam Hussein to withdraw from
Saudi Arabia or heaven knows where else. And
that prompts the thought that if Hitler had been
stopped in Czechoslovakia the history of the last
fifty years in Europe would have been dif-
ferent.
I would like to make the point in this
European forum that once again the United
States has set an example by facing up to the
responsibilities of the r6le falling to them in our
time, on this occasion in defence of the interna-
tional order. And if the worst happens and war
becomes inevitable I would like particularly to
emphasise the fourth recommendation to the
Council in this report, namely the need for
member countries of WEU to deploy more
ground and air forces in the Gulf area.
To make progress towards the formulation of
a truly European doctrine of security we have to
begin by banishing the thought in the minds of
many Europeans, namely that we Europeans are
prepared to defend freedom, democracy and the
international order to the last drop of American
blood.
I wonder: would we at this stage of the conflict
have taken the decision to deploy military forces
by ourselves in the GulI?
It seems to me that the draft recommendation
in the report, with which I am of course in
agreement, is a kind of catalogue or index of
faults, of unfavourable circumstances which
become more serious as war 
- 
God forbid 
-
appeani increasingly inevitable.
The Council should take the necessary steps ...
take them urgently consider the matter
without delay ... act promptly ... take decisions.
These are the key words in most of the recom-
mendations in this report dated 7th November.
It is now 5th December and given the latest res-
olution of the United Nations the situation is
much more serious.
I have nearly finished, Madam President.
Let no one think that I draw any comfort from
what has happened or from what may happen.
Nothing is further from my thoughts. But there
is no doubt that this must open many people's
eyes. It shows that here in Europe we must move
on from words to deeds.
Western European Union has played and is
playrng an important part in this crisis. But it
must continue to become stronger and improve
its structure because that is the only way it can
become more effective.
At a time of endless discussions on the future
defence and security structures, at a time when 
-in my view incautious 
- 
reductions are being
made in the defence budgets of the various
member countries, the content of paragraph 69
of the report on the importance of WEU, and
recommendations 8 and 10, which are some of
the most debated and amended recommenda-
tions in these reports, are extraordinarily
important; they hold the key to the future of
Western European Union and to the structuring
of a European security system.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Speed.
Mr. SPEED (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
I, too, con-
gratulate our two Rapporteurs on their excellent
reports. They deal with the Gulf crisis and set
out some lessons for this organisation.
Saddam Hussein has waged effective psycho-
logical warfare. Some of us may have forgotten
that, apart from killing, torturing and injuring
many thousands of Kuwaitis, he has done the
same to his own people in lraq, and not just the
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Kurds. Yesterday my colleague, Sir John Stokes,
pointed out the cruelty and the violation of
international laws that come with the taking of
hostages. I go further. I have every sympathy
with those taken hostage and their families, but
we do not serve them or the cause of peace in
the Gulf any good purpose by the constant
stream of European and American politicians -
most of them has-beens - going out there and
trying to negotiate the freedom of some hos-
tages. Saddam Hussein has ruthlessly exploited
concern about the hostages, and every time we
try to bargain for hostages in this way we are
ensuring that dictators or terrorist organisations
will take hostages in the future. They are there to
be used, and I am afraid that we are conniving at
that.
Recently we have had another United Nations
resolution and Mr. Bush's offer of talks. I fear
that Saddam Hussein will prolong the talks,
release quite a lot of land but not all of Kuwait
and then release the hostages on a phased basis.
Then what? We have already heard in this
Assembly siren voices saying " Peace in the Gulf
at any price', and we know that in America and
on continental Europe public opinion is, to say
the least, wobbly. In a few weeks'time, Saddam
Hussein will be left with important parts of
Kuwaiti territory, having given up some other
parts and released some hostages, and we shall
then say that that is not worth fighting over. Yet
the principle that aggression should not pay
must remain uppennost.
As for the future of WEU, paragraphs 8, 9 and
10 of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report are vital
and should not be diluted. It is certainly worth
studying crisis prevention, the satellite agencies
and the whole business of a naval on-call force
or the possibility of a European force d'action
rapide. Those were mentioned by the President
in his speech to the Assembly a couple of days
ago and referred to in my report on European
security eighteen months ago. We must ensure
that WEU has a r0le in such events in the future,
and we must look at making the European pillar
of the alliance more effective than it already is.
If nothing else comes of the Gulf crisis, that will
be a worthwhile prize. The military and political
necessity is there. All that we need to ask our-
selves is whether we are willing, ready and able
to carry it through. I hope that we shall endorse
that principle along the lines of paragraphs 8, 9
and l0 and instruct our ministers to take
action.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Romero.
Mr. ROMERO (Spain) (Translation). - Ladies
and gentlemen, in order to clarify my position
on the order of the day during this debate on
European security and the Gulf crisis let me say
that both I and the group I represent hold that,
for the sake of political honesty, all views, even
those that are not in agreement with the
majority, should be aired.
The reactions and analyses of governments in
Europe and throughout the world, political
movements and the media, show that a funda-
mental change has taken place, because of
concern about an act of war that is no longer
hypothetical but has become a real possibility
within a specified period. The resolution in
question allows any nation having units in what
is known as the multinational force deployed in
the Gulf to consider itself legitimately entitled to
use force once the period stated in the resolution
is over.
We are not party to any attitude that tends to
devalue political and diplomatic initiatives, and
therefore we take a serious view of the fact that
the Council of Ministers has made no statement
to the public in Europe or before the United
Nations, presenting proposals and distancing
itself from the intensive diplomatic activity over
the last few months with only one object in view,
the creation of an instrument, Resolution 678,
that may lead to war.
We are convinced that it is necessary to con-
tinue patiently to apply sanctions whilst pur-
suing the diplomatic initiative. Economic
pressure and diplomacy will take time to
produce results, and this is the only way to avoid
war.
United Left supports the proposal tabled by
the SPD in the German parliament: " Maintain
and increase political, diplomatic and economic
pressure on Iraq and unconditionally rule out
any military option'. To set a term to a period
for political and economic pressure is to switch
the political coercion to the military sphere.
Within this framework, it is absurd to believe
that the function of the ships deployed in the
Gulf has not changed. Once they are there there
is no way in which an interpretation taken uni-
laterally by any of the present allies can fail to
have a direct effect on the ships, either as logis-
tical support or directly in acts of war.
Therefore, as the French Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and Defence stated here yesterday, each
country will have to make its own judgrnent in
the matter in accordance with its constitution
and its legal and parliamentary rules.
To conclude, Madam President, the initia-
tives are as follows: first, to continue to support
the embargo; second, to propose to Community
and WEU countries an undertaking not to use
military force as long as the frontiers of Saudi
Arabia are respected; third, to propose that the
European Community and the United Nations
should discuss initiatives aimed at solving in the
medium term all the problems affecting the area.
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Because when the problems of the area were
under discussion it was said that one interna-
tional crime cannot be the excuse for the com-
mission of another international crime. And
when the authors of various international crimes
against international law are known, public
opinion asks that none should go unpunished.
Therefore, althotrgh one problem should not
be linked automatically to another, a timetable
has to be drawn up for solving all the prpblems
of the East, including the Palestinian problem.
There should also be a security organisation
studying the export of arms to developing coun-
tries from Europe, the United States, or other
countries of the North, and a global programme
for demilitarising the area should be launched,
in view of the military potential that is concen-
trated there.
Those are our positions, Madam President,
and they are not marginal ones. We have two
million votes in Spain and are the third largest
political group. On the 16th of this month there
will be a demonstration in Madrid attended by
the two big trade unions, workers' committees,
the UGT and a peace movement chaired by the
Socialist Senator, Francisca Sauquillo. And
there is a public opinion in Europe and in par-
ticular in Spain, where President Felipe
Gonzalez has acknowledged that public opinion
does not support a military option of this kind.
Therefore, in all fairness to myself and all my
colleagues, I have to give expression to our dis-
agreement in this democratic forum.
The PRESIDENT (franslation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Fioret.
Mr. FIORET (Italy) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has brought
home the precariousness of peace dramaticallyto world public opinion. Its preservation
requires the vigilance of the whole world com-
munity; it cannot be left to a few global custG
dians. The illusion that the normalisation of
East-West relations might have guaranteed a
lengthy period of tranquillity has been dispelled
by the Gulf crisis and its warning to govern-
ments that the threat will be there as long as the
chequerboard of the world is crisscrossed with
not just military but also political and ideo-
logical tensions.
The events in Kuwait have also illustrated
another fact and that is the profound mistake of
nourishing certain centres of conflict in order to
limit or extinguish others. A strategy of this
kind, which may have yielded results at other
times, has turned out to be an incalculable and
dangerous boomerang in the recent past.
Saddam Hussein's aggression, with the
hostage blackmail in violation of human rights,
is a barbarian act; to defeat it, in all its infamy,
will require a high degree of unity and interna-
tional solidarity. But the Gulf question, while it
requires the restoration of international law that
has been violated in accordance with the United
Nations resolution, also points up the urgency of
correcting those dangerous imbalances in arma-
ments allowing the hegemonic designs of the
dictator of Baghdad to come to fruit.
Item 6 of the draft recommendation in Mr. De
Decker's excellent report is highly relevant polit-
ically and an essential keystone ofsecurity in the
Middle East and in Europe itself.
The opening of direct negotiations between
the United States and Iraq certainly represents a
significant and encouraging step towards
making the threat of war more remote. But the
restoration of international order will not auto-
matically mean the destruction of the lethal
arsenals in existence in the Middle East and
other outrages against the weaker nations will
take place with the same kind of unscrupu-
lousness as that of Saddam.
The withdrawal of troops from Kuwait
therefore needs to be accompanied by a security
plan which in all solemnity establishes the invio-
lability of the frontiers of the Middle Eastern
countries.
The suggestion of a CSCM conference for the
Middle East on the model of CSCE should be
welcomed and it is to be hoped that our
Assembly will support the calling of such a con-
ference in the near future. A system of interna-
tional co-operation for the Middle East will
enable principles and standards ofbehaviour to
be laid down acceptable to all the peoples in the
region and not only those who share the western
system of values.
If the conflict in the Persian Gulf were to
result in producing a feasible model for political
systematisation in the Middle East, this would
certainly be received by mankind with a feeling
of relief similar to that which greeted the
destruction of the Berlin wall a year ago, as the
end of a destructive East-West conflict.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Sole-Tura.
Mr. SOLBTURA (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
I
believe that the Gulf crisis is a conflict that
embodies and expresses all the political contra-
dictions of the present time. As has been said, it
is the flrrst conflict after the official end of the
cold war, the first to have taken plaoe since the
oflicial disappearance of the two opposing blocs.
It illustrates the need to define a new interna-
tional order at a time when the available mecha-
nisms are still those of the old order. This being
so, I would emphasise that although we are con-
fronted by a violation of international law, that
is not the main problem. Besides denouncing the
violation of international law we should also
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urgently reconsider the basic concepts of inter-
naiional law that have hitherto applied.
This conflict also raises some other broad
issues. One of these is a rethink of the nuclear
strategy that was conceived as global deterrence
betweEn two equal superpowers. As was proved
in Vietnam, and as, I think, is going to be
proved again in lraq, this strategy does not work
in regional conflicts - and these are what we are
likeli to see in the immediate future. It also
dem-onstrates the possibility that medium-sized
powers, such as present-day Iraq, cal utilise the
present vacuum to commit acts of aggression
ind take up positions that may have widespread
strategic and economic consequences. As I said
before, this situation poses the problem of the
institulions we need to reform the international
system. The present ones date from the previous
period and are demonstrably inadequate.
Certainly at the present time the United
Nations has recovered some of its predominant
r6le, but it cannot fully discharge that r0le, partly
because it does not have any forces ofits own.
Of course, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, NATO, exists and there is no
intention of dissolving it at the present time, yet
it too has to be reformed because it was created
for the situation existing when Europe was
divided into two blocs, and that will not be the
pattern of the future. And what we are dis-
iussing here is the future r6le of institutions like
ours which express the wish and the ability of
Europe to devtlop a policy of its own. At the
same time I believe that we have an obligation
to begin making preparations for a new kind of
institution, already suggested or announced,
such as CSCE-type conferences for the Middle
East and for the Mediterranean, which are
undoubtedly areas ofpotential conflict both now
and for the immediate future.
Clearly, whilst the co-ordination measures we
have adbpted in WEU have been useful, they
also show how limited is our scope, for we are
confronting the Gulf crisis with forces still
geared to the logic of the great powers, the logic
of ttre previous phase. The countries of Europe
and in-particular our organisation do not and
will not have a predominant rdle militarily, and
vet we are following different policies. Never-
lheless, I am broadly in agreement with the drift
of the.two draft recommendations, if not with
their precise wording. I say this because I wish
to express my support for the amendments that
have-been fut forward and which I believe
emphasise three very important aspects.
The first is that if the Gulf conflict is to be
solved peacefully, so must the other problems of
the region such as those in Palestine and
Lebanon.
Second, the other countries taking part in the
embargo, and especially the members of
Western European Union, should not be called
upon simply to support the military pressure;
they should also have a voice and a vote in any
disiussions and negotiations that may take place
in the search for a peaceful solution before the
expiry of the ultimatum given by the latest reso-
tufioriL of the United Nations Security Council'
Third, the countries of the region should have
a large say in the final solution.
In closing I wish to mention a matter that may
appear to be secondary but which I believe to be
eifremely important. I believe that our Assem-
bly shouid mike a definite contribution to clari-
fying the real issues of the conflict' We should
itraUenge misrepresentations aimed at presenting
the Gu-if conflict as the first step in a global
ethnic or religious struggle, specifically a strug;gle
against the rebirth or expansion of Islamic fun-
dimentalism. I believe that that would be the
worst outcome for everybody, and we strould there-
fore make it clear that this is not a war of religion
or a fight against any kind of religious funda-
mentalism, but a new kind of military and stra-
tegic conflict which calls for a redefinition of the
international order. We must also be aware that
behind the growth of those fundamentalisms lie
serious problems to do with economic devel-
opment ind the gap between what weprimly call
the North and tho South, because this aspect is
crucially important to any lasting solution.
(Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Lambie.
Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). - I was one
of the twenty-six members of parliament who,
during the tiouse of Commons' debate on the
Gulf -crisis, voted against the government's
policy of United Kingdom armed forces pa4ici-
iatin-g in the Gulf -operation and, therefore,
lgainit the policy of my PartY, the Labour PaItJ,
wtricn supporti the government on this.
Although l-am not speaking for the United
Kingdom Government or even for the Labour
opp6sition, I believe that I am speaking for
niore of the people of the world, especially the
people of Europe, than many other representa-
iivei whom I have heard during our one and a
half days' debate on these reports.
Nothing justifies the use of force in the Gulf.
As many-rLpresentatives have said, we should
carry on imposing sanctions, get 9n with negoti-
atioirs and reach a peaceful solution. I have
noticed during our debate that colleagues whose
countries are contributing little or nothing to the-
alliance and who are furthest from the point of
conflict are more militant and warlike. I wish
that more representatives had been present late
yesterday afternoon to listen to the Turkish dele-
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gate's words ofadvice and appeals for a peaceful
solution. Turkey shares a border with Iraq.
Yesterday, the Minister of Defence of France
made some reasonable and honest statements.
Both reports give the impression that the alliance
is between the United States and Europe, but in
reply to questions the Minister said that most of
us were on the sidelines and that it was like a
game of poker with only two players, the United
States and Iraq. He also said that there was no
political will within the Council of Ministers to
commit more forces to the Gulf. That is the
honest opinion of the leaders of the western
alliance, rather than the opinions set out in both
these reports. We are creating the feeling that
Europe is contributing, when everyone knows
that it is contributing little. I am sorry that the
American Ambassador is not here. He mildly
criticised the lack of support from Europe foi
the American attempts to get a military solution
to the conflict in the Gulf.
What is the position? France has 4 600 land
forces in the Gulf, but they are way behind the
front line because they will not be put under
American control. We are told that there is an
Arab contribution and that Syria has 16 000
troops there, but they are also behind the front
line because they do not know whose side they
will be on. Egypt has l8 000 troops, away from
the front line. The only troops on the front line,
under a unified command, are the American
and British troops. We are committing ourselves
to providing 12 000 land forces 
- 
at present,
about 7 000 are there. Even the British contri-
bution to the 500 000 land forces in the Gulf is
next to nothing.
This is not an allied attempt to solve the Gulf
problem; it is solely an American attempt. Yes-
terday, my friend Mr. Martinezftom Spain said
that this action was not the consequence of the
ending of the cold war. I say that it is. If the cold
war had not ended and if the Americans had
gone into the southern part of the Middle East,
the Russians would have gone into the northernpart and there would have been a stalemate.
Now, because of the ending of the cold war,
there is only one superpower and, unfortunately,
that is the United States.
Vluny people here talk about human rights
and say that we must protect countries fiom
invasion by others. I have a longer memory than
most people here. I remember the Philippines,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Chile 
- 
which had a
democratic government 
- 
Grenada and Panama.
I remember all those invasions and attempts by
the United States Government to interfere iir
the rights of independent sovereign countries.
I am a wee bit worried that we as Europeans
are prepared to put no military effort intb the
Gulf war but want to give full support to the
Americans to lose their lives. I shall not listen to
the voices that will be raised in the chamber
today. I put it to members that, if they want war,
they will get one. As everyone knows, one does
not reach solutions by heading towards war. One
of the strongest, most economically powerful
countries in the world will fight against a third
world country without any industry and with l7
million people. It cannot be defeated without
help from Germany, France, Spain, Portugal
and all the other countries whose representatives
have spoken in favour of war.
There can be only one result 
- 
the Americans
will win, and we will have American bases for
ever more in the Middle East. Once we have
solved this problem, what about Syria? Pres-
ident Assad is the 'great white hope ". One of
the most obscene things that I have seen recently
was the American President sitting side by side
with President Assad. We know everything that
President Assad has done and will do onCe the
war in the Middle East ends.
We have to solve the problem of Palestine.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Would you
kindly conclude, Mr. Lambie, as you have gone
well beyond your time.
_ 
Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). 
- 
I am just
finishing, Mr. President. There has been no
mention of Palestine and Israel. I-et us throw
both these reports out. Let us consign them to
the waste paper basket, where they should be,
and speak up for a peaceful solution. I say to the
people who want war that their sons and their
constituents will not be fighting. As the French
Defence Minister said, they willbe sitting on the
touch line. They will be the hooligans on the
football terraces shouting on the t*o teams in
the fight. Let us get down to a peaceful solution
and to negotiation and get some sense into the
Assembly. Let us talk of peace, not war.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I remind
all members that, if the time-limits which we
have set ourselves are to be respected, it is impor-
tant that each speaker should make an effort to
limit what he has to say to the agped five minutes.
In his enthusiasm, Mr. Lambie has spoken for
nine minutes.I hope that his example will not be
followed too often.
Ladies and gentlemen, we shall now suspend
the debate on the report connected with the Gulf
situation and resume it later this morning.
5. Address by Mr. Clarh
Minisur of State for Defence Procurement
of the United Kingdom
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
91de1 of the day is the address by Mr. Clark,Minister of State for Defence Procurement oi
the United Kingdom.
r30
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Minister, we are aware of the demands on
your time and of the difficulties which the
current situation presents for you and we are
therefore all the more appreciative of your
presence here today.
Without further delay, I ask you to take the
rostrum.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the United Kingdom). - It is a
great pleasure for me to address the thirty-sixth
iession of the WEU Assembly. I have listened to
and drawn enlightenment from the contribu-
tions to the debate. It is particularly appropriate
that the Assembly should be debating the Gulf
crisis 
- 
that is, the illegal and brutal occupation
of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein - which provides
an opportunity for WEU member countries to
rally- iound and demonstrate European soli-
darity and commitment to playing a full part in
the united response of the international com-
munity to this unprovoked aggression.
Just over four months have passed since the
invasion of Kuwait. The international com-
munity responded swiftly by passing a series of
United Nations Security Council resolutions
condemning the invasion and setting in hand
measures to deny Saddam Hussein support andto secure Iraq's withdrawal. The United
Kingdom's aim, which I know you all share, is-to
resolue the crisis as soon as possible by peaceful
means. We hope that, by using diplomatic and
economic pressure within the context of the
United Nations resolutions, Saddam Hussein
will realise that the whole world stands against
him and that only lraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
and the restoration of Kuwait's independent and
legitimate government will secure peace. WEU
must play an important part in that process.
From the outset of the Gulf crisis, a primary
aim has been to deny trade and finance to
Saddam Hussein by stopping any imports and
exports reaching or leaving lraq by sea. To this
end, at their extraordinary meeting on 2lst
August, defence and foreign affairs ministers of
WEU countries declared their intention to con-
tribute towards enhancing the international
maritime effort deployed in the implementation
of United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions.
In particular, they stressed that their aim
would be to co-ordinate their operations in
support of a naval trade embargo, 
. 
always
beiiing in mind the importance of ensuring that
such aition should assist wider co'ordination
with all nations deploying naval forces in the
Gulf region.
The naval contribution made bY WEU
member countries is impressive. Of the 100-plus
naval support vessels deployed by fifteen coun-
tries, the contribution by WEU nations amounts
to over fifty ships deployed in the Gulf and the
eastern Mediterranean. Of those, the United
Kingdom at present accounts for two destroyers,
two-frigates, six logistic support vessels - all
armed 
- 
three mine counter-measure vessels and
a support ship. In addition, the Nimrod mar-
itime patrol aircraft of the RAF are responsible
for the key interception areas in the Persian Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman, where surveillance oper-
ations of potential sanction-breaking vessels are
conducted.
Co-ordination of naval operations has
developed at two levels. In the Gulf itsell fol-
lowing on from the Bahrein international naval
confeience on 9th and 10th September, naval
co-ordination is by means of the monthly con-
ferences of senior naval officers. They are the
forum for drawing up a patrol schedule for oper-
ations in those waters, which can take into
account national requirements in respect of per-
missible areas of operation and national tasks
such as port visits ai well as the primary task of
maritim-e embargo surveillance. The United
Kingdom believes that the distribution of vessels
throughout those waters without restrictions on
operating zones has maximised the flexibility and
effectiveness of the multinational efforts.
The scheduling conferences also cover matters
essential to the co-ordination of such a large
number of vessels in one area, communications,
IFF procedures and so on. The WEU confer-
ences and plenary sessions, which bring in all
other non-WEU nations, are working well. They
have resulted in the effective and smooth
co-ordination of the maritime effort in the Gulf.
There have been regular meetings of the ad hoc
group of defence and foreign affairs officials,
Established after the ministerial meeting in
August and the meeting on 271!r Auglst of the
chi6fs of staff. The chiefs of staffmeeting was, of
course, the first in the history of WEU.
In addition, a naval points of contact group
has been set up to discuss and resolve issues
which are more appropriate to captains than
naval commanders in the field. The regular
meetings of the group provide an invaluable
forum ior exchanges of information and views
on issues such as ihe content of operations, the
rules of engagement for dealing with sanction-
breaking mirihant vessels and for the identifi-
cation and resolution of common problems.
Even though the United Kingdom has had
several years'- experience of the Armilla patrol,
we havd found new problems in enforcing the
trade embargo. Such problems include dealing
with a poteniially hostile Iraqi master and crew,
taking iontrol ofsanction breakers who refuse to
divert voluntarily and dealing with other such
incidents, which are below the threshold of
combat but present particular diffrculties of
decision.
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We need to share experiences and find
common solutions to such problems. WEU pro,
vides a unique forum for that and I welcome the
way in which the naval points of contact and
senior officers' co-ordination meetings have
developed. We must facilitate both bilateral con-
tacts and, most importantly, wider co-
ordination with other nations.
-Maritime embargo operations are only a part
9f the pressure being applied following -theUnited Nations resolution. A multinational
force of ground and air assets has been com-
mitted, the aim of which is to demonstrate that
behind the peaceful pressures of diplomatic iso-
lation and economic sanctions there lies the mil-
itary option. I am convinced that only a demon-
stration of military resolve is likely to persuade
Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait
and to fullil the requirements of the United
Nations Security Council resolution.
In September, the United Kingdom decided
to send British forces to Saudi Arabia and to
reinforce the RAF units already in the Gulf. On
22nd November, we decided to employ addi-
tional army personnel and equipment to Saudi
Arabia. That substantial additional commitment
demonstrates our belief that the military option
must be credible. The First Armoured Division
is already an oversized division. It will bring to
over thirty thousand the number of Briiish
forces committed in the Gulf. It contains over
220 main battle tanks, all supporting infantry in
armoured personnel carriers, artillery which is
additional to the normal establishment, and
long-range rocket support and helicopter
support.
The full operating cost of the British forces
committed to the Gulf is some f,3.5 million
sterling a day. If we maintain our current level
of operations 
- 
assuming that hostilities do not
break out 
- 
our total costs are likely to exceed
f I billion sterling by the end of the financial
year.
Several offers of support have already been
made to the United Kingdom, for example, to
assist with the transport to the Gulf of our mil-itary deployment and the provision of addi-
tional ammunition, which is vital to sus-
tainability and high attrition rates. Many of
those offers have been made in the context of a
WEU military points of contact meeting, and all
members have agreed to assist partners in
deploying forces and to extend co.ordination in
naval areas, particularly to logistic support for
ground and air forces. The military points of
contact meetings have proved useful for identi-
fy_ing areas of weakness and directing the efforts
of allies to areas where a contribution of
whatever size can enhance the multinational
force to best effect.
We all hope that it will not come to it, but if
hostilities cannot be avoided, there will inevi-
tably be casualties. The numbem cannot be pre-
dicted. I stress that there cannot be too much
medical support for troops of whatever nation-
ality who are prepared to risk life and limb in
the defence of democracy and freedom. Nor
should we forget the spectre of Iraqi use of
chemical and biological weapons. The interna-
tional community will hold personally respon-
sible those who violate the Geneva protocol of
1945, to which lraq is a party, which prohibits
the use of chemical or biological weapons.
But we cannot hope that such considerations
will prevail upon Saddam Hussein, whose
record of brutality, even against his own people,
would indicate otherwise. United Kingdom
forces are properly trained and equipped, but itis important that the right medical facilities
should be available, and this is another area
where all assistance would be beneficial.
So far, despite the alignment of the world
nations against it, Iraq has shown no sign of
withdrawing from Kuwait. Instead, the
destruction and looting that were so graphicalty
described in last week's United Nations debate
on the rape of Kuwait continue. [n an effort to
resolve the crisis by peaceful means, on
Thursday the Security Council 
- 
for the first
time in thirty years 
- 
passed a resolution per-
mitting the use of whatever measures are nec-
essary to uphold and implement Security
Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent rel-
evant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area. That resolution
represents the latest and strongest bid for peace.
We hope that it will bring home to Saddam
Hussein the futility of his attempt to divide the
international community and demonstrate to
him that there is no ambiguity about what the
United Nations Security Council requires. The
withdrawal from Kuwait must be complete.
There is no room for half measures or for com-
promise.
Whatever our narrower national considera-
tions may be 
- 
events may be interpreted with
slight variations in different chancelleries 
- 
it is
essential that in this, our first real test outside
the familiar and habitual confrontation with the
ancient Soviet threat, Europe should present a
completely united front. The future tranquillity
and stability of the world order depend on it.
I thank you very much for the privilege of
addressing you.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
for your address, Minister.
. 
You kindly said you would answer ques-
tions.
I call Sir Russell Johnston.
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Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
The Minister will understand that not only
British members but members from other coun-
tries of Western European Union read with
great concern the allegations against him in the
British newspaper The Sunday Times. Those
allegations were that in the period before the
invasion of Kuwait, when the United Kingdom
along with other WEU members applied an
embargo on anns or arms-related sales to Iraq,
the Minister was aware of and connived at sales
from the United Kingdom to Iraq of equipment
which could be used for military purposes.
I hear people behind me muttering the word
* disgraceful'.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Hear, hear.
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
I have not posed the question in an antagonistic
fashion. It is a very important question, because
The Sunday Times is a newspaper of European
repute and what it publishes in such an overt
fashion must be directly and openly answered. I
certainly think that parents whose sons and, in
some cases, daughters are in danger of dying in
the Gulf will want to know very clearly, openly
and directly from all ministers concerned in this
enterprise that everything is being done and
everything was done previously to avoid the
supply of arms to lraq. I was disappointed that
the Minister did not make a direct reference to
this when he spoke, because he owed it to us to
do so.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Rubbish.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before
asking the Minister to answer this question, I
have a point to make. We are in an area where
the line between the debate on internal policy
and that on international policy is ill-defined. I
would remind you that it is the business of this
Assembly to concentrate on security problems in
the general context of Europe, the Atlantic
Alliance and the world. I therefore ask you all to
make the necessary effort not to give in to the
temptation to replace this main debate by others
whiih have more to do with the internal politics
of our different countries.
I now call the Minister, who probably wishes
to reply to the speaker.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the Uniled Kingdom) (Trans-
lation). 
- 
Mr. President, if you will allow me,, I
will remain seated to reply to questions but for
this particular question I prefer to stand.
(The speaker continued in English)
I very much resent Sir Russell Johnston taking
the opportunity of our meeting here to ask a
question that relates to my personal conduct on
the basis of testimony - if you can call it that -
which was derived from a team ofresearchers -
ifyou can call them that - who never referred to
me, never referred to my office, never referred
to the Minister for Trade, never referred to the
Department of Trade and Industry and never
referred to our member here, Mr. Garrett, who
represents Wallsend, who is a parliamentary
consultant to the machine tools association.
I have a complete and total answer to these
allegations, which are rubbish, trash and sensa-
tional, and in the fullness of time that answer
will be presented. It certainly will not be pre-
sented 
- 
I shall try to restrain myself from any
pejorative 
- 
to a member of parliament of little
particular interest, status or concern to me in a
forum where it is entirely inappropriate. But it
did not escape my attention that he tried to
introduce 
- 
I believe in contemptible manner -
an emotive element into the question by
referring to parents and others who have
children and loved ones in the Gulf, so I am
ready to tell him that I, too, am in that c?tegory.
One-of my sons is serving in the Gulf at the
present time.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Ward.
Mr. WARD (United Kingdom). - Is the Min-
ister satisfied with the speed at which all the
allies can get reinforcements to the Gulf area
given the problems that may exist with
shipping?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procarement of the United Kingdom). - [ do not
believe that there are any problems in relation to
reinforcement of everything that is air-ponable.
That includes all forms of equipment other than
very heavy armour - artillery pieces_, multiPle
long-range rocket systems and so forth. The
airlift capacity is very strong and I see no par-
ticular concern about that. The shipping
arrangements work very well and we a-re con-
scioui that this affords a good example of speedy
response and international co-operation.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Hardy.
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - The Min-
ister heard the speech of my colleague, Mr.
Lambie. Does he accept that my party fully
shares the view that there must be a complete
withdrawal from lraq? Will he also accept that
we have repeatedly made clear...
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). From
Kuwait.
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Yes, with-
drawal from Kuwait. I am grateful to Mr. Jessel
who is extremely competent at observing minor
slips.
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Does the Minister also accept that one reason
for our continuing view that the military option
must remain credible is that if it does not
remain credible, the sanctions policy would not
remain credible? Does the Minister also accept 
-I am sorry to go on but it is important 
- 
that the
maintenance of sanctions must be accompanied
by a degree of supervision, which is itself subject
to public awareness? I am not referring to the
matter raised by Sir Russell Johnston. If there is
a significant breach of sanctions by any member
state of this organisation, this organisation, not
least in view of its importance and responsi-
bility, should not be denied such information.
Breach of sanctions should not be shielded by
excessive confidentiality.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the United Kingdom). 
- 
That is a
good point. The military option and the
enforcement of sanctions are inseparable. All
our available information suggests that the sanc-
tions r6gime is working extremely well and there
is no hint ofany breach by the European states.
There may be perforations in that rdgime along
some of the vast frontiers, but I should not like
to judge whether such breaches arise out of
direct government connivance of the neigh-
bouring countries or are caused by local condi-
tions. The breaches are minimal in terms of the
impact of the sanctions r6gime on the Iraqi
economy and they are outside the knowledge of
this organisation.
When sanctions are in place for a long time a
resolution is put before cabinet. Once they are in
place I accept there is a tendency to relax those
sanctions at different levels and we must be vig-
ilant about that in the future.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Speed.
Mr. SPEED (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
The Min-
ister has referred to the considerable naval assets
that WEU is providing in the Gulf 
- 
more than
fifty ships. Since we have no WEU organic air
cover for those naval assets, given that the
French carrier is returning, is he satisfied that
there is sufficient co-ordinated air cover for our
maritime assets should hostilities break out?
The Minister will be aware that there is a
problem of command and control between the
land forces and the ships. That is an important
point for WEU to consider.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procarement of the Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
Since
1981, when Mr. Speed most honourably
resigned from the administration, he has been
one of the great protagonists for air cover for
naval forces. I have great sympathy with his
arguments and since being appointed a United
Kingdom minister responsible for defence I
have tried to introduce some of those argu-
ments. I am in complete sympathy with the
general principle that he is advancing. I am sat-
isfied, however, that air cover 
- 
CAC as it is
called 
- 
is in profusion. Indeed, air traflic
control in a wider sense presents problems
because of that cover. Air cover is the least of
the problems that we are likely to face should
hostilities break out.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). This
sounds more and more like question time in the
House of Commons.
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-
Unlike one of my colleagues, I shall not lower
the tone of the debate, but I have two questions
to pose. First, has the Minister seen the report,
carried exclusively on Sky TV news, that
Saddam Hussein may be contemplating a with-
drawal from Kuwait and the islands while
retaining the oilfield? Does he agree that that
would not meet the terms of the Security
Council resolution? Does he believe that we are
doing enough to make it clear, particularly to the
United States, that Europe is making a sub-
stantial contribution to the Gulf effort? Does he
also believe that the comments made by a
certain colleague that denigrated the size ofthe
European contribution do not help Western
Europe?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the Uniled Kingdom). 
-l entirely
agree with Sir Geoffrey, whose argument has
been echoed not only by the United Nations, but
forcefully and uncompromisingly stated by our
Secretary of State, Douglas Hurd, as recently as
two weeks ago on the floor of the house. I am
sure that Sir Geoffrey heard that speech. It is
clear that any partial solution to the crisis is not
acceptable. It cannot be acceptable that the
aggxessor should be allowed to profit from his
venture and brutality. There is always a danger
that after a long period of tension people forget
the origins of the dispute and, because they want
a solution, they believe that nine-tenths of a
solution is better than a war and the shedding of
blood. I caution strongly against such a view
because of the precedent it would set and the
problems that would spring from that in the
future.
If people feel that by attacking, bullying and
intimidating weaker neighbours they can,
whatever the international outrage, end up with
something out of the episode, we shall all be at a
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greater risk. We must maintain a completely
implacable front on the extent of the with-
drawal. It must be absolute. There should be no
opportunity for the Iraqi dictator to claim or to
portray to his people that he has delivered some-
thing from the adventure.
I always enjoy Mr. Lambie's interventions
and you, Mr. President, have already reminded
us how evocative these proceedings are of the
House of Commons, even down to the periodic
and slightly contemptible attack that is some-
times a feature of debates in the House.
I enjoyed Mr. Lambie's contribution, but I do
not believe that most of it made much sense. I
accept that there is a certain amount of uncom-
fortable truth in what he said about the
European contribution. The European contri-
bution, except for that of the United Kingdom,
is not of a scale that we should like. In such
world crises it is not appropriate that Europe
should allow the United States to play the pre-
dominant - not dominant - r6le. There are
inherent instabilities in forfeiting and aban-
doning the European r6le - I accept it is not nec-
essarily the r6le of equal, but Europe has a sub-
stantial contribution to make. The United
Kingdom has played its part, but I should like to
see our European friends and partners more
involved. I am not denigrating what they have
done or offered. I am not making a criticism.
My tone is more wistful. I should like those
partners to make a greater contribution and if
the situation deteriorates, as it may, I hope very
much that they will feel able to make a greater
contribution.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Earl of Kinnoul.
Earl of KINNOUL (Uniled Kingdom). - I feel
I must almost apologise for being the first repre-
sentative to speak who is not a member of the
House of Commons. I congratulate the Minister
on his excellent and balanced statement which, I
am sure, all of us appreciate. He referred to the
effectiveness of sanctions. Can he give us any
encouragement about how effective they are?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the United Kingdom). - They are
effective in that they have effectively brought to
a halt inward and outward traffic. Most of Iraq's
foreign earnings are derived from its oil exports.
Accoiding to any normal actuarial approach,
Iraq could face acute balance of payments and
overseas earnings problems already. Iraq had a
colossal long-term and medium-term debt. Nat-
urally, it no longer attempts to serve the debt.
Despite what Iiaq plundered from Kuwait,
which was not an insubstantial amount, Iraq
must be approaching the position where it can
no longer bay cash for what it needs, even if it
finds supply channels. There is some evidence of
supply along the southern seaboard of the Medi-
terrariean of what it urgently needs in terms of
immediate military spares. There are compo-
nents in the hi-tech sector such as fuses, sole-
noids, microcomputers and chips which are
portable 
.and are needed to maintain weaponiystems in a serviceable condition. One must
pay cash for them. If they can find a supplier -
ihdre is always someone - they will not find the
goods on ciedit. The constrictions on Iraqi
export of oil will mean that Iraq will run out of
hard currency soon.
Iraq is a closed, authoritarian society. Its
internal arrangements are highly repressive and
punitive. Thal extends the possibility of the
ldministration surviving in terms of popular
acceptability for a long term. I see certain bottle-
necks approaching in the overall civilian suppf
of steel. If we are sufliciently patient, that will
start to take effect. Sanctions are debilitating
Iraq, but the judgment on how long only to use
sanctions is a major political one and must be
made by heads of government and the United
Nations Security Council.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Garrett.
Mr. GARRETT (United Kingdom). - I should
like to praise your conduct from the chair this
morning, Mr. President. You would make a
good Speaker in the British Parliament. Your
[andling of what could have been an acrimo-
nious matter deserves commendation.
As some of our European partners who are
here this morning are reluctant to put any more
combatant troopi or forces into the Gulf, will
the Minister consider making an appeal to those
nations to consider bringing in non-combatant
personnel, such as those who can contribute to
medical care and even to other units, for
example, transport and signals? Could the
nations who are represented this morning press
their governments to make some contribution in
that way? Although we have had a statement
from Sir Geoffrey this morning about Saddam
Hussein's possibilities, we are still faced with the
fact that that gentleman is still in place.
Finally, if the honourable member who
attacked the Minister had been in the House of
Commons on Monday, instead of frolicking
around in Paris, he might not have asked such a
silly question.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. CLARK (Minister of State for Defence
Procurement of the United Kingdom). - I shall
not refer again to that objectionable inter-
vention. Mr. Garrett's point about contributions
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is entirely valid. Contributions can be made at
many different levels and certainly the medical
flreld is one. The Assembly will be interested to
know that Hungary has offered us a complete
field hospital with its staff. That is signifrcant
and welcome.
I referred in my speech to the high costs which
the United Kingdom is bearing. They are multi-
plied by a factor of twenty-five for the United
States. If there is any kind of apparatus for a
fund from which some of those costs could be
drawn and into which the European nations
could contribute, it would be extremely helpful.
We are carrying burdens, not only of the pos-
sible tragic loss of life, but of distortions and
expenses. These military deployments give rise
to threats to resources. They can also be mea-
sured in terms of harsh expenditure. All forms of
contribution are welcome. WEU could well
apply its mind to finding formulae for such con-
tributions. That would be most welcome.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
That con-
cludes the questions.
Thank you, Minister, on behalf of the
Assembly for coming here and for your
important contribution to the debate on the
implications of the invasion of Kuwait, the
problems of the Gulf and European security
which we shall now resume.
6. Eurupean security and the Gulf crisis
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf regioa
(Raumed joint debate on the reprts
of the Political hmmittee and the Delcnce Committee
and yotes on the fuqft recommeafutioas, Docs. 1211
and anendments and 1218, oddcadum and uundments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the resumed joint debate on
the reports of the Political Committee and the
Defence Committee on European security and
the Gulf crisis and on the consequences of the
invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the
Gulf region and votes on the draft recommenda-
tions, Documents 1244 and amendments and
1248, addendum and amendments.
The joint debate is resumed.
(Sir 
.Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I call Mr. Veryvakis.
Mr. VERYVAKIS (Observer from Greece). -First, I congratulate the two Rapporteurs on
their excellent work on the Gulf crisis. I want to
make some political observations on the recent
developments in the Gulf.
There were undoubtedly revolutionary chan-
ges in 1989. Now in 1990 the changes in Central
and Eastern Europe as well as Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait have established another
world in the place of the one which we knew.
Now we have new problems and threats. I have
four observations to make.
First, in the transient period of history in
which we live and in this momentous instance,
the active defence organisation, WEU, has an
important r6le. In addition to the declarations,
which refer to the new world, we now want to
establish a new system. NATO and WEU have a
decisive rOle to play.
The declaration of Paris and the procedure of
CSCE is the beginning of a new situation, of a
new hopeful code of relationships between
nations, of proceedings and new organs for the
building of a new era. Nevertheless, the interim
realities are stronger than the hopes, plans, and
declarations ofgood aspirations. In this context,
WEU reacted positively in recent times towards
provocations 
- 
first, in 1987-1988 and later in
the Gulf crisis. Nevertheless, WEU does not
cover all the nations that belong organically in
Europe and the Europe of the Twelve. The
Danes, Norwegians and Greeks do not belong to
WEU. In the new provocation...
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Mr. Veryvakis, would
you bring your speech to a conclusion? You
have already had five minutes.
Mr. VERYVAKIS (Observer from Greece). -No one knows, in the new provocation of
history, the completeness of the reaction of
European defence. WEU is the only, but not the
completely, purely European organisation...
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
You have had your time,
Mr. Veryvakis. I am sorry, but you are taking
time from other colleagues. You have had five
and a half minutes already. Will you please
resume your seat?
Mr. VERYVAKIS (Observerfrom Greece). 
-l
ask for just two minutes.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
No, I am sorry, but you
are being unfair to other people. Will you please
resume your seat? Thank you very much.
The next speaker on our list is General
Andjelkovic.
General ANDJELKOYIC (Observer from
Yugoslavia). 
- 
Mr. President, distinguished
ladies and gentlemen. I am glad to be able to
greet this distinguished gathering on behalf of
the Assembly of Yugoslavia. It is a special
pleasure to stress that, for the third time this
year, we are attending 
- 
for the present, in the
capacity of observer 
- the sessions of the
Assembly of WEU. This is also an indication of
mutual interest in further developing co-
operation on the part of the Assembly of Yugo
slavia and of the Assembly of WEU.
136
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES TENTH SITTING
General Andjelkovic (continued)
The moment at which this second part of the
thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of
WEU is taking place is truly exceptional. Inter-
national relations, European and global, are cur-
rently at a historic crossroads, at the end of one
and at the beginning of a new historic cycle.
Democratisation, the reduction of arms and
integration are asserting themselves as long-term
tendencies in international relations. Concern is
mounting over the awareness that the threats to
the contemporary world have not been removed,
one of which is at its very door, involving
Europe as well. The Gulf crisis could slow
European integration. The crisis will gravely
affect the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, make their reforms much more costly
and thereby endanger the initiated democratic
processes. The countries hard hit by the crisis
include Yugoslavia, with estimated losses to the
end of this year amounting to about $2.3
billion.
Yugoslavia consistently adheres to all the res-
olutions of the Security Council adopted in
respect of the Gulf crisis and will continue to do
so. It is our principled stance to oppose
aggression and accept neither the occupation
nor the annexation of sovereign and inde-
pendent states. We are therefore in favour of the
withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from Kuwait.
We support the resolution of the crisis by
peaceful means because, given the concentration
of temporary artns, a war would take a vast toll
in human lives and material resources.
The PRESIDENT. - General Andjelkovic,
you have ten seconds to finish.
General ANDJELKOVIC (Observer from
Yugoslavia). 
- 
Once again, Mr. President, allow
me to express our gratitude for the opportunity
to take part in this important debate.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The penultimate speakeris Lord Mackie, who has five minutes
maximum.
Iord MACKIE (United Kingdom). - Mr.
Schoolmaster, I shall endeavour to stay within
my time. I shall not waste time congratulating
the Rapporteurs - I understand that members
cannot hear me. Shall I make the joke again?
The PRESIDENT. - It is in your time.
Lord MACKIE (United Kingdom). - The
Rapporteurs have done a good job, but they
have been congratulated enough already. They
cover a wide field, I want to confine myself to
the hostages. Mr. Speed and Sir John Stokes
have spoken of them.
The brutal cynicism with which Saddam
Hussein has used the hostages presents one of
the greatest dangers that we face in dealing with
the future peace of the world. He has been enor-
mously clever about it. The master stroke of
releasing the wives so that they could go home
and, naturally and rightly, plead for their hus-
bands, has been of great benefit to him. The
parade of senior politicians to Iraq has resulted
in the release of only a proportion and kept his
advantage going. It is appalling that these
people, who were there purely pursuing their
careers, should be put into the front line by this
appalling dictator.
For the peace of the world, we must see that
this tactic does not succeed. If it does, if we let
him get away with it, every petty dictator and
every big dictator in the world will use the same
tactic. That is only one of the many reasons for
getting rid of Saddam Hussein. My sympathy is
entirely with the wives and relations. I appre-
ciate the necessity of not letting him get away
with it.
I heard a number of speeches today that very
much remind me, at my age, of the speeches thatI heard before the last war when the peace
movement was as illogical as it is today. Of
course, I am for peace. I am for success by
peaceful means, but I fear that, unless Saddam
Hussein is toppled, the.peace movement will not
succeed. I want it to succeed, and I want us to
solve the problem by peaceful means, but it does
not look likely unless he is removed entirely.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you for being
such an obedient pupil, Lord Mackie.
I call Mr. Hardy.
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I wish to
make a short speech, not least to reflect the view
adopted by my party and expressed on many
occasions in the House of Commons and at the
annual conference. As I said in my question to
Mr. Clark, the military capacity has to be
credible. The Labour Party has made that view
clear many times. But we see the military option
as an essential accompaniment to the economic
policy that is being pursued.
As I said to the Minister, if we do not have a
credible military option there is much less like-
lihood of sanctions succeeding. That means that
we should not use the military option if sanc-
tions can be effective. The military option
should be seen as the approach of last resort.
This inevitably means a longer time-scale than
some people might like, and there is, of course,
the counter-argument that delay might permit
Iraq to develop or deploy new weapons, perhaps
nuclear or chemical. It is argued that delay
might make the scale of conflict much more hor-
rifying. However, although that risk cannot be
denied, and in any case it exists, it should lead
us to ensure that the sanctions are detailed and
rigorous and that individual international
financial pressure should be thoroughly exerted.
At the same time we should emphasise the need
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for adequate public supervision and monitoring
of international sanctions.
It would, of course, be foolish of us to
announce that there are no circumstances in
which force would be used, but it should be
accepted that the main purpose of the military
presence is as a political lever for the dis-
lodgement of the aggressor. However, we must
at all times present and maintain a broader
view. This crisis should be seen as giving the
world a historic opportuniff to establish a modern
and desirable precedent which can be developed
and repeated to ensure that there is a permanent
international barrier to aggression. That could
be a precursor to global arrangements to prevent
conflict. It means that we cannot pick and
choose our United Nations resolutions.
Five steps are now essential: first, an indi-
vidual acceptance that settlement of this and
other Middle Eastern problems must be
pursued; secondly, that the international com-
munity will provide an automatic guarantee to
deter further military advances and adventures
in that region and others; thirdly, that while
Saddam Hussein's overthrow may not now be a
prime or principal aim, we must at least prevent
his becoming the head of an enlarged Baby-
lonian empire of the modern millenium, espe-
cially if he is joined by the more fanatical
Muslim extremists; fourthly, we must secure an
extension and development of the United
Nations structure to ensure that the capacity to
respond to crises is not unduly protracted; and,
fifthly, as a result of this crisis, there must be a
vigorous and comprehensive pursuit of interna-
tional agreements to restrict modern and
chemical weaponry.
Those who dismiss that approach may regard
it as being too idealistic. I remind the Assembly
that it was only two or three years ago that those
of us who sought to encourage the double zero
option or the pursuit of international negotia-
tions to secure a reduction in conventional
weapons were acqused of having an idealistic
approach. I believe that idealism must be asso-
ciated with this effort.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
We now have a problem
and I am taking what I think is the most prac-
tical course. We have two reports, two
Rapporteurs, two Chairmen, sixteen amend-
ments, and we have to finish at I o'clock.
Therefore, I have intemrpted the list of speakers
and those who have been unable to make their
speeches may, in the same way as we operate in
the Council of Europe, hand in their speeches to
the Table Oflice and they will be printed in the
written proceedings.
We now come to the votes on the draft recom-
mendation, and flrrst we will take Document
1244 from the Political Committee. Before we
do that, I ask the Rapporteurs and the Chairmen
if they wish to speak.
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands). 
- 
Will you
ring the bell so that everyone knows that the
order has been changed?
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Yes, we will do that.
I now call Mr. De Decker, the Rapporteur of
the Political Committee.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). 
-At the end of this very long and interesting
debate I thank members for their remarks which
have demonstrated how qualified our Assembly is
to deal with the most critical questions affecting
European security. I specially wish to thank
those who have voiced their support for the
work and recommendations of the Rapporteurs.
I must at once make clear that the report I
have drafted has to be considered as comple-
mentary to the brilliant report recently pre-
sented by Mr. Pieralli. This I say in reply to Mrs.
Baarveld-Schlaman who rightly regrets that
certain questions raised in the report, including
more especially the overarrning of Iraq and its
causes, are insuffrciently analysed. This is due to
the fact that Mr. Pieralli's report goes into the
question in great depth, while my own report is
only an extension. The two documents must be
considered as together forming a whole.
At the conclusion of this debate I wish to draw
your attention to the amendments which Mr.
Pieralli and I, with the support of other
Assembly members, have tabled to our own
draft recommendation in order, precisely, to
respond to the expectations and sentiments
expressed during the debate.
This debate together with the address by the
Chairman of the Council and the contributions
by Mr. Dumas and Mr. Chevdnement has clearly
shown WEU's central r0le in questions related
to European security and also that it can only
glow increasingly important over the coming
months and years. The events in the Gulf have
unquestionably proved the ability of WEU to
make progress in defining a European security
concept and to react in dangerous situations
such as crises like that now confronting us.
Unfortunately, as I pointed out in my intro-
ductory remarks, the Gulf crisis has also proved
that, apari from the remarkable naval co-
ordination which has been achieved in the Gulf,
some division in Europe has appeared with
regard to the presence ofland and air forces in
Saudi Arabia. This illustrates how diflicult it
would be in the present European context to
transfer responsibilities for defence matters to a
supranational institution like the EEC, and how
particularly suitable is an intergovernmental
structure like our own to perform this kind of
rdle.
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The essential issue in this conflict and in this
crisis is 
- 
as the debate has shown - compliance
with international law. And I thank Mr. Caro for
so excellently making the point that the defence
of international law knows no geographical fron-
tiers. It has to be defended everywhere.
Finally, in this debate I would like to refer to
the division in this Assembly between the great
majority, who believe that law must prevail and
the r6le of the United Nations be strengthened
even though this option may ultimately imply
the use of force as a last resource and the smaller
number, who argue the classical case for pac-
ifism but thereby run the risk of legitimising
Saddam Hussein's aggression and use of force.
But nobody, as we have clearly seen, wants war.
We all prefer a political solution, we all want
sanctions to succeed. United Nations Resolution
678 and President Bush's initiatives are aimed
in this direction.
I will end by speaking to the amendments, so
that I do not have to intervene again as
Rapporteur...
The PRESIDENT. At the right time,
please.
I call Mr. Ahrens, the Chairman of the
Political Committee.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
has considered the report very thoroughly on
two occasions. We are pleased that so many
members of the Assembly have spoken to this
report. I will be commenting on the various
amendments. I will now comply with the Presi-
dent's request and simply ask the Assembly to
approve the report.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
As the Assembly will be
aware, according to the rules there is no time-limit on the speeches of chairmen or
rapporteurs. However, I hope that they will be as
succinct as possible.
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, I will begin by
thanking the many speakers who have taken the
trouble to participate in the debate on this very
important subject.
I want to mention a number of points in con-
nection with this debate. First, a rhetorical
question: why do we, as individual nations and
as WEU, have troops in the Gulf? Because we
stand side by side with the international com-
munity. We are not neutral, but we are also
there because the Security Council has adopted
many resolutions that call on us to do various
things and on Iraq to meet requirements which
it has completely ignored so far.
Security Council Resolution 678 is a reso-
lution, not just a diversion for one or two coun-
tries. Let us bear that in mind.If the WEU coun-
tries decide to send forces to this trouble spot -
that is one of the premises of my report - we
must equip ourselves as best we can, with the
appropriate command structures and the means
to exchange information. We must ensure that
our forces can perform their tasks in the Gulf as
effectively as possible. I refer you to Mr. Speed's
speech in this context. This is a part of my
report which I am, of course, glad to say was not
criticised by any of the speakers. I do not
therefore need to linger over these recommenda-
tions. They stand, and no one has criticised
them. Of course, there is still a great deal to be
desired, such as verification and satellite surveil-
lance, which have been referred to already. Here
again, this will not be the last debate on the
subject in this Assembly.
Looking to the future, Mr. President, your
Rapporteur and the Defence Committee do not
believe that we can now say: * So that's that! ",
whatever the outcome of the Gulf crisis. Our
organisation, WEU, must not close the book on
the serious problems we face in connection with
out-of-area operations. Even after this debate, I
am therefore firmly convinced that, if we, or
more to the point, perhaps, if ministers are not
prepared to enter into this debate, we are going
down the wrong road. Once again, we cannot
simply insist on WEU playing a part and other-
wise just close the book.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. The last
speaker in this section is the Chairman of the
Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith.
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - The
Defence Committee has adopted a positive and
resolute approach to the matter. The report is
positive and it deserves to be kept intact as a
result of the vote today.
We heard several references in the debate to
the problem in the Middle East. We should
remember that, to return to basics, the problem
was caused by a blatant and brutal act of
aggression against Kuwait. The reason why
troops originally went to Saudi Arabia was the
apparent imminent invasion of that country by
Saddam Hussein.
I share a detestation of war with probably
everyone in the Assembly, but if in the long term
lives are to be saved, some form of conflict may
be necessary. As the British Minister said in his
excellent speech this morning, partial solutions
are not acceptable. Many people agree that it
must be all or nothing.
The embargo and the participation of WEU
countries in the Gulf patrols has been excellent.
The sea embargo has been almost 10090
effective, but there is probably seepage over land
and probably by air. I belong to the school of
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those who believe that we shall be placed in an
impossible position if we are forced to maintain
the blockade and retain forces in place
throughout Saudi Arabia for a whole year.
When I came back from the Gulf my opinion
was that war was inevitable. I have not changed
that view, although I have prayed, in common
with everyone else, for a climb-down on the part
of Saddam Hussein. Somehow I cannot see him
fulfilling the criteria we have put forward in
attempts to solve the problem.
Peace at any price is always a shoddy and tatty
cry and, over the centuries, it has always pro.
duced disastrous consequences. I believe that we
must remain firm and resolute in the interests of
the peace and safety of the world in the years to
come.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you, Sir Dudley.
The amendments will be considered in the order
in which they relate to the text of the draft rec-
ommendation, namely: Amendments 5, 6, 4, 7,
1,2,8,9, 10, 11, 3 and 12.
Amendments 2, 8 and 9 will be debated
together.
Amendment 5, which has been tabled by Mr.
Pieralli and Mr. De Decker, reads:
At the end of the preamble to the draft recom-
mendation, add a new paragraph:
'Considering the adoption by the United
Nations Security Council of Resolution 678giving Iraq until lsth January l99l to
evacuate Kuwait before any force is used
against it and welcoming the fact that Pres-
ident Bush has decided to take advantage of
this respite to open talks with Iraq and that
the latter has accepted this proposal,'
I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). 
- 
Mr.
President, the amendment which I am tabling
reflects developments in the regional situation
arising from the resolution of the United
Nations Security Council and the initiatives of
President Bush.
The nature of the amendment is therefore
purely descriptive, but our recommendation
should nonetheless be based on the updated situ-
ation.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
has not discussed this amendment. As it adjusts
the text of the report to recent developments, I
recommend that it be approved.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. I shall
therefore put Amendment 5 to the vote.
(A vote was then taken by show ofhands)
Amendment 5 is agreed to.
Amendment 6, which has been tabled by Mr.
De Decker and others, reads:
In the draft recommendation proper, after
paragraph 2, add a new paragraph:
" Ask member states to earmark or set up,
each according to its means, a force that can
be transported over long distances to help to
restore peace in response inter alia to requests
from the United Nations Security Council and
to provide it with weapons and equipment
commensurate with the requirements of such
operations; "
I call Mr. De Decker to move the amend-
ment.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium)(Translation). 
-
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the debates
we have had in committee and in this chamber
have shown one ofthe present basic weaknesses
of Europe in such a crisis, namely that it is not
yet ready to project its political will out of area
within the framework of the United Nations
when it considers that peace is under threat.
It is for this reason that in this amendment it
is proposed to:
" Ask member states to earmark or set up,
each according to its means, a force that can
be transported over long distances to help to
restore peace in response inter alia to requests
from the United Nations Security Council and
to provide it with weapons and equipment
commensurate with the requirements of such
operations; ".
The object of this text is a European rapid
action force ready for use, as and when required,
by the countries which so wish. It calls for no
additional military investment, but it does
require that countries maintain and coordinate
a force of this type to act within the framework
of the United Nations.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. Does anyone
want to oppose the amendment?...
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). 
- 
I am sym-
pathetic to the intentions of the amendment, butI believe that it contains problems. First, it is
clear that its plea for a peace-keeping force is
mostly related to the United Nations resolution,
but, inter alia, it could relate to and include
operational actions undertaken by WEU which
were opposed to the stated position of the
Security Council or undertaken in circum-
stances when the Security Council had not made
a decision. That would be irresponsible. Sec-
ondly, we must consider all the circumstances of
each event, for example, the region, or the possi-
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bility of finding a peaceful solution. It is too easy
and simple to give a blank mandate to an
eventual peace-keeping force. Therefore,
although I am sympathetic to the amendment I
do not believe it should be supported.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. What is the
view of the committee?
I call Mr. Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
A similar proposal was put to
the Political Committee in the original report,
although it did not refer to the Security Council
of the United Nations. This paragraph - without
the reference I have mentioned 
- 
was rejected in
committee.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. I shall now
put Amendment 6 moved by Mr. De Decker to
the vote.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 6 is agreed to.
Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr.
Scheer, reads:
Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommen-
dation proper.
I call Mr. Scheer to move the amendment. He
is not present.
Amendment 4 is not moved.
Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr.
De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele,
reads:
At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add:
", inter alia by systematic implementation of
paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty;"
I call Mr. De Decker to move the
amendment.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Our aim in paragraph 4 is to stress the need to
pursue the reactivation of WEU. As you
yourself, Mr. President, have been responsible
for a report on this subject, you know better
than anyone the great political significance of
this aim within the framework of the relations
between the European institutions.
The purpose of this amendment is therefore to
specify more clearly how we consider that this
reactivation of WEU should be pursued, notably
by the systematic implementation of paragraph
3 of Article VIII of the treaty.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. Does anyone
want to oppose the amendment?...
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
rejected a similarly-worded paragraph.
The PRESIDENT. - Let us get one thing
clear, have they considered the amendments as
such?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
We did not discuss the amend-
ments, but while discussing the report as a
whole, we deleted a paragraph which was on the
same lines as this amendment.
The PRESIDENT. I shall now put
Amendment 7 to the vote.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 7 is agreed to.
Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr.
Soell and others, reads:
In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommen-
dation proper, leave out * which might take
levels above the ag;reed limits " and insert " in
the region ".
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move the
amendment.
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - Mr. President, the first
signature on this amendment is Mr. Soell's, but
he has to be in Bonn today. I have also signed
the amendment, and I can tell you why we are
opposed to the insertion of the words " which
might take levels above the agreed limits ". We
therefore want to delete this insertion.
We believe there are already far too many
weapons in this region. After all, many of the
problems have arisen because of all the weapons
that have been supplied. If the word * limit "
was left out, sub-paragraph 6 (b) will still say
enough. The intention is clear, and agreements
can always be reached on the limitation of
weapons.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. Does anyone
wish to oppose the amendment?...
What is the view of the committee?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
has not discussed the amendment. I do not think
it changes the wording of the recommendation
to any signif'rcant extent. I therefore leave it to
the Assembly to decide whether or not to
approve this amendment.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you. I shall put
Amendment I to the Assembly.
(A vote was then tal<cn by show of hands)
Amendment I is agreed to.
We now come to Amendments 2, 8 and 9. We
shall debate these together. I shall ask each of
the movers to make a speech, ask whether there
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is any opposition and then we shall vote on
them separately.
Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr.
Martinez, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer, reads:
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
the Lebanese problem on the basis of the
application of the United Nations resolutions
which have still not been respected, while
strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI
of the treaty governing the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons signed by the nuclear
powers; "
I call Mr. Stoffelen to move the
amendment.
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). 
- 
The
amendment talks about the peace conference in
the Middle East. It is particularly clear now that
it is more logical to state openly that the main
reason for such a conference is to attempt to
settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Amendment 2 is a better description of reality
than Amendment 8 which speaks of,
" a settlement of relations between Israel and
the Palestinians. "
It is indeed a case of
* settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
the Lebanese problem "
on the basis of not just Resolution 242, but all
the relevant resolutions.
We all know what is at stake in the Middle
East. We know the risk of atomic and nuclear
weapons there. Therefore, we want to add the
references to the application of Article 6 of the
non-proliferation treaty. Each party to the treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to the cessation of
the nuclear arrns race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament under strict and effective
international control. In other words, the
amendment addresses the real peace conference
in the Middle East, including taking due care of
the problem of nuclear weapons. I recommend
its adoption.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Amendment 8, which
has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli
and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" a settlement of relations between Israel and
the Palestinians on the basis of implemen-
tation of relevant Security Council resolu-
tions; "
I call Mr. De Decker to move the
amendment.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). 
-Mr. President, Mr. Pieralli and I, as Rap-
porteurs on this subject, have stressed in the
explanatory memoranda of our reports how nec-
essary it is when making a political analysis of
the crisis in the Gulf to emphasise and focus
attention on respect for international law and
United Nations resolutions in every case where
these resolutions relate to areas within that
region.
It is therefore quite clear that in a report of
this scope it is right to refer to the situation of
the territories occupied by Israel while stressing,
as I have done in my introductory remarks, that
to my way of thinking there can be no question
of dealing with the two problems 
- 
the Gulf
crisis and the Palestine problem 
- 
at once. Be
that as it may, the Palestine question must be
dealt with by the international community
immediately the issue of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait has been settled.
In the amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez,
Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer, which points in a
similar direction, they would like the question of
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons added
to the amendment tabled by myself. In addition,
however, their amendment states that the non-
proliferation treaty was signed by the nuclear
powers, which is not true. I do not believe that
France signed the treaty. I could therefore, as
Rapporteur, agree if the text proposed by Mr.
Martinez, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer were to
end with the words: * of the treaty governing the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons'.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Amendment 9, which
has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli
and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
* full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty
thanks to the disbandment of the militias and
the evacuation ofLebanese territory by Israeli
and Syrian armed forces; "
I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.
Mr. PIERALLI Qtaly) (Translation). - Mr.
President, like the previous Amendment 8
tabled by Mr. De Decker, the purpose of
Amendment 9 is merely to record two political
positions already unanimously adopted by our
Assembly, in particular with the unanimous
approval of Recommendation 475.
It reflects therefore a traditional position
which the WEU Assembly has always voiced.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Martinez.
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- 
On a point of
order, Sir Geoffrey. The three amendments are
absolutely complementary. It would be diflicult
for any of us to vote against any of them. We
cannot vote on all three because that would be
excessive. The wording about Lebanon is far
better in Mr. De Decker's amendment. Our con-
cerns about the nuclear question are better
expressed by Mr. Stoffelen's amendment 
- 
the
other does not refer to that. The
Israeli-Palestinian case is also dealt with better
in Mr. Stoffelen's amendment. Therefore, I
appeal, on the grounds of common sense, to the
Chair, whom I trust absolutely, to ask the
movers of the amendments to combine the three
of them, provided that it is the general con-
sensus that these two or three matters must be
introduced in the recommendation.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The three amendments
are each in order. I am perfectly prepared to
defer this item while we deal with other amend-
ments, if the three movers can get together and
find a simple way of making the amendments
more relevant without confusing the Assembly.
Perhaps the movers could coalesce the amend-
ments, if the Assembly would find that
helpful.
Would that be helpful? It would. Therefore I
ask the three movers to disappear rapidly. They
have about five minutes to get the amendments
into shape.
Amendment 10, which has been tabled by Mr.
De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele,
reads:
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
' ensuring regular supplies of oil for the inter-
national market;'
I call Mr. De Decker to move the
amendment.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). 
-
Here it is just a question of strengthening the
text by referring to a regular supply ofoil to the
international market. It is a straightforward and
general comment aimed at a lasting solution to
the problems of oil prices and supply.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
oppose the amendment?...
That is not the case.
What is the view of the committee?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
rejected an identical paragraph in the draft
report.
The PRESIDENT. I will now put
Amendment l0 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment l0 is agreed to.
Amendment I l, which has been tabled by Mr.
De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele,
reads:
At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:
" establishing more effective solidarity
between Arab oil-producing countries and
those that lack the resources essential for their
economic development; "
I call Mr. De Decker to move the
amendment.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Our wish here, Mr. President, is that the often
thinly-populated oil-producing countries should
show greater solidarity with other countries in
the region which are often more densely popu-
lated but do not have this raw material.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
oppose the amendment?...
I call Mr. Martinez.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). 
- 
I am a bit embar-
rassed by this amendment and will abstain in
the vote in any case. I do not think that it is up
to us to tell the oil-producing countries in the
Arab world to support the non oil-producing
countries in that region. It is a bit presump-
tuous. I do not think this adds much to the reso-
lution. I was very much in favour of the pre-
vious amendment, although it was defeated in
committee, because that concerned us directly.It is not our most direct responsibility to
organise inter-Arab solidarity.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr.
Martinez.
What is the view of the committee?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
The committee rejected a
similar passage in the draft report for the
reasons Mr. Martinez has just given.
The PRESIDENT. I will now put
Amendment 1l to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment Il is negatived.
I am now able to return to Amendments 2, 8
and 9 and to tell you that Amendment 8 has
been withdrawn. Amendment 9 stays and
Amendment 2 is amended by deleting the last
five words, " signed by the nuclear powers ". Are
we adding the words that you have written
down, Mr. Stoffelen, or is this just for my infor-
mation?
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). 
- 
They are
not being added.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against Amendments 2 and 9?...
I call Mr. Pieralli.
143
OFFICIAL RTPORT OF DEBATES TENTH SITTING
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- 
To
clarify the wording of Amendment 2 the words
" and the Lebanese problem " should be deleted
as the Lebanon question is also referred to in
Amendment 9. Othenrise, we would be referring
to Lebanon twice. I am sure Mr. Stoffelen will
agf,ee.
The PRESIDENT. That is a further
agreement, and I think that we are all content
with it.
Does anyone wish to speak against
Amendment 9?...
I call Mr. Jessel.
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). 
- 
It seems to
me that this amendment is not meaningf,ul
because it refers to the restoration of Lebanese
sovereignty. But as Lebanon, in practical terms,
is a country without a government, it is hardly
meaningful to refer to its sovereignty. Therefore,
I cannot support the amendment.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you very much.
I now ask the Chairman of the committee for
its view on Amendment 9.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, these amend-
ments were not available to the committee, but
we rejected similar proposals in the original
draft report that referred to the Palestinian-
Israeli problem. The idea underlying this
amendment was not, therefore, originally
approved by the committee.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I shall now put
Amendment 9 to the vote.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 9 is agreed to.
May I now read to you Amendment 2 as
amended by the agxeement:
" Settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on
the basis of the applicdtion of the United
Nations resolutions which have still not been
respected, while strictly respgcting the obliga-
tions of Article VI of the treaty governing the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; "
In other words, in line I the words * and the
Lebanese problem " have been removed, and in
the final line the words * signed by the nuclear
powers " have been removed.
Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment
as amended?...
What is the view of the committee?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation).- As I have already said, Mr. Pres-
ident, a similar passage in the original draft
report was deleted.
If I may say so, I personally consider this
addition appropriate, especially in the light of
developments in recent weeks.
The PRESIDENT. I will now put
Amendment 2 to the vote.
(A vote w$ then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.
Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr.
Martinez and Mr. Stoffelen, reads:
After paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph:
* Seek the association ofall countries partici-
pating in the military and political effort to
ensure the success of the embargo - and in
particular the WEU member states 
- 
with the
talks between the United States and lraq fol-
lowing the United Nations Security Council
resolution.'
I call Mr. Martinez to move the
amendment.
Mr. MARTINFZ (Spain). 
- 
We regard this
amendment as extremely important - perhaps
the most important of those that we have tabled.
Although it has been signed by myself and Mr.
Stoffelen, it represents the views of the Socialist
Group.
This paragraph must be considered in con-
nection with Amendment 5, which regards as
extremely important the fact that President
Bush has launched an initiative for talks with
Iraq with a view to using all possible opportun-
ities to bring about the Iraqi withdrawal from
the occupied territory of Kuwait before the date
fixed in the latest United Nations Security
Council resolution.
We have said that it is important. We must
now complement it by asking that the measure
be implemented without leaving other states,
and WEU states, out of the process. That takes
into consideration some of the comments that
you made, Sir Geoffrey. The contribution of
Europe and that of some Arab countries cannot
be underestimated. It is a serious contribution.
We have been committed politica[y by sup
porting the embargo. We must participate in the
process, perhaps through joint action or consul-
tations. We cannot be outside the process which
started in the past few days and weeks. That is
why we ask that countries which have been espe-
cially involved in military and political efforts to
make the embargo a success be associated with
the procedure launched by the President ofthe
United States, whose initiative we praise else-
where in our recommendations, thanks to the
amendments that we have adopted.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you, Mr.
Martinez.
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Does anyone wish to speak against the
amendment?...
I call Mr. De Decker.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium)(Translation). - I
do not really wish to oppose the amendment
tabled by Mr. Martinez...
The PRESIDENT. - Either you oppose it or
you do not.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Reluctantly I am obliged to oppose the
amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez because,
while it is vital to do everything in the search for
a political solution to the conflict, it is not
peihaps necessary to follow the suggestion of
Mr. Martinez and Mr. Stoffelen that the
member countries of WEU as such should be
specifically associated with this, since WEU has
recommended an Arab solution to the conflict.
Furthermore, every possible European poli-
tical intervention has to be envisaged in finding
a way out of the crisis rather than confining our-
selves, as the amendment tabled by Mr.
Martinez proposes, to participation in the
bilateral talks between the United States and
Iraq, which is not a wide enough framework. I
therefore recommend that this amendment be
rejected.
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, the committee
did not discuss this amendment.
The PRESIDENT. I will now Put
Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 3 is agreed to.
Amendment 12, which has been tabled by Mr.
Pieralli and Mr. De Decker, reads:
After paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new ParagraPh:
" Use all the means at its disposal to promote
a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait
and to determine the stages for the restoration
of lasting peace throughout the Near and
Middle East before expiry of the time-limit set
by the United Nations Security Council for
authorising recourse to force. "
I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, this amendment follows on directly
from Amendment 5, which we have approved as
far as the part concerning the preamble is con-
cerned.
Here we have a recommendation to the gov-
ernments of our countries, which have in any
case already begun to act upon it because there
are reports in today's newspapers stating that
the representatives of the twelve EEC countries
are to meet the Iraqi Foreign Minister after the
Washington consultations. So the purpose is to
place on record an initiative which is already
under way and to encourage our governments to
use the time which we still have up to 15th
January to get traq to pull out of Kuwait and
release the hostages.
For these reasons I consider that the Assembly
should vote for the amendment.
The PRESIDENT. Thank You, Mr.
Pieralli.
Does anyone wish to oppose
amendment?...
What is the view of the committee, Mr.
Ahrens?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, this amendment
was not available to the committee. It adapts the
report to the current situation and conforms to
the spirit of our recommendation.
The PRESIDENT. I will now Put
Amendment 12 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 12 is agreed to.
I call Mr. Martinez.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). - On a point of
order, Mr. President. It would be only rea-
sonable to put the paragraph that we have just
adopted before the previous paragraph in the
final draft. The previous paragraph does not
contradict this one, it is a consequence of it. It
would also be reasonable to add the word
* therefore " to the paragraph that we have
adopted in order to link the two paragraphs'
The PRESIDENT. - Thank You. MaY I
suggest that we leave it to our excellent Table
Oflice to put the recommendation into a sen-
sible grammatical order?
Before anyone leaves for lunch, I remind
members that there is a second report with four
amendments to follow.
We shall now vote on the whole of the draft
recommendation contained in Document 1244,
as amended.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or
more representatives or substitutes present in
the chamber request a vote by roll-call.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
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There are not. The vote will therefore be taken
by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show ofhands)
The amended draft recommendation li
adopted t.
We now turn to the draft recommendation
presented by the Defence Committee in Doc-
ument 1248, to which four amendments have
been tabled.
The amendments will be considered in the
order in which they relate to the text of the draft
recommendation, namely: Amendments l, 3, 2
and 4.
If Amendment I is agreed to, amendment 3
will fall.
If Amendment 2 is agreed to, amendment 4
will fall.
Amendment l, which has been tabled by Mr.
Lambie, reads:
Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommen-
dation proper.
I call Mr. Lambie to move the amendment.
Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). 
- 
If the
amendment is carried, it will take the guts out of
the report, so it is an important amendment.
NATO and the Warsaw Pact were children of
the cold war. WEU, as the political voice of the
North Atlantic Alliance and the corresponding
body in the Warsaw Pact area, was necessary
during the cold war. To use an old phrase, I
believe that WEU should " wither away'
because there is no longer any need for a body
like it.
Whenever one talks about ending a body, one
must consider the many vested interests that are
involved. In this Assembly, we have all the dele-
gates from their national assemblies. We enjoy
coming to Paris, meeting people and talking to
our counterparts in Western Europe. We enjoy
the reports that are presented after journeys in
Western European countries, the Far East andNorth America. When we talk about an
organisation withering away, we are saying that
all those journeys will stop.
Whenever we talk about an organisation with-
ering away, we come up against the people who
work for it. All the gentlemen whom we iee here
- 
there are not many with us now 
- 
will be made
redundant. I recognise that that is a tremendous
problem for them, but I am sure that, with the
bureaucratic build-up of the EEC, there will be
plenty of good, similarly well-paid jobs for them.
I would put to them what conservative members
put to me when I complain about the withering
away of my steel industry or shipbuilding
industry. They say, " You must consider markei
forces. " Even if people lose their jobs, market
forces will solve all their problems in the long
run. I put it to those gentlemen who will lose
their jobs 
- 
I am sure that all of you support
these policies 
- 
that market forces will solve all
their problems.
The recommendations call for the build-up of
WEU " as the forum for out-of-area co-
ordination " and involvement of naval and air
forces. Instead of building up WEU's activities, I
foresee a winding up of that organisation. I
propose that we delete paragraph 8 to start that
winding up. If we agree to paragraph 8, we will
build up this organisation and give more jobs to
the gentlemen who work here. I have great
pleasure in supporting the amendment.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you very much,
Mr. Lambie.
I call Mr. Reddemann to oppose the
amendment. May I say that, while you were not
here yesterday, Mr. Reddemann, the President,
Mr. Pontillon, conveyed his compliments to you
on your re-election.
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). 
- 
I oppose the previous
speaker's proposal. I believe Western European
Union is still very much needed. Those who feel
this organisation should be completely wound
up would do well to set an example and leave
this Assembly. That might be a way to prevent
our being confronted with proposals like this in
the future.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
What is the committee's
view?
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). 
- 
The
committee is against the amendment, for the
simple reason 
- as explained by Mr. Lambie -
that it takes the guts out of the report.
The PRESIDENT. I will now put
Amendment I to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then takcn by show of hands)
Amendment I is negatived.
_ 
Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr.
Stoffelen and others, reads:
In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation
proper, leave out all the words after 'Brussels
Treaty ".
I call Mr. Stoffelen to move the
amendment.
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherland.s).- Due to cir-
cumstalces, I shall, unfortunately, be extremely
brief. The purpose of the amendment is to delete
* and examine for the longer term the idea of
creating a WEU naval on-call force for external
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operations, together with a possible pooling of
appropriate national air mobile assets into a
European rapid action force. "
I have three points to make. First, you will
remember, Sir Geoffrey, our discussions on your
report on WEU and the European Community.
W-e said that no one could predict the outcome
of CSCE in the third basket. You said that WEU
could be an instrument in that framework. It
would be contrary to the decision that we took
on the first day and it would be wrong to give
such a clear signal, as though we already know
the outcome of further discussions on CSCE.
Secondly, we have just adopted Amendment
6, dealing with a peace-keeping force. The
maiority of members accepted - I did not - the
ref6ren6e to Security Council requests' This
wording of paragraph 8 does not mention the
Security Councilbeing responsible, so it is not in
line with the decision that we just took.
Thirdly, we all hope that the United Nations
Security Council will act as it has acted so far in
the Guif crisis. If there are further developments
towards a United Nations peace-keeping force,
we should not object to, obstruct or hinder those
developments bi propagating the idea of our
peace-keeping force.
For all those reasons, we must object to this
irresponsible, dangerous text.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank You very much,
Mr. Stoffelen.
Does anyone wish to oppose the
amendment?...
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer has the floor.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, in my view, the
iext was worded with extreme care. The United
Nations is not mentioned, and of course nothing
unfavourable is said about the United Nations.
Paragraph 8 calls for an examination for the
longer tErm, but it does not say anything about
command structures. This organisation is urged
to take some political responsibility. In my,
opinion this amtndment takes the heart out of
the recommendation. I am therefore opposed to
it.
The PRESIDENT. - What is the committee's
opinion?
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - The
committee considered the amendment and
rejected it by a large majoritY.
The PRESIDENT. - I will now Put
Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show ofhands)
Amendment 3 is negatived.
Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr.
Lambie, reads:
kave out paragraph l0 of the draft recom-
mendation proper.
I call Mr. Lambie to move the amendment'
Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). - I should
like to delete paragraph l0 on the basis that it is
an interference in the internal affairs of member
states. At the end of the day, the United
Kingdom Parliament, without any h9!n. or
advice from any other body - the Assembly is a
non+lected body as far as the United Kingdom
is concerned 
- 
will make up its mind on the level
of defence expenditure. We should delete
paragraph l0 so that the United Kingdom Par-
iiament can be the sole arbiter of the level of
defence expenditure in the United Kingdom and
need not take advice from any other non-elected
body.
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to
speak against the amendment?...
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)(Translation). Mr. President, I 
"ry alsoopposed to this amendment. All par-agraph 10 of
the recommendation says is that, if we feel that
the Gulf crisis or other developments should
result in our adopting a given attitude, we
should do so preferably - and I underline the
word " preferably', because that is what it says
in the iext as well - before further cuts in
defence budgets are made, and that this should
be done in a co-ordinated way. Hence these
words in the text. It is, of course, for each
national parliament, both Mr. Lambie's par-
liament and my own, to decide for itself.
The PRESIDENT. - What is the view of the
Chairman?
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - The
committee rejected the amendment.
The PRESIDENT. I will now Put
Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 2 is negatived.
Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr.
Martinez and others, reads:
In paragraph l0 of the draft recommendation
proper, leave out all the words after'European
forces ".
I call Mr. Martinez to move the
amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation). -
Amendment 4 refers to the important aspect of
instituting consultations within WEU 'on the
optimum- future structure of European
f6rces... ". This is what counts. It is my feeling
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that the end of the paragraph adds nothing sig-
nificant. Indeed, it seems even ludicrous to say:
*... preferably before further cuts in national
defence budgets are made.'
I get the impression that an attempt is being
made to press for or predict new cuts, which
does not happen to be the case in alt WEU coun-
tries. In my view, the final phrase adds nothing
essential, it even diminishes the scale and
importance of the co-ordination whose very aim
is to define the optimum future structure of
European forces.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone want to
speak against the amendment?...
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, in replying to
Mr. Martinez I will use the same word as he hasjust used. I feel it would be rather ludicrous 
- 
I
therefore entirely agree with Mr. Lambie on con-
stitutional grounds 
- 
if these concluding words
were not retained. They conoern national
responsibilities. What we are doing is appealing
to our ministers and our governments to think
first and then act. That is how I put it yesterday,
and that is what is at stake here. Even if we
accept Mr. Martinez's argument, it is simply
impossible to leave out the concluding wordC,
because we in the Assembly would then be
taking upon ourselves responsibilities which the
parliaments must take. I therefore oppose this
amendment.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
What is the view of the
Chairman?
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). 
- 
The
committee rejected the amendment on the
grounds enunciated by the Rapporteur.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I will now put
Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 4 is negatived.
We shall now vote on the whole of the draft
recommendation in Document 1248.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or
more representatives or substitutes present in
the chamber request a vote by roll+all.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken
by show ofhands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The draft recommendation is adoptedt.
7. Change in the order of busiruss
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I regret that there will
not now be time for us to deal this morning with
the last item of business, the debate on the
report of the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations on enhancing WEU's public
relations.
I would therefore like to propose to the
Assembly that this item be postponed and taken
as the first item of business this afternoon.
Are there any objections?
The change in the order of business is agreed
to.
8. Date, timc and ordcn of the day
ofthe ncxt sittiag
The PRESIDENT. I propose that the
A_ssembly hold its next public sitting this
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orden of
the day:
l. Enhancing WEU's public relations (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations and vote on the draft recommen-
dation, Document 1246).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expend-
iture of the Assembly for the financial year
l99l (Presentation of and debate on the
report of the Committee on Budgetary
Alfairs and Administration and vote on thedraft budget, Document l24l and
addendum).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1989
- 
the auditor's report and motion to
approve the final accounts (Presentation of
and debate on the report of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
and vote on the motion to approve thefinal accounts, Document 1236 and
addendum).
4. Consequences of developments in Central
and Eastern Europe for European security(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Political Committee, Document
1255 and amendments).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at l.I5 p.m.)l. See page 32.
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The following speeches were handed in to the
Sittings Office:
Mr. VERYVAKIS (ODserter from Greece). -
Secondly, the invasion by lraq of Kuwait con-
firmed that although the East-West conflict has
ceased, with the consequent ending of peril and
threat, the cold war has not been extinguished.
Sensitivity in other regions continues. The Med-
iterranean region has become tn area ofgreater
interest. The absence of Greece from WEU is
unbelievable in the context of a coherent
European defence structure.
Thirdly, the sudden attack upon Kuwait, with
its consequent brutal violation of international
law, showed what little weight was attached to
the United Nations and its resolutions. If we are
to manage the problems of the area we must take
into account the relevant resolutions relating to
Lebanon, Palestine and Israel and Cyprus.
Fourthly, we are at a moment in time when we
should think not only ofEuropean defence but
of European security. We ought to proceed step
by step, approaching the various European
organisations.
Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (Italy) (Translation). -
Although late in the day, we still have time to
improve co-ordination still further. Perhaps
nobody 
- 
not even we ourselves - has taken our
institution sufficiently seriously, misled as we
have been by an atmosphere of serene wellbeing
and reassured by the powerful shield of
NATO.
I support Mr. De Decker's report, especially
as regaids the European observation satellite
agency.
This Assembly, thanks to the work of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee culmi-
nating in the recommendations which we have
approved, identified long ago this real strategic
n-eed, which will also be a gathering point for
European countries.
Events in the Gulf have demonstrated just
how forwardJooking and appropriate those
recommendations were.
At a time when the forces of the WEU coun-
tries are 
- 
with varying difliculty 
- 
establishing
operational liaison " in the field ", it is
important that a collective and reliable source of
information should be provided for them.
It is not a question of wishing to compete with
our American allies but rather of guaranteeing
that each of the two pillars of the Atlantic
Alliance has its own autonomous information
system, each capable, if need be, of being
checked against the other.
There are various suggestions in the recom-
mendation which we can support: co-operation
on transport matters, the establishment of pro-
cedures, exchanges of information and so forth.
These are requirements which have been iden-
tified for some time and which the Gulf crisis,
where the forces of various European countries
operating in the area have to communicate
together, has rendered more acute. But it is not
merely a question of coping with one specific
crisis, however gtrave. The lessons we shall learn
will tomorrow provide the basis for a joint
European force no matter what form the future
institutional structures take.
There is much talk - and given the impor-
tance of being prepared in time it is quite right
that there should bt - about the future nature of
the European institutions assigned to look after
our collective defence, but it is important that,
apart from the opinions we may all individually^
hive on the subjtct, sight should not be lost of
the concrete advantages implicit in inter-
operability.
What WEU is doing in spite of its weak struc-
tures is certainly positive.
The present exchanges of help and experience
between the various armed forces in the Gulf
area must surely constitute a basis of what we
shall be setting up in the future and, with your
permission Mr. President, may I briefly make
the critical point that it would have been better
had we begun the process of integlation that is
now under way before being forced to do so by
Saddam's aggression and the United Nations'
resolutions.
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom). - In con-
gratulating both Rapporteurs on their excellent
comprehensive reports, I want to enlarge upon
Mr. De Decker's recommendations as to what I
believe we should be seeking in the Middle East
once the Gulf conflict is over.
One thing is already certain: the situation
there will never be the same again.
If the United Nations is to remain credible,
we must assume that sovereignty will be restored
to Kuwait. It is only the means that remain to be
determined 
- 
the force of argument, or the force
of arms.
One positive consequence for the United
Nations, in response to Mr. De Decker's recom-
mendation in paragraph 6 (b)would be for it to
become the internationally-recognised register
for all future trade in arms.
As President Bush made clear at the United
Nations on lst October, and as was subse-
APPENDIX
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quently agreed at the Rome summit, new
attempts to resolve outstanding regional
problems must follow that of the Gulf. Mr. De
Decker has referred to two of them 
- 
the Pal-
estine problem, and the Lebanese problem.
Concerning the first, during my recent visit to
Jordan, Israel and the occupied territories to
prepare a new report for the Council ofEurope
on the Palestine refugees, in my meetings with
Israeli ministers, Palestinian leaders including
the PLO, and Crown Prince Hassan, I found a
far narrower gulf between the two sides than I
expected 
- 
as defined in the Shamir peace plan,
and the PNC declaration of 22nd November
1988.
Both allow for the recognition of what each
other seeks 
- 
the right of self-determination of
the Palestinians, and the right of Israel to exist
within secure and recognised frontiers 
- 
for
which United Nations Resolution 242 pro-
vides.
It requires a catalyst to break the current
stalemate and to commence the dialogue that is
necessary. Mr. President, the resolution of the
Gulf crisis can be the catalyst.
Similarly, in Lebanon where we are now wit-
nessing, for the first time in more than ten y@s,
the withdrawal from confrontation of the
internal factions.
Surely, after the Gulf, it must be in the
interests of all for an international presence to
replace those ofthe occupying powers, Syria and
Israel.
There is, however, a third outstanding
regional problem which remains to be resolved
to which the Rapporteur does not refer. It is that
of the Kurds. For as long as international recog-
nition of their right of self-determination
remains ignored, I fear there will always be a
problem. That must be clear from the history of
the last seventy years, since the great powers
determined the frontiers of the Middle East after
the first world war.
Since then, the Kurds have been persecuted,
and have become refugees, most recently from
Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons. Those
who survived fled to Turkey. They have also
become terrorists 
- again in Turkey, as the
PKK. It must be in the interests of Turkey, of
Syria, of lran, of Iraq and of the Soviet Union 
-in whose countries the Kurds live 
- 
for their
problem, too, to be resolved after the Gulf.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to refer
to the 'regional security structure " that it is
being suggested should be an outcome of the
Gulf.
In his address to us yesterday, Mr. van
Eekelen referred to that " institutionalised
ongoing co-operation towards effective confl ict-
preventing mechanisms' of the strengthened
CSCE process. Could not the same principles
apply to the Near and Middle East? Indeed, that
is precisely what has been proposed by Italy 
-the CSCM Conference on Security and
Co-operation in the Mediterranean, including
the Middle East.
I found both Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister,
Mr. Nabakganu, and Crown Prince Hassan
receptive to the idea. I am sorry that it does not
figure in the recommendations before us today,
and hope that the Rapporteurs will take note of
it as a positive way forward to bring peace and
stability to the Middle East, as it has clearly
done in Europe.
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ELEVENTH SITTING
Wednesday, 5th December 1990
Suttuany
1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Enhancing WEU's public relations (Presentation of and
debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommen-
dation, Doc. 1246).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Romat (Rapporteur),
Mr. Nufiez, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, Mr. lopez
Henares, Mr. Esteves, Mr. Roman (Rapporteur), Sir
William Shelton (Chairman).
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year I 99 I (Presentation of and
debate 6n the report of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget,
Doc. l24l and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Rathbone (Vice-Chairman),
Mr. Diaz, Mr. Miiller, Lord Mackie, Mr. Niegel, the Pres-
ident, Mr. Rathbone.
The sitting was opened at 3.05 P.m.
in the Chair.
The PRESIDENT. - The sitting is open.
1. Attendance register
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The names of the substi-
tutes attending this sitting which have been
notified to the President will be published with
the list of representatives appended to the
minutes of proceedings r.
2. Adoptioa of the minutes
The PRESIDENT. - The minutes of pro-
ceedings ofthe last sitting have not yet been dis-
tributed. Under Rule 2l(1) of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I will invite the Assembly to adopt these
minutes as soon as convenient after they are dis-
tributed.
3. Enhancing WEU's public relations
(Prcsentatioa ol and debate on the rcPort
of thc Committee for Parliamentary
and Publb Rebtioas and vote on the draft recommendation,
D@.1216)
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The first order of the day
is the presentation by Mr. Roman of the report
5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1989 - the auditor's
report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presen-
taiion ofthe report of the Committee on Budgetary Alfairs
and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the
Jinal accounts, Doc. 1236 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Rathbone (Vice-Chairman).
6. Consequences of developments in Central qnd Eastern
Europe for European security (Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1255 and
amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (Chairman),Mt. de
Puig, Mr. Miiller, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Bowden, Mr.
Pachtas (Obsemer from Greece), Mr. Romero, Mr. Mota
Torres, Mr. Sole-Tura, Mr. Moya, Mr. Liapis (Obsemer
from Greece), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg" Mr' trhrellrs(Chainrun).
7. Change in the order of business.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly,
of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations on enhancing WEU's public relations,
Document 1246, debate and vote on the draft
recommendation contained in Document 1246.
I call Mr. Roman to present his report.
Mr. ROMAN (Spain) (Translation).
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I
have the honour to present comes at a time
when public opinion in Europe is looking for
clarification and new guidelines to guarantee
security after the political changes that have
taken place in Central and Eastern Europe and
after n-ew threats have arisen from other parts of
the world.
The debate on the European security and
defence dimension has to centre upon the aims
of the modified Brussels Treaty. That is to say,
the goal must be both to guarantee the security
of the citizens of member countries and to
establish an order ofjustice, peace and security.
The three factors in this new situation are: rec-
ognition that changes have taken place in
Europe; the fact that unexpected threats have
arisen from beyond the borders of Europe; the
increased momentum towards European unity
based on heightened public interest and the fact
that this unity is seen as an undeniable political
necessity for economic, social and cultural
l5l
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reasons; and, finally, the fact that it must be
achieved without risk, that is to say, withoutjeopardising the transatlantic link.
This being so, all sections of WEU should do
their best to ensure that the public understands
the r6le of WEU in this new situation. The
public image of WEU fails to reflect the respon-
sibilities placed upon it by the modified Bruisels
Treaty or its enhanced activities following its
reactivation and enlargement. There are some
plus factors relating to public relations that
should be noted. For example, the Council of
Ministers has, for the first time since 1987,
resumed the practice of issuing press notices
after its meetings. The Standing Committee has
also begun to issue press releases as was pro-
posed by the Assembly and in the present
Kuwait crisis the President of the Assembly
immediately condemned the invasion and called
on governments to invoke the treaty to convene
the Council. Other bodies reacted more slowly.
But if we look at our relations with the press and
the news of the annual reports of the Council
there is no impression of any desire to develop a
real education and public relations policy 
-you have to study the reports. Again, when
Mr. Pontillon sent out a long, detailed question,
No. 285, on public relations, the Council's reply
arrived nearly a year later and then containeil
too many generalities and very few specific
statements.
On the other hand, I believe that the creation
of a logo, selected by our committee and
approved by the Presidential Committee, was an
important achievement of the Assembly and I
should like to congratulate its young Belgian
designer. The President's letter, too, is a com-
mendable initiative that should be continued
because it keeps members of parliament
informed. After months of discussion about the
problem of security and defence in the context
of the political union of Europe, we have to
admit that governments in general have taken
up a wait-and-see stance with regard to the
future of Western European Union. None of the
member governments is making any effort to see
that the public is better informed about WEU,
although there is some talk about its potential
for building or implementing the political union
of Europe.
As regards specific measures, there seems to
be an inclination to wait until the future r6le of
WEU is clarified before taking any steps in any
direction. On this subject I would refbr to the
answer given by the Federal German Gov-
ernment to the question asked by Mr. Antretter,
in which the government said that it would have
to wait and see what the future r6le of WEU is to
be in the context ofthe changes now taking placein Europe before publishing an information
leaflet on Western European Union.
With respect to the efforts made by the
Assembly and its members and their action in
national parliaments it is clear that there has
been more debate in some parliaments as a
result of initiatives taken by members of our
Assembly. But this has not happened in all of
the parliaments, and I would therefore urge you
to make WEU known in all our houses of par-
liament, because getting our governments
involved in the debate is the best way to
increased public awareness of the issues with
which our organisation has to deal.
In closing may I say that this is one of those
debates where it is difficult to know what is best,
i.e. whether, as Timothy Garton Ash has said, to
lower the rhetoric to the level of reality or to lift
reality to the level of rhetoric. To lower the
rhetoric is to admit our impotence, but to lift
reality requires more resources than, truth to tell
and sad to say, are presently available to us. We
have to admit that we are in a situation from
which it is hard to escape, but which we shall
overcome if we all do our best to strengthen
Western European Union regardless of what its
future may be. We parliamentarians have more
experience than governments in working with
high volumes of the unreal and the imagined,
but I should like everybody to be clear that this
statement is far from signifying acceptance of
the present situation, because we are not going
to give up asking for more material and human
resources and adequate financial instruments.
The Council has to realise that we lack the most
elementary tools of communication and infor-
mation that an assembly of this kind should
have and which the European Parliament, the
Council of Europe or our own national parlia-
ments already do have. For these efforts to be
made there has to be the necessary political will.
Surely it is not too much to ask that this political
will should be forthcoming at the present time in
Europe?
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you, Mr. Roman,
for presenting this extremely important report.
It is important for the future of our organisation
because, as you reminded us, some people may
say that we must wait for definition of our r6le
in the context of European security. I agree with
your comment that enhancing WEU's public
relations could also be a way of enhancing the
definition of our r6le in the future. After all, we
need full understanding of these issues by the
people whom we represent. The draft recom-
mendation recognises the efforts of our Secretary-
General. He has made an important contri-
bution in terms of our organisation's image.
The debate is open.
I call Mr. Nufrez.
Mr. NUftEZ 6pain) (Translation). - The
report that Mr. Roman has just presented gives
us a conspectus of WEU policy on information
and public relations, and also suggests new ways
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of strengthening this information policy. It is a
timely and necessary report, both as regards the
present position of WEU as the only European
organisation dealing with defence and security
and also with public information about thinking
on the future of WEU within the context of
European union. As the Rapporteur has shown,
there is clearly a lack of information about the
activities of WEU, and we ought to be aware
that this is a very serious mistake to fall into
because, in the era of communication and infor-
mation we live in, institutions that the public
knows nothing about run the risk of being
thought not to exist. That is why I believe this
report to be necessary and timely. Timely above
all at the present moment when the Gulf crisis is
showing the r6le of WEU to be more important
perhaps than ever before.
We wonder, for example, Mr. President,
whether the public has been told that the general
staffs of the armed forces of all member coun-
tries of our'grganisation have met for the first
time since 1954 and that this is a fact of crucial
importance in the changes under way con-
cerning security and defence in Europe. Some
politicians, including parliamentarians, have
contended that Europe as such has, and has had,
nothing to do with the co-ordination of the mil-
itary forces currently deployed in the Gulf. In
some cases there have been demagogic, mali-
cious insinuations that the entire operation was
under United States's orders. This is untrue; it
leaves out of account WEU's important r6le in
co-ordinating the military forces in the Gulf.
This is why we need to set up a new base to
provide information about our Assembly and
about WEU in general. Fortunately, since last
July, we have had a very useful instrument in
the form ofthe Institute for Security Studies. In
my view, this institute ought to be more than a
think tank about the activities and future of
WEU; it should also provide information to the
public with qualifications in this field. A start
might be made by staging joint activities with
other institutions such as universities and non-
governmental organisations holding discussions,
round tables and so on.
We also need to begin thinking about a policy
on WEU publications as such, and this could
also be done through the lnstitute for Security
Studies. I believe that for this purpose it might
be a good idea to begin with a publication saying
what WEU is, e.g. a volume in the well-known
French * Que sais-je ? " series. I think it is
important to begin with simple books targeting a
wide public.
As has been said already by our Rapporteur
and others, the adoption of a logo for our
Assembly is an important step, because a picture
is often better than a thousand works. And in
this case it is a cheap, simple and effective
image. We should continue along this road
because WEU is changing, and although that
change is a task for politicians it is important in
democratic countries like ours to carry public
opinion with us. The public needs to know what
we are doing and how important is WEU's
function as the pillar of defence and security in
Europe. We must avoid any divide between
action by politicians and public opinion, and the
best way to do that is to have a new information
policy for publications, conferences and so
forth. I believe that Mr. Roman's report is a
good basis for a new and necessary step by our
organisation and I therefore wish to congratulate
Mr. Roman on its excellence.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you
for your contribution, Mr. Nufrez.
May I say that this proposal seems to me very
relevant, because WEU could indeed run sem-
inars or conferences in our member countries
with the co-operation of the universities. I think
this would be an important and effective way of
making the aims of our organisation known
among the future leaders of our continent.
I call Mrs. Garcia Manzanares.
Mrs. GARCIA MANZANARES (SPain)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, speaking for the first time in this
Assembly I have much pleasure in supporting
the report submitted by my colleague Mr.
Roman.
I believe that the subject ofthat report is par-
ticularly relevant at the present time because
discussion about security up to a few months
ago was virtually the preserve of specialists.
Now, recent important events, including the end
of the cold war, the dissolution in practical
terms of the Warsaw Pact, the CSCE summit
and the Gulf crisis, have all combined to make
security a widely-discussed subject in our coun-
tries and no longer simply a theme for experts,
as we can see from the press and periodicals of
the most varied kind. It has even become a topic
in social conversation.
Therefore, the time would seem to have come
to spread this debate to opinion-forming circlesin our democratic society. This will mean
strengthening co-operation with existing private
groups, associations and institutions so as to
enhance the interest paid to security matters in
Western Europe, increasing co-operation and
promoting debates and discussion in educa-
iional centres and universities as the previous
speaker said and making WEU known through
the various communications media. These activ-
ities and others could be performed by WEU's
Institute for Security Studies which began work
last July and could, as Mr. Roman's report
informs us, be an extremely important
instrument for disseminating information about
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security. Its activities should therefore be con-
siderably stepped up.
I should also like to say something more about
this enhancement of WEU's public relations, not
institutionally in terms of co-operation with uni-
versities, but by involving non-governmental
organisations. Late last September I had
occasion to welcome a conference on the future
of NATO organised in Spain by the Spanish-
Atlantic Association which is one of the sixteen
civilian associations there are in all the member
countries of the alliance. It seems to me that the
fact that a civilian, non-governmental associ-
ation was supporting and publicising the aims of
the alliance and stimulating discussion in
society, was extremely important and I thoughtit might also be a good thing if similar non-
governmental organisations of this kind could
be established in member countries of Western
European Union, in a co-ordinated structure,
which would perform a useful service in making
WEU more widely known.
I should also like to make special mention of
the logo chosen by WEU and its young designer.
In my opinion it conveys an attractive image of
WEU, tuned to the younger public. If Western
European Union really helps to popularise the
question of how our defence and peace can be
organised, it will have done good work,
whatever its ultimate future proves to be.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, for a very interesting
contribution.
I call Mr. LoWz Henares.
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation).
- 
Mr. President,ladies and gentlemen, my com-
ments will be very brief, partly because I do not
think it is necessary to emphasise the contents of
Mr. Roman's excellent report. His report is so
complete, comprehensive and compact that it
leaves little more to be said. Nevertheless, I
should like to touch on two points.
In the first place, it is obvious from the nature
of our organisation and our convictions that in a
democratic process any important decision
affecting our political systems must carry public
opinion with it, and few decisions aie more
important than those that affect national and
collective security. This being so, it is indispen-
sable for the public to feel that it has been
informed, and if necessary mobilised, on
matters of collective defence and security. For
us this is a gap that must be filled, because we
have only recently joined this organisation, so I
hope you will excuse me if any of my remarks
are ill-chosen.
It is often said that in past years WEU has
been a sleeping beauty, despite the positive
action taken by this Assembly; that the defence
of the western world has been practically taken
over by NATO. We hear persistent demands for
WEU's revitalisation, and for that it is essential
to have the support of public opinion which is
not likely to be forthcoming unless some infor-
mation is published. I therefore believe it is a
very timely moment for this report and the rec-
ommendation to be approved. The report shows
how this information should be disseminated.
Not only by frequent contact with the press and
the media, though this, of counie, is indispen-
sable, but above all through contact with non-
governmental organisations that are interested
in defence, and with institutions that by their
prestige and influence mould thinking in our
countries, such as the universities and centres of
learning, as well as with important organisationsin society, such as the trade unions and
employers' organisations. I repeat, Mr. Pres-
ident, that I believe this to be very necessary.
Finally, my second point is that defence policy
must include the organisation and its opera-
tional strategy and the disposition of the
forces available, whether for deterrence or for
response, should the need arise. I believe that
the education of public opinion forms an
essential part of an effective collective security
policy, not only in order to inform the publib
about what we are doing, but also because the
deterrent capacity of our organisation 
- 
and of
its member countries as a whole 
- 
will be based
not only on their own military strength but also
on the flrrm support of public opinion. In politics
and in public opinion, that which is unknown
effectively does not exist, and that is why an
adequate information policy is so necessary.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Esteves.
Mr. ESTEVES (Portugal) (Translation). 
- 
Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, notwith-
standing the lack of unanimity as to the way in
which the future security of Europe can be
assured, the Gulf crisis has shown that no other
European institution was able to respond as
promptly and effectively as WEU. Because of
the part played by WEU its image has been pro-jected to an international public audience which
had hardly heard of it before. That is why the
meetings promoted by this organisation were
followed with a great deal of curiosity and
interest, and it was seen how quickly its
members reached a common position about the
Gulf crisis.
When this serious crisis struck, the Brussels
Treaty and its organisation sprang into action,
and therefore Europe will in future depend upon
this institution.
Nevertheless, we should realise that decisions
taken by international organisations on matters
as important as those concerning peace and
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security, can find acceptance only if those
organisations enjoy high public regard. At the
present time WEU is still virtually unknown to
large sections of public opinion in Europe and
the world, even those that have most access to
modern channels of information. This being so,
the draft recommendation presented by our col-
league, Mr. Roman, is most timely and should
be given high priority by our organisation in its
endeavours to become more widely known to
the public in Europe. I therefore congratulate
Mr. Roman on the excellent report he has sub-
mitted and the clear way it points out the need
for a change in WEU's public relations policy.
It is important to change our methods, but it
is even more important to change the level of
Iinance allocated to this purpose: the appropria-
tions mentioned in the report are quite obvi-
ously insufficient to finance a credible public
relations programme. Thus, whilst fully sup-
porting the content of the draft recommendation
to the Council and in view of the fact that we are
approaching the start ofa new budgetary period,
oui first priority should be to secure a consid-
erable increase in the financial backing for a
campaign to promote the WEU image in the
national institutions of the various member
countries and in the media and opinion-forming
organisations.
Such an effort is essential to the achievement
of a credible, effective link between WEU and
the citizens it represents, so that in future the
credibility of its efforts on behalf of European
security is ensured. And whatever the doubts
and uncertainties we are faced with in this per-
manently changing Europe, there is no doubt
that at present WEU enjoys general confidence.
We should therefore make every effort, and
especially financial effort, to place WEU in a
position to fulfil its responsibilities.
The PRESIDENT. - This morning the debate
with the Minister from the United Kingdom
seemed like a debate in the House of Commons,
but in this debate we have heard contributions
only from Iberian members of the Assembly.
There is a good reason for that. Portugal and
Spain are new members, so they are probably
more aware of the need for a new policy to
promote the image of WEU.
The list of speakers is concluded, and I now
ask the Rapporteur to reply.
Mr. ROMAN (Spain) (Translation). - Mr.
President, I should like briefly to thank those
who have spoken and to bring out the points
each of them has made.
Mr. Nufrez has, I believe, given us some very
useful ideas which we shall discuss in com-
mittee, if Sir William Shelton agrees.
Mrs. Garcia Manzanares stressed the very
important part played by intermediate, non-
governmental organisations, of which the
importance in any democratic system has been
emphasised by thinkers from John Stuart Mill to
Norberto Bobbio.
Mr. [npez Henares spoke to us about the rea-
wakening of the sleeping beauty that WEU has
been, and of the need for public opinion to
support any venture to be undertaken in a dem-
ocratic society. Lastly, Mr. Esteves called for a
real change, one that takes account ofeconomic
realities when the budget for Western European
Union's information policy is being drawn up.
To conclude the debate, this is, in my opinion,
the overall product ofall the speeches and ofthe
spirit of the report.
We must heighten public awareness of the
importance of security and defence and of the
need to reach a consensus at two levels: both
within our countries, and in international
organisations such as our own.
Consequently, unless we have adequate means
of information and communication, it will be
difficult to convey to the public the various ele-
ments of the debate we are carrying on here or in
other forums; indeed, I doubt whether political
institutions of any kind, and there are many in
Europe, are aware of the way this debate is
going, because a debate is anyttring but a fixed,
immbveable position. Therefore, we should
make known the various provisional conclusions
we reach as international circumstances change.
We therefore need to allocate more money,
equipment and personnel to this task. l{, *y
opinion the high aims of WEU amply justify the
draft recommendation upon which we are
voting today.
The PRESIDENT. - Does Sir William
Shelton, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations, wish to
speak ?
Sir William SHELTON (Uniled Kingdom). -l
wish to join in the general welcome that has
been given to the excellent report, so ably done
by mi friend beside me, Mr. Roman. It is first
class and was passed by a unanimous vote in
committee. No amendments have been tabled
and it is safe to say that it has been well
received.
The Rapporteur and another colleague men-
tioned the budget. In paragraph 67 ofthe report
it is clear from those parliaments that answered
the question that their budgets for public rela-
tions are between lVo and 2o/o. The public rela-
tions budget of WEU is 2% of the total cost. The
implication that could be drawn is that WEU's
budget is adequate, but nothing could be further
from the truth. I doubt whether the parliament
of Westminster has any budget for public rela-
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tions, but we have constant television and press
coverage every day ofthe week. Such a budget is
therefore not needed, but WEU does not have
that coverage and we shall not achieve such cov-
erage without more money.
When people read the report I hope they will
remember what Mr. Roman said, and the con-
clusion of the report, which states that we should
have a bigger budget. We should not be misled
by the fact that our budget appears to be average
in comparison with that of other parliaments.
Our budgets are not comparable.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations has presented
in Document 1246 a draft recommendation, to
which no amendments have been tabled.
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation contained in Document 1246.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five
representatives or substitutes present in the
chamber request a vote by roll+all.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call ?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
(A vote was then tal<en by show of hands)
The draft recommendation is adoptedt.
(Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, took
the Chair)
4. Draft budga of tlrc administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year Uet
- 
(Pnsattaioa of aad dcbote oa tlu reptt
of the Commine on Budgaary Afioin and Attntiaiaraion
and vote oa tle druft budg4 lrc. 1211 ord oddetdum)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the presentation of and
debate on the report of the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration on the draft
budget of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year l99l and vote
on the draft budget, Document l24l and
addendum.
I call Mr. Rathbone, who is standing in for
Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur of
the committee to present the report.
Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom). 
- 
First,
I offer apologies on behalf of the Chairman and
Bapporteur, Mr. Klejdzinski, who, unfortunately,due to r@ent elections in his country, cannot
be with us this afternoon. He has aiked me,
as Vice-Chairman of the Budget Committee, to
stand in as Rapporteur.
_ 
We are discussing the budget of the Assembly
for 1991, and I should like to refer the Assembly
to document A/WEU/BA (90) I I which, in a
note by the Office of the Clerk, explains what
has happened. In a nutshell, the draft budget put
forward by the Assembly, approved by the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
of the Assembly, has been reviewed by the
Qudget experts in the Budget and OrganisationCommittee of the Council of Ministers and by
the Permanent Council. That budget has not
been accepted. They have not accepted the
Assembly's request in particular for the budget
to allow for the proper staffing of the Assembly's
secretariat to meet the needs of the newest
members of WEU 
- 
Spain and Portugal. We
have disagreed on that major point.
The lack of approval of proper staffing to
meet the requirements of Spain and Portugal is
deplorable. It overlooks in every possible aspect
the need of this Assembly to do its job properly
in support of the activities of our governments
in the pressing needs that they face, most partic-
ularly at this moment in the Gulf.
The second substantive point is what I fear
can only be described as unwarranted inter-
ference by the Permanent Council in the legit-
imate rights and responsibilities of this
Assembly to staff posts as required, both by
experience and, on advice, by nationality, and to
propose the sort of gradings of posts of
Assembly staff which we deem necessary.
Although it may sound like a technical point, we
must take the Council's interference in our
rights and responsibilities seriously.
There is a further point. It has to do with con-
sideration for the Assembly and its committeesin our responsibilities and working arrange-
ments, which must be described as verging on
the contemptuous. The Budget and Organisation
Committee of the Council met in London only
on l5th November to comment on the draft
budget we had carefully put forward. The Com-
mittee knew that the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration of this Assembly, oi
which I am proud to be Vice-Chairman, was
meeting on l9th November 
- 
a meeting set a
long time previously, in the hope of apflroving
the draft budget prior to consideration in oui
gr{inary ses-sion today. That was leaving too
little time of itself.
Because of the lack of time and agreement on
the part of the Council's committee,-it was abso-
lutely impossible to take any position during the
meeting of the Assembly's Committee on Bud-getary Affain and Administration. At that
meeting, on Monday, lgth November, we stated
categorically, from all sides of the political
spectrum, the need to provide staff for the
id
I
1lri
l
l. See page 37.
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advent of Portugal and Spain in this
Assembly.
Following that inconclusive meeting, which
was annoying of itself, the Permanent Council
met on 29th November to consider the report of
its Budget and Organisation Committee. The
comments on the draft budget were received
within the secretariat of this Assembly only last
Monday. That in turn meant that the secretariat
had to provide a briefing for this Assembly's
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration to consider those views at an early-
morning meeting yesterday. We duly considered
this. At that meeting, w€ were told that the
Council had upheld the advice of its Budget and
Organisation Committee in turning down the
posts that we had requested. That was a sorry
blow. It means that we come here today in a
quandary. The draft budget which we had care-
fully prepared does not have the blessing ofour
Council of Ministers.
Two possible courses of action offer them-
selves. First, we could refuse to endorse the
budget and demand that the Council of Min-
isters reconsider the matter. That was debated
extensively not only in the Budget Committee of
this Assembly, but in the Presidential Com-
mittee, which kindly met to consider this
quandary during yesterday's luncheon break.
Indeed, in my experience of WEU, to call a
meeting in a luncheon break is a mark of
urgency.
If we turn down the budget, we would enter
1991, which is only twenty-five days away, with
no agreed budget. We would have to operate
during l99l on the basis of a one-twelfth per
month budget based on 1990 figures. That
would inevitably mean under-cutting the
Assembly's ability to perform its increasingly
important work properly next year, even more
than the approval of the truncated budget would
tend to do. Therefore, it was concluded in the
Budget Committee and endorsed in the Presi-
dential Committee that that would be a self-
destructive step for the Assembly to take. It
would not apply any greater pressure on the
Council's committee to behave better or to con-
sider our requirements better. Indeed, it would
probably lead to animosity between the Council
and ourselves which, in turn, would lead to a
lack of satisfactory conclusion later in the year.
The alternative is, this afternoon, to pass the
draft budget, but only on the condition - I
accent this strongly - that a supplementary
budget requirement, which is presently being
prepared to meet the Assembly's most pressing
needs, is considered urgently by the Budget and
Organisation Committee of the Council of Min-
isters and, in turn, by the Council of Ministers
as soon as possible, most particularly to meet the
requirements of our new colleagues from Spain
and Portugal.
In addition, I should like to suggest to the
Assembly that it requests that you, Mr. Pres-
ident, should respond to the Council's last.
message in the firmest terms, addressing your
response not to the secretary-General who cor-
responded with you, but to the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council. I accent that identifi-
cation of addressee because I must express some
doubt as to whether ministers are really aware of
the full and extremely negative effects to which
their permanent representatives' previous con-
siderations and decisions have led.
In addition, following strong recommenda-
tions from members of our Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration and your Pres-
idential Committee, I urge all members of this
Assembly to approach their own appropriate
ministers 
- 
whether in the foreign office secre-
tariat or in the budgetary secretariat - to ensure
that each minister of each of our nations is
entirely aware of the reservations and the
disgust of this Assembly at our treatment. I fear
that they may not be aware of it. Those are the
most important points that I should like to put
to the Assembly in considering this budget.
We have discussed in the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration the way
in which our WEU salaries are established. They
are part of a basket of salary agreements for a
number of international organisations. Of
course, we want our secretariat to be assured of
fair and extremely good salaries for the hard
work that its members do for us, but on the face
of matters, salary increases of 890 to allow for
inflation for those working and living in coun-
tries where inflation falls far short of 890 are not
an illustration of best housekeeping. Our com-
mittee is looking into that.
That aspect hides the fact that, apart from
salary increases, the increased funding for our
ever-increasing work is a paltry l.8Yo. I believe
that the Council's behaviour in budgetary
matters runs completely contrary to the closer
co-operation between Council and Assembly to
which you referred in your opening words on
Monday, Mr. President. In that speech, you
described our Western European Union
Assembly as the accepted parliament of
European security. As long as we have that
important r6le 
- 
the importance of which has
been accented by the Assembly's actions and
debates this week on the critical position in the
Gulf 
- 
all members of this Assembly must be
equally served so that our Assembly continues to
do that crucial work well and to provide parlia-
mentary legitimacy to the actions taken by our
national forces under the WEU umbrella.
In summary, I suggest to the Assembly that we
endorse and accept the draft budget, but with
the important provisos I have described.
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
Mr. Rathbone for your clear, precise and com-
prehensive presentation.
The debate is open.
I call Mr. Diaz.
Mr. DIAZ (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, this is the first time
I have spoken in this auditorium and I feel very
proud. I congratulate Mr. Klejdzinski and his
colleagues on producing this excellent and
exhaustive report and Mr. Rathbone for pre-
senting it so well.
Even a glance at this work shows the detailed
effort that has gone into it. It is exhaustive to a
fault, attending to every aspect in the minutest
detail. It did not deserve the treatment it has
received. Every cent has been contested, every
expense placed in doubt, down to whether or not
to appoint a chauffeur to the Assembly. It is all a
little ridiculous.
After Mr. Rathbone's introduction there is
very little more to be said, except to ask are we
not being put into a straitjacket that may
hamper the progressive development of WEU?
This is a problem that should concern us if we
want Western European Union to play the r6le
and have the strength it should at this time. We
should give much thought to the budgetary
aspects if WEU is to become a powerful force
for international stability. We must put first
things first. The budget should not inhibit action
- 
it should facilitate it.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Miiller.
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, when Western European Union was
established, the intention was to give it a demo
cratic cloak, the parliamentary Assembly of
Western European Union. One of the ancient
fundamental rights of a democracy is that it is
first and foremost the elected representatives of
the people who decide on the budget. It is
impossible to explain the history of democracy
without reference to this fundamental right of
the peoples' representatives.
Following the report and the presentation we
have just heard, we observe that in our
Assembly the right to determine the budget, this
original democratic right, is subject to some
restriction, in that the Council of Ministers ulti-
mately decides how the money available for this
Assembly is used. I regard this as inherently
unacceptable. I feel that the fundamental demo-
cratic rights, especially those relating to the
budget, should be greatly extended.
I have a few very brief comments to make on
the budget. What strikes one about this budget 
-given the scarcity of funds 
- 
is that the largest
portion naturally has to be spent on the
meetings and committee meetings and on main-
taining the administration, and that very, very
little money is available for what I would call
operational activities. In fact the sums in
question are scarcely worth talking about.
The previous speaker has just said that the
Assembly of Western European Union and the
alliance itself face new tasks. That being so,
funds earmarked for operational purposes must,
of course, be increased. I will just give two
examples.
As we have been joined by two new member
countries, the Assembly has been enlarged, but
there has been virtually no change in the opera-
tional funds. Operational funds ought to be
available, for example, to enable the President,
the chairmen of the committees and the
rapporteurs to undertake fact-finding missions,
to gather information and to represent the aims
of Western European Union vis-i-vis other
organisations. The appropriation for this has
remained the same, although no one can deny
that the workload is growing.
The same is true of something that has fre-
quently occupied us in the past, Western
European Union's information policy. Here
again, no change can be detected in the appro-
priations. This means that, with an increasing
inflation rate, Western European Union's infor-
mation policy will tend to be more limited in the
future than it has been in the past. I therefore
appeal to the Council of Ministers, which, if you
like, is ultimately our master, to put down more
operational funds in future planning, and
provide more creative opportunities. I believe
that only then can the Assembly really do justice
to the new tasks assigned to it.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Lord
Mackie.
L.ord MACKLE (United Kingdom). 
- 
I begin
with a genuine, not a formal, tribute to Mr.
Rathbone. He stepped into his job at short
notice and he has mastered the intricacies and
ludicrousness of the procedure of the Budget
Committee in an extraordinary manner. I see
him bowing. He is right to bow because it is a
great feat and he is a man of great abilities.
The work of the Budget Committee is an
extraordinarily complicated process. The secre-
tariat understands it but its members need to
consult a mass of little red books to look up the
rules for this and that before they can establish
the procedure. As the Rapporteur said in his
speech, the contempt with which the committee
has been treated by the committee of the
Council of Ministers is considerable. It is
extraordinary that answers to questions on the
whole budget are given on the day before the
Budget Committee's meeting is due and even
during the meeting of the Assembly.
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I am a substitute member of the Budget Com-
mittee. The committee needs a dedicated
chairman who understands the politics of the
whole business and is prepared to give a great
deal of time to the work. I am aware that the
chairmanship is subject to negotiation between
parties. I hope that they will consider the matter
carefully and choose someone who can master
the complicated details of the budget quickly,
push the political point and ensure that the
Council of Ministers is kept in its place. From
the Rapporteur's speech, it is clear that there is
much need for that. I trust that you will use your
great weight, Mr. President, to ensure that the
budget is accepted and that the supplementary
budget receives the proper attention that it
deserves.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call
Mr. Niegel.
Mr. NIEGEL (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, let me first pass on the regards of the
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration, Mr. Klejdzinski,
who is unfortunately ill. He very much wanted
to present this draft budget and from the outset
has voiced the same criticism as we have heard
here today.
As a member of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration I should like to
follow on from what the previous speaker said
and describe the situation in rather more dra-
matic terms. The way we are treated here in this
Assembly, and especially in the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration, is a
tragedy. As Giinther Mtiller has rightly said, a
parliament's most important democratic right is
the right to determine the budget. But what is
the situation here ? All I can do is repeat what
the Bavarian comedian Karl Valentin once said:
" Wollen haben wir mtigen, aber diirfen haben
wir uns nicht getraut. " (We would have liked to
want to, but we didn't trust ourselves to dare).
For all practical purposes that is the situation
here: we are playing at semi-democracy with the
budget, but the Council of Ministers has the last
say.
I would ask you, Mr. President, to look into
these things during this period of office. So who
is this Council of Ministers? Not the Ministers
themselves, who concern themselves not a jot
with these things, but the high-ranking bud-
getary officials, who simply pull out their slide-
rules and say: " This is how it will be. " So we
are virtually puppets dancing to the tune of
senior government officials in Bonn, London,
Paris and Rome. But we are too good for that.
Changes must be made, or else we shall put a
stop to this farce! I want to make that abun-
dantly clear. They advance us the money and let
us play around at democracy. That is all we get,
and we are then dependent on these oflicials. So
please have a serious talk with the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers and the other ministers,
and tell them: " You are parliamentarians your-
selves, don't allow democratic rights to be
abused like this!"
Secondly, I agree with what Mr. Rathbone
said: if we had not approved this budget, we
would have had only a twelfth under the old
version and would not be able to do any work at
all. So we are putting up with this budget, but
rightly demanding that a supplementary budget
be drawn up immediately and discussed as soon
as today's sitting is over, and that it be the
subject of tough negotiations with the Council of
Ministers.
We do not want to throw the money out of the
window, either. As Giinther Miiller has already
said, there is no money available for operational
activities anyway. At best, there is enough for us
to pay the staff. Above all, it must be possible
for appropriate working conditions to be created
on these premises. And if we have the political
will to accept new members - I am grateful to
Mr. Diaz from Spain for speaking first - we
should so provide the opportunity to give them
due consideration.
I must also say a few words to the staff of this
organisation. I want to thank them for the work
they do. But - and I am now addressing the
Clerk 
- 
we should also distribute posts fairly, so
that we do not have some countries appointing
numerous members of staff and others almost
none at all. Staff posts should reflect the
member states' contributions. I would add that
people receive different treatment. Some are
very highly paid, others very poorly paid. Here
again, a fair balance should be struck, so that
staff members who have been here a very long
time are not forced to work at the lower levels of
the A-grades, while other, young people coming
in are appointed at A-4.I mean no offence to
new members of staff, but when new people are
employed, they should take their proper place in
the existing hierarchy.
To summarise, I would appeal once again to
the Council of Ministers, addressing them as
fellow parliamentarians, who would not dream
of tolerating this attitude towards the budget in
their own countries.
We should also thank our colleagues for the
work that is done here.
In conclusion, I would like to say that this is
my last speech in this house. After twenty-two
years as an active member of the Bundestag and
a number of other international organisations, I
am retiring from the Bundestag. I want to thank
all the members and staffof this organisation for
their co-operativeness and support. I wish the
Assembly every success, and above all I hope it
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achieves its objective of becoming the par-
liament of European security.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Ladies and
gentlemen, thank you for your interest in this
debate. It is not usual for the budgetary, man-
agement and operational problems of the
Assembly to attract such attention from parlia-
mentarians.
I am pleased at the tribute paid to Mr.
Rathbone for the manner in which he has per-
formed the diflicult task of setting out the
problem and formulating proposals at such short
notice.
I also support what Mr. Niegel has said about
the staff of our institution. There are not very
many of us and it is this small team whose
devotion and loyalty enables this Assembly to
function on a reasonable and respectable level
with the meagre resources provided. It was right
and proper, ild desirable, that this tribute
should be paid to them.
I have very little to add. Mr. Rathbone's pre-
sentation of the problem was excellent. There
are three things which are unacceptable in the
behaviour of the Council of Ministers. I say
Council of Ministers because that is the time-
honoured phrase, but in truth 
- 
as I confirmed
again at lunchtime a little while ago 
- 
the min-
isters are actually rarely told about what is
cooked up there by the bureaucrats and, in their
haste and with their complex responsibilities,
they end up supporting proposals which they
have had too little time to study in any depth.
This is unacceptable because their decision con-
tradicts their political commitment and the
encouragement we constantly receive from the
various ministers who pay us the honour of
addressing the Assembly and urge us to further
develop both our efforts and our resources.
The decision also conflicts with the imple-
mentation of measures arising out of earlier
decisions connected with the enlargement of
WEU and prevents us from being able to honour
our obligations to Spanish and Portuguese
members.
The decision of the Council is also inadmis-
sible with regard to promotions and recruiting
because it implies the right to supersede the
Assembly in responsibilities which are those of
the Assembly alone. These matters are our
responsibility, not those of the Council's finance
committee.
Finally, as parliamentarians, I do not see why
collectively in this European assembly we
should accept what individually we reject in our
national parliaments, that is to say to be subject
to the decisions of bureaucrats with no demo-
cratic legitimacy. In all our countries the vote on
the budget is parliament's privilege. For my
part, I see no reason why this right should be
taken from the Assembly.
These observations are aimed in the same
direction as Mr. Rathbone's remarks, and I
therefore ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to give
us your, if possible, unanimous support in this
matter. In practical terms, I therefore ask for
your support for the compromise solution put
forward by the Budget Committee, and com-
promise is what it is. We do not want a public
confrontation with the Council of Ministers
because we do not feel that it would serve the
cause of the institutions concerned. We accept
the no-growth budget but, to be consistent with
ourselves and true to the logic of our own ambi-
tions, hnd those we are enbouraged to assume,
we ask for a supplementary budget to be
passed.
I have written a letter 
- 
not yet posted because
I wanted to hear the Assembly's decision first 
-
which is along the lines suggested by Mr.
Rathbone and informs the Minister both of our
dissatisfaction and of what we expect as a result
of his intervention.
The end of the letter reads as follows:
'In these circumstances, the Assembly wished
to avoid an immediate and possibly pttblic
confrontation with the Council. It therefore
decided to accept the renewed budget, on
which there is no disagreement, and to submit
in a supplementary budget its proposals for
adapting the structure of the Office of the
Clerk to the enlargement and reactivation of
WEU. This document will allow all the WEU
bodies concerned to re-examine the problems
to which the Council has offered only a very
incomplete solution.
I hope you will be good enough to draw the
attention of the Permanent Council to the
importance of the draft supplementary budget
which will be presented in order to allow the
Assembly at last to have the wherewithal to
carry out its tasks at this new juncture. "
I think that this clearly expresses the wishes of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration and those of the Presidential
Committee, which yesterday gave its backing for
this solution.
I hope that in the vote that will now be taken
the Assembly will support our initiative.
I call the substitute Rapporteur.
Mr. RATHBONE (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
I do
not wish to delay matters any further. I endorse
the plea of my colleagues from Spain, Germany
and the United Kingdom for increased funding
and flexibility to fulfil the enlargod functions
and the more important tasks which the
Assembly faces. I suggest, Mr. President, that
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you point out to the Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council that general funding has increased by
only l.8lYo. We wish to be masters of our own
house, and we need the wherewithal to be
effective masters. Will you also distribute copies
of your letter, amended in that way, to all the
members of the Assembly so that they in turn
can follow up the matter with ministers in their
own national parliaments? It is through suchjoint pressure that we shall achieve a satisfactory
conclusion, not only to this budgetary impasse
but to considerations of draft budget requests in
the future.
I suggest that the Assembly approve the draft
budget for 1991, as amended by the Budget and
Organisation Committee and by the Permanent
Council and that we add as a rider the sub-
mission of a supplementary budget to cover the
points made during this debate.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate
is closed.
Clearly the vote we are about to take must be
accompanied by pressure from all of us on our
governments to ensure that our joint effort
iesults in ministers taking a favourable attitude
towards our supplementary budget.
Although I know they have already been at
work, I specially ask the Spanish and Portuguese
Delegations to bring pressure to bear on their
foreign ministers to ensure they realise that the
absence ofPortuguese and Spanish nationals on
the staff of the Offrce of the Clerk is due to the
refusal of the Council of Ministers to give us the
necessary resources. It even has the audacity to
say that the resources will be made available as
soon as we have made savings in the man-
agement of our own operating budget, which is
equivalent to ordering us to reduce our level of
activity.
Ladies and gentlemen, I therefore request that
you help us in what we are trying to do.
We shall now vote on the draft budget of the
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for
the financial year 1991.
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten
representatives or substitutes present in the
chamber request a vote by roll-call.
Are there ten members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
We shall now vote on the draft budget for the
financial year 1991.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The draft budget for the financial year 1991 is
adopted unanimously.
The Assembly has therefore unanimously
approved the conclusions of its Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the
Presidential Committee.
5. Accounts of the adminisfiative expenditure
of the Assembly for the linancial year 1989
- 
the auditor's report and motion to approve
the final accoants
(Prusentation of and vote oa the motion
of the Commiuee ot Budgetary Alfairc and Admiaistration
to qproee the fiiol @coants, Doc. 12j6 and addendum)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the presentation of the
accounts of the administrative expenditure of
the Assembly for the financial year 1989 - the
auditor's report and motion to approve the final
accounts and vote on the motion to approve the
final accounts, Document 1236 and addendum.
I call Mr. Rathbone, Vice-Chairman of the
committee, replacing Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman
and Rapporteur.
Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom). - This is
a short and somewhat official flrnal step with
regard to the Assembly's accounts for 1989. I
should like to mention that they were audited
for the first time by the Premier Pr6sident de la
Cour des Comptes de France who has taken over
from the Premier Prdsident de la Cour des
Comptes de Belgique who audited the accounts
forthe financial years 1986, 1987 and 1988. It is
appropriate for the Assembly to express grat-
itude for his co'operation and efficiency, which
should be greatly appreciated.
The accounts for 1989 are presented in the
same manner as in previous years. The auditor's
report scrutinises the correct management of the
budget and the book-keeping. One comment was
made about a more realistic assessment of initial
estimates under each sub-head of the budget
which would avoid large transfers in the course
of the year. That was noted by the Assembly and
account of that has been taken in the draft
budget for 1991. I believe that that shows the
alacrity with which this Assembly and its bud-
geting process respond to good advice from
outside.
I therefore propose that the Assembly approve
the motion presented in order to let you, Mr.
President, finally off the hook for any further
responsibility for the budget for 1989.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Mr. Rathbone, for your very British con-
ciseness.
I have no members down to sPeak.
We shall therefore now vote on the motion to
approve the Assembly's final accounts for the
financial year 1989.
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Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten
representatives or substitutes present in the
chamber request a vote by roll-call.
Are there ten members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The motion is agreed to unanimously.
6. Consequences of developments in Central and
Eostern Eurupe for European securtry
(Prusentation of and debate on the rcport
of ,hc Pofirtcd Commideq Doc. 1255 and anendmeats)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the presentation of and
debate on the report of the Political Committee
on the consequences of developments in Central
and Eastern Europe for European security, Doc-
ument 1255 and amendments.
I call Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the Political
Committee, on behalf of Mr. Lemoine, the
Rapporteur.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, the report which you now have to
discuss and vote on has gone through a good
many vicissitudes and these have left their
mark. After an initial, very thorough discussion,
the committee asked the Rapporteur to draw up
a draft recommendation to go with the report,
which we intended to discuss at the committee's
last meeting but one. This discussion could not
take place, because the Rapporteur was pre-
vented from attending the meeting. At short
notice we then convened a further meeting of
the committee, which was to be held at the time
of the part-session of the Council of Europe ten
days or a fortnight ago. But it was unfortunately
impossible to reach the necessary quorum for
this meeting. Only a few members were present,
because several delegations had to return to
their capitals at short notice.
During an informal discussion with the
Rapporteur the committee members present,
who, as I said, did not constitute a quorum,
decided that the Assembly should receive only a
very short and very cursory report, which was to
be discussed in committee yesterday morning
and to form the basis of a debate on this
important subject here in the chamber. But, sad
to say, our Rapporteur was again unable to
attend yesterday morning, having been held up
by the traffic.
The committee therefore decided unani-
mously yesterday morning to submit the report
to you today unchanged, in its cursory and very
brief form. As Chairman of the committee I was
asked to present it.
But we also agreed that some members from
the various political groups represented on the
committee should be asked to think about a sup-
plement to this cursory report and to propose
amendments, and they have done so. You have
eight amendments before you. We should
include these amendments in today's debate, or
at least make sure that their contents are
covered in our debate.
In the current situation in Europe it seems to
me irrefutable that this Assembly, the only
parliamentary body capable of formulating
Europe's position on defence and disarmament,
should now pronounce upon these vital ques-
tions.
Although formally the Warsaw Pact
organisation still exists, in practical terms it has
become a nonentity. The same is not true of
NATO, but NATO too is rightly considering a
change in its concepts and in its mandate. We
think it is absolutely essential for these consider-
ations to be reflected in the views of this
Assembly. We would therefore be grateful to
you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if we
could formulate this opinion here and now.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you
Mr. Ahrens for being so brief.
The debate is open.
I call Mr. de Puig.
Mr. de PUIG (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first pay
tribute to Mr. Ahrens, who found himself in a
somewhat delicate situation as this report
proved controversial in committee and the
debate was at times rather heated, so that the
report had to be presented as it is today for
debate in the Assembly. We appreciate his
calmness in the discussions and his pre-
paredness to present the report today.
This report, entitled * The consequences of
developments in Central and Eastern Europe for
European security ", suggests that it is a reply to
the question: what are those consequences? And
the answer is that the consequences are total,
final and absolute. What has taken place in the
East is an unprecedented historical change, a
revolutionary change, which obliges us in the
West to alter, and to alter gladly, our ideas
regarding security and peace, and our objectives
and strategies. This change is taking place at a
time when we have just been given a very
important history lesson, namely that things we
thought impossible have become possible within
two months. Supranational difficulties that
looked insuperable have been overcome at a
speed that nobody could have foreseen. Equally,
now that we are asking ourselves what the future
t62
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES ELEVENTH SITTING
Mr. de Puig (continued)
holds for us as regards peace and security, we
should also realise that events may move far
more rapidly than we could have imagined at
one time, and it is clear that everything depends
on the outcome of events in the East. What
happens in the East will have repercussions on
our own societies and on the policies of our gov-
ernments, as well as on the workings of a future,
newly instituted order of peace and security.
Everything depends on that outcome, and
because the process is beset by great difficulties,
there are unknown quantities that cannot be
dealt with as yet.
We can see that these countries in the East are
demonstrating a clear will to do away with the
old r6gime, both economic and political, to
establish democracy, to join the West in security
matters as well, and to become part of a united
Europe. This is good, and we regard it as such,
but it is not enough. We must analyse the pro-
cesses in all their complexity, and that com-
plexity exhibits three genuinely problematic
dimensions: the economic dimension, that of
maintaining the integrity of the states, and the
political dimension.
As regards the economic dimension, you
know that some of those countries are facing
economic breakdown. They are in a desperate,
life and death situation, and the collapse of the
planned economy has been a basic reason for the
-hange, as it may also contribute materially to
eventual success. It will take time to establish
functioning market economies and it remains to
be seen what kind of market economies are
established. There will be some unpleasant sur-
prises for some of the citizens of those countries,
now fascinated by the idea of a market economy
and impatient for its arrival. They need to learn
that it may take decades to achieve the levels of
production and prosperity of our societies, and
we shall see what happens to the fascination and
the impatience.
There is also the problem of maintaining the
integrity of states. In at least two countries - the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - this problem is
acute, and we cannot predict the outcome,
whether these countries will adopt federal or
confederal systems, or whether they will divide
into separate states. This is a serious problem
for the stability of security and co-operation in
Europe, and in addition to the intrinsic problem
of potential national or state demands, there is
the problem of minorities, and in many cases of
minbrity populations, within the nationalities
which are demanding a state of their own. It is a
problem of extreme complexity that may lead to
instability and possibly even violence, and to
tensions that may ag1ravate and complicate the
process of change in the countries of Eastern
Europe.
Finally, there is the strictly political problem,
about which we may also harbour doubts and
worries. For democracy has to be organised,
while at the same time the economy must
function and the problem of nationhood must
be resolved. It is not enough simply to talk about
democracy: democratic political forms have to
be adopted. You know that democracy cannot
be built by such means as the revival of anti-
semitism, nor can it be built without political
parties, in the manner of populist anti-party
movements, nor by means of a populism verging
on demagogy. We are worried about some of
these processes, because difficulties will arise if
the economy does not work. We cannot even
rule out a relapse into authoritarianism because
of the impatience and tension caused by an eco-
nomic depression that may last for a long time.
Some might even be tempted into dictatorships
introducing authoritarian solutions apparently
acceptable to part of the population.
The political problem has not been fully
solved. What can we do about these problems,
and about this complicated process taking place
in the countries of Eastern Europe? Whilst
Europe is being built, and whilst a new system of
peace and security is being put in place, our
brief is to help. There are many institutions
now, perhaps too many, but they all serve a
purpose at present, and before we replace some
of them by others we should flrnish working out
the overall framework of peace and security that
will be dependent at any moment upon what
happens in each separate country in Eastern
Europe and in those countries as a whole.
I believe that the institution we all think of
when we talk of East and West, namely the
CSCE, should be the main institution for
defence and security. We say it should stretch
from the Atlantic to the Urals - although when
we are talking about the Atlantic and the Urals I
like to recall that the Urals finish in the middle
of the Soviet Union, indeed in the middle of the
Russian republic, and that we shall have to see
what happens beyond the Urals. A distinguished
colleague from this Assembly, when com-
menting perhaps on the information given us
yesterday by the French Minister of Defence,
when he was talking to us about the conven-
tional forces located beyond the Urals, spoke of
the potential danger from China, since although
there had been developments in the Soviet
Union there did not appear to have been similar
developments in China. Any logical design for
peace and security could maintain a defensive
system close to the Chinese border.
In any event, the CSCE should be the major
institution 
- 
but at present it is only a plan. A
few small bodies have been set up, but there is
scarcely even a secretariat. There is very little in
the way of integration. Remember that the next
meeting of heads of state and foreign ministers
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of the CSCE is not due to be held until 1992. We
are involved in a slow, long-tenn process, and
perhaps the famous assembly that CSCE is to
hold can be the instrument to inject some
dynamism into the CSCE, which is now in a
transitional, slow and incomplete stage. In any
event, it must be the locus of the great commit-
ments to peace and security, of the application
of the new doctrines we are already discussing
when we talk about self-sufliciency in defence,
or shared security in defensive control and veri-
fication systems. It must, as a matter of course,
be the institution in which those subjects are dis-
cussed and in which the basic security commit-
ments between member countries are adopted.
I believe, Mr. President, that just as what
happens in the East will undoubtedly influence
the kind of agreements and institutions that will
form the framework of peace and security in
Europe, it is equally true that we can do much
from within WEU to ensure that the changes
taking place in the East are meaningful and are
realised along the lines we would wish to see. Let
us support only those changes which are realistic
and in accordance with our three great objec-
tives 
- 
peace, democracy and the building of
Europe.
(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call
Mr. Miiller.
fUr. UUILER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). Mr. President, ladies and
gentlemen, I would like to begin by considering
part of the report which pleases us all and is
extremely positive. It describes the develop-
ments in Central Europe last year. If we are
honest, two or three years ago no one would
have expected things to turn out like this. By
this I mean the developments over the German
question, once the pivot of East-West tensions
in Europe and now finally resolved. Still very
fresh in my memory is the discussion we had in
the Political Committee in the spring of this
year on whether there could be two different
armies in Germany. No one could have foreseen
the speed of developments, so that there would
be only one army in a sovereign Germany, or, to
take one example, that a unit of the Federal Air
Force would be flying the Soviet Union's latest
aircraft, the MiG-29. Anyone who had predicted
anything like this a year ago would probably
have been regarded as unrealistic, chasing after
rainbows.
But this example demonstrates that history
tends constantly to produce sensations. And we
are all happy with these developments. As a
German representative I would like to stress that
we are glad these developments have been pos-
sible, that this sovereign Germany is still a
member of the North Atlantic pact and of
Western European Union, and that the area
covered by Western European Union's treaty
has been extended to include the five new
Federal L6nder, the former German Democratic
Republic. That, too, could not be taken for
granted, because there were many pople, even
in my own country, who had long been saying
that a reunified Germany would be possible only
if it left the western defence systems and charted
a neutral course between the blocs. This is
precisely what did not happen. But it is this
development that is vital to European stability,
because, far from resolving the German
question, a neutral Germany, between the blocs,
as it were, would have constituted an element of
uncertainty for the future.
The two-plus-four agreement also made it
clear 
- 
I would like to emphasise this particu-
larly in WEU, because we have also entered into
corresponding commitments to WEU 
- 
that the
reunified Germany will not manufacture or hold
any nuclear weapons, any biological weapons or
any chemical weapons. That too is a major con-
tribution to stability.
As part of the CFE process we will be reducing
the German arrny, air force and navy to 370 000
men by 1994. And by 1994 
- 
this is another
point that is still causing some uncertainty 
- 
we
will be seeing the withdrawal of the units of the
Red Army still stationed in the territory of the
five new Federal Llinder 
- 
some 390 000 men.
ln this context we are not underestimating the
serious problems the Soviet Union is having
with these troops in the five new Federal
Ldnder. It is not easy for the Soviet Union to
withdraw them, because it does not know where
to put them. The Federal Republic of Germany
has said it is willing to provide thirteen billion
Deutschmarks for the construction of suitable
accommodation for these troops in the Soviet
Union, so that they can actually withdraw.
I feel, incidentally 
- 
and I make no bones
about it 
- 
that these troops might possibly with-
draw before 1994, because the Red Army units
in the five new Federal Uinder are in a very dif-
ficult situation. The soldiers are badly paid, and
discipline is declining. The fact that declining
discipline and the poor pay of the Red Army sol-
diers is resulting in an extensive black market in
Red Army weapons will not help to improve
security in Europe.
In the two plus four.agreement we also settled
the question of the German frontiers. Poland
and Germany will be signing a treaty. But I
would point out in this context, again with ref-
erence to future security, that a treaty of this
kind cannot be concerned only with frontiers,
but must also settle the question of the rights of
minorities in the territory of the Republic of
Poland.
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There has been an interesting development in
this respect in the last two years. When a
Council of Europe committee visited Warsaw
in December 1989, it was presented with an
official Polish Government paper which said
that minorities counted for only 0.90/o of
Poland's population of 39 million. This referred
not only to the German minority but also to the
Lithuanian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Ruthenian
and other minorities. We all know that these
figures were not and are not correct. The
minority problem has always been suppressed in
Poland. It is crucially important to a policy of
stability 
- 
I must stress this 
- 
that minorities in
a nation state should have appropriate rights.
After all, we want the minorities to stay where
they are and not to emigrate. We also want them
to be able to play their part in the construction
of a democratic Poland. It is important - I
repeat 
- 
for this matter to be settled by treaty.
When I speak of minorities, it is clear that we
have this problem not only in Central Europe
but to a far greater extent in South-Eastern
Europe. If you are familiar with the situation in
Romania or Yugoslavia, you will know that
there is a powder keg of nationality conflicts in
these countries that could explode any day. I
was greatly depressed by demonstrations on
Romania's national holiday a few days ago,
when the crowds shouted highly nationalist
slogans. This concerns both the Moldavians,
who still form part of the Soviet Union today,
and the Hungarian minority in Romania. And
there are other minorities, such as the millions
of gypsies in Romania. We are also aware of the
minority problems and nationalist slogans in
Bulgaria. And we are, of course, aware of the
serious nationality conflicts in Yugoslavia,
which constantly make one feel that there might
be a military coup or something similar in order
to maintain the unity of this multinational state
at all costs.
All these, ladies and gentlemen, are signs that
the resolution of the German question has not,
of course, resolved all the conflicts in Europe,
and that fresh conflicts may occur at any time.
Our greatest concern 
- 
and this is also evident
from amendments that have been tabled here -
is that the huge multinational Soviet Union
might plunge into an acute crisis, which might
eventually lead to civil war, economic chaos or
something similar. Any such development
would have serious implications for Western
Europe's security 
- 
there is absolutely no doubt
about that 
- 
because economic chaos or a civil
war would result in millions of refugees leaving
the Soviet Union for the West. We must appre-
ciate that such a development could, of course,
also have direct repercussions on the member
states of WEU and NATO.
I regret the nationalist slogans in Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe. I regret - as Mr. de Puig
has already said 
- 
that new populist slogans ofa
racist nature, such as anti-semitic slogans - are
being used in these countries, because all this
contributes to instability rather than stability in
Europe.
Now that the German question has been
resolved, I can only hope that we will also be
getting to grips with these other issues. At a
recent international conference a Russian
socialist put it rather succinctly: the German
question had been resolved, and now the
Russian question is on the agenda. I would not
like to let this pass without comment, because of
course it contains a grain of truth. We know that
the nationality conflicts in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe are an obstacle to future
progress that we must tackle. This means that
those countries with western values which have
united in WEU for security reasons will have to
observe the trends in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe in the next few years with particular care
and commitment. They must do all they can to
play a peacemaking rOle there and perhaps even
to alleviate the effects of famine, so that Europe
may look fonrard to peace in the next century as
well.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Scovacricchi.
Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, we have all observed - and it is
something I wish to repeat because it seemed to
me hardly possible 
- 
that something of extraor-
dinary historical weight has occurred in Europe
which has altered the existing scenarios.
It is the fact that the governments of Eastern
Europe have themselves been signing the death
certificate of the Warsaw Pact following its loss
of the German Democratic Republic. Hungary
and Poland especially, speaking through their
Foreign Ministers 
- 
the former during his recent
visit to Italy and the second at the NATO
assembly in London - have said that the
Warsaw Pact will be dissolved in a few
months.
However, western authorities, and especially
the NATO organs, point to the continuing might
of Soviet military potential, which needs to be
seen separately from internal developments
within the USSR and the breakdown of the
Warsaw Pact. Even if the Soviet Union were to
be isolated, it would still, with its nuclear
arsenal, be able to destroy the entire world.
So we should ask ourselves what has changed
in Europe from the military standpoint. Let us
try to outline briefly the salient points of these
changes. First, the negotiation of the CFE
agreement, which - if I understand it properly -
partly corresponds to the MBFR in Vienna, has
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very greatly reduced the possibility ofa surprise
attack with conventional forces.
Next, however, the Soviet strategic, and more
particularly atomic, potential remains. This is
another threat to the present internal stability of
the Soviet empire already exposed to such grave
economic, political and, above all, I would say,
psychological trials.
Third, the risk of instability has increased
enormously in certain areas of Europe. The shat-
tering of the Warsaw Pact has been followed by
the outbreak of national and nationalistic con-
flicts between the Hungarians and Romanians,
Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Montene-
grins and many others.
Not to mention the recurrent and persistent
dangers in the Mediterranean area which have
never allowed us to lower our guard. However,
this issue is not part of the matter in hand this
afternoon and I do not therefore propose to
expand on it.
In conclusion, Mr. President, it seems to me
to emerge clearly from the perceptive comments
made by a large number of members and to need
no further demonstration that we must ensure
that the Atlantic Alliance survives and that the
defensive structures of this old continent are
maintained intact.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I call Mr. Bowden.
Mr. BOWDEN (United Kingdom). 
- 
First, I
congratulate Mr. Ahrens and his committee on
their far-seeing and imaginative report. In June
this year, when I had the privilege of addressing
this Assembly, I expressed the view that Pres-
ident Gorbachev had only an even chance of
surviving the next twelve months. I still hold
that view. I fear that at best Mr. Gorbachev will
find himself under enormous pressure in the
coming months and the early part of next year.
Most of us in the Assembly hope and wish that
he will survive. The consequences of his
departure could be grave for European security
and stability.
President Gorbachev's r6le in the world has
been outstanding. Clearly, he has forged himself
a place in history which will be talked about for
many decades to come. The way in which he has
approached the reunification of Germany 
- 
it is
now united 
- 
in particular will be remembered.
Who would have believed a year ago that the
Soviet President would agree that a reunited
Germany should become a full member of
NATO and a member of the European Com-
munity?
Those of us who in most, if not all, of our
political lives looked forward to the collapse of
the communist-socialist empire do not want
Eastern Europe or the USSR to descend into
anarchy and chaos, nor to see a new military dic-
tatorship rise from the ashes. The future will be
decided largely by economic considerations.
There is no question but that starving people
Grn become desperate and unpredictable.
However, the Soviet army is another major
factor. Paragraph 13 of the report states: * Psy-
chologically, it is certainly not easy for such a
powerful body as the Soviet army to understand
why the political leaders have made concessions
to the West, particularly in regard to German
unification, but this may also be true of other
sectors ofthe Soviet leadership. " Those are very
wise words and thoughts.
The Soviet army is immensely powerful, but
there are signs of change. In 1989, Soviet arms
production fell sharply, with tank production
being halved, fighter production falling by 12%
and the cancellation of at least one major
warship. However, the levels are still very high,
with I 800 tanks, 600 fighters, nine submarines,
six major surface ships and 130 intercontinental
ballistic missiles. We must not underestimate
the Soviet strength.
Whether Russia and the Eastern European
countries will be able to cope with their
enormous economic problems quickly is highly
doubtful, and there must be a major r6le for us
in Western Europe and in other countries in
giving them all the help that we can.
In a period of great uncertainty but exciting
possibilities for new democratic regimes to
emerge, as well as of freedom and human rights
for millions of people who have for years lived
under totalitarian governments, we must
provide positive help of all types to protect their
future as well as our own.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Pachtas, Observer from Greece.
Mr. PACHTAS (Observer from Greece)(Translation). 
- 
I first wish to compliment Mr.
Ahrens on his presentation of this report.
We have seen the end of the confrontation
between the blocs. The Warsaw Pact is fading
away and the Atlantic Alliance is increasingly
wondering what its purpose is. And yet it was
the cold war that gave Europe and the world a
form of stability for over forty years.
Today we have to show we are capable of
setting up mechanisms for co-operation and
security that provide greater stability still, based
this time not on a cold war but on the strength of
ideas, humanitarian considerations and values,
political planning and social strategies. We have
also to put institutional measures into effect that
are based on freedom and give primary impor-
tance to dialogue, general consensus, the
reduction of armed forces and the limitation of
conventional weapons. We have to create real
political instruments for settling disputes and
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forestalling conflict by defusing military crisis
situations and eliminating their causes.
European construction has to be a force for
peace, d6tente and open collaboration with
every country in a Europe equipped with its own
defence system and security mechanisms. We
have to lay the foundations of a new, collective
security system that will convince all the coun-
tries of Europe that there are no longer any
grounds for mutual apprehension since they-
would all be part of the same fabric made up of
reciprocal guarantees, territorial integrity and
the rights of all peoples - whether militarily and
economically they are weak or strong - to
determine their own future without foreign
interference.
Today more than ever these principles must
be made reality. The gap between Realpolitik
and the politics of ideas must be narrowed and
we must show that our words as politicians are
translated into the acts of responsible human
beings.
At a time when the eyes of every man and
woman are riveted on the efforts of the interna-
tional community to overcome the Gulf crisis, it
is unfortunate that these efforts are not being
helped by reference to the lessons of the past.
The United Nations resolutions on the
problems of Palestine and Cyprus have long
gone unheeded thus creating the impression that
the principles of national independence and the
sovereignty of nations are meaningless and may
be violated by any aggressor strong enough to
take advantage of the international situation.
We need to promote the institution of a pan-
European security system based on the Helsinki
process and to strengthen and institutionalise
the CSCE process in the field of security. We
also have to push for a parliamentary dimension
to the CSCE process which would be a parlia-
mentary organ guaranteeing democratic control,
i.e. control by the people's elected representa-
tives, of a process of co-operation which has
hitherto been essentially intergovernmental in
character. Arrangements should therefore be
made for permanent parliamentary partici-
pation in the CSCE process by means of a par-
liamentary assembly of the Council of Europe,
not by the creation of a new institution.
We have to show that we are capable of setting
up a new mechanism for co-opration and
security guaranteeing a high level of stability
through CSCE and WEU. If we are to approach
the problem realistically, the first thing to do is
to intensify co-operation not merely between
states but primarily between the groups of coun-
tries in the European Community and Western
European Union. An enlargement of WEU to
include all the member countries of the Com-
munity would enhance cohesion in policy deci-
sions and reinforce the European identity in
security matters.
In conclusion, I must point out that we should
not lose sight ofanother essential factor, that is
to say the social and economic dimensions of
European security. Security will not become a
reality until these problems have been solved as
well.
We have complex social problems to over-
come which are causing friction and dividing
Europe. They include poverty, unemployment,
environmental protection, social disparities,
ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, cul-
tural deprivation, the status of women, racism
and xenophobia.
In the new conditions which demand a pos-
itive approach on our part and in which nations,
civilisations, societies and economic systems
must n@essarily evolve, we need not only
models but also values to fit the new realities.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Romero.
Mr. ROMERO (Spain) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, to reach ajudgment on the consequences of developments
in Central and Eastern Europe for European
security I ask myself: what effect will these
events have, or what effect are they already
having?
In the first place, we should welcome this
movement towards political and democratic
freedom in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, in order to build what has been called
the 'tcommon European house ". It is therefore
very important that in building Europg we
should have in mind what is psychologically
speaking a new culture, covering the area from
the Atlantic to the Urals, when speaking about
Europe. For when we speak ofEurope, we have
a habit, an in-built defect, of speaking on the
purely local level of Western Europe. The right
framework is the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe. It is this framework
that should be given the facilities, the support
and the institutions needed to embody Euro-
pean security, if we are looking for continental
iecurity embracing all the countries of Europe'
We believe that the dissolution of the military
blocs established during the cold war period,
which have only a few years left to them will call
for a period of transition. I am not referring to
the Warsaw Pact, which in practice has been dis-
solved and will soon be dissolved formally; I am
talking about NATO, which could plan to dis-
appeai in about eight, ten or twelve years' time
and Ue incorporated into some security and veri-
fication arrangements, shared unselfishly on the
part of Western Europe, and sharing its fortunes
ind its future with the countries of Central and
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Eastern Europe. This model of shared security,
based on new military doctrines of reasonable
sufficiency in defence, with controls both on the
size of the armed forces of every country in
Europe, and on conventional and other arrns, so
that no army could constitute a threat to neigh-
bouring countries and that the size of the armed
forces in terms of personnel, type and pattern, in
relation to gross national product, should then
be subject to verification agreements and con-
trols. This reasonable suffrciency in defence
should be a doctrine accepted by all the armies
of the nations of Europe.
In connection with the progress of the coun-
tries of Central Europe towards democracy, I
suggested yesterday that it would not be
acceptable for them to be kept waiting for a long
time. There is no need to set high entry require-
ments; rather we should explicitly support the
process of democratisation whilst aiming at
supranational European mechanisms that would
also strengthen democratic processes. As things
are, these democratic processes are under
enonnous threat in some parts of Central and
Eastern Europe because of the phenomena of
disintegration and nationalism and other recentpolitical, economic and social phenomena.
Therefore, we should do well not to wait long
before giving them supranational support with a
Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe with increasing powers, to which they
could have recourse for the peaceful mainte-
nance of their own plans for democratisation.
In closing, may I say that Europe's rela-
tionship with the rest of the world is very
important. For example, no vision of European
security should fail to include arrangements for
co-operation with the other shores of the Medi-
terranean, with Africa, Latin America and other
parts of the world. There are now two hundred
million Arabs living betwsen Egypt and Mauri-
tania. This demographic pressure is very consid-
erable. Unless there is co-operation leading to
development and to new economic and social
prospects, tensions may arise in the future. It is
therefore very important for Europe to base its
security on some new, co-operative relation-
ships, not militarising international relations,but setting up appropriate mechanisms of
co-operation for development with Africa, Latin
America and other parts of the world.
And if we have the United States and Canada
with us, and I think they should be with us, in
this Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, we shall have a relationship within a
new framework of pan-European security, with
an Atlantic link, that does not imply a fortress of
the countries of the north, differentiating them
from the south, because in the future the chal-
lenge will be in the relationships established
between north and south as regards theproblems of ecological resources, energy
resources and raw materials, and in the need to
progress towards a security shared not only
among all the countries of Europe, but between
Europe and the rest of the world. This is a major
challenge, one which is shared by all the coun-
tries of Europe, and we believe that this is the
way we should go; we should regard the
European continent as a single regional entity in
its relations with the world as a whole. The time
has come to put in place wide-ranging instru-
ments of co-ordination and not to speak small-
mindedly of ourselves as member countries of
NATO or WEU.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Mota Torres.
Mr. MOTA TORRES (Portugal) (Trans-
lation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,
the report we are debating, dealing with the con-
sequenoes of developments in Central and
Eastern Europe for European security, throws
much light upon the hopes we cherish for
building a Europe that is democratic, pro.
gressive and secure in its entirety: it also throws
light on the concerns we feel about the objective
conditions in which this journey to democracy is
being embarked upon, with its complications
and hazards both internally and as regards the
new international situation that forms the back-
ground of the changes that are taking place.
As things are, the whole of the policy of
openness initiated and led by Mr. Gorbachev in
the Soviet Union has had repercussions that are
manifest in all the countries that were within the
Soviet sphere of influence and have since put in
hand measures for making their r6gimes more
liberal and democratic and for effecting vary-
ingly radical changes in their systems.
Without exception, however, they are wres-
tling with grave economic difliculties of social
instability and political legitimation, all of
which aggravate the situation and demand
coolness and hard work to bring it under
control.
Germany has been unified. Free and demo-
cratic elections have taken place in most of the
countries concerned; new constitutions have
been drawn up; there are calls for more partici-
pation and greater consensus; the ice of a cold
war that put fear into our hearts for decades is
breaking up; ownership laws are being changed;
states ruled by law are being formed; the flag of
the resolute defence of the rights of man is being
raised; new relationships are being forged both
in and outside Europe; Mr Gorbachev has pro-
posed to the Soviet Union and to the world the
building of a 'common European house' and
today, discussing a * new European archi-
tecture " we are conscious both of its inevita-
bility and of the r6le we have to play in this
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enorrnous joint undertaking full of difliculties
but also of desirable prosPects.
Because ofhistorical factors and the objective
conditions it has inherited, the greatest diffi-
culties in this long and complex process of tran-
sition face the Soviet Union itself, and it is Mr.
Gorbachev who has the responsibility of steering
his country safely across waters made dangerous
by the storms of nationalism, an economic crisis
oi unimaginable proportions and national and
factional unrest, not least of which is the
position of the Soviet armed forces in this whole
iituation. No words of mine are needed to
emphasise the attention and importance we
should attach to this perilous journey, which we
hope will be a short one, on the way to a safe
harbour.
The signs of instability in the Soviet Union
are public knowledge and are due by and large to
the factors I have just mentioned. The Soviet
leader is aware of these factors and has been
introducing policy measures to enable him to
overcome ihese diffrculties, not only by taking
the power he needs himself but also by winning
the international political and economic support
that is essential.
The security of Europe depends on the contri-
bution in this field made by each of the coun-
tries of which Europe consists, so security in
Europe can never be advanced by states acting
on their own. It must result from a conscious
collective effort to build a secure Europe based
on attitudes and policies favouring the objec-
tives on which we all agree.
Western European Union will also be an
important moderating factor because it is not
subject to conflicting interests alien to its
founding principles. It has already demonstrated
in the Gulf crisis that it can take joint action in
defence of the values in which it believes,
notably the defence and maintenance of peace.
This heightens the importance of the part that
all European countries have to play in designing
and installing a new system of security and
defence to meet the new demands on Europe
that now arise with the end of an East-West
balance in which the equation was achieved by a
logic ofconfrontation, not co-operation as is the
case today.
We have good reason to believe that both men
and institutions are capable of meeting these
fresh challenges. And there is also reason to
believe that the institutionalisation of the CSCE
process and the building of pan-European struc-
iures of co-operation will provide a further
essential medium for growing Eastern European
participation in new forms of enlarged ce
-operatibn 
- 
as the Rapporteur has very well said.
For all these reasons there is hope.
A number of draft amendments have been
tabled for reasons of logic and systematic
arrangement, both in the preamble and the rec-
ommendations. Generally speaking, I am in
agreement with these amendments which I con-
sider necessary to ensure that the draft recom-
mendation on which we shall shortly vote is
clear and effective.
Meanwhile, I should like to emphasise the
stimulus that these recommendations provide
for the European Economic Community to
organise and co-ordinate the assistance to be
given to the economies of the countries con-
cerned as an absolutely essential way ofreducing
and of lessening the tensions that economic
crises inevitably generate and which I have
already mentioned in this speech.
The critical dilemma with this report and its
recommendations is that, though this may not
be what we intended, we are either going to do
very hastily something that needs to be carefully
thought out or else we could be delaying some-
thing- that needs speedy and effective action'
I believe that the report and recommenda-
tions represent a commitment - both to this
Assembly and to Europe as a whole and to the
future.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Sole-Tura.
Mr. SOLE-TTJRA (Spain)(Translation). - Mr.
President, I think we are all aware of the impor-
tance ofthis debate. But I am not going to repeat
what has already been said about the extraor-
dinary pace and scale of the changcs, the end of
the two blocs and the need to define a new sce-
nario and a new concept of stability.
I should like to base my remarks on a different
aspect. I believe that although there have indeed
be-en enormous changes and there are no longer
two blocs in Europe, there are still two Europes'
And this not only as regards the economy or the
social aspect but also in terms of institutions and
therefore security.
In Western Europe our security arrangements
are still intact and our countries are protected by
a diversified system of institutions and alliances.
We are in the European Economic Cbmmunity,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, WEU,
the Council of Europe, and the CSCE. So,
security problems have not changed very much
for us.-Even so, what has happened in our con-
tinent does undoubtedly mean that we have to
reflect on our own institutions and on their
future. Even though our security arrangements
are still intact theycan no longer function in the
same way or be based on the same assumptions
or, if you wish, we cannot use them as before.
The enemy in Europe that made them all nec-
essary has disappeared and therefore we have to
set about rethinking our systems of strategy and
security, because we cannot now aim them at the
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same foe. But the problem is whether at this
time we can go on thinking about world-level
enemies. Is there likely to be such an adversary
for Western Europe now or in the immediate
future? I believe some people think there is some
such enemy, or would like to invent one, either
by postulating that the enemy may be outside
Europe, in the Arab world or imagining that the
changes in Eastern Europe are not irreversible,
and that therefore the enemy has not disap
peared at all. If we are logical, though, we have
to make a complete change in our strategic
thinking.
Instead of thinking in terms of a global
adversary, I feel we should address our minds to
new kinds of conflict that call for different
mechanisms and responses. The Kuwait
problem is a perfect example. I believe that this
is what we on our side should be thinking aboutin this connection, but in the other Europe,
Eastern Europe, the situation is not exactly the
same. A massive security framework has disap
peared. Whatever we think about the raison
d'Otre of the Warsaw Pact, it was a security
mechanism, and it no longer exists. In effect, the
CSCE includes the eastern countries but it is not
yet an adequate framework to give them the
security they need, and bilateral disarmament
agreements are what they are, bilateral disarm-
ament agreements; in so far as the two blocs no
longer exist, such agreements concern only two
parties and not all parties. Consequently, a very
large vacuum has opened up in Eastern Europefrom the security viewpoint 
- 
a feeling of inse-
curity which we should understand. And it is not
only military or strategic insecurity, it is a blend
of several factors.
Clearly, the first of these factors is the com-
plete economic change that all those countries
have to make. It is a change without precedent
and therefore without any signposts, a transition
from a centralised, bureaucratic order in which
everything was owned by the state, to a market
economy. And, I repeat, there are no precedents
for change on such a scale or at such a pace. It is
therefore cause for great economic and social
uncertainty and considerable doubt as to the
intrinsic stability of the societies concerned.
The second factor, also clearly a factor of inse-
curity, is the territorial instability to which
several colleagues have already referred, and
which surfaces in the form of conflicts between
nationalisms. In addition to that, however, we
are seeing the breakdown of old imperial struc-
tures that had been kept in place by other
means, as in the case of the Soviet Union. Here,
too, we are faced with several unknowns. We do
not yet know how stable the political map of
Eastern Europe will be, we do not know, for
example, whether Yugoslavia will still exist as a
single country in a few months'time. We do not
know whether the Soviet Union will continue to
exist as a single country. Even countries that
appear to be more stable, such as Czechoslo.
vakia, also have serious problems of stability as
between their various parts. This is an extremely
serious problem from the viewpoint of security
and stability, but it is also of direct concern to
us. Another question is whether the Soviet
Union itself might not break up into a number
of separate territories, and this in a country that
has nuclear missiles at present under the control
of a single authority, whose future is by no
means certain. There is also insecurity inherent
in the weakness of political institutions and gov-
ernments. Make no mistake, the problem of
those countries today is not the survival of the
previous states or political systems, but their
potential collapse and considerable weakness,
because they have not yet been replaced by
others that are stronger and have greater demo-
cratic credibility, and because they are, at very
least, in a process of transition that is far from
complete. This too, generates insecurity, the fact
that no final balance of political power has been
achieved. None of these countries yet has a
stable system of political parties. Instead, as we
can see every day, there are considerable uncer-
tainties, alignments that are changing and will
change again because they reflect a diffrcult tran-
sition. But as yet, there is no stable system of
political forces enabling us to know either what
to expect or, above all, how they relate to our
own political power system.
These factors of insecurity, therefore, are not
something we can regard as alien or of no
concern to us, because ultimately if the concept
of Europe has any meaning it is because we see
oqrselves as parts of one and the same complex,
with a common history and above all a common
vision of the future. But for that very reason we
on this side have to create conditions that will
help events to develop along those lines by over-
coming present insecurities and intensifying
co-operation and integration.
This is the direction in which I feel our
debates should lead and, on that score, I believe
that we have almost lost a good opportunity for
having that debate, because the original draft of
the document submitted to us did not encourage
discussion. I have to say that this causes me
some concern and dissatisfaction. At the same
time I should like to thank Mr. Ahrens in par-
ticular, but also the other members putting their
names to the amendments that have been
tabled, for their efforts to make this document at
least a viable basis for debate, enabling us to
come to some conclusion. The document as pre-
sented did not allow this to be done and I
believe that it was unworthy of the kind of
debate we should have. Even now, not all the
problems that this document presents have been
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solved, for although the amendments constitute
a distinct improvement as regards the draft rec-
ommendation, the document is a whole in itself
and in the idea it embodies and it also contains
an explanatory memorandum that has remained
unchanged. This contains a number of mistakes
that in my opinion seriously detract from its
credibility. I shall refer to two of these mistakes
in closing.
In paragraph 21 of the explanatory memo-
randum, with reference to developments in the
countries of Eastern Europe, it is said that there
are two groups of countries: Poland, Hungary
and Czeihoslovakia already have democratic,
non-communist governments " while Bulgaria,
Romania and Yugoslavia continue to be gov-
erned by communist r6gimes that have been
reformed in very different ways ". I believe that
this is incorrect. It is not certain that these three
countries are still governed by communist
rdgimes reformed in different ways. The situ-
ation is far more complex and complicated, and
we cannot accept that banalities of this kind,
that furthermore are not only inaccurate but a
complete distortion of the facts, be voiced in a
body such as this AssemblY.
In paragraph 27, refering to Romania, there
are alio several inaccuracies. I say this because I
was recently a member of a special delegation
from the C6uncil of Europe visiting Romania in
order to report on whether the country might be
admitted to the Council of Europe with special
observer status, and I believe that the statement
made in paragraph 27 that " the revolution
served on[y to change the leaders but not the
former rdgime as such' misrepresents the situ-
ation. Also the statement that " Mr. Iliescu.'.
obtained more that 850/o of the votes cast, which
led to counter-demonstrations in the streets of
Bucharest in June that were repressed ", etc., is
completely untrue and at the same time leads us
up a Utind atley. These statements being in the
report, I would not be happy with myself if I did
not call attention to them because I believe that
they weaken the credibility of the document.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - This mav
be so, Mr. Sole-Tura, but you know very well
that what we have to vote on is the recommen-
dation. The report is the Rapporteur's work.
Also, the situation is changing so fast that
what is written three or four months, or even a
few weeks ago, may no longer wholly match the
facts on the day when the report is tabled in the
Assembly.
As you know, this report has been put back
several times. The debate will naturally be con-
cerned with the draft recommendation and it is
on this that attention must be focused, for one
thing in order to avoid inaccuracies due to the
passage of time. The fact remains that even then
itre text we adopt tomorrow may well be out of
date a fortnight or month later.
Thank you, in any case, for your remarks.
Mr. SOLE-TURA (Spain) (Translation). - I
take your point very well, Mr. President. That is
why I drew the distinction.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Moya.
Mr. MOYA (Spain) (Translation). - I shall
confine my remarks to a few brief observations
about devi:lopments in the countries of Eastern
Europe with iegard to the security dimension.
I agree with the special importance that the
document, and obviously the amendments as
well, attaches to the efforts made within CSCE
with the object of creating a pan-EuroLean
framework for security and co-operation. This
framework would be an appropriate instrument
for deepening the concept of joint security of
which the corbllary is the maintenance of a level
of security and deterrence based upon the idea
of sufficiency, and its construction would need
full-scale development of arbitration facilities
and confidence-building measures and the joint
organisation of verification and control instru-
ments. In this respect I wish to state my
asreement in particular with what is said in the
diaft recommendation, and in Chapter IV of the
report.
Although much remains to be done, a gteat
deal has already been achieved in establishing a
firm basis for strengthening a pan-European
system of security and co-operation.
The signature in Paris of the CFE treaty
largely brings to an end a deployment of forces
whos6 massive build-up of offensive capabilities
had effectively split Europe in two for half a
century. The 
- 
agreement removes one of the
obstacies to Eait-West understanding of most
concern to the European allies: the imbalance in
conventional weapons, where the Warsaw Pact
had always had superioritY.
Today Europe is a continent with fewer arms.
But we still need to redouble our efforts for
future negotiations leading to new agreements at
Helsinki In t992, as urged in paragraph 3 of the
draft recommendation.
As some members have said, the pace of
political change in East European countries has
iecently quickened. One of the main tasks of the
report wal to analyse these changes. But despite
th-e speed and depth of the changes on the
European scene there are still some unknowns.
Even after the CFE agreements, the Soviet
Union will still be a superpower, and the
outcome of perestroika cannot yet be qualified
as irreversible. Ethnic minority problems and
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the upsurge of nationalisms mean uncertainties
about frontiers. The transition towards the
market economy will undoubtedly be accom-
panied by social unrest, and no type ofchange in
political rdgimes that are not yet firmly eitab-
lished can be ruled out. It also has to be said
from the security viewpoint that the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact has created a real structural
vacuum with reactions and disagreements
among its members, making it essential for these
nations to be brought under the umbrella ofjoint and lasting security.
We need a stable framework into which to fit
the changes now taking place in Europe and to
absorb the tension and maladjustment they
cause. The CSCE is performing and will con-
tinue to perform a highly important rOle in this
process and deserves our support. I also believe
that, as a European forum on matters of
security, WEU can and should contribute to the
success of thls process by strengthening its
instruments of action and reflection. This seems
the right point at which to mention the contri-
bution that could be made to this process by the
recently-formed Institute for Security Studies
ald-the help that WEU could give in organising
the forthcoming conference on military doctrine
scheduled for 1991.
Neither should I fail to mention the impor-
tance ofsetting up the conflict prevention centre
as recently decided at the CSCE summit. I agree
with the ideas on this subject expressed in-the
report. Its functions will consist of detecting
abnormal military activities and will help to
reinforce the communications network se[ up
under the CSCE agreements and the confidence-
building measures. In this connection I would
like to point out that the peaceful settlement of
differences, the central reason for the creation of
this centre, relates not only to the prevention of
disputes but also to the finding of ways and
means of settling peacefully any conflicts that
pay in flc! break out. In this connection it may
be useful for WEU to play its part in deciding
what positions should be adopted at the forth-
coming meeting of experts to be held in Valetta
early in l99l on this question of the peaceful
settlement of disputes.
One factor that is often said to contribute to
the difliculty of creating a security zone, and the
thirty-four countries belonging to the CSCE
themselves make the point, is precisely its
numerous and varied membership. And it is
true- that high numbers and variety place a limit
on flexibility of operation in matt'eri of security
and do not make it easy to construct a func-
tional, effective collective security system.
In fact, the CSCE is complementary to the
existing security alliances, i.e. NATO and WEU,
not an alternative or a substitute, and this is
stated in paragraph 56 of the report. Never-
theless, it is only by involving the countries of
Eastern Europe in the joint task of finding col-
lective solutions that we shall be able to lay the
foundations of a lasting order of peac-e in
Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Liapis, Observer from Greece.
Mr. LIAPIS (Observer from Greece). - Mr.
President, Greece abides by the international
peace and the principles emanating from
democracy and international law. Today, as it
has always done in the past, it is actively
co-operating with the allied forces deployed in
the Gulf. The participation of Greece in all the
common western operations during the century
was neither ambiguous nor hypocritical as it wai
for some other countries which lately have been
fighting for democracy, peace and even for the
European ideal.
Greece has participated and continues to par-
ticipate in all the common efforts of the West, for
the restoration of the international legacy, notgnly because it firmly and unconditi-onally
believes in all those values that constitute thb
respgct for national independence, human rights
and international order, but because of its own
painful experience, created in the past by the con-
stant violation of the above principles. We firmly
support the comment of the Secretary-General of
WEU in his information letter that: " Aggression
against one member of the United Nations is tan-
tamount to aggression against all. "
We believe, as does everybody else partici-
pating in this Assembly, in this international
order according to the implementation of the
relevant United Nations resolutions. But, at the
same time, we share the view that security and
co-operation are needed in our continent, espe-
cially after the latest historical events in Central
and Eastern Europe. There is an urgent need for
Western Europe to play its rightful rOle in main-
taining peace and international stability. That is
why we consider that the mission of WEU is
essential.
In addition, I believe that to strengthen its
important mission WEU should approach the
EEC in a spirit of closer and more fruitful
cmperation. In any case and for the moment,
WEU fills the existing vacuum in common EEC
security and defence policy.
But we must never forget that our common
dream is the creation of a supranational com-
munity and confederation with common
defence, foreign and economic policy. When the
time comes, the destiny of WEU is to be
absorbed by the EEC. At that time, we shall
have reached our ultimate goal 
- 
a united
Europe based on our common origin, territory
and religion.
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Although I listened with interest to the remarks
of Mr. Liapis, his last remark was quite unaccep-
table. He is taking us so far ahead of the report
which I presented yesterday, and which was
accepted unanimously, that he must have
intended to say that he wants this organisation
to be absorbed by the European Community.
Mr. LIAPIS (Observer from Greece). - In due
time.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Well, it came over rather swifter and more
utopian than that. Ifhe is talking about beyond
1998, anything could happen, and, as I said yes-
terday, I have an open mind on that issue.
I wish to mention five or six problems. All of
us were immensely heartened by the advent of
democracy in Poland, and we all applauded the
efforts of Solidarity. But I remember pointing
out then that Solidarity was the umbrella under
which it was possible for all segments of demo-
cratic Polish political thinking, together with the
church, to unite. I also said that at some stage
Poland, if she wished to pursue her democratic
ideals, would have to recognise that in the real
world of politics you cannot continue under an
umbrella. We have seen the beginning and the
disintegration of Solidarity, in the sense that
many of its segments have been fighting the
presidential election. In the elections for the
lower house early next year there will be even
more fragnentation.
That will apply throughout many of the coun-
tries that have left the rule of communism and
are looking for the best route forward into a
democratic world. It is all very well to have high
ideals and to aspire to a market economy - all of
which I thoroughly endorse - but until you have
grass roots organisations down in the villages and
towns that understand political thought and the
segment to which they belong people will feel cut
off. They will see these orators appearing on tele-
vision, they will recognise no connection between
them and the orators, and they will not realise
that they have a major r6le in ensuring not only
the acceptance of democracy, but its continu-
ation. It is very easy to achieve democracy; it is
even easier for it to slip away.
Seven months ago I had the great privilege of
addressing the Foreign Relations Committee of
the Polish Senate. I warned it that the real
danger would be the creation - in Poland, Yugo-
slavia or the Soviet Union - of fifty, sixty or
seventy different political parties. That is the
route to disillusion, disintegration and chaos.
That, rather than a nuclear war, may be the
problem that Europe will face over the next
decade.
In that context, where does WEU stand and
what can it achieve? I do not believe that we shall
have a major opportunity to influence people.
That is much more the responsibility of our sister
organisation, the Council of Europe. Earlier
today someone said that we must not thwart the
desire of some countries to become accepted into
Europe, but we must start with the recogrition
that the major priority is the endorsement of
human rights. Until the principle of human rights
is accepted throughout those countries, it is dif-
ficult to see how they will progress along the hard
road to a democratic system.
It was a little diflicult to accept the earlier
speech of a communist member, who chided us
on how we should reach democracy. The last
people from whom I want lessons in democracy
are the communists. I hasten to add that I do not
mean all the communists in this Assembly. I
find the views of the Portuguese and Italian
communists much more acceptable than the
views of many liberals whom I have met. It is
hypocritical of other communists to talk about
the need for democracy. I need not say which
country I am talking about.
In those circumstances, how should we
proceed? We have a duty to understand that our
security system in Europe needs to be expanded.
The sooner that this organisation is enlarged to
bring in the countries that wish to join us - not
merely those that are at present members of the
EC, which is not the best criterion for joining
this organisation - the sooner we shall have
the opportunity to work out a pan-European
securiiy system based on countries of like mind
and inclination. It will not be easy. As someone
said earlier, we shall have to accept that for four
decades it has been fairly easy to keep the peace
in Europe because each of the two blocs - the
Warsaw Pact and NATO 
- 
knew in its heart that
if it staned a warlike activity it would result in
the annihilation of both blocs. Therefore, in a
weird sense, that presented us with stability and
a strangely uneasy peace.
The Warsaw Pact has gone, and there is a real
prospect 
- 
I hope that it does not happen - of
the Soviet Union breaking up. Within the con-
fines of the Warsaw Pact, the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and the INF talks, it has
been relatively easy to reach agreement with the
Soviet Union about nuclear weapons. But if the
Soviet Union breaks up, how can we have an
agreement with, for example, the independent
[ussian state? For many years it will be impos-
sible for it to become a member of the United
Nations, and it will be extremely diffrcult to
reach an acceptable agreement with the Russian
federation. For the past forty years, the Russian
federation has provided the bulk of the top
officer echelons of the Soviet army, and there is
a gteat preponderance of nuclear weapons in
that state.
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For that reason alone, I endorse what my col-
league, Andrew Bowden, said earlier. We must
hope that Mr. Gorbachev not only stays in
power, but can find a way of holding the Soviet
Union together in the sense that agreements
signed by him on external matters will hold
throughout the Soviet Union.
That us the second danger that I foresee. Both
dangers can be overcome but nevertheless they
exist. Then we have to consider what organi-
sation can provide the input that a democracy
needs to have into decisions taken by govern-
ments.
Among the several amendments that will be
proposed tomorrow is a crucial one reminding
this Assembly of the need for a parliamentary
assembly for the CSCE. We must work out how
WEU will fit into that parliamentary assembly.
The three Helsinki baskets are very distinct and
we have little or no input into at least one of
them. But at this stage discussions are taking
place 
- 
in a somewhat unrealistic manner 
- 
on
how we can produce the right answers.
If we cannot persuade all the countries of the
CSCE that it is in their interest to have a parlia-
mentary assembly, we shall have a major
obstacle to overcome. We know from what has
been said so far that the majority of CSCE coun-
tries, particularly those of Eastern and Central
Europe, are in favour of such an assembly. Mr.
Gorbachev said in Strasbourg that he reco[nised
the need for the United States and Canada to
remain involved in Europe.
The United States and Canada participate in
CSCE. One must remember that E stands for
Europe and we have the interesting paradox of
some in the United States who do not want tojoin an organisation that has in its title the word
Furope. How do we reach the ideal whereby the
input that covers WEU combines with the input
that covers the relevant baskets of Helsinki? We
shall need all the influence that we can exert in
the North American continent to try to persuade
people that, without their input in such an
organisation, it would be a less good organi-
sation.
I am conscious that I am speaking for rather
longer than usual, and I am also conscious ofthe
fact that there is no timeJimit. In conclusion, I
want to address another issue that is relevant to
my speech and which is, in human terms, the
most difficult and most dangerous to address.
What will happen to Europe after lst January
when many millions of Soviet citizens get pass-
ports and decide to move across frontiers? We
shall be faced with the prospect of tens of thou-
sands of Soviet citizens who may not merely
wish to visit our nations on holiday, but to stay.
Are we going to turn them back? Are we going to
put them into camps as my government has
been forced to do in Hong Kong with those
people who are not genuine refugees from
Vietnam? That problem must be considered.
The German Government plans to abolish the
need for visas for Polish citizens. Will that lead
to a great influx of Poles into the German
nation?
Sadly, we already know that there are many
people in all our countries who are bitter and
unreasoning and who hate foreigners. They will
try to make life diflicult for them. We may be
faced with the spectacle 
- 
which the media will
use 
- 
of people being brutally and roughly
turned back or put into camps. At once, those
people from Eastern and Central Europe will
question whether our countries are democracies.I can imagine them saying: * We now have
freedom to travel, but our freedom has been cur-
tailed. How do we get into a different country? "I can almost foresee more bloodshed, trouble
and people killed in the next decade as a result
of this phenomenon than were killed in Europe
in the past forty years.
I have no solution and I am not certain that
this organisation is the right one to find it, but if
we do not find one, we may feed the fires of
nationalism. Those fires led to Sarajevo and that
led to 1939. What ended in 1945 left us with
some of the problems that were not solved inl9l8 and some of the problems that caused
Sarajevo.
We must find a way of making the last decade
of this century and the beginning of the next
century safe for our children otherwise they will
curse us for having failed to understand that one
does not necessarily die any more happily by
conventional weapons than one does by nuclear
weapons.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The
applause in the chamber is ample evidence of
the interest members took in your address, Sir
Geoffrey.
The debate is closed.
The Chairman of the Political Committee
would no doubt like to make a few remarks to
end the debate, and I therefore call Mr.
Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, as Chairman of
the committee and also as Rapporteur, I would
like to thank most warmly all those members
who have spoken to this report, and especiallyfor their leniency towards this very brief
report.
The common thread in all the statements was
the change in the situation in Europe,
characterised until recently by East-West con-
frontation, by different systems, and by two mil-
itary pacts arming against each other. Today
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uncertainty in Europe has other, and different
sources.
I will not go into what each and every member
said. They all pointed out that the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe are now in a very
serious economic plight, that there are
enonnous social tensions, which we are no
longer used to, and, we might add,-ecological
pro-blems on a scale that is also fortunately
unknown to us. All these uncertainties of an eco-
nomic and social nature could become politi-
cally explosive. It is certainly no exaggeration to
describe some of these countries today as a
powder keg which a spark might suflice to
ignite.
Remember that in the Soviet Union thirteen
thousand Red Army soldiers who used to be sta-
tioned in the former German Democratic
Republic are having to live in tents this winter.
This alone could result in a movement which
would force the armed forces of the Soviet
Union to take action that might easily get out of
hand. That is only one of the possible sparks.
A second element of uncertainty has similarly
been referred to again and again; the demise of
the communist system of suppression has
resulted in the strengthening of nationalist
movements. We see this both in the Soviet
Union and in other countries, and I will say
quite frankly that in my own country, or in some
parts of it at least, the thinking and the language
are more nationalist today than a year or two
ago. We must keep a very close eye on this.
What can we do now? I strongly endorse one
demand that has been voiced. We need a system
that embraces East and West, and we need the
involvement of the United States of America
and Canada, something else that was not dis-
puted in the debate. It is entirely due to the
United States and Canada that this * peace ",
this absence of war, has been preserved in the
last few decades. We will continue to need them
as guarantors of peace in Europe. And we must -
thii too has been said - talk more openly to one
another - not about one another, but to one
another.
We must also establish new rights for minor-
ities, and the appropriate body for this is cer-
tainly not Western European Union but the
Council of Europe. If we accept that all the fron-
tiers in Europe remain unchanged, including
those which seem absurd, even those whose
creation entailed the violation of international
law and human rights, we will be having
minority problems in almost every European
country in the near future.
So what we need is strong protection for
minorities. Othenvise, if the minorities are
unable to come into their own and develop
freely in their own way in the countries they are
in and where they have to live, we shall inevi-
tably see efforts being made to change frontiers,
which will lead to international tensions.
I think I am right in saying that it was Mar-
garet Thatcher who once said ice was at its most
dangerous when it was melting. I believe she was
right. We will have to keep a very close eye on
th-ese new elements of uncertainty in Europe.
Sir Geoffrey referred to another threat, the
danger of further migrations within Europe from
Easf to West. I recently read a Soviet source
which stated that ifperestroika does not succeed
and a roll-back occurs in the Soviet Union, some
twenty-three million people will leave the
country for the West. Imagine what that would
mean to us! It would be chaos.
As you can see in all your countries, wherever
foreighers are concentrated, where they are
perhaps more numerous than the indigenous
population, nationalist tendencies are very pro-
nounced and nationalist parties and citizens'
action groups quickly formed. This is inevitable.
So we must try to keep these people in the East.
That is why it is so important to help the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe to
survive the winter. In countries where the distri-
bution system is collapsing it is a truly difficult
task to eliminate famine by means of donations.
Nevertheless, I believe we must try everything.
For example, I am grateful to my government
for sending to the Soviet Union the supplies
stockpiled in West Berlin against a possible
future blockade. I feel we should all be consid-
ering the opportunities for similar moves in our
own countries.
Many speakers pointed out th-at, with
East-West confrontation now a thing of the past,
Europe will have to redefine its r6le in the world
and witl then have to play its r6le more vigor-
ously than in the past. The image of the world
still 
-bears 
the stamp of Europe and even today
the countries of Europe still carry a responsi-
bility for this world. Many of the tensions in the
world are the outcome of European policies.
Speaking of Kuwait, as we have done today, we
a[ know that the frontiers drawn for it were not
exactly of the happiest, but they too were the
outcome of a EuroPean PolicY.
We must take our responsibilities in the world
more seriously. We will be able to survive in the
long term and cope with the threats from outside
onty if we broaden our sense of responsibility
and look beyond our own continent, large as it
has now become.
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in recent
months I have paid numerous visits to a part of
Germany which used to have a communist gov-
ernment. What depresses me most there is not
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the backwardness of the infrastructure and the
poverty that confronts one: far worse are the
changes in people's attitudes. People who used
to live in a system in which it was dangerous for
them to have thoughts of their own, and in
which private initiative made them suspect,
cannot be expected to launch themselves
straight into the market economy today. We
must have patience, and we will need a grcat
deal of imagination if we are to overcome the
major difference that still exists between people
in Europe today, even though the communist
system has collapsed. Only then will Europe find
peace.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr.
Ahrens, I am sure I speak on behalf of all the
members when I express our thanks not only for
the work you have done these last few days but
also for a[ ttrat you have accomplished over so
many years. I am particularly pleased to be in
the Chair at the moment as it gives me the
chance to tell you that during the time which
some of us parliamentarians still have before us
we shall think of you as a model to pattern our-
selves upon in our efforts to improve our work
as members of parliament and Europeans but,
more especially, as right-minded people and
right-minded democrats. Thank you Mr. Ahrens.
7. Change in the oder of business
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Because of
the progress that we have made, the orders of
business for the two sittings tomorrow are very
light.
As I know that many of you would be glad if
we could end our debates tomorrow morning
I suggest that the order of business for this end
of the session be amended to allow Mr.
Tummers's report on the conversion of the
Soviet defence industry to be debated immedi-
ately after the vote on the recommendation con-
cerning the consequences of developments in
Central and Eastern Europe for European
security.
I understand that Mr. Tummers is in
agreement.
Are there any objections?
The change in the order ofbusiness is agreed
to.
8. Date, time and ordcn of the day
of the n*t sitting
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I propose
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting
tomorrow morning, Thursday, 6th December, at
l0 a.m. with the following orders of the day:
l. Consequences of developments in Central
and Eastern Europe for European security(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc-
ument 1255 and amendments).
2. Konversiya 
- 
conversion in Soviet military
industry (Presentation of and debate on the
report of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 1249).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The silting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)
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The sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in
the Chair.
l. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Consequences of developments in Central and-Eastern
Europi for European seiurity (vote on the draft recom'
mendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ward, Mr. Martine?, Mr.
Ahrens, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Caro (explanation of votQ,
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Ahrens.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The sitting is open.
1. Attendancc rugistet
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The names of the substi-
tutes attending this sitting which have been
notified to the-President will be published with
the list of representatives appended to the
minutes of proceedings r.
2. Adoption of tlu minutes
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule2l of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of
proceedings of the two previous sittings have
been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agteed to.
3. C,onsequercu of developments in C*ntral
and Eostera Europe for Eumpcan security
(Votc oa tlu dnfi twmneadation,
Doc. 1255 and aotcndaats)
The PRESIDENT. - The next order of the
day is the vote on the draft recommendation on
th6 consequences of developments in Central
and Eastern Europe for European security, Doc-
ument 1255 and amendments. The debate on
the committee's report was concluded yes'
terday.
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4. Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry, (Pre-
sentation'of and debate on the report of the Technological
and Auoslace Committee and vote on the draft recom'
mendation, Doc. 1249).
Spealcers: The President, Mr. Tummers (Rappglt9y),5r.
Moya, Mr. Elisseev (Obsemu from the- USS_fl/, Mr.
Morcira, Mrs. van den Brink (Member of the European
Parliament, Obseme), Mr. Pedregosa, Mr. Atkinson, Mr'
Tummers (Rapporteur), Mr. Stegagnini (C hairman).
5. Close ofthe session.
Eight amendments to the draft recommen-
dation have been tabled, in the name of Mr.
Brito and others.
The amendments will be considered in the
order in which they relate to the text of the draft
recommendation, which in this case is the order
in which they are numbered.
Amendment l, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
In the preamble to the draft recommendation,
after paragraph (il, add the following new para-
graphs:
'Welcoming the end of the division of
Europe and of the East-West confrontation
and the progress towards democratisation and
liberalisatioh in the Soviet Union and the
other Eastern European countries;
Concerned nevertheless at the alarming
decline in the economic situation in Eastern
Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable
repercusslons;
Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels
Treaty in which dl WEU member countries
undertook to promote the economic recovery
of Europe;'
As none of the signatories is present, I call Mr.
Ward to move the amendment.
Mr. WARD (United Kingdom). - I move the
amendment formally.
The PRESIDENT. - The amendments are
signed by representatives of the poli.lical groups,
so to tnit exlent they should be easily accepted.
Mr. Martinez, would you like to speak to
Amendment 1, which Mr. Ward has moved for-
mally?l. See page 41.
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Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). 
- 
| should like to
suggest a procedure that will make for economy
of time and argument. As you realise, the
amendments have been signed by empowered
representatives of the groups whose task it is to
agree items that have already been discussed
and adopted in the relevant committees. They
deal with a text that has already been agreed.
Yesterday, when we saw the text that was elabo-
rated by the Rapporteur, Mr. Lemoine, we had
the feeling that it was far too meagre and was
linked too much to the current situation without
taking into account a number of other consider-
ations. Therefore, the recommendation of our
Assembly would have been a bit weak.
The subject is very important 
- the conse-
quences of developments in Central and Eastern
Europe for European security. We should not
come out with a meagxe statement relating only
to present circumstances. Therefore, we thought
that we should give more substance to the items
that have already been discussed and approved
in the committee.
That is why I hope that it will be possible to
adopt the amendments without having a full
debate on each one. There is nothing very newin them. They merely complemeni the text
about which Mr. Lemoine spoke yesterday.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you, Mr.
Martinez. We shall have to go through them
briefly for the sake of form. Does anyone wish to
speak against Amendment l?...
That is not the case.
Does the Chairman of the committee wish to
say anything?...
_Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, I do not want to
repeat what Mr. Martinez has said. The
amendment deals mainly with ideas that were
expressed here in the Assembly yesterday
afternoon; the reference to the very poor eco-
nomic and social situation in Central and
Eastern Europe, which we must overcome
together if we want genuine peace and balance
in Europe.
On the committee's behalf I urge members to
adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDENT. I will now put
Amendment I to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was then tal<cn by show of hands)
Amendment I is agreed to.
Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
In the preamble to the draft recommendation,
after paragraph (iil, add the following new para-
graphs:
* Emphasising that European security would
be threatened if areas of instability emerged in
Eastern Europe;
Considering that the strengthening and
institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer
the peoples of Europe new prospects and
improved security on the basis of a streng-
thened system of all-European co.operation;
Considering that the strengthened CSCE
should henceforth be used as the principal
forum for advancing disarmament and ihe
limitation of armaments;'
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). I move the
amendment formally.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against Amendment 2?...
That is not the case.
Does the Chairman wish to add anything?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany).
- 
No.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I will now put
Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was taken by show of hands).
Amendment 2 is agreed to.
Amendment 3, which has been tabled by
Mr. Brito and others, reads:
In the preamble to the draft recommendation,
after paragraph (it), add the following new para-
graPhs:
* Welcoming the fact that the final settlement
of the German problem has made it possible
to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic
Alliance and allowed the German people to be
united in freedom, thus enhancing stability
and security in Central Europe;
Considering that Germany's undertakings in
regard to recognition of its present frontiers
with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation
of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the
levels of its armed forces are exemplary mea-
sures that are likely to strengthen the confi-
dence of all European countries; -
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). I move the
amendment formally.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against the arnendment?...
That is not the case.
Do you wish to add anything, Mr. Ahrens?
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany).
- 
No.
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The PRESIDENT. I will now Put
Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.
(A vote was taken by show of hands)
Amendment 3 is agreed to.
Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
In the preamble to the draft recommendation,
after paragaph (iii), add the following new para-
graphs:
* Supporting the steps being taken to establish
an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, which would give the parliamentary
dimension to the CSCE process as decided by
the Paris summit, while recalling its own
responsibilities in all areas covered by the
modified Brussels Treaty;
Recalling that WEU has special responsibility
in the establishment of a new European
security concept based on the doctrine ofsuf-
ficiency and taking account of the situation
that will exist after the treaty on conventional
disarmament has been signed;
Considering the maintenance of United States
and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an
essential factor for guaranteeing the future
security of Europe in a new environment;"
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). - This is a very
important amendment because it deals with the
parliamentary dimension of the CSCE in which
almost all of us have been involved. There are
strong feelings about what the future should
hold. 'We must not create institutions that
duplicate work and expense. In creating the par-
liamentary assembly of the CSCE, we should use
the experience that we have gained in our
Assembly and in the Assembly of the Council of
Europe, which brings together parliamentarians
from almost every country in the CSCE and
which will soon involve more.
Therefore, this paragraph is extremely
important as it will help us to reach a reasonable
settlement in our continuing debate. We must be
united in our purpose in the coming months to
achieve the reasonable solution foreseen in the
text that will be adopted.
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to
speak against the amendment?...
I note that Mr. Ahrens has nothing to add.
I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show
of hands.
(A vote was then talcen by show of hands)
Amendment 4 is agreed to.
I call Mr. Caro.
Mr. CARO (France)(Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I voted in favour of this amendment
which, as Mr. Martinez has explained, is of con-
siderable importance and I would like to explain
why I voted for it.
In the first place, I look upon this as a part of
the preamble and not the operative clauses. That
is my feeling on the matter. There are two points
I want to make in explanation of my vote.
The first is a position which I, and I am not
alone, continue to defend. The adulthood which
Europe has now reached in organisations like
the Council of Europe, WEU and the Com-
munity entitles them to form the organisational,
not to say institutional, centre of what is done
within the CSCE framework. I therefore see the
first paragtaph of the amendment culminating
in an assembly of Europe based on the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I
agree, but extended within that framework to
those CSCE members who are not members of
the Council of Europe, which is after all
somewhat different. This is how I see it, but my
vote is nonetheless in favour.
The second point concerns WEU, and Mr.
Martinez drew attention to it a short time ago
when he spoke in support of the amendment.
We shall have another opportunity to discuss its
institutional r6le as such in the debates on the
organisation of the Helsinki process in the wake
of-the summit which has just been held'and
bearing in mind the relevant proposals which
WEU has already made under this heading.
WEU's institutional r6le is also something I
have in mind.
The PRESIDENT. - Amendment 5, which
has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others,
reads:
After paragraph I of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraPh:
* Play an active part in building the new all-
European system ofco-operation and security
and give it useful impetus based on the
co-operation structures set up by member
countries in the framework of WEU, the
European Community and the Atlantic
Alliance; "
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). I move the
amendment formally.
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to
speak against Amendment 5?...
Mr. Ahrens has nothing to add.
I will now put Amendment 5 to the vote by
show of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
Amendment 5 is agreed to.
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Amendment 6, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
After paragraph 2 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph:
* Give strong impetus to the European Com-
munity's efforts to organise and coordinate
assistance to the economies of the countries
concerned;'
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). 
- 
The amendment
is the result of our discussions. We have already
said that the economies of a numberof countries
have been badly affected by the consequences of
the Gulf crisis and the embargo. We take
responsibility for helping those countries to
overcome their difliculties. We should make
that clear in the recommendation.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against the amendment?...
Mr. Ahrens has nothing further to add.
I will now put Amendment 6 to the vote by
show of hands.
(A vote was then tal<cn by show of hands)
Amendment 6 is agreed to.
Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
After paragraph 3 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add a new paragraph:
* In accordance with the modified Brussels
Treaty, examine from a military standpoint
the consequences of the reduction in tensiortin Europe following the progressive with-
drawal of Soviet troops and define, in prepa-
ration for examination in the Atlantic
Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of
allied forces in Europe; "
I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). 
- 
I move the
amendment formally.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against the amendment?...
Mr. Ahrens has nothing further to add.
I will_ now put Amendment 7 to the vote by
show of hands.
(A vote was then tal<cn by show of hands)
Amendment 7 is agreed to.
_ 
Amendment 8, which has been tabled by Mr.
Brito and others, reads:
After paragraph 4 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, add the following new para-
graphs:
'Follow up the intention it expressed in
Brussels to strengthen co-operation between
member countries in security matters so as to
open the way for a possible European union
associating the European Community,
European political co-operation and WEU;
Pursue its efforts to ensure that current
thinking about the creation of multinational
forces is set in the context of a European
security dimension;
Work out, with due account for the specific
nature of European security interests, a
European position for revising the strategy of
the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain
Europe's security in a new environment;
Develop means of countering more quickly
and more effectively any dangers which may
arise out of area;
Examine the expediency of regular meetings
of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member
countries;
Re+xamine the r6le of deterrence in the new
European security context;
Take the decision to create an observation sat-
ellite agency.'
I call Mr. MartinEz to move the amendment.
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). 
- 
The paragraph is
important as it states the main tasks necessary to
implement the ideas that we have already dis-
cussed. It is an important paragraph to be
included in the recommendation.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Does anyone wish to
speak against the amendment?...
Does the Chairman wish to add somo-
thing?...
Mr. AHRENS Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, on behalf of the
committee I should just like to take this oprpor-
tunity to thank memben and the secretariat who
have together taken the trouble to give the
report some real substance in a very short timeby adopting these amendments. This has
enabled us to say something about the present
situation in Europe and the tasls we face in the
immediate future. I believe the Assembly can be
happy with this report.
The PRESIDENT. 
- I will now put
Amendment 8 to thp vote by show of hands.
(A vote was tal<en by show of hands)
Amendmertt 8 is agreed to.
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1255, as amended.
_Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show
of hands unless five representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by
roll-call.
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Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The amended draft recommendation ,s
adopted unanimously t.
1. Konveniya - conversion
in Sovia military industry
(Presenntion of ad fufute oa the ruPrt
oltlu Tccfunlogical aad Actospuc Commine and wtc
on the dr{t ruommondatiott, Doc. 1249)
The PRESIDENT. - The final order of the
day is the presentation of and debate on the
reiort of the Technological and Aelospacg Com-
mittee on konversiya 
-conversion in Soviet mil-
itary industry and vote on the draft recommen'
dation, Document 1249.
I call Mr. Tummers to present his report.
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlandsl (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, before I present the report I
want to make a point of thanking the committee
which instructed me to draw it up. It entrusted
this task to me because I have so often referred
to the origins of WEU in committeg lnd, tq plt
it briefly, have backed internal stability and the
stand against disastrous militarism as g-uar-
antees o-f peace and security in our countries.
I should also like to express my appreciation
to the Supreme Soviet, which was my host whenI visited-the Soviet Union in connection with
this report. I can say that my visit took place in
the trut spirit of glasnost. We had absolutely no
diffrculty in obtaining information. We were
allowedio inspect the original documents on the
spot, and we got straight down to business. I
would add that, when we were not working, we
were given the opportunity to gnjoy the-cultural
side of the Soviet capital, from Tolstoy to
Mayakovsky, and from the Kremlin monuments
to the Sukov Tower. For this we are particularly
grateful to our guide, Mrs. Tabarova.
We can now say that konversiya is a lively
topical issue, which is attracting interest on all
levels of society. Politically, this was apparent
here when questions were Put on Mr.
Chev0nement's statement. Members from both
the Federal Republic and Portugal asked ques'
tions on this subject. In this morning's Figalo I
read a page-long article by Mrs. Hdllne CarrBre,
reporting a recent survey of the soci4l dimension
of the changes that result from the transition
from the military to the civil sphere. In this case
the focus is on the army rather than on affns
production.
Konversiya is, of course, occurring within the
framework-of the economic situation in the
Soviet Union. But we resisted the temptation to
write at length on this subject becausd that
would really-have exceeded our telms of ref-
erence and-would also have covered a much
wider area. That would not have been the best
wav to eet to the heart of the matter. We are
pleised,-of course, that, apart from lhe treaties
ielatingto economic aid which are referred to in
the rep-ort, a treaty on economic aid was siqqe$by tlie Soviet Union and Italy on lSth
November, and that Spain has also offered a
programme of economic aid, without con-
cluding a specific treaty.
Besides the economic problems, the report
describes both the opportunities and the
problems involved in the transition from mil-
itary production to the manufacture of con'
suniei goods. The report bears witness to the
desire -for konversiya which we encountered
durine our visit to the Soviet Union in early
Septefober. With reference to this desire - and I
want to emphasise this - I must add that a great
deal has still to be done before it can be con-
verted into reality. The change from the pro-
duction of military goods to consumer goods
clearly cannot be establishgd on lhe right lines
ouernight. A great deal of effort will be involved,
not only as regards programming or in technical
matters, but ilso wtren it comes to the social
implicaiions of the conversion programme. The
report therefore indicates the need for us to
foilow up the programme. I hope this view will
also be -supported here. In other words, we-
cannot say that the report makes a number of
recommeridations, and then pass on to the next
subject. Precisely because it is necessary for us
to io-operate in konversiya, we must try to make
the facilities we have available to the Soviet
Union. So we must stick to the proglamme, and
see how matters develop in this area. This pre-
sentation is not the end of the story. We must
also be prepared to take another look at the
progress-of-developments in, say, two years'
time.
As regards these difiiculties, and especially
those relating to the realisation ofthe intention
to proceed to konversiya, we must appreciate
that enormous numbers of people are involved
and that the military industry has already begun
to manufacture a whole range of consumer
goods. So there arc many commodities in
Evervdav use which have been produced under
tne irm5retta of the military production appt'
ratus, thus escaping the stringent standards of
the market place, which are, of course, needed to
keep this transition to the market economy-
under control. So we do not know if the price of
a refrigerator is attuned to its marketingl. See page 42.
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potential, or if it has a production price linked
to the options open to the military production
apparatus for its manufacture, wilhout any
accurate check on what the market price should
be. This may cause difficulties. Another point is
that.the military are running the military pro-
duction apparatus. It will be very difficult-ini-
tially to get these people to demonstrate the flex-ibility required in order to switch to other
production methods. They will have to be imagi-
native and gear their management to be so as
well, and they will also have to realise the
necessity for this, which will pose quite a few
problems in the general context of changes in the
Soviet Union. When offering our help, we must
therefore focus on young people wanting to
specialise in management who ire keen to dis-
cover the requirements of adjustment to the
market._In addition, they must be keen to study
the market economy as such, and the part they
can play in it as businessmen. So when we talk
about help, this is the kind of help vrc must offer
first. In other words, retraining-and in-service
training will be needed before large sums are
spent on specific enterprises.
Mr. President, if a proper start can be made
on konversiya in the Soviet Union in a period of
about two years, a period in which various
things can be adjusted 
- 
I am not saying that
everything will have progressed as far as we
would like by that time 
- 
some assimilation will
be achieved with what WEU is seeking: eco-
nomic, social and cultural stability, as a-sound
basis for peace and security. That ls an idea we
can endorse.
To conclude my presentation, I want to point
out that we now haye to tackle questions relating
to the definition of conversion used in manuali
and text books in the Soviet Union. We have
mentioned two of them on page 15. You will see
that this refers not only to a number of technical
requirements but also to the human dimension,
to people's everyday lives, for which decent
living conditions must be ensured and social and
cultural opportunities provided. I particularly
want to emphasise this, because looking to the
future, all these things will have to be con-
sidered. We must be less hesitant in reaching out
to the people who are at work.
_ 
There was speculation here yesterday about
the economic ddbdcle and the ensuing chaos that
might occur if certain measures were taken in
the Soviet Union. We must, of course, do
nothing to encourage zuch eventualities. -The
best way of avoiding this is to apply ourselves to
the needs of the people in theif everyday lives
under decent conditions. We know thlt the
Soviet Union recently signed the cultural con-
vention of the Council of Europe, providing us
with an additional link. Thii ii someihat
remote from the subject of konversiya, but these
things are not all independent: they are, inter-
woven, related to one another. The cultural con-
vention of the Council of Europe opens up
opportunities. It will be possible in future to
switch from military affairs to the social aspects
of life and the -manufacture of ionsumer
goods.
Mr. President, I see that no amendment has
been tabled to the report, which was completed
some time ago. I hope this is not a sign of lick ofinterest in the report as such but an
endorsement of the simple recommendations we
have made. We could not have done more. I
would remind you that there has been no imme-
diate response to the idea of donating large sums
of money, not even in the Europeai' Com-
munity. After all, no one knew precisely what
structures there were, where the money would
go, or what might be done with it. The aim of
the recommendation is to support the plan to
implement konversiya quickli. That -is our
F-nmary 
-concern. We must, moreover, keepabreast of events so that we can continue to giv-e
this support. This is the way to achieve sitis-
factory results.
The PRESIDENT. 
- Thank you, Mr.
Tummers, not only for a fascinating intro-
duction but an interesting report. Thanlfyou for
contributing to the skill of the committee, which
has not called any amendments forward. you
are to be complimented on that.
The debate is open.
I call Mr. Moya.
Mr, MOYA (Spain) (Translation). 
- 
I shouldjust Iike to make a few brief comments on the
e-xcellent- repgrt presented to us this morning,
the result of much hard and fruitful work.I
believe that it contributes something new not
only in relation to the conversion of the Soviet
defence industry but also, mutatis mutandis, in
terms of the light it may throw on the con-
version of arms industries in other countries.
What I have to say follows the thread of the
main argrrment of the report, but basically it
concerns not so much the content, namely
industrial conversion in the Soviet Union, bui
rather collateral aspects connected with the
destruction of surplus material arising out of the
CFE agreements recently signed in Faris.
First, something occurs to me that is not often
considered, lam9ly that we have to recognisethe economic impact that a disarmament
process has, at least in the short term, due to the
cost of destruction and verification. That being
so, I believe that the idea often entertained thai
disarmament will automatically lead to imme-
diate tudgetary savings in any-country may be
ryi91aken, at least in the short term ind espe-
cially in countries more particularly affected-by
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the arms reduction quotas. I believe that this
phenomenon will be true of many countries, and
that, at least initially, we should not have any
false hopes that disarmament will necessarily
lead to immediate large budgetary savings. This
may not happen because of the costs involved.
Secondly, I believe that the CFE agreements
on the destruction of surplus equipment will
affect the Soviet Union and its conversion oper-
ations more than it will affect many countries in
the alliance, because the latter will have much
smaller quotas. I shall not quote figures, but it is
obvious that if the Soviet Union reduces its
combat aircraft strength by approximately half,
and gives up nearly 6090 or 7090 of its tanks,
whereas NATO will have to destroy only a few
hundred, there is a disproportion because ofthe
disproportion that existed in the first place,
given the asymmetry of conventional forces in
Europe that was very much to the advantage of
the Warsaw Pact. I say this because, as I under-
stand it, one of the problems that will affect the
future processes of destruction and verification
in the Soviet Union will be, or is being, deter-
mined by the fact that, having moved vast quan-
tities of military equipment to the other side of
the Urals, the Soviets may not destroy as much
equipment as might first have been thought.
Indeed, as somebody has said, this transfer oper-
ation may be thought to be in breach of the
spirit of the agreement. And although it is
intended that a large part of the equipment
moved to the Asiatic zone of the Soviet Union
be destroyed, this destruction may not in prin-
ciple be subject to the verification arrangements
for which the agreement provides. This will no
doubt be one of the thorny questions to be
resolved by the future advisory committee
charged with monitoring implementation.
Lastly, I would just refer to another point in
the report 
- 
which has already been mentioned -
about the effect on civilian research which to
begin with will have priority over the arma-
ments industry. On this matter I would simply
say that although, of course, this will be the situ-
ation both in the Soviet Union and in other
countries, I think that to a large extent some of
these technological processes can be used for
both civilian and military applications. In some
degree the distinction between research for spe-
cifically military or specifically civilian pur-
poses, which used to be clear-cut, is becoming
blurred by the alternative uses that many of the
products concerned are now beginning to have
in industry.
To conclude, these were just a few remarks on
a report which is generally excellent and com-
plete, and which throws much light both on the
process that will shortly be applied in the Soviet
Union and on the parallel processes that may
occur in other countries.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you, Mr. Moya.
I now call Mr. Elisseev, an observer from the
Soviet Union, who I think is with us for the first
time.
Mr. ELISSEEY (Observer from the USSR)(Translation). 
- 
I first wish to express our grat-
itude for giving us the possibility to attend this
session. We are very interested in fostering
co-operation between parliamentarians and con-
sider this possibility to be a sign of your will to
build jointly the political foundations for the
harmonious development of the world.
Towards the end of the twentieth century,
competition between the military powers of
states exceeded acceptable limits. There are
now, in the world, several times the volume of
arms needed to wipe out our civilisation com-
pletely. Continuing the anns race merely
increases the possibility of a disastrous trend of
events.
The Soviet Union is now proposing to ter-
minate competition and reverse the trend. This
is the specific goal of converting our country's
defence industry. The degree of conversion is
determined by reasonable sufficiency for the
security of the state. We hope the level of this
suflicienry will decrease although we see that
not all the participants in the arms race have
decided to stop it. Many types of dangerous
weapons are still being developed. This is a
warning for us.
The report presented at the session today
largely corresponds to our assessment of the
course to be followed by conversion in the
Soviet Union and the problems we shall have to
overcome.
According to the plans that have been
adopted, military expenditure in our country is
to be reduced by 1490 in 1990-91 and, by about
1995, its proportion of GNP should be reduced
by one and a half. Conversion affects about 500
firms which are now organising co-operation
with firms in France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Federal Germany and other countries
and we are gaining experience with direct links
between firms. There are certain obstacles to be
overcome such as the negative influence of the
restrictive Cocom lists.
We believe all countries have an interest in
developing ceoperation, which must become
multilateral, and here Western European Union
might play a significant r6le. In this respect, it
would be very useful to organise consultations
between representatives of WEU and parliamen-
tarians from Eastern European countries.
The parliamentary charter invites us to pursue
conversion in military, political and economic
concepts. We hope this conversion will be a
success.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you for that most
interesting contribution, Mr. Elisseev.
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The next speaker is Mr. Moreira.
Mr. MOREIRA (Portugafl (Translation). 
-Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the FinalAct of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) signed in Hel-
sinki in 1975 opened up new opportunities for
scientific and technological exchange. In imple-
mentation of the conclusions of this conference
a number of meetings tmk place between
experts from the West and from Central and
Eastern Europe, promoting personal contacts
and political ddtente.
Unhappily, at the beginning of the eighties
relations between the East and West again deter-
iorated and a period of tension due to the wors"
ening of the international climate led to the
freezing of various programmes of international
co-operation, in particular the joint United
States-Soviet Union programmes in the field of
energl, transport and space research.
However, with the rise of President
Gorbachev to political leadenhip in the Soviet
Union the authorities of that country began to
exhibit increasing ooncern about the deplorable
state of the national economy at a time when
military expenditure represented a high pro-
portion ofgross national product.
This significant change in Soviet policy
announced and implemented by Mr. Gorbachev
led to reductions in personnel and equipment in
the Soviet armed fores, reductions which began
after his speech in December 1988 before the
General Assembly of the United Nations and
which have continued up to the present time.
The freeing of budgetary resources, staff and
personnel undertaken in parallel with reductions
in military personnel and equipment enabled
the Soviet state to'begin converting its military
industry and using the capacities thus released
for civilian purposes.
In addition to this, from 1989 onwards
opinion in Western Europe increasingly held
that the threats to world peace were no longer
coming from Central and Eastern Europe but
were arising in certain countries of the South
and the third world. This new trend of opinion
in the West influenced the report submitted by
the Committee on Economic Affairs and Devel-
opment of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on the subject of a report on
the arms trade and the rights of man, in which it
was suggested that a Cocom (Co-ordinating
Committee for the Multilateral Control ol
Exports) within which eastern and western
countries were working together to prohibit the
export ofsensitive products to certain countries
of the South, would be extremely useful.
Unhappily, the crisis in the Gulf which began
on 2nd August last, came as a confirmation of
the concern of this body of opinion in
Europe.
In fact, as I said earlier, more and more people
in western countries have been comini io this
conclusion as the Central and Eastern European
countries have been ending the communist
r6gimes under which they had lived for four
decades and returning to democracy and to
democratic freedom, or have taken decisive
steps towards transforming themselves into
democratic legal states and, economically, into
market economies.
In addition to Mr. Gorbachev's political will
and to the trends of opinion in Europe men-
tioned above, one should also mention that
various domestic consumer goods such as colour
televisions, audio and video equipment, refrige-
rators and sewing machines are now being
almost entirely manufactured by the Soviet
defence industries.
As early as l97l the then Secretary-General of
the CPSU, konid Brezhnev, stated that civilian
products represented 4CI6 of the total pro-
duction of the defence ihdustry, and this per-
centage remained stable until 1988. According
to information released by the Soviet author-
ities, it was due to increase to 5096 in 1990, 53%
in l99l and 60q6 before 1995.
At first sight, and bearing in mind that the fac-
tories now producing domestic capital goods
were dependent upon the nine ministries into
which the great Soviet military defence complex
was divided, it seemed easy to implement the
conversion of the defence industry. This,
however, did not happen in 1988 and 1989, a
fact which led the military-industrial com-
mission (the authority co-ordinating the defence
complex) and the Defence Industry Department
of Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) to
initiate, together with the Ministry of Defence, a
national programme of conversion of the
defence industry covering the years l99l-95
under which the defence industry was to direct
its effort of civilian production into the fol-
lowing three main areas: improving the living
standards of the population; stimulating scien-
tific and technical progress in industrial-sectors
and in the national economy as a whole; and
lastly, developing new types of technological
materials in civil production.
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the well-
constnrcted report of our colleague Mr.
Tummers, whom I congratulate and thank once
mone, contains ample arguments to deserve our
unqualified approval, as does also the draft rec-
ommendation, since internjtional peace and
security will be more socure and lasting the more
countries and their people work together,
become better acquainted and create bonds of
mutual friendship and brotherhood.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Obrigado, Mr. Moreira.
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Before I call the next speaker, colleagues may
be interested to know that the previous speaker,
Mr. Elisseev, was one of the early Soviet cosmo-
nauts. We congratulate him on what must have
been a brave adventure.
The next speaker is Mrs. van den Brink.
Mrs. van den BRINK (Member of the
European Parliament, Observ er) (Translation). -
Mr. President, it is a$eat honour for me to take
the floor here for the first time as the represent-
ative of the European Parliament. I consider it
very important for closer contacts to be estab-
lished between the European Parliament and
WEU. We will undoubtedly find ways and
means of achieving this at the intergovern-
mental conference to be held in Rome in
December.
It is a great pleasure for me to make a few
comments on Mr. Tummer's report. I am not a
little impressed by his clear analysis. As you can
imagine, I have not yet studied the report in
depth and there has been no opportunity to
discuss it in the European Parliament. On the
other hand, we have discussed it with three rep
resentatives of the European Parliament, and we
certainly endorse its conclusions and recommen'
dations. But, once again, I must add the qualifi-
cation that the report has not yet been studied in
depth.
Aid to the Soviet Union is, of course, an
extremely topical issue. As you know, the
European Parliament has discussed it at length
and on many occasions, and a co-operation
agreement has been signed with the Soviet
Union. Yesterday, it was decided that a special
ECOFIN Council meeting would be held on
l2th December to discuss aid to the Soviet
Union, which is based on four elements. Among
other things, a long-term view of aid to and
co-operation with the Soviet Union will be
established and the existing agreement will be
approved.
In the European Parliament we could regard
Mr. Tummers's report as a guideline for the
report we are ourselves drawing up on the
reduction of arms exports and conversion
(konversiya) in the region. I am therefore very
pleased to be able to take this home with me. I
would like it if Mr. Tummers could find a way
to come and explain it more fully to us.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much
for that helpful intervention and constructive
offer. I am sure that we need to avoid dupli-
cation, and if you can build upon what Nic
Tummers has done it will help everyone.
I call Mr. Pedregosa.
Mr. PEDREGOSA (Spain) (Translation). -Mr. President, may I first congratulate
Mr. Tummers on giving us such an informative
and finely-shaded report. Though this may be
unfortunate for everybody, both our Soviet
friends and ourselves, it is highly accurate and
true. For the sake of brevity I shall only touch
lightly upon some aspects which seem to me of
the greatest importance and on which I am
broadly in agreement with what was said by
Mr. Moya.
Undoubtedly the most serious problem facing
the Soviet Union is how to overcome an
extremely serious economic crisis given the fact
that its other tasks, such as the introduction ofa
democratic system, etc., are fundamentally
dependent upon its ability to bring this crisis
under control. The improvement of the coun-
try's industrial network or its creation in many
cases is crucially important to economic reform
and our immediate concern is wnh this area.
The conversion of the Soviet defence industry is
not simply a military matter, as might largely be
the case in the West; in this country it is a
problem of survival, for here conversion will
always have a twofold meaning - disarmament
and economic reform having to be put into
effect in a situation of virtual paralysis.
With respect to agreements on disarmament
may I remind you of the enormous cost of
desiroying conventional armaments, which
nearly always implies a capital loss and which,
as I see it, is very important since it will also
have a negative effect on the conversion process.
Moreover, the disarmament process involves
verification and control, which does not come
cheaply either. We shall have to ensure that the
part of the defence industry which remains mil-
itary can be used for this verification and moni-
toring function, which will have a civilian tech-
nological spin-off that fortunately can be
utilised. I refer basically to space technology.
Although the Soviet Union has achieved spec-
tacular progress in the area of defence tech-
nology, it has so far lacked effective civil appli-
cations, contrary to the situation in the West,
where both lines of development have run in
parallel. This being so, the conversion should
apply not only to the heavy primary industries,
but to the most technologically advanced
sectors, because it is from these that the greatest
benefit will come in manufacturing terms, and
that the transfer of technology to civil industry
can be most relevant.
May I in closing mention something that
recently came to my notice. The Spanish firm
CASA, which manufactures aeronautical
products and is a world leader in carbon fibre
components, was the first western aerospace
company to visit a similar Soviet company
Ilyushin, for the purpose of sharing engineering
knowhow, with an eye to the future joint pro-
duction of equipment exclusively for civil use. I
believe this to be an extremely good way to help
with the conversion of the Soviet defence
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industry, applying our knowhow, experience and
investment for this urgent purpose and thus no
doubt benefiting not only our Soviet friends but
also our whole community.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The last speaker in the
debate is Mr. Atkinson.
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom). 
- 
Like
you, Mr. President, I was particularly interested
in this report by Senator Tummers, not least
because of my experience as a Rapporteur whenI presented the report on Cocom which was
debated and adopted here exactly a year ago. I
am delighted that so many of the report's recom-
mendations have since been implemented. Mr.
Elisseev will also be glad to learn that.
I, too, congratulate the Rapporteur on the
thoroughness ofhis report. Thanks to the end of
the cold war, the Soviet Union is not alone in
facing the challenge of converting its swords into
ploughshares. The peace dividend is presenting
problems to many of the member states of WEU
and NATO, and I am sure that my country is
not alone in the depressingly familiar round of
announcements of closures and redundancies in
our defence industries. But, fortunately for us,
our defence industries do not dominate our
economy as they do in the Soviet Union. In
addition, because our defence industries are
mostly in private hands, they enjoy the freedom,
flexibility and motivation to retrain, retool and
diversify. That is what konversiya is all about.
It is quite simply because the opposite is true
in the Soviet Union that konversiya is proving
neither as quick nor as easy a fix as had origi-
nally been hoped in contributing to the reversal
of a declining economy and to meeting the
demands of the Soviet consumers. Although I
fully support the recommendation that the West
should share advice and expertise with our
Soviet counterparts where it is prudent so to do,I am not at all enthusiastic about calling for
western investment and involvement until the
Soviet Union has undertaken the essential
political and economic reforms that will enable
konversiya to deliver. I mean the full-hearted
opportunity for, and encouragement of, private
ownership, a market economy and a pluralist
society 
- 
in short, the practical realisation ofthe
qualifications for full membership of the
Council of Europe.
However, there is one area in which
konversiya could improve the lot of the Soviet
pgople immediately. That is in the redeployment
of the manpower in the Red Army.
We must all be aware of the current food crisisin the Soviet Union as winter approaches.
Rationing is now being introduced. That crisis is
lot just caused by an inadequate production of
food 
- 
after all, the Soviet Union has produced
a record harvest this year. Between 2096 and
3090 of that food fails to reach the shops and it is
clear that there are problems of distribution due
to inadequate storage, inadequate transport and
inadequate roads. It is a scandal that food is
rotting in the fields and on the road sides in the
country while people are going hungry in the
cities.
The redundant Red Army could be put to
good work immediately diggrng and picking the
harvest and transporting the food to the distrib-
utors, the middle men, and on to the shops to
prevent hoarding and comrption. It could also
be used to improve the roads in the country and
in the cities, where they are abysmal. I am sure
that Senator Tummers found that as he was
enjoying cultural activities in Moscow.
Such are the immediate needs of the Soviet
people to which konversiya could respond. I
hope that the report before us will make more
lhan a passing contribution to solving what is
fast becoming the biggest crisis facing our con-
tinent today
The PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr.
Atkinson.
That completes the list of speakers. There is
an interesting paradox for colleagues to con-
sider. Today, we have had no time-limit on
speeches, but virtually everyone kept within five
minutes. Why is it that when we have a five
minute timeJimit almost everyone tries to
exceed it ? That is worth thinking about.
Does the Rapporteur of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee, Mr. Tummers, wish to
reply ?
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlandsl (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, I would like to thank all the
speakers for their contributions to this debate.
Three of them referred to the verification of
developments. I think this should follow on
from what I have said about keeping abreast of
developments. I referred in this context to
putting intentions into practice. I believe two
years must pass before we can again consider
how successful verification has been. Mr. Moya
went offat rather a tangent. In my opinion, what
he said in this context did not really have any-
thing to do with this debate, but although the
President ruled the subject out of order,-I will
address it briefly. The issues connected with the
Paris agreements and the withdrawal of tanks
beyond the Urals have nothing to do with this
debate, unless the removal of the tanks beyond
the Urals is connected with the self-destruction
of the tanks as a result of poor maintenance and
so on.
Mr. President, I am very grateful to our Soviet
colleague for joining in the debate and for
expressing the intention to proceed to con-
version in such clear terms. In so doing, he
placed added emphasis on what we have saiA in
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our report. I saw this as underlining the report,
and I am happy about that.
I am particularly grateful for the follow-up
opportunities, to which particular reference was
made in the statement by Mrs. van den Brink of
the European Parliament. I look forward with
interest to seeing what happens on l2th
December. I gladly accept her kind invitation to
participate in what the European Parliament
does on this subject. I welcome - endorsing the
President's words the fact that real
co-operation can take place in this way.
There was a reference to unrest in the Red
Army and developments that might lead to
further demilitarisation. We have not enlarged
on these aspects of the report. We have referred
mainly to the social problem in businesses. We
have not concerned ourselves with the details in
other areas. For those interested I deliberately
referred to an article in this morning's Figaro.
Reference was made to conversion in relation
to the space industry. Discussions with our
Soviet colleague outside this chamber have
revealed that the intention is to make available
to the medical world, for example, much of the
technology developed by the space industry. So
this will also be of immediate benefit to society
as a whole.
Mr. President, Mr. Atkinson asked me if I had
seen the corn rotting in the fields and so on. One
can certainly pinpoint this and link it with the
word 'scandal', but I would point out that
there are also many things in our part of Europe
that are rotting, and to which we could attach
the word'scandal ". When all is said and done,
we have cities half rotting away here and I find
that scandalous. I will not put it that way in this
case, mainly because it would detract from my
intention to give the greatest possible support to
the processes that have begun in the Soviet
Union and would throw a spanner in my
thinking works. This does not mean that I have
no criticism to make, but I feel we should make
a different use of our criticism.
Mr. President, I have been able to draw up
this report - I have already expressed my grat-
itude to everyone involved - thanks to the com-
mittee as the production machine and especially
to our committee secretary. My sincere thanks
to him for his supervision and inspiration. I am
also grateful to him for his critical marginal
notes on the ideas committed to paper. I partic-
ularly want to emphasise this.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr.
Tummers.
Does Mr. Stegagnini, the Chairman of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee, wish
to speak?
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf
of all the members of the Technological and Aer-
ospace Committee I wish to congratulate Mr.
Tummers and the secretary of the committee on
this important contribution to our debate.
The report in question comes before the WEU
Assembly at a very important juncture in inter-
national life from the standpoint of East-West
relations and more especially the new relations
between Western Europe and the Soviet
Union.
The presence today in this chamber and the
panicipation in our debate of a Soviet parlia-
mentarian, who has been able to contribute
most pertinently thanks to his personal
knowledge of aerospace matterc - he was an
astronaut 
- 
has given me gtreat satisfaction.
Mrs. van den Brink, speaking as a member of
the European Parliament, has told us that the
topic we are considering has also been discussed
in another European forum, so that we may be
proud of having initiated a highly interesting
and productive collaboration between different
institutions.
The problem ofthe conversion ofthe defence
industry affects not only the Soviet Union but
also many Western European countries, as many
speakers have pointed out. This raises difficult
and sensitive questions not only in economic
and social tenns but also in relation to techno-
logical development and the availability of
funding for research in the defence field, which
has always led the way in relation to research in
other areas.
I am pleased that Mr. Atkinson referred to the
report on Cocom which we submitted a year ago
to those in charge ofthis international body con-
cerned with trade in technology and strategic
goods and suggesting that they should modify
their previous policy. This was done as we con-
firmed on our trip to Moscow last spring and in
other meetings with Soviet political representa-
tives.
A new collaborative relationship is also devel-
oping between some western countries - Italy,
France and Spain 
- 
and the Soviet Union with
regard to the conversion of the defence industry.
Having set such a large-scale operation in
motion the Soviet Union is now faced with
critical problems, though I believe this will also
stimulate market mechanisms in the advanced
technology sector.
A feature at recent international aerospace
exhibitions has been the active presence of
Soviet industries which, to go by the quality of
the products on show, is now appealing not only
to its traditional markets in the satellite coun-
tries and those linked to the communist system,
but also to western countries.
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This is a first saample of market co,operation
arising from industrial conversion.
I believe that the report in question is ofgreat
importance and is similar in this to the Cocom
report of a year ago. I also feel it represents a
major WEU contribution to knowhow and
co-operation in the most important sectors of
technology and the defence industry.
In this field WEU has behind it an out-
standing tradition which is likely to be main-
tained and enhanced especially if, as seems
probable, other European bodies are faced with
the same problems. This would pave the way to
integrating technology and scientific research
into the overall European political soene.
I thank Mr. Tummers and the secretary of the
committee for their contribution and I hope that
the report will enjoy a large oonsensus of support
as this is a document of considerable value both
in its contents and the prospects which it opens
up.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The Technological and
Aerospace Committee has tabled a draft reoom-
mendation, to which no amendments have been
tabled.
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1249.
-Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by showof hands unless five representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by
roll+all.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll+all?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
(A vote was then talccn by show of hands)
The draft recommendation ls adopted
unanimously t.
5. Closc of the sessbn
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
We have now reached
the end of the second part of the thirty-sixth
ordinary session of the Assembly. We would all
agree that it has been a useful and informative
session. We have debated a most current issue
and I am sure that by the time we meet again in
June we shall find that much has become clearer
gbout intergovernmental co-operation, bearing
in mind the Rome conference next week. In the
light of it and the ministers' meeting on
Monday, we may know more about the relation-
ships between the various organisations. We
have a full agenda for June.
I wish you all a happy Christmas and happy,
hedthy and prosperous new yoar.
I declare the thirty-sixth ordinary session of
the Assembly of Western European Union
closed.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 11.40 a,m.)
L See page 44.
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